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This edited volume was initiated in 2013. At that time, Christian Thibon 
(2010–2014) was the director of the French Institute for Research in Africa 
(IFRA) in Nairobi and I was myself its resident researcher (2011–2014). The 
responsibility for this editorial project was shared with the new director in 
2014, Marie-Emmanuelle Pommerolle (2014–2018), and handed over to me 
when I succeeded her in 2018. With Kenya in Motion, the three directors 
aim to provide a panorama of the first two decades of the 2000s in Kenya 
that can be useful to students and researchers, but also accessible to the 
general public. It is modelled on Le Kenya contemporain—a book by Karthala 
publishers and edited by François Grignon and Gérard Prunier—that came 
out in 1998 but dealt mainly with the late 1980s and early 1990s.
However, since the changeover in 2002, Kenya has been striving for 
change. On the one hand, throughout the 2000s, the Kenyan economy 
modernised and there has been a strong and steady growth rate which, by 
2015, moved Kenya into the lower middle-income bracket. In June 2008, 
former President Mwai Kibaki’s Kenya Vision 2030 national development 
programme announced its ambitions: it was “a roadmap for accelerating 
transformation of (the) country into a rapidly industrialising middle-
income nation by the year 2030.” This strategy notably took the form of 
developmental capitalism with massive investments in infrastructure 
mega-projects (railway, airport, port, dams, etc.). This policy of mega-
projects continued after 2017 with President Uhuru Kenyatta’s national 
development programme, the “Big Four Agenda,” which more firmly 
asserts redistribution and democratisation as a goal. At the political level, 
the adoption of a new Constitution in 2010 and the implementation of 
decentralisation from 2013, which was strongly supported by Kenyans, 
propelled the country towards democratisation; it encompasses the fight 
against the injustices of the past that are still present and are producing 
blatant inequalities. But the path towards the proclaimed transformations 
has been chaotic: the 2007 elections were marred with violence, caused 
too many victims, traumatised Kenya, and weighed in on the next two 
elections. Recent assessments of Vision 2030 are mixed while the effects 
of the Big Four Agenda remain tenuous. Criticism resonates in a country 
where civil society, one of the most dynamic in Africa, acts as a pressure 
force on a political class still locked in its patron-client and ethnic logic.
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In view of such changes—be they expected or planned, but also hindered 
or even disordered—, it was imperative for a research centre based in 
Nairobi to document and analyse the last twenty years of Kenyan political, 
economic and social life, from 2000 to 2020, in a book accessible to the 
greatest number of people. Kenya in motion, which is published both online 
and in print and available in both French and English—thus making it 
possible to discuss with all our English-speaking colleagues and to enter 
in a dialogue with the recent and ambitious Oxford Handbook of Kenyan 
Politics edited by Nic Cheeseman, Karuti Kanyinga and Gabrielle Lynch 
(2020)—brings together the contributions of specialists from Kenya. Some 
contributions cover a broad spectrum (political economy, social history, 
development, decentralisation) while others address more specific themes 
(arts, school, religion, land, water, security, trade, etc.). Six short texts called 
“Focus” are added to the fourteen chapters that make up this volume. They 
enrich certain chapters with their close focus on banking, higher education, 
slavery, sacred forests, religious adherence and the globalised art scene. 
Together, these texts provide both a synthetic grasp and particular visions 
of Kenya in the first quarter of the twenty-first century.
We wish to thank several institutions and individuals. First of all, our 
deepest gratitude goes to the colleagues who contributed to the book—
doctoral students, newly graduated doctors, and experienced researchers—
for their sustained commitment to IFRA projects and for their unfailing 
patience. Secondly, this project would not have been possible without IFRA’s 
financial and human resources support, nor without the OpenEdition Books 
platform, which hosts the publisher’s brand “Africae” and its “Studies” 
collection in which this book is being published. Within IFRA, our special 
thanks go to Chloé Josse-Durand and Marion Asego, respectively for 
the proofreading of some texts and for the administrative and financial 
support. We are also very grateful to our colleague Claire Médard from IRD 
(French National Research Institute for Sustainable Development) for her 
involvement and rigorous peer reviewing. Our warmest thanks also go to 
Antoine Kauffer for his efficient editorial work, and to Bastien Miraucourt, 
in charge of editing at the CNRS based at the Les Afriques dans le monde 
(LAM) laboratory in Bordeaux and in charge of the publications of the 
French research institutes of sub-Saharan Africa, without whom this book 
could not have existed. Finally, our gratitude goes to all the translators 
of the English-language version of Le Kenya en marche, that is, Kenya in 
motion, who have enthusiastically and professionally put their language 
skills at the service of IFRA through the “UN Volunteers” online platform.
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Introduction
To the Test of Social  
and Political Violence
From the Kenya of Millionaires  
and Millions of Beggars to the Three Kenyas  
of the Twenty-First Century
Christian Thibon
Translated by Catriona Bell
“The eyes of a starving child,” “Kenya has become a nation of ten millionaires 
and ten million beggars”: these lines from Josiah Mwangi Kariuki’s most 
often-quoted speeches are fitting anecdotal hooks to begin this chapter. 
Such critical views concern two historical periods: firstly in 1962 when 
Kenya was assessing its colonial era, and then at the beginning of the 
1970s during the first decade of independence with its many people “left 
out in the cold,” that is, beggars as well as reliant vulnerable people. Such 
words—both critical and provocative, sensitive and political—reflect the life 
and political trajectory of Kariuki, a nationalist, progressive and populist 
leader, incidentally a millionaire, who was assassinated on 2 March 1975. 
His position was brilliantly taken up by a generation of intellectuals and 
especially in the novels from the new Kenyan school, also known as the 
Postcolonial Kenyan novels, which include amongst others Meja Mwangi, 
Ngugi wa Thiong’o, Charles Mangua, and Grace Ogot. These literary 
works embrace critical social realism and target the ruling elite. They do 
not simply resound with post-independence disappointment, but reflect a 
deeper dissonance, both urban and rural, against the backdrop of a culture 
clash, of a tension between tradition and modernity, as well as of the 
political deadlock (Kabayi 1998; Kurtz 1998). In this way these works are as 
lucid about the first two decades of independence as they are foreboding of 
the subsequent changes that Kenyan society is presently experiencing—a 
premonitory mode of thinking which only artists have the gift of.
In 2020, nearly half a century later, how relevant are these observations? 
And to what extent have social changes over the last thirty years confirmed 
or changed such social polarisation? Do these changes weigh on the identity 




At first glance these images and discourses are still relevant today. 
Various elements appear to confirm this idea in spite today’s nature-
oriented and tourist-aimed marketing with its stereotyped ethnic 
categories (including the archetypal serene “Masai Warrior”) as well as 
more distant and cautious photo reportages, somewhat blur the picture.1 
Media buzz perpetuates these images with titles such as “Kibera—Africa’s 
largest slum” (Desgroppes & Taupin 2011) or “Dabaab, the world’s largest 
refugee camp,” for example. Reports also abound about the daily life and 
suffering of many, which are usually intertwined if we pay close attention. 
Take for instance the chokoras (street children) “who rummage through 
waste,” or “the stone breakers” who work by the roadside. And last, fear 
prevails because of the violence of gangs and urban ghettos’ militias as 
well as, in pastoral areas, of livestock thieves. Conversely, other images 
offer an optimistic vision, and hopes of success, even if only in their 
beginning stage. They shed light on the proliferation of malls, the digital 
revolution, and the housing bubble and urban growth, which a political 
communication that promotes national success emphasises even further… 
And minor news items back up these major successes as well, such as the 
broadcasting of the import of mechanical crushers—crushers that should 
bring an end to the slave-labour conditions of stone breakers! Yet such 
emergent modernity brings in offensive situations exemplified by the 
ostentatious and mediatised lifestyle of some millionaire tycoons which 
urban and rural legends tell about. Recent opinion polls2 have recently 
revealed a divide in public opinion between the confidently hopeful and 
the despairingly suspicious in the face of the unknown, between Saint 
Valentine’s Day—a rose business success story as well as a reflection of a 
new individualised lifestyle—and recurring fears generated by the rising 
cost of living, corruption and violence, and the risk of famine in the 
pastoral North of the country.
The social question and the condemnation of injustices remain as 
prevalent in political speeches as in some clerics’ sermons, intellectuals’ 
accounts, journalists’ reports and in the sharp satire of caricaturists.3 Even 
if these messages have lost their original radical nationalist ideology or 
Marxist leanings and its political spokesmen, their capacity to mobilise, 
1. These photographic works, which are both exhibited and published, have 
been on the rise in recent years. They aim to visually capture social issues, 
the rise of the middle class, etc., by adopting an aesthetics of the everyday that 
aligns with a strong commitment to fight human suffering.
2. Opinion polls from Ipsos Synovate are available on their website: http://www.
ipsos.com/fr-fr/toutes-les-publications.
3. Among others, the works of cartoonist Gado in The Daily Nation.
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young people in particular, through the new mass culture4 remains intact. 
At the same time, the arguments have changed. We find many more 
moralistic denunciations of deviances from televangelists or elders. We also 
find ethnic recriminations which focus on access to land and spoliation, 
that is, on the “land question”—whether it concerns rural or urban dwellers. 
Categorial and sectorial claims have arisen to defend certain professions. 
And millenarian revolts have reappeared and are taking roundabout routes.5 
In a society deeply marked by political debates and becoming more and 
more a show-society—due to the importance taken by the media and social 
networks—, these images and speeches are of tremendous importance, 
even more because they feed in people’s conscious and unconscious 
attitudes: indeed, they bring to light a division within Kenyan society, and 
in the urban world in particular, that would increasingly become rigid and 
could potentially result in explosive fractures. It is noteworthy that, in 
contrast to the independence years when the modern-urban world and 
the traditional-rural world were split and distinct, nowadays this half-
world where wealth is neighbouring poverty increases frustrations among 
those who cannot access the enrichment they see but from which they are 
banned, as much in the cities as in the countryside.
Whatever comments are made about them, these imaginaries, sometimes 
overstated, get revitalised through real-life experience: they relate to 
objective realities. In order to capture them, it is possible to use statistics, 
maps and sociological data based upon social and economic monitoring 
and observations. From the 1990s, multiple sources offer information that 
is global and national, but also sectoral and regional or even local.6 These 
series are mapped—and thus somewhat dramatised. They raise questions 
regarding the permanence as well as the dynamics and causes of the 
changes observed.
4. Songs and music such as benga or reggae, theatre, and the urban language of 
the ghettos, Sheng.
5. This includes the great increase in urban and rural militias, vigilantes, and 
urban gangs, some of which spread millenarian claims and expectations, in 
particular the Mungiki, in the 1990s-2000s.
6. The data provided here are extracted from international and national agencies 
reports, public or accessible online, such as: census data, data from KNBS (annual 
statistics and Basic report on well-being in Kenya), from KIBHS and from KPHC, 
financial, demographic and health surveys from DHS, economic surveys from 
BM, WHO, Unicef; finally, from SID, the Society for International Development, 
and from some NGOs such as Oxfam; see KNBS-SID (2013).
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1. The Poverty-Growth-Inequalities Triangle
An initial macroeconomic social response, supplemented by a more bird-
eye-view observation, confirms finding and brings further nuance it to it 
at the same time. On the one hand, Kenya remains a nation of millionaires, 
some of whom have become billionaires, and the land of a politico-economic 
monopoly which, for some of its actors, is entering its third generation. 
This is evidenced by the consolidation of politico-economic dynasties 
successively put in place by each new governmental team, the saga of 
political entrepreneurs as well as the family trajectories of industrial or 
agribusiness entrepreneurs, and the trajectories of individuals—who can be 
called “tycoons”—who are hard-working or lucky magnates. More recently 
the success of wealthy urbanites in real estate, services and finance has 
been as rapid as urban legends would have it and sometimes the financial 
scandals that come up with them. Incidentally, these individuals now exceed 
the 200 families of the politico-economic clique - listed7 in a register that 
the media and social networks regularly update. They were said to be about 
9,400 individuals in 2016, which represents a 95% increase between 2006 
and 2016, according to African Wealth Report, pulling consumption and 
investment upwards… according to a consumerist trend which supposedly 
attract “up-market” tourists and rich foreign residents to the Indian Ocean 
coast followed by celebrity magazines and national tabloids.
On the other hand, “the beggars” are still there, yet perhaps less visible 
than in the past. However, the poverty and structural vulnerabilities remain 
prevalent, so much so that the last great famines of a recent past, like those 
from 1984–85, still resonated in the 2010s as shown by the increasing 
price of ugali flour and food shortages. Furthermore, climate change and 
its local variations stress the structural constraints, clearly evident in the 
arid or semi-arid northern part of the country and continue to impact 
communities with a high population growth. Knowledge about these 
destitute populations has increased as well the categorisation they are 
subject to. As early as 1999, the National Poverty Eradication Plan8 targeted 
the following groups: farmers without land, disabled people, female headed 
households, farming communities in semi-arid regions, AIDS orphans, 
street children, and beggars. In 2015, there were 3.6 million orphans and 
vulnerable children (OVC), 0.41 million internally displaced people owing 
7. See Verdier (2013), Kenya Private Sector Alliance (2013), “Kenya, les cercles 
d’affaires des décideurs.” 2012. La Lettre de l’océan Indien – Insiders, 16 November.
8. This 15-year plan was presented in February 1999 under Daniel arap Moi’s 
presidency. It followed on from the World Congress in Copenhagen, right after 
the Structural Adjustment Plans (1993) that announced the adoption of poverty-
reduction policies.
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to “political or natural reasons” (IDP), 0.48 million registered refugees, and 
3.6% to 4.6% of the national population living with a disability (2008 survey 
and 2009 national census). The undernourished population is estimated at 
9.6 million, out of a population of 46 million, while the numbers of farmers 
without land—more difficult to discern as figures does not take into account 
young people without unemployment who are often moving around, if not 
migrants—made up 10% of the farm workers in 2004.9 Finally one third 
of households are headed by women, but this measure refers to various 
situations of dependency or vulnerability as well as autonomy, notably in 
the cities, thus not exclusively a measure of heads of poor households.
On a regular basis, large national surveys progressively follow one after 
the other, even more with the launch of national plans to eradicate poverty.10 
They provide quantitative data that records and follows the evolutions, 
allowing us to reconstruct historical trends, to classify the chronic nature 
of poverty, to identify populations below the poverty line, and to assess 
the persistence of extreme poverty and the levels of prevalence of hunger. 
General trends come out from these datasets. Beginning in the 1990s, but 
starting earlier in the 1980s, a general deterioration of key indications 
is visible (poverty levels, hunger, demographic indicators) with regional 
and cyclical patterns revealing the impact of droughts, prices and socio-
political conflicts. The concurrence of an economic depression, structural 
adjustment programs, an AIDS epidemic followed by political crises in 
time of transition reduced the number of public jobs, thus doubling the 
number of poor people that rose from 25% to 56.8% (44% in the cities) as 
well as of people living below the poverty line between 1972 and 2000. Life 
expectancy went downward from 59 to 54 years and the average income 
per resident reduced from 360 USD to 306 USD between 1989 and 2000.
A key fact, these curves reversed from 2002–2004. The changes to 
the trends are slow but lasting whilst at the same time macroeconomic 
indicators (growth rate and GDP) are returning to growth. This general 
improvement includes vital indicators, such as life expectancy and the 
prevalence of hunger which has gone from 30% of the population on 
average in the 1990s to 21% in 2015. The same is true for the number of poor 
people that has slightly fallen from 56.8% in 2000 to 46% in 2006, followed 
by 45% in 2009 and 32% in 2015–2016. Yet this remains a high number: 
nearly 16 to 17 million people, of which 1.5 to 2 million Nairobi dwellers 
out of 3.5 million. It is also the case for extreme poverty which has fall off 
from 19.5% to 8.5% between 2005 and 2015–16.
9. The land data are a special case in Kenya’s statistics as it is always approximate.
10. They target the OVC, disabled groups, populations living in arid and semi-
arid zones, and more recently dependent elderly populations.
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This new course is linked to the return of economic growth and a sustained 
increase in the average per capita income, despite the high population 
growth, which rose from less than 500 USD to 743 USD in 2006, 1,000 USD 
in 2010 and 1,432 USD in 2015 (World Bank data). The improvement is more 
modest when calculated and compared in Kenyan currency and current 
exchange rates, taking into consideration inflation: this is the case between 
2004 and 2011, from 37,000 to 76,500 KES per year, from 35,000 to 39,000 KES 
per year11 (KIPPRA 2015). Moreover, inflation and the cost of urban living 
are eroding urban income growth. Purchasing power is affected by natural 
crises—for instance provoking the growth in price of maize—as well as 
political crises. Thus, in the months following the post-election crisis of 
2007–2008, the capital experienced a half yearly inflation rate of 25-30%, a 
situation which is repeated with each electoral period.
Furthermore, in the 2000s, characterised by the rise of an emerging 
economy or at least by Kenya’s ascension to the rank of middle-income 
country, the gap between beneficiaries and those excluded from the fallout 
of the growth became obvious. This differential, if not this social inequality—
described in budgetary as well as demographic and health surveys (DHS) 
through socio-economic characteristics, goods, uses, domestic equipment 
and the asset base of each household—is captured by the statistical 
measure of the income gap, estimated at 0.416 in 2018 by the Gini index. 
This measure, albeit high, is well below that of other southern and central 
African countries12 and tends to dip in the countryside, but remains high 
in the cities where the wealth is concentrated. In 2016 the first quintile of 
the population (e.g. the richest 20%) had access to 56% of income whilst the 
bottom quintile (e.g. the poorest 20%) had only 4%, and in the cities the first 
two quintiles had access to 90% of income (data from KBS Basic Report on 
Well-being in Kenya).
Another measure of inequality is derived by examining paid employment 
or self-employment—be it formal or informal work—and wage conditions, 
which both reveal structural constraints and positive development, even 
with distortions. Due to the population growth and the inertia of these 
trends, the number of employees, a measure smaller than the total working 
population, doubles every 6 to 7 years: 1.5  million in 1986, 3  million in 
1993, 6 million in 2000 and the figure reached 10 million in 2008, whilst 
the ratio of employees to working population (men 78%, women 67% and 
young people 69%) vary only slightly as well as the distribution by sector 
of activity.
11. See data in KIPPRA (2013), IEA (2010) and ADB-GoK (2013).
12. For an emerging country, Kenya, like Tanzania, is within the average. The 
highest index is found in South Africa.
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In addition to the weight of population growth, the sets calculated 
from official data (data from Republic of Kenya Economics Survey) show 
a dramatic turnaround. Starting from the 1990s, the formal sector dropped 
heavily, starting from 79% in 1986 to 19.5% in 2008, then 17% in 2017. The 
informal economy thus absorbs the growth and the subsequent effects of 
public policies (PAS from 1993 to 1997).
Therefore, in less than ten years, Kenya has shifted from a country of 
salaried employees, with a certain level of security, to a country of self-
employed or informal workers, and from a mixed regulated economy to 
a liberal economy. Part of the urban working classes, composed of public 
and private sector employees, dismissed public officials and workers—are 
weakened, without protection whilst their unions, impaired or controlled 
by the regime, fall back to defending their trades (Leitner 1973; Sandbrook 
1975; Smonini 2009). The informal economy has consequently seen a sharp 
increase from 0.5 million in 1990 to 4.2 million in 2000, 6.1 million in 2006, 
9.2 in 2011, and 13.3  million in 2017. This situation accounts for 83% of 
economic activity and 70% of GDP. Yet it cuts across different situations: 
it comprises activities either in the process of becoming formal services or 
professions in certain fields, but also situations of survival and structural 
insecurity. Finally, youth unemployment is estimated between 17 and 58% 
of all the “youth,” depending on how this category is defined, which is one 
of the highest in the region.13 Nevertheless the formal salaried economy, 
private as well as public, experienced a relative increase: between 2004 
and 2015 it rose from 1.7 to 2.1 million, whilst during the same period, the 
employment share in the tertiary sector rose from 48% to 52% and that of 
the secondary sector stayed constant (ADB-GoK 2013).
The analysis of income redistribution through work is only possible 
for the formal sector, which at first glance is rather privileged compared 
to the informal sector: it reflects general inequalities. There is a high 
differential between high and median wages, in the public as well as the 
private sector, which is better able to acknowledge skills and qualifications, 
with underpaid categories in the public sector (such as the teaching and 
medical professions), so much so that the practice of working two jobs has 
become common even if public sector jobs are sought after for the security 
they offer. In the cities, the formal economy, as outlined by a retrospective 
study of urban biographies, remains the desired horizon (Bocquier 2003), 
but certain areas of the informal economy are the levers of growth, such as 
specific services, industries and urban start-ups.
This statistical and qualitative data reveals strong new trends, confirmed 
by the growth in financial assets (goods and services) and consumption 
levels among intermediate incomes. It even shows the emergence of new 
13. 55% according to Awiti & Scott (2016).
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social strata whose living standards correspond with the two top quintiles, 
which are “the richest” from the DHS budgetary surveys. Moreover, the 
statistical indicators evaluating since 2002 the social distribution of cultural 
capital, access to education, levels of schooling, and media access confirm 
the potential for meritocratic social mobility, though they are unequally 
distributed throughout the country. This evolution combined with 
population growth is both an economic and social opportunity for many. 
Most spectacularly is university enrolment, which is growing rapidly14 
although the Kenyan economy struggles to manage this social demand. 
This demographic divide is fuelling an international and recently regional 
migration of Kenyan graduates, resulting in a significant diaspora estimated 
at 3  million people, a sharp increase in the last decade, (corresponding 
to about 9% of the population in 2014). This constitutes an important 
contribution for the economy and society owing to financial transfers. 
Such transfers are indeed the fourth largest provider of foreign exchange 
after tea, horticulture and tourism, as well as an asset for families thanks to 
support provided for schooling, health and real estate costs.
It is obvious that this macro-socio-demographic approach reveals not so 
much a dividing line between the cities and the modern commercial sector 
on one side and the countryside and the traditional subsistence sector on 
the other—as was the case in the decade following independence—but 
between two social spaces or two worlds: the rich and the poor. This reality, 
however, should be approached in ways that avoid the caricatured image of 
“the millionaires and the millions of beggars.”
2. The “Two Kenyas”: Two Worlds, Two Social Spaces
The dividing line that cuts across both the urban and the rural worlds 
is both a power relationship and a relation of proximity. The power 
relationship is characterised by the top benefiting from an abundant 
labour force that is both insecure and underpaid. And the relationship of 
proximity is evidenced by the fact that the rich were former poor or have 
poor relatives in their family. This divide is observable through big-picture 
overviews as well as through detailed observations which recent works of 
socio-demography, social geography and social anthropology provide, and 
most notably those that exploit to the fullest new research methods such as 
the Geographic Information System. Such close-up approaches, associated 
with macro-data, help to draw social landscapes, reveal social structures 
and bring to light social relations. They contribute to spatialising social 
14. The number of students increased from 118,000 in 2007 to more than 400,000 
in 2013. The government thus expected a workforce of 60,000 (or 10% of the 
out-of-school population) by the end of 2010–2020, a figure which was actually 
higher in 2016 with nearly 700,000 students (see Provini 2015).
To the Test of Social and Political Violence
9
polarisation while revealing social nuances and new dynamics of interest 
to all disciplines of humanities and social science seeking to understand 
change and continuity. To do so, they work with various conceptual tools, 
like Pierre Bourdieu’s “social space” or the notions of “space-time-memory” 
of historians and of “identity-territory space” used in social geography.
In recent years, the city has been a particularly studied area because it 
crystallises all inequalities but also all the hopes for initiatives, freedoms, 
diversity and the social rebalancing that it promises. At first glance the 
overall picture is not a rosy one. The capital city and the large cities display 
social and geographic fragmentations (Charton-Bigot & Rodriguez-Torres 
2006). They also bear witness to space injustice in terms of access to 
vital services (Ledant 2013), if not segregation between the upper classes 
gathered in their residential neighbourhoods and the populations of the 
slums. Unlike in the past, cities conceal the masses of street children, even 
families on the street,15 and at the same time host gangs like in South 
American cities. Yet new types of differentiation and stratification are in 
motion, this time in more optimistic ways. They concern even deprived 
neighbourhoods and the spaces that are being built at their edges, as well as 
slums that turn into middle class neighbourhoods. These dynamics bring to 
light an internal line of distinction between residents who can access mass 
consumption, or have just started accessing it, and those who cannot—
mass consumption which an increasing number of malls and shopping 
centres materialise as they are built in affluent neighbourhoods and in 
these new in-between areas. It also separates those who can and those who 
cannot build and secure their property, have access to water, benefit from 
development programs…. Thus, the new urbanised spaces, including some 
slums, still include informal as well as formal housing, mostly rented, but 
also a minority of “non-poor” owners who live above the poverty line. In 
Nairobi, the latter represent 27% of the slum population. A study of urban 
poverty carried out by Oxfam GB in 2009 helped to understand the situation 
of households by distinguishing the “wealthy” whose annual income varies 
between 200,000 and 300,000 KES per year, thus representing 10% of the 
population—which puts them in the middle-class bracket—and the “middle 
poor” with around 100,000 to 200,000 KES per year who represent 20% to 
40% of the population depending on the year considered. These “middle 
poor” represent a median group floating on either side of the poverty 
threshold.16
15. There are about 200,000 street children. According to a national estimate, 
100,000 of them in 2000 in Nairobi and 130,000 in 2009 were driven from 
downtown Nairobi to some slums.
16. The poor, who live under the poverty threshold, relate to two distinct 
groups: the “permanent poor” and the “very poor,” who represent 40% and 10% 
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Social anthropology and social demography, on the one hand, and social 
expertise, on the other, which poverty reduction programs call on, accurately 
describe these two worlds, that is, this spatial bipolarisation described 
above and the distinctions at play. This is the case in Nairobi, between 
and within the urban districts. Take for example the neighbouring districts 
of Muthaiga, the most residential area of the capital, and the Mathare 
and Pangani ghettos, which used to be slums. More generally, marginal 
differences appear in the slums within the different strata of settlement17 
between squatters, tenants and owners, between old-timers and new comers, 
but also between households. Monographs reveal that in slums, which 
have become more and more mono-ethic ghettos following the 2007–2008 
crisis, there is much demographic and economic precariousness, everyday 
instability and family tensions, natural and environmental vulnerabilities, 
prevailing insecurities and the grip of gangs and militias. They also shed 
light on the ways in which sociability, the economy of affection, socio-
cultural cohesion, the creative energy of the “little big men,” and innovative 
or fraudulent accumulations, as Deyssi Rodriguez-Torres shows (2012), do 
prevail. The resilience of the slums dwellers who believe in and hope for a 
future of education for their children, is demonstrated in the high levels of 
pre-primary and primary education, both public and private, so much so 
that in some slums, residents nourish optimistic expectations, according to 
opinion polls.
The findings are the same for the countryside, even though the social 
situations there are not only complex but also divided. In view of this, 
two scenarios can be identified for the agricultural semi-urban spaces 
and centres. There is, on the one hand, an agrarian Kenya that stretches 
from Mombasa to Kisumu, and, on the other, the peripheral areas and 
pastoral North, from the Somali border to the Ugandan border. In the 
agrarian Kenya, farm workers, rural households and farm owners have 
to deal with a difficult process of modernisation—sometimes a complete 
break from and sometimes heir to the traditional model of reproduction—
that is linked to the urban and international market and to cities through 
commuting between towns and the countryside. They simultaneously 
grapple with social confrontation. particularly regarding the land 
question (Argwings-Kodhek 2006). In this regard, the precise measure 
of land inequalities remains unresolved, as it raises questions about the 
privatisation of collective land, spoliation and redistribution, and many 
unknowns concerning land registrations and the legal status of land. But 
respectively (Goodfellow & Taylor 2009)
17. See Cahiers d’Afrique de l’Est/The East African Review no. 44, special issue: 
“Slum Upgrading Programmes in Nairobi: Challenges in Implementation.” 2011. 
https://journals.openedition.org/eastafrica/509.
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for agriculture-oriented regions (except for pastoral zones within which 
the collective ownership or use of land plays an essential role, and except 
for the public domain where land is often labelled as heritage), data from 
official sources about surveyed land and from national surveys indicate 
blatant inequalities and large gaps over land control. Thus, in 1969, 7% of the 
farm workers owned 34% of agricultural land, a figure which monographs 
have since confirmed. These gaps and inequalities also concern social 
distribution: in 2004, farmers without land, micro-owners, smallholders, 
and large land owners with more than 10 hectares made up respectively 
26%, 50%, 25% and 5% of the total farmers. The “agrarian reforms,” meaning 
the redistribution of land in several waves since independence, as well 
as the support to cooperatives and hydro-agricultural installations, have 
ultimately only benefited a minority of farmers from certain ethnic groups 
(Oucho 200218). They equally benefited large established landowners who 
were able to buy back land put on the market. The reforms have therefore 
not transformed the differentials that were already in place during 
colonisation.19 What they did, however, is to contribute to Africanising 
the large land property and, in some areas of the highlands, to giving rise 
to small and medium-sized land owners, while confining the large former 
colonial properties that have invested in their farms. As a consequence, the 
countryside offers a mixed picture: there is a majority of young landless 
farmers and micro owners, partly as a result from the long-term land 
deprivation established during colonisation but that was not corrected by 
the agrarian reforms of independence; this majority rub shoulders with 
small or medium-sized enterprising properties that have gained from 
the land privatisation that started as soon as the early 1950s. This sort of 
properties also benefited from some subsequent booms, used economic 
niches (e.g. coffee, tea, cereals, horticulture), received support from 
economic policies, and enjoyed opportunities in local markets, in transfers 
with the city and the countryside, and in urban connections based upon 
intergenerational links. These two constituencies of farmers neighbour 
large estates or companies that usually depend on modern technologies 
and form an agrarian power as they act a politico-economic lobby and are 
built upon technical corporate sociability. This agrarian power has been 
strengthened through investment in economic areas, such as tea, cereals, 
horticulture and dairy products, that were more promising than the neo-
colonial private plantations of coffee and their public counterpart in sugar 
production. Their presence is prolonged and strengthened by integrating 
18. See also reports on public good and their registration, notably the Ndung’u 
Report.




or associating with the agri-food industries in the hands of the Asians or 
of the former public cooperatives or companies now privatised.
This evolution contrasts with the pastoral peripheries that are 
still confronted with ordinary fatalities: there people struggle to feed 
themselves and survive. The cyclical poverty tends to become structural 
under the cross-effects and snowball effects of climate vulnerability, the 
restriction of natural resources, the high population growth, and new 
economic and political contexts: the tragedy of the commons is underway. 
It can be associated with statutory degradation (e.g. for a shepherd to lose 
his flock is tantamount to extinction, as it forces him to become a farmer), 
although historically such degradation hit a share of these communities 
only marginally during crises, famine or drought (Anderson & Broch Due 
1999). The capacity for resilience of these pastoralist communities, without 
assistance, is becoming way less effective than before and new modes of 
adaption are weakening the social fabric. Indeed, the marketing of pastoral 
resources (through cattle raiding and cattle rustling), the redistribution-
partitioning of land (between ranches, reserves, and parks), and political 
and geopolitical instability are breaking apart the traditional means of 
survival in communities with high population growth and with internal 
and inter-regional tensions resulting from pastoral migration. In the 
process, groups of the newly wealthy, sometimes migrants, have taken the 
opportunity to monopolise the land to the detriment of local communities, 
playing on ethnic or regional rivalries (Grenier, Bollig & McCabe 2011). 
However, these faraway or even landlocked spaces and times that are so 
different from the centre and have long remained the no man’s land of 
Kenya, are now however becoming more and more connected to it: the 
Masai, Samburu or Turkana “young warriors” understand and speak 
Swahili, if not Sheng. Nevertheless, this assessment must include regional 
nuance. Some pastoral societies in the southern regions, including at least 
some of the Masai, benefit from the extension of new crops, including 
cereals, the meat market, or links with the big cities, such as the opening 
and widening of the regional tourist economy: this Westernisation, partly 
assimilated and controlled, that goes along with the privatisation of land 
and developments through ranches, farms, parks or reserves, happen at the 
expense of some local communities, and even more often at the expense of 
their own culture, resulting in a mobility of circular migration further and 
further away (Péron 1993; Spear & Waller 1993).
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3. Two, Three Kenyas Put to the Test of Reforms, 
Efforts for Well-Being, and the Challenges  
of Public Policy
Public policies for development, social protection and investment in 
the public service, and more generally poverty reduction reforms and, 
following the Constitution, devolution and modernisation as envisaged in 
Vision 2030 can, or might, bring to the whole population what the market 
and new economic growth, based upon an abundant low-cost labour force, 
cannot offer by correcting Kenya’s social and spatial differentials. Yet, the 
effects of these social-cultural policies (education) and social protection 
policies (which includes support to OVC, elderly people, etc.) take time, just 
as the multiplier effects of the major projects of Vision 2030. In addition, 
the assessment of these reform and the measures that accompany it as well 
as the rise in power of the counties have unveiled the multiple facets of 
territorial discrimination and increased awareness of them (Sivi 2013).
However, taking these socio-territorial inequalities into account 
changes how society and its various components see themselves. Poverty 
is no longer defined and perceived solely in monetary terms (income) and 
patrimony (household assets). It now includes access to services, goods, 
knowledge, opportunities to advance and social mobility, insisting on the 
notion of “well-being”: such an indicator is put forward by the calculation 
of human development or methods of equalisation used for the equitable 
calculation of county budgets—somehow in the spirit of a “new Harambee.” 
Moreover, a new measure, the poverty gap, is used to assess how far away 
the standard of living of the poor population at the county level is from 
the national poverty line. It puts in full light the full extent and acuity of 
the social question, in terms of developmental delay in certain counties of 
Kenya. Well-being and the poverty gap, once they are mapped,20 draw social 
spaces and landscapes, less binary and more complex that the rationale of 
the two Kenyas: by crossing economic, patrimonial and access to services 
data, we rather find three Kenyas.
Firstly, there is a Kenya often described as “useful” on the Mombasa-
Kisumu axis. Undoubtedly the winner, it is characterised by an 
overrepresentation of the top national quintile—those who are the “richest” 
according to recent DHS surveys—in Nairobi (67% of the population), in the 
cities (49%), in the central region (32%) and in coastal cities (24%). There, 
the poverty line and the relative poverty gap are the lowest, while the 
regional indicators of human development and well-being are the highest. 
Additionally, for the destitute, access to services and the urban market 
allows hope of meritocratic advancement through school or of climbing the 
20. See the maps available on the websites of SID and KPHC.
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ladder and getting rich thanks to involvement in the informal sector. The 
“useful” Kenya is the country’s hub for consumption and employment. But 
these indicators decline as we move out of the cities: rural poverty is at the 
gates of the major cities, in their suburban peripheries, as well as in coffee 
producing and horticultural areas of paid employment (Kinyanjui 2007).
Secondly, and on the contrary, a Kenya made up of outskirts and 
territorial disparities is emerging: it includes the counties of the northern 
pastoral peripheries, and semi-arid spaces that form an arc of a circle with 
the counties of West Pokot, Turkana, Samburu, Isiolo, Mandera, Wajir, 
Tana river, Garissa as well as Kwale. They have the lowest socio-economic 
indicators (e.g. poverty line and poverty gap, incomes, high gap in the Gini 
index, little secured employment) and are way behind in terms of socio-
cultural development (access to education, water, electricity, etc.). They 
also have the largest number of “the poorest,” making up 73% of their 
population, and the highest poverty intensity (for example 46% in the Tana 
River county versus 4% in Nairobi), whilst their communities are the most 
affected by climate change. Moreover, marginalisation is high, targeting 
the “indigenous peoples,” pastoral societies, hunter-gatherer farmers—
often isolated like the Ogiek and the Yaaku—, and particular ethnic groups 
such as Kenyan-Somalis, evidenced by many reports like the Human Rights 
and the Truth and Reconciliation national commission. These societies 
are somewhat Kenya’s “Third World,” as they are subordinate to both 
objective situations and general perceptions of their status. Last, the fact 
that these areas host refugee camps, for instance Kakuma and Dabaab, and 
have historical geopolitical border instability and recurrent dissidence, 
contributes to this devaluation. It also raises fears because of their higher 
than average population growth rate.
Finally, the third Kenya, somehow set in between, yet the most imposing 
demographically, is sandwiched between the two Kenyas, that is, between 
the useful “winner” and the peripheral “loser.” It is made of the hinterlands 
of the useful Kenya, the coast of The Indian Ocean, the central region, the 
central Rift region, and the western regions, which are all overpopulated 
areas. They correspond to the historical and saturated population centres 
around Mount Kenya, in the Nyanza and Western provinces (e.g. the Kisii 
region), on the Swahili coast and in areas vulnerable to variation in climate 
near arid lands and frequently impacted by droughts. The percentages of 
the “poorest” and the intensity of poverty are higher here, whilst human 
development indicators are average. In particular educational data is above 
average, with the best-performing school districts: in 2016, 13 school 
districts out of the top 20 in the exams for accessing higher education come 
from this area (corresponding to the Kamba, Kikuyu, Meru, Luhya, Nandi, 
and Kalenjin regions), and 7 urban and semi-urban districts have a strong 
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education tradition (among them Nairobi, Mumia, Kakamega, Kisumu, 
and Nyeri).21 This gap between the economic situation and the socio-
cultural indicators explains why education is a priority, if not the object 
of a collective strategy of promotion that includes the urban elite who 
send their children to these renowned schools. This divergence is also the 
cause of internal tensions between young people, women, the often highly 
educated new generations and the established elders, whose authority 
is increasingly contested. These spaces consequently have high levels of 
domestic, neighbourhood, and even political violence that testify to these 
internal tensions. The communities only survive through countryside-town 
circulations, be they permanent migrations or commuting with the centre 
and its cities, and thanks to intergenerational transfers. These exit options 
and also these efforts to keep going with rural society via income transfers 
are not new, going back to the colonial period, but they are reaching their 
limits in some areas, like in the Kisii and the Luhya regions.
The Kenya of today has thus become a case study that illustrates the 
interactive poverty-growth-inequality triangle inherited from the colonial 
time, which the crisis of the 1990s (with adjustment and liberalisation 
programs) have brought to light and which the growth of the 2000s and 
its ill-development have set in motion. The bipolarisation of the “two 
Kenyas”—one with its elite and one with the mass poor—is reproduced and 
maintained, but there are rather “three Kenyas,” that is to say three social 
spaces increasingly distinct and visible, with diverse dynamics regarding 
access to modernisation, different social aspirations (advancement, 
emigration, rural exodus or not), and varied territorial identity, memories, 
and trajectories that pull towards or away from the centre. Furthermore, 
this triangle of growth-inequality-poverty foreshadows a future story, that 
of the emergence of intermediate categories, of a middle class, which hinges 
on redistribution by the market and at least by the state. This transformation, 
which owes both to emergence processes and to social advancement, 
may give rise to a pivotal social class, therefore raising hopes for social 
stabilisation in the not so distant future. Is the old developmentalist dream 
of social stability, of the status quo through growth becoming reality?
But in the immediate future, such bi- or tri-poled scenarios raise fears 
of tensions, if not social conflicts, and exacerbate social pressures given 
the national political and even cultural stalemates. Surprisingly and 
without inferring too easily a colonial legacy or at least a seduction of 
the Kenyan elite by the colonial elite, and in view of some commonalities 
in the education system and religious practices, Kenyan society could be 
considered somewhat “Victorian” with its triptych set against a backdrop 




of wild capitalism: the first part is made of a triumphant and westernised 
oligarchy that includes capitalist-gentlemen but compassionate and open to 
charity; secondly and in contrast, we find a mass of poor people of various 
social and ethnic backgrounds both in urban areas and in the countryside 
whom young migrants constitute a lumpen proletariat, even a potentially 
“dangerous class”; and finally there is an increasing intermediate class 
that can be found both in urban areas and in some rural areas, which we 
can label as “middle class” or petit-bourgeois—yet with no connection to a 
labour aristocracy—whose main characteristics are to be somewhat anxious 
and frustrated by the search and learning of a safe “sweet home” in secure 
compounds but also because of their unmet expectations of a better life.
Today and more so than yesterday, this perspective of social divisions and 
their associated fear, which are the other side of this raw social deal, raise 
questions. On the one hand, how is it possible to overcome the deadlock 
in which the new educated generation are, and which the government and 
international organisations measure through index alerts—with a Gini 
index above 45% and increased levels of youth unemployment? On the 
other hand, and more so, how can the explosive outcome of social mobility 
be prevented? Politics only, as a way to bring different people together, 
could triumph over social dissonances. Yet, according to historian Bethwell 
Ogot who recently took stock of the nationalist project and of Kenyan 
identity, such kind of politics is missing today. Consequently, the study 
of social changes cannot omit a political and cultural analysis because the 
country is without or is in search of a national and social pact… and has 
actually been since independence.22
4. Kenya without a Social or National Pact,  
in the Grip of Symbolic Violence
From the first decades of independence to the transition of 1990, social 
divisions are present, but accepted. This social state is alive in the shape 
of muted acceptance which Josiah Mwangi Kariuki had condemned. The 
lines of separation were then still racial, neo-colonial, even regional and 
social. In view of this, the enrichment of national leaders and of their 
families, originally poor for most of them, was cast as the good fortune 
of the victors: it was an individual revenge rather than a social fact. 
These leaders neither belonged to a traditional African aristocratic elite, 
then non-existent, nor to the African economic elite already emerging or 
established, with the exception of a few.23 Thus social inequality became 
22. See the latest publication on this topic: Mwangi, Opongo & Wahome (2019).
23. Recently, scholarly biographies of nationalist leaders (e.g. Paul Ngei) and 
Kenya’s great political families have tremendously increased, notably focusing 
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Africanised, yet without the racial connotations of the colonial period, by 
drawing from conformist, if not unequal so-called traditional community 
values. This social architecture was later maintained by authoritarian 
political systems, the neo-patrimonial nature of the state which politico-
economic dynasties and a managerial and business petit bourgeoisie 
benefited from. This elite expanded, diversified and renewed itself from 
the top by co-opting the newly promoted, the “big men” and those under 
them, such as intermediaries and officials who were often the “broker-cum-
clients” within such a pyramid system (Kidombo 2007). This domination 
and social peace suited Western partners concerned with geopolitical 
stability during the Cold War, especially at that time when the status quo 
contributed to civil peace. In effect inequalities are thus managed, ritualised, 
and somehow digested by imagery, rhetoric and political practices which 
since independence had been based on the national and moral values of 
sharing, solidarity, redistribution an pooling, that is, of the “all together” 
of Harambee—the national motto under President Kenyatta. Moreover, this 
nationalist political culture, confirmed and followed by the Nyayo regime 
(nyanyo meaning “the trace” in Swahili) of President Daniel arap Moi, 
resonated within the community and ethnic ethos of family and community 
accomplishment, success, advancement, seniority, and social conformity. 
Religious discourses also resounded with references to these values and 
contributed to the building of Kenyan identities.
In the name of this national pact, mobilising all Kenyans thus helps to 
symbolically and materially correct the inequalities. This happens, firstly, 
through community work—a model which the nationalist nations of 
East Africa all share—and, secondly, through exchanges, compensations 
and distributions that tacitly materialise the social contract, beyond the 
political pact. The successive regimes of Jomo Kenyatta and Daniel 
arap Moi instrumentalised this social “pact-contract” through political 
patronage and both institutionalised and ritualised it through speeches and 
slogans, through practices and symbols. Various very tangible gifts resulted 
from these in a ceremonial manner. Land was the first of these gifts, as 
well as commercial opportunities and profits, public amenities and social 
community projects, individual promotions, equipment and so on. The 
distribution of consumable products was the second type of gift, such as 
maize in times of scarcity or milk for school children. Local and territorial 
communities, often gendered, thus benefited from some of these exchanges, 
donations and takings which were sponsored and mediated by all the actors 
of the politico-administration. In reality patronage and clientelism were 
rapidly overtaking the original form of self-mobilisation, transforming 
on the Kenyattas, the Mois and the Odingas. Others are about “big men,” such as 
Charles Njonjo (Médard 2012).
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Kenyan citizens into “political beggars.” Such a system reached its peak in 
the Moi era, a one-party regime, by integrating the periphery through the 
relay of local bosses, the “big men.”
For a time, this redistribution—which is also a sort of politico-social 
evergetism—acted as a very strong social bound, despite the fact that is 
unequally favoured ethnic groups, allies, and partisans. It maintained 
links with the communities at the bottom and built an imagined national 
community, with the added bonus that it regulated in this way the foundations 
the regime in place by renewing its competing local elites. However, such 
a contract-pact, which also included support for the cooperatives (with 
780,000 members in 1975 from a population of 13.5  million: see Kanogo 
1990) and the strengthening of the public and administrative authority, the 
public bureaucracy and public companies, was only possible to the extent 
that the financial and economic margins of the ruling power was grounded 
upon a prosperous parastatal economy. This was the case for many reasons 
until the mid-1970s, until the 1980s and then 1990 when the depressive 
economic context giving less resources to the state, together with the 
authoritarian drift, poor governance, and the political transition failed 
this social contract-pact (Grignon & Maupeu 1998). The ethnic-political 
conflicts of the transition then gained the upper hand and sowed the seeds 
of a “moral ethnicity,” which is another type of pact.
Since then, this national and social pact, already dormant on the political 
level—as the political lines of the main political parties converge in an 
assured liberal perspective according to which redistribution is a function 
of the economy only—has broken down. Its rectification is still desired 
through a second Harambee (Equal Rights Trust & Kenya Human Rights 
Commission 2012).
As such the underlying and cold violence, apparent in the regimes of 
poverty as well as in social inequality and to which the country seems to 
have become accustomed, is therefore not solely social but has also become 
a symbolic if not moral violence. This happened progressively as Kenya’s 
nationalist model, which was based more on regulation than integration, 
which was more cultural than political, has become defective. We contend 
that ultimately this failing has been compensated by the recourse to 
ethnicity and then to religiosity.
Since the 1990s, the danger has started to show and translated into 
either a mass explosive social blaze owing to accumulated frustrations or 
a silent ethnic conflict. Both situations awaken and join up during every 
significant event, that is, during social conflicts, through politico-social 
protest movements like those which militias represent, and during political 
and election fever, which spreads the aspirations of the youth, the new 
generations, and specific age groups. The mobilisation of the youth into 
To the Test of Social and Political Violence
19
militias as well as the social dramatisation of the post-electoral crisis of 
2007–08 are an illustration and a peak point of these phenomena. Low-
intensity violence is also a daily experience at community level, in the 
streets, in families, and within household. And domestic violence is rising 
sharply24 as traditional, family, and community models of regulating 
tensions do no longer manage it as they were in the past and do no longer 
have the moral authority required for doing so.
What is more, it is feared that in the future the chains of social inequality 
might once again play on socio-political tensions—social inequality between 
towns and cities, between territory-defined populations and within them, 
between the old and the young, between men and women, and between 
nationals, foreigners and marginalised people, the last ones being de facto 
dependent on humanitarian action. Identity, ethnic, and religious answers 
and ways to shut from the others might also arise, which in Kenya have 
already been at play, or even forms of Messianism, escapism and anomy. 
Eventually, wandering and aimless individuals and groups might increase 
in number and be captured or exploited by terrorist strategies as much in 
cities as in the countryside.
Through these fragile social bonds and relations, it is clearly the ethnic 
question that dominates the social scene—or the “tribal” question if one 
retains the official terminology in use (“ethnic affiliations, tribes and 
nationalities”). At least it is the construction and uses of rigid identities 
that deserve to be addressed. Such identities are indeed both exclusive and 
violent, especially in times of open or muffled but also hopefully protective 
crises, yet crises that are always kept in memory. Social history therefore 
cannot do without a cultural and identity-aware approach.
5. Ethnicised Social Relations:  
Has Ethnicity Replaced Class?
Kenyan society appears to be more and more divided along ethnic lines, 
so much so that it appears that ethnicity has taken the place of class, or at 
least become pervasive in the understanding of social and human relations. 
While only 2% of Kenyans self-identify as “Kenyans,”25 the declared 
ethnic affiliations—but is it through an exclusive sense of affiliation?—are 
essential even though internal social differences are growing irrespective 
of ethnic group. Has the ethnic struggle replaced the class struggle, as well 
24. See the data in the different DHS surveys on the reality and the perception 
of domestic gender violence.
25. This might include, among others, naturalised Asians who do not declare 
themselves to be “Kenyan Asians.” Since July  2017, “Asian” is politically 
recognised as Kenya’s 44th “tribe.”
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as the racial struggle? Might imagined community equality and expected 
fraternity—of rank and status—26 help to accept or even erase social 
differences? To answer these questions, we are now turning to history and 
historical sociology, as ethnic groups are historical constructs.
Today the ethnic reality prevails. The 43 “ethnicities and nationalities” 
in place since independence (and 44 since 2017) tacitly and officially 
recognised this reality on a social-cultural level. Among them, some 
“ethnicities” are considered “central” given their demographic strength in 
some regions and because they are represented throughout the country 
(census data 2009) as follows: the Kikuyu 17%, the Luhya 13.7%, the Kalenjin 
12.7%, the Luo 10.8%, the Kamba 10%, then the Somali 6%, the Kisii 5%, 
the Mijikenda 5%, and the Meru 4.1%. Besides them, there are “peripheral” 
ethnic groups characterised as regional or even territorial minorities, which 
also include the “nationalities” such as the Asian Kenyans, White Kenyans, 
Arab Kenyans and “indigenous people.” This ethnic division is undergoing 
internal changes due to differing population growth rates and fertility 
rates, as some regional groups have entered demographic transition while 
the pastoral communities are seeing strong growth.
This multicultural presence and ethnic diversity are part of Kenyan 
history and heritage. The longue durée historical perspective necessary 
to apprehend population settlements, the diffusion of languages (Nilotic, 
Bantu, Cushitic, Swahili…), techniques and material cultures, and cultural 
practices and exchanges, reveals differentiated constructions. Such 
constructions have changed because of particular demographic, pastoralist 
and agro-pastoralist mechanisms—impacting upon patterns of settlement, 
territorial expansion and growth—as well as because of social-economic, 
ecological, and social-cultural dynamics and due to the geopolitical 
context. These more or less favourable interactions stem from and have 
built diversity but also inequality in so-called traditional societies on the 
demographic, economic and geopolitical front: all of this explains the 
historical difference between the central ethnic groups and the peripheral 
ethnic groups. However, “ethnogenesis,” that is, the construction of ethnic 
territories and identities, seems more recent. It was reinforced in the 
nineteenth  century when the populations came into contact as a result 
of demographic growth, thus creating internal tension and even external 
conflicts, even though, at that time, ethnic borders were still fluid and inter-
ethnic exchanges frequent.27 Remarkably this construction did not result in 
state formations: there was no monarchy or aristocracy in Kenya except for 
26. See the number of ethnic declarants who do not report their clan or subtribe.
27. All great theses of regional history by Bethwell Allan Ogot, William 
Ochieng, Godfrey Muriuki, Henry Mwanzi… note the porous nature of borders 
between tribes in the nineteenth century before colonisation.
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embryonic forms (e.g. the city-states of the coast, and the Wanga state) and 
for a few occasional leaders, “big men,” warlords and precolonial prophets.
Secondly, colonisation administratively entrenched racial categories 
and ethnic identities, territorialised them and exploited them without, 
however, attributing more or less value, or fewer or greater privileges to 
certain ethnic groups to the detriment of others, unlike what happened 
in other neighbouring colonised areas. In the Kenyan colonial regime, 
the appointment of chiefs remained the responsibility of the colonial 
administration and was never mediated by a customary ethnic authority 
as seen in monarchies and chieftaincies elsewhere in Africa. For its local 
administration and army, the colonial power exploited local resources; for 
labour or clerical assistants, it drew on central ethnic groups geographically 
associated with colonial exploitation; and for its military force it recruited 
from the peripheral ethnic groups perceived more as warriors and more apt 
to the arms profession—a process that in some cases contributed to inventing 
ethnic groups, like the creation of the Nubians. Thus, while the central ethnic 
groups, including the Kikuyu, were the most favoured through proximity 
to colonial power or through new economic trends or even by the reforms 
of the 1950s,28 they were also the most penalised by it. This style of colonial 
management and this proximity, this encounter between the colonial world 
and certain ethnic groups, is also reflected in the emergences of indigenous 
elites, the junior civil servants, the clergymen. They produced narratives 
and nationalist identity writings that blended traditions and borrowings 
from certain religious political conceptions of modernity (Peterson 2012). 
These types of “invented tradition” (Ranger 1985) and ethnic patriotism 
of the “small homeland” (petite patrie) compensated for the weakness of 
the political ethnic legacy. This local elite participated in the nationalist 
claim and then struggled for independence which prepositioned them 
to a national destiny. Upon gaining independence and although regional 
strife, fuelled partly by the racial question (the place of racial minorities 
and particularly that of the Asians), was perceptible between central ethnic 
groups (the Kikuyu and the Luo) and the peripheral ethnic groups or divided 
centres (like the Luhya, the Kalenjin, the Mijikenda), the national sentiment 
outshone feelings of ethnic belonging and supported a national associative 
project that nevertheless lacked a “national high culture,” principally a 
national language that was then neither English nor Swahili.
Thus, in Kenya, as anywhere else—and perhaps even more so—, the 
proclaimed nation is even less a natural given: it is a historical contemporary 
28. Including the Swynnerton plan for the privatisation and redistribution of 
land in 1952, the authorisation of farm plantations, indigenous trade in certain 
areas, recruitment of personnel with a background in industrialisation, in the 
aftermath of the Second World War.
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invention, a geo-economic, institutional, political construction, without 
long-term filiation except for the territorial, administrative and geopolitical 
framework inherited from colonialism. Moreover, this nation only a single 
objective: “nationalism,” which was the history of present time as well as 
the collective destiny of a cultural, social and political modernisation in 
its beginning stage. However, at the time of independence, the national 
consensus was dominated by a project of “African-Kenyan Socialism” 
blending political democracy, well-being, a mixed economy and self-
sufficiency, and the progressive Africanisation of inheritance and jobs, under 
which ethnic groups did not have the right to political citizenship but to 
cultural citizenship. Yet the latter structured daily political life and impacted 
the national life but in an unequal manner, because historical processes 
differentiated them on many levels, granting some of them intellectual, 
economic, geopolitical, and demographic primacy. But political actors and 
political parties, with their strategies of conquest and maintaining power, 
increasingly played this reality, pulling the strings of ethnicity under the 
cover of nationalist rhetoric and through authoritarian practices. This had 
already been the case since independence, in the construction of parties, 
regional alliances and then ethnic alliance (including the KANU-KADU 
division), then ethnocentrism as an exercise of power. Ethnic preference 
was used in the management of power and in access to the state, to its 
services and redistribution, as well as tribalism to conquer and stay in 
power. This tendency was reinforced even more when political life became 
democratic, at least competitive. From the transition of the 1990s, indeed, 
politics both instrumentalised the ethnic factor and was trapped by it and 
by its power of demographic mobilisation deployed at each election. “The 
tyranny of numbers”29 therefore prevailed by corrupting and playing up 
the “moral ethnicity” unique to each society (Berman & Lonsdale 1992). 
Finally, the political disruptions and even more so, political crises—often 
due to identity manipulation—took root because of the litany of human and 
universal tragedies and the ascending collective violence they triggered, 
leaving in their wake painful memories and conficting identities.
The decades of independence—and even more during the transition and 
the democratic period—therefore contributed to the exclusive consolidation 
of ethnic identities, which neither the precolonial nor the colonial period 
had produced, or if so, perhaps only partially. Tribalism in its various forms 
and through authoritarian, autocratic and even democratic implementations 
also took part in it. For these reasons, the ethnicisation of society appears 
to be a top-down process that stems from strategies devised by political 
elites at various levels through the manipulation of ethnic identity for 
29. In the words of political scientist Mutahi Ngunyi during the 2013 elections 
(see also Thibon, Fouéré, Ndeda & Mwangi 2014).
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their immediate gain—be it a politico-economic or a social gain—via 
political client-patron networks. Thus, social differentiation, territorial 
discriminations, the creation of millionaires as well as the emergence of 
a managerial public middle class, who are sometimes perceived as the 
brokers of the politico-economic elite, are the direct or indirect product of 
ethnicisation.
However, we should not ignore a powerful bottom-up movement 
grounded upon the conjunction of many reasoned behaviours seeking 
advancement and survival, the resilience of the “ethnic groups of beggars-
clients,” and the many attitudes that illustrate identity tension in reaction 
to the often-destructive process of socio-cultural modernisation with 
the objective to manage the malaise suffered by family and community 
structures. Such a movement is all the stronger when it is relayed through 
writing and language, even more when modern mass media is involved. 
This ethnic retreat, this ethnicity from rural and urban societies weakened 
by modernisation clings to a tradition or lost authority. This is illustrated 
by the millenarian militia, the culture clashes, the masculinity crisis and 
the authoritarian fold around traditional authorities (age classes and the 
elders). We often tend to forget those who have lost everything, who do 
not sink collectively into social anomie but cling to “what remains when we 
have lost everything,”: and what remains is culture, even if reinvented. Such 
a process is also true for the middle classes and concern both the old small 
managerial promoted bourgeoisie whose strategies of social meritocratic 
ascension are indebted to ethnic mediations, and the recent middle class 
that is a bit less permeable to identity-related pressures. Both resort to 
moral ethnicity and appropriate ethnic patriotism for security purposes or 
social distinction, which plunges into tribalism during time of crisis.
Thus, the ethnicisation from above has found a reactive echo in society, 
especially as the suffering endured during these socio-political crises—
which Kenyans experience as an intermittent civil war they are scared 
of—have given the people an additional memory of a sensitive nature. 
We would not then be facing 2 or 3 Kenyas but closer to 4 Kenyas, with 
the risk of seeing some leaders or local political classes play the card of 
decentralised ethnicity.
Conclusion
Closely observing Kenyan society in the twenty-first century and putting 
it into context bring to light complex dynamics that cannot easily be 
captured in the idea that there are “two Kenyas” based upon a binary 
dividing line inherited from colonisation and reproduced the decades of 
the independences. Rather, “three Kenyas” emerge with their own social 
spaces, if not their ethnic-focused spaces. This complex character becomes 
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even more obvious as we take into account not only income, well-being, 
and politico-ethnic behaviours, but also cultural changes. Some of these 
changes are silent but observable in everyday practices by looking at 
collective behaviours and habits, the effects of education and digital booms, 
access to media, language usage, the demographic transition of households, 
and more generally modernisation and acculturation. Other changes 
are less visible, or even invisible, except in times of overt crisis, as they 
relate to perception and religious practices, collective sensitivities, gender 
relations and diverging identities that may be divisive. The socio-cultural 
differentiation at work is more complex than we first thought. It reveals 
silent changes that can perhaps be seen in a more optimistic light than the 
one we used in this chapter to depict the inevitability of social trends. Such 
a move requires switching from the panoramic and longitudinal approach 
adopted here to the analysis of social trajectories through the use of a cross-
sectional survey or monographic observation.
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State, Economy  
and Development in Kenya
Hervé Maupeu
Translated by Devon Winters, Ana de Oliveira & Daniel Persia
Since the 1960s, Kenya has been regarded as a bastion of capitalism. Kenyan 
elites have been relatively consistent in their vision of development, 
particularly with regards to the role that the state should play; indeed, as 
in other African countries, the public sector has always been a key driver 
of development. By “state,” we mean first and foremost an institutional 
or otherwise legal reality, which brings together within a single entity 
(internationally recognised) the structures of the three major powers 
(the executive, the legislative and the judiciary), the administration and 
ministries. This type of definition makes it possible to take some distance 
from the dominant Weberian approaches that emphasise the monopoly of 
the legitimate use of force over a territory and the exclusively bureaucratic 
characteristics of the administration. The Kenyan state has never perfectly 
controlled the entirety of its national space and the bureaucratic practices 
of administrative services coexist with neo-patrimonial dynamics. 
Tim Kelsall (2013, 12) presents the paradoxical nature of this mode of 
governance as such:
The system is held together by the personal distribution of material resources 
and perks (many of which are ‘rents’ in modern economic terminology) 
distributed and consumed as though they were the private property of the ruler 
and/or his staff. ‘Neo-patrimonialism’ refers to a political economy in which 
the basic authority system is combined with, or exists behind, some formal, 
impersonal elements of governance, such as a legal system that demarcates the 
public and private domain, or an administrative code with formal criteria for 
staff hiring and promotion.
The ways in which the state works, notably in relation to the 
different economic sectors, are also affected if not determined by the 
forms of democratisation that shape the country. Thus, in recent years, 
electoral democracy has been supplemented by institutions and practices 
characteristic of control or surveillance democracies. It means, following 
Pierre Rosanvallon, that the multiplication of independent authorities 
responsible for fighting corruption, the organisation of counter-powers 
between the various political institutions, and the improvement of the 
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independence of the judiciary have given more legibility to the action of 
the state, yet without eliminating patron-client practices, as we shall see.
Under the leadership of East Africa’s most elaborate—and certainly 
most efficient—state, Kenya’s economy has changed significantly since 
independence. Throughout the 2000s, the economy grew at a strong 
and steady rate (usually above 5% per year), and since 2015 Kenya has 
moved into the lower middle-income bracket (annual income between 
1,046  USD and 4,125  USD).1 But the wealth produced is very unevenly 
distributed. Only 20% of the population makes up the middle class.2 The 
poverty rate (according to ILO criteria) exceeds 40% of the population. 
Most importantly, Kenya ranked 155th out of 188 countries in 2017 on the 
Human Development Index.
This chapter will explain how Kenya has put in place this type of 
economy by tracing the evolution of its economic policies and identifying 
key turning points. The Kenyan state has always been a “developmental 
state,” in the sense that contemporary approaches give to this concept. Thus, 
Laura Routley (2012: 8) considers that “a developmental state has sufficient 
state capacity to be effective in its targeted areas and has a developmental 
vision such that it chooses to use this capacity to work towards economic 
development.”3 We will present the different forms of interventionism of 
a state that has never fell into neither a market economy nor a marked 
liberalism unlike its neighbouring countries.
1. This World Bank classification is defined according to the gross national 
income (GNI) per capita of each country. In 2017, Kenya’s GNI was 3,250 PPP 
USD. There are other typologies that take GDP per capita into account. In 2017, 
Kenya’s GDP was 1,678 USD according to the IMF and 1,507 USD according to 
the World Bank. Tanzania’s GDP per capita was 936 USD and Uganda’s GDP 604 
USD.
2. According to the criteria of the African Development Bank.
3. Routley completes her definition by specifying four characteristic attributes: 
“1- A capable autonomous (but embedded bureaucracy); 2- A political leadership 
oriented towards development; 3- A close, often mutually beneficial symbiotic 
relationship between some state agencies and key industrial capitalists; 4- 
Successful policy interventions which promote growth.” Maia Green (2014, 16) 
thinks that the developmental state must be distinguished from what she calls 
the “development state.” The latter has much worse results in the economic 
and social fields than the first; and it is formed in close interaction with 
international development agencies. According to Green’s criteria, the Kenyan 
state has characteristics of both types of state. Thus, it remains the 6th recipient 
of international aid in Africa (4% of GDP in 2016).
State, Economy and Development in Kenya
31
1. “Patron-Client Capitalism” during the First Decades 
of Independent Kenya (1963–1992)
In the 1960s, all the African countries gaining independence chose sides in 
the cleavage imposed by the Cold War. Those who were behind the United 
States and aimed to pursue a policy of cooperation with the former colonial 
power generally opted for a capitalist political and economic system. Those 
who preferred the Soviet or Chinese paths, or who participated in the non-
aligned movement, moved instead towards a form of socialism. But what 
kind of capitalism and socialism are we talking about? Paul Nugent (2004) 
rightly speaks of “African Socialism” and “Home-Grown Capitalism.” These 
African types of socialism and capitalism differed greatly from Western 
models. Some analysts even believe that in Africa, socialist and capitalist 
regimes functioned in a relatively similar way (with a one-party system, 
marked statism, personalisation of power…). We shall see that, in the 
1980s, the political and economic systems of Kenya (in principle, capitalist) 
and neighbouring Tanzania (that followed socialism known as Ujamaa) 
were actually very similar. Beyond the rhetoric of those in power, these 
regimes can be distinguished by a series of precise criteria. Paul Nugent’s 
frame of reference can help us characterise Kenyan capitalism during this 
period. He focuses on four criteria: the importance given to self-reliance; 
the degree to which the state is perceived as the main vehicle for economic 
growth; the importance given to social equality; and the degree and forms 
of participation of the masses in political processes (Nugent 2004, 142-
143). Drawing upon these elements of differentiation, one can define the 
particularities of the Kenyan system, which, according to Joel Barkan, 
constitutes a “patron-client capitalism” (Barkan 1984; 1994).
Capitalism vs Socialism during the Critical Juncture of the 1960s
Proponents of neo-institutionalism, whether economists or political 
scientists, emphasise the idea of “critical junctures.” There would be 
moments in history of intense institutional change (modification of the 
frame of reference and ground rules) that determine the way economic, 
political and social structures function for the (often long) period that 
follows. Some call this “path dependency” (Collier & Collier 1991). In Africa, 
independence represents one such critical juncture. At that time, Kenya’s 
leaders opted for capitalism but without it seeming to be the obvious or 
only choice available. Jomo Kenyatta long used socialist rhetoric to justify 
his preference for a market economy.4 Two types of arguments have been 
4. It is revealing that the manifesto of the regime of the time is entitled African 
Socialism and its Application to Planning in Kenya (1965). Within the dominant 
party, KANU (Kenya African National Union), a strong minority headed by 
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used to explain how the African countries chose between the capitalist 
path and the socialist option. For some, the ideological preferences as 
well as the personality of the Heads of State made it possible to grasp 
these differences.5 For others, the characteristics of the national political 
field at the time of independence conditioned the choices available. In 
the case of Kenya in the 1960s, Joel Barkan emphasises three structural 
variables: the centrality of ethnicity in the political system; a particular 
colonial legacy linked to the fact that Kenya was a settlement colony; 
and the place of the Kenyan economy in East Africa (Barkan 1994, 14–
16). Thus, both political divisions and the party system were organised 
around ethnic identifications. Jomo Kenyatta had to constantly negotiate 
with regional leaders with strong legitimacy. He also had to consider the 
interests of a powerful white community, especially as he could not do 
without British military aid because of the Somali secession attempts 
(Shifta War) of the North-East region and the uncertainties of its army (a 
tentative coup d’état in 1964). Moreover, the country’s economy was the 
most developed and diversified in the region. The Northern Corridor from 
Mombasa supplied the whole of Africa’s Great Lakes region, and since 
colonial times, Nairobi has been an important hub in finance, insurance 
and services. Thus, Kenya has had a competitive advantage in extending 
its capitalist experiment.
Alongside these classical explanations, some specialists try out more 
general theories. This is the case of Leonardo Arriola (2013) who seeks 
to understand why African countries developed very different financial 
systems at the time of independence. Some established access to credit 
monopolised by state-owned banks. They often opted for a socialist 
regime.6 Others preferred more liberal banking systems, with a multiplicity 
of private banks. In this way they marked their predilection for capitalism. 
Arriola argues that when the Founding Father of the nation came from a 
constituency where the economy was based on exports, he favoured the 
proliferation of private banks, while those coming from a non-exporting 
Oginga Odinga argued for a more egalitarian economic system and sought 
support from the Eastern European countries.
5. As early as the 1960s, political scientists brought to light how much African 
regimes relied on the personalisation of power. Nevertheless, from one country 
to another, the Founding Fathers of the nations played more or less important 
roles. All studies on Ujamaa emphasise Julius Nyerere’s role in bringing the 
Tanzanian political system into its socialist path and in defining its particular 
content (Maguire 1969; Pratt 1976; Bjerk 2016). In Kenya, Jomo Kenyatta did 
not have the same room for manoeuvre and his biographical analysis is less 
interesting than in the case of Tanzania.
6. This is not always the case (see the case of Cameroon analysed by Arriola).
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constituency insisted on the need for the state to tightly control access to 
credit.7
State and Capitalism during the Kenyatta Era (1963–1978)
Kenya’s initial choice of capitalism is not indicative of its particular form 
because, as we know, capitalism is not the same from one place to another 
(Fulcher 2004, chap. 4; Thelen 2012). If we take Ian Bremmer’s very general 
definition, who considers that capitalism is “the use of wealth to create 
more wealth… and that, in general, in the capitalist economic system, most 
means of production (labour, land and capital) are owned by private actors 
and give rise to trade” (Bremmer 2010, 25), we can imagine how varied 
organisational arrangements can be. Of particular interest to us is the way 
in which the Kenyan state fits into economic relations and organises them 
(or not). In order to characterise these interactions, it is first necessary to 
explain some of the peculiarities of the administrative system of this country 
from the 1960s to the early 1980s. Over this period, the executive considered 
that an administration with marked Weberian characters (hierarchical 
system, bureaucracy, valuing merit and competence, not very corrupt…) 
was a major political asset in so far as it guaranteed its independence from 
local leaders. As soon as he came to power, Jomo Kenyatta abolished the 
federal-type constitutional system and imposed recentralisation based on 
a prefectural-type organisation. He simultaneously organised patron-client 
redistribution by putting notables in competition with each other to be 
elected in relatively free elections. In this respect, he established the basis of 
a representative democracy at constituency level and a rather satisfactory 
rule of law was guaranteed by a particularly efficient administration. In the 
social sciences, such a bureaucratic, autonomous and sovereign “Kenyatta 
state” was promoted by David Leonard (1991). His book presents the 
biographies of four senior officials who successfully led ministries or public 
enterprises. Most of them had started their careers in the colonial era and 
spread the spirit of British-style public service into their administration. 
In fact, the Africanisation of the Kenyan administration was very gradual 
and pragmatic (compared to Tanzania). Throughout the 1990s and 2000s, 
7. This is the first element of Arriola’s theory of the formation of opposition 
coalitions in contemporary Africa. The author thinks that political alternation—
condition of a consolidated democracy—requests the constitution of multi-ethnic 
coalitions of the opposition forces. In political cultures where patronage prevails, 
these coalitions can only occur with the financial support of businessmen who 
engage politically only when their material interests are not directly threatened 
by the ruling elite. According to Arriola, this is only possible in countries where 
access to credit is not politically locked up by the state. These coalitions would 
only be found in countries where many private banks thrive.
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many senior officials of the Kenyatta time published their memoirs. Such 
autobiographies became a particularly popular literary genre in Kenya. 
They promoted the era of prosperity (and of Kikuyu dominance) that the 
Kenyatta period represented in retrospect, especially for those published 
during the economic recession of Moi’s regime (1978–2002).8
It is therefore necessary to explain how this very particular state is 
situated in relation to economic players. To do so, some classic typologies 
produced by the vast field of study of forms of capitalism (or “Varieties 
of Capitalism” scholarship, often known as VofC scholarship)9 are useful. 
They help to clarify what Barkan means by “patron-client capitalism.” In 
the main types of capitalism, a distinction is often main between the social 
model of capitalism, found mainly in Europe and Japan, and the liberal 
model, characteristic of English-speaking countries. It is difficult to compare 
the regulated market economies of Western Europe with the systems in 
place in postcolonial Africa. In Kenya, attempts to develop a welfare state 
has had limited effects. Basic health insurance quickly made it possible 
to cover most of wage earners with varying degrees of effectiveness. The 
public pension system proved to be underperforming, including for civil 
servants.10 Yet, the transition to a liberal system of social protection started 
only in the 1990s after a series of scandals regarding misappropriation 
of social security funds. Following Thelen’s analysis (2014), the European 
systems differ in three crucial levels: (centralised) negotiations on working 
conditions, labour market policies, and (specialised) training and its links 
with the economic world. On the first point, Kenya from the 1940s to the 
1960s had labour unions with strong national federations that had shown 
great capacity to organise long strikes in the workplace (Mombasa strikes) 
and to mobilise on political agendas, especially at the beginning of the Mau 
Mau crisis (Cooper 1996; Durrani 2018). The leaders of independent Kenya 
took it upon themselves to quickly dismantle the power of the unions and 
put them under the control of the single-party state.11 Since then and for 
the most part, working conditions have largely been negotiated at the level 
of each company, using local representative structures. Regarding labour 
market policies, the Kenyan state promoted wage employment, which 
explains why, up to the 1980s, Kenya, along with South Africa, had one of 
8. About how the opposition to the Moi regime used the memory of the “milk 
and honey” era, see Maupeu (2008).
9. See notably Thelen (2014, chap. 1).
10. Munguti, Richard. 2018. “Authority Orders Posta to Pay Ex-workers Billions 
in Pension.” Daily Nation, 26 April. https://nation.africa/kenya/business/posta-
to-pay-4-000-ex-staff-more-benefits-36724 [archive]; Openda, Joseph. 2018. 
“Retired Teachers Resume 18-year Pension Battle.” Daily Nation, 27 July.
11. Only the teachers’ unions have continually retained a strong influence.
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the highest wage rates in Africa. In terms of educational policies, Kenya 
differentiated itself from its neighbours by promoting primary education 
but especially secondary education. It also supported technical training 
supposed to meet the demands of economic actors (Cooksey, Court & 
Makau 1994).
It is thus clear that, from the beginning of independent Kenya, the 
timid push for the development of social capitalism aborted. However, 
it is difficult to speak of “liberal capitalism.” Of course, labour law was 
rather much in line with this type of economic system, but those in power 
were too preoccupied with controlling economic forces to really allow 
a “liberal” system to develop. Is it then “state capitalism” in the sense of 
“a system in which the state plays a leading economic role and uses the 
markets primarily for political gains” (Bremmer 2010, 33)? Today, the 
concept of “state capitalism” is associated with countries such as China or 
Russia, but Bremmer detects forms of state capitalism in African countries 
such as South Africa and Nigeria. To a lesser extent, some characteristic 
elements of this type of capitalism can be found in the Kenyan system of 
the 1960s-1970s, especially if one adds to Bremmer’s definition the idea that 
the state uses the markets for political purposes by using patronage. This 
brings us back to the idea of “patron-client capitalism.” At that time, the 
state intervened strongly in the economy, especially through three types of 
policies: the Africanisation of certain sectors, the redistribution of land, and 
the development of public enterprises.
Firstly, the Africanisation of the economy aimed at reserving certain 
areas for Kenyan citizens, in fact “African,” and excluding economic 
actors from certain communities, particularly Indians, who were forced 
to sell some of their businesses. These measures benefited very specific 
clienteles. For example, many shops on Nairobi’s busy River Road were 
sold to notables from Murang’a, the political stronghold of Dr Julius 
Kiano, the minister in charge of this question. The Kenya National Trading 
Corporation was also working to reserve certain types of imported goods 
to African agents. Again, businessmen of certain communities (in this 
case, Kikuyu and Swahili) are said to have benefited particularly from 
these privileges (Ochieng, 1995). Secondly, the land policy of the Kenyatta 
era has been a major legacy of this regime whose shock waves still carry 
on until this day (Onoma 2010; Joireman 2011; Boone 2014). The Million-
Acre Scheme remains one of the symbols of this policy of redistribution 
of land in the White Highlands. During the British period, some areas of 
the Rift Valley were reserved for white farmers and managed directly by 
the state, while an indirect administration regime prevailed in other parts 
of the country. During the decolonisation negotiations, it was foreseen 
that the settlers could, if they wished, sell their land at a favourable price. 
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Fifteen years later, 95% of these farms had changed ownership. Nearly half 
of this land was subdivided and resold to smallholder families as part of 
settlement schemes. More than a third of these operations benefited the 
Kikuyu.12 This temporarily eased tensions within a community that was 
emerging from a full-blown civil war between different factions—the Mau 
Mau crisis had not just been an anti-colonial war. Throughout the Kenyatta 
era, the various organisations managing the distribution of land kept a 
captive clientele, in particular because no title deeds were distributed, in 
principle until each family had finished paying back its loans. The leaders 
of these groups thus became particularly powerful political entrepreneurs. 
The best known of them was Dixon Kihiga Kimani, the only Kenyan 
politician to be elected in three different constituencies (all in the Rift 
Valley: North Nakuru [1974–1979], West Laikipia [1992–1997], and Molo 
[1997–2002]).13 The Kikuyu were not the only ones to benefit from the 
subdivision of settlers’ farms. There were also Luo, Luhya and Kisii 
settlement schemes, not to mention the ethnic groups that occupied these 
areas when the British arrived. Not surprisingly, the latter (or at least some 
of their dignitaries) felt that all this land had to come back to them. Jean 
Marie Seroney (MP of Tinderet), in particular, mobilised crowds, especially 
during the affirmation of the Nandi Declaration (1969), which proclaimed 
the exclusive right of the Nandi to these territories.14 This earned him 
imprisonment, ending his political career. He was not followed by the key 
Kalenjin leaders whom the Kenyatta regime was clever enough to include 
within the country’s leadership team. Daniel arap Moi was appointed 
Vice-President and many politicians from the region were able to easily 
acquire large estates through loans from state-owned banks—loans that 
were not always repaid. Half of the settlers’ farms were sold off without 
being subdivided, most often to people close to the regime.
Lastly, patronage was pervasive among the many public companies that 
were set up during this period. The public enterprise formula was intended 
to allow more equal access to public goods such as water or electricity. 
These structures were also meant to make certain sectors more attractive, 
12. Leo (1984) estimates that the Kikuyu captured 40% of these territories even 
though they represented about 20% of the Kenya’s total population.
13. Almost until his death in 2004, Dixon Kihiga Kimani was the Kikuyu patron 
of the Rift Valley and served as an intermediary between the Kikuyu of this 
province and the big men of the Central district, which is the cradle of the 
Kikuyu community.
14. It is during this period that the idea of a Kalenjin identity—federating several 
groups of the Rift Valley (in particular, the Nandi, Kipsigis, Pokot, Sebei, Sabaot, 
Keyo, Marakwet and Tugen)—took hold and served as a vehicle for the defence of 
their common interests, particularly in relation to land. See Lynch (2011).
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in particular agriculture. But very quickly, the management positions 
in these public companies became honorary positions to be distributed 
according to the political interests of those in power. The bosses of these 
companies often used their position to develop real patron-client machines 
through which they hired their dependents or those who could be useful to 
them. We will see later that this type of management has had economic and 
political effects, especially from the 1980s.
The analysis of Kenyatta-era capitalism has given rise to much 
discussion, notably what has been called the “Kenyan debate”—one of the 
great controversies of the golden age of academic Marxism. It is difficult 
to summarise without distorting them the dozens of books and the many 
articles published on this subject. At a time when the dependency paradigm 
was dominant in Marxist circles, these scholars asked whether economic 
development was financed by domestic or foreign capital. Michael Cowen 
and Gavin Kitching showed how some African entrepreneurs were able 
to generate surpluses in many agricultural sectors—surpluses they could 
reinvest in different other sectors. Based on research made in the national 
and regional archives, they described the emergence of what they called 
an African petite bourgeoisie (Kitching 1982; Cowen 199615). Other 
authors focused more on postcolonial economy. They described a highly 
inegalitarian development that excluded in particular the peasantry, even 
though the growth relied heavily on agriculture. Essentially, they believed 
that Kenyan entrepreneurs were rather autonomous from international 
capital. These entrepreneurs used the multinationals more than they 
depended on them, often by relying on the normative capacities of the state 
and the negotiation possibilities of the political elites (Leys 1975; Langdon 
1987; Swainson 1987).16
At this point, and especially in desc ibing post-Kenyatta era capitalism 
(after 1978), it is important to refer to debates on the measurement of economic 
growth and its causes. In the early 1980s, talented young economists used 
Kenya as a ground to defend their neo-institutionalist approach. In doing 
15. The major influence of Michael Cowen (1996) mostly relies on the many 
grey literature articles he published in the Working Papers of the Institute of 
Development Studies (IDS) of the University of Nairobi, in which he provided 
significant quantitative data on different agricultural sectors during the colonial 
period. The Kenyan debate developed in complement and in dialogue with the 
equally rich “Tanzanian debate” (Shivji 1976; Saul 1979; Hyden 1980, amongst 
many others).
16. The Kenyan debate continued to irrigate contemporary thinking. Dominique 
Connan (2014), in a non-Marxist historical perspective, studied the autonomy 
of current entrepreneurs compared to the autonomy of the state. Lisa Mueller 
(2018) believes that a new middle class—less dependent on the state than the 
previous bourgeoisie—is the essential vector of protest in Africa today.
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so, they opposed the neo-classics, very dominant on American campuses, 
which they criticise for not properly taking institutions into account and 
for not considering the role of politics in the functioning of economies. 
Robert Bates (1981) explained Kenyan prosperity by the fact that its leaders 
refused to give in to the “urban bias,” unlike most other presidents on the 
continent. According to Lipton (1977), African regimes had little legitimacy 
and their state little capacity for action. To preserve their power, these 
regimes were working to meet the immediate needs of the citizens they 
considered the most dangerous and in particular urban dwellers. Thus, they 
sought to artificially lower the price of food by controlling the marketing 
of agricultural goods, thus buying social peace at the cost of impoverishing 
the countryside. Robert Bates believed that countries where elites invested 
heavily in agriculture refused to sacrifice the rural world to the cities. 
Such countries generally opted for a capitalist system. For its part, Morten 
Jerven (2016) advocated for more nuanced conclusions. He showed that 
economic growth rates had so far been relatively poorly calculated (lack of 
reliable data in many sectors; difficulty in comparing between countries, 
notably between Kenya and Tanzania because of different methodologies 
in public statistics…). Above all, he believed that it was difficult to measure 
the economic influence of political regimes. Doing so would necessitate 
differentiating institution by institution and sector by sector. In fact, the 
neo-institutionalists who studied the economic crisis of the 1980s in East 
Africa largely shared these concerns. Bates (1989) described how former 
President Moi skilfully took advantage of the famines that occurred during 
this period to gain control of the grain industry. This branch of agriculture 
struggled to recover after several decades of mismanagement and patronage. 
During the same period, the coffee sector, dominated by the Kikuyu, became 
the target of the Head of State who saw political competition there that he 
needed to counter (Chege 1987; Bart, Charlery de la Masselière & Calas 
1998). This is the period when the economic (and to some extent, political) 
situation of capitalist Kenya and socialist Tanzania were dangerously close 
together. In both countries, public deficits shot up as well as inflation. Over-
employment was high in both states, but the quality of public services was 
deteriorating dramatically as a result of corruption and lack of investment. 
Joel Barkan’s following diagnosis is sound:
In both countries politics took precedence over economics, though for different 
reasons. In both countries the state pursued redistributive policies and 
interfered with the operation of markets, resulting in a dramatic showdown 
of economic growth. In both countries, the ruling elite sought to monopolise 
political power and shackle civil society (Barkan 1994: 21).
A push of authoritarianism then dismantled many democratic gains; and 
international aid—so important in the public budgets of both countries—
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began to dry up. Under pressure from international donors, the two 
neighbours accepted (with great reluctance and lack of sincerity) structural 
adjustment plans and reforms aiming at democratising their regimes.
2. Uncertain Democratisation and Kleptocracy  
during the Second Phase of the Moi Era (1992–2002)
From 1992, the governing elite made concessions and adopted reforms 
that were characteristic of the democratisation process of this period: 
legalisation of multipartyism, recognition of a certain freedom of speech, 
especially in the media, possibility of creating civil society organisations… 
During this transition phase, when the regime was shifting from a type 
of authoritarianism that was not saying its name to a democracy not yet 
consolidated, the economic cost of the political control over the population 
increased tremendously. In order to stay in power, the ruling elite needed 
more material resources at a time when the state had become poorer and 
the national economy was in deep recession. They put in place a mode of 
governance that many analysts have referred to using the term “kleptocracy.” 
This concept proves to be heuristic when we specify its components: high-
level corruption reaches unprecedented levels and diversifies; the political 
control of the economy is accentuated by using largely illegal methods; 
militias often supported by the police intervene violently and terrorise the 
population; structural adjustment plans and state reforms are negotiated 
but poorly implemented, which creates the illusion that the state operates 
in accordance with the modalities in force at an international level. These 
four dynamics make up the system.
Corruption at the highest reaches of the government is nothing new, as 
we have seen. It aimed to finance political life while massively enriching the 
elites—in short, it fuelled neopatrimonialism. Yet, democratisation opened 
up a period of strong uncertainties which incited the governing elite to an 
unprecedented gluttony. The Goldenberg case is the symbol of this practice 
and this period.
In addition, the political class took over many plots of land and public 
buildings. According to Jacqueline M. Klopp (2000), such appropriations were 
a means of finding resources in areas beyond the control of international 
bodies. However, these practices did not go unnoticed and many NGOs and 
other civil society organisations informed the public. Several parliamentary 
committees described the diversity and massive nature of these thefts. 
The Ndungu Land Commission (2003), in particular, highlighted that 
these illegal allocations of public land were made mainly in the 1990s and 
during election periods. It showed that the entire administrative system 
supposed to regulate real estate was involved. The level of corruption in 
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this area was such that all property rights were weakened. Many Kenyans 
had the just feeling that their property title could be challenged at any 
time. Furthermore, banks were aware that many loans were based on 
fragile foundations when their clients gave, as a guarantee, land that the 
Parliamentary Commissions17 showed it was illegally acquired.
The privatisation of public land in a patron-client logic was linked with 
another characteristic of Kenya’s kleptocracy: the use of extremely violent 
militias, especially during election periods. During the 1990s, many areas 
of public forest, particularly in the Mau Forest or on the slopes of Mount 
Elgon, were opened up for settlement for the benefit of populations close 
to the ruling party. At the time of the elections, communities deemed 
favourable to the opposition were massacred or forced to evacuate these 
constituencies (Klopp 2001).18 Their plots of land were often taken over by 
families who voted “correctly.” And this happened in a context where many 
politicians used abundantly the rhetoric of autochthony (against supposed 
allochthons, or foreigners).
During this first decade of democratisation, the very high-ranked 
political elite stood out as essential economic actors. Thus, Moi, Biwott 
and several other Kalenjin politicians bought out the branches of the many 
multinationals that were pulling out of Kenya. They also invested in the 
media, transportation and the petroleum products distribution sector 
(Thomas 1997; 1998). They were suspected of being directly linked to more 
or less illegal traffic, e.g. speculation on sugar imports, especially during 
periods of risk of famine; cultivation and trade in drugs….
These different characteristics of the Kenyan kleptocracy are what 
some have called “criminalisation of the state.”19 Others prefer to speak of 
“informalisation of political life.”20 But these elements of governance were 
complemented by institutional reforms of the state in order to keep the 
17. In addition to the Ndungu Commission, other parliamentary committees 
provided specific indications of misappropriation of public lands. We can 
think in particular of the Njonjo Land Commission (1999) and the Akiwumi 
Commission of Inquiry into Tribal Clashes (1999).
18. In 1992–93, these killings resulted in nearly a thousand deaths and several 
hundred thousand internally displaced persons’ (IDPs). These ethnic cleansings 
mostly took place in the Rift Valley, considered the stronghold of the ruling elite 
of President Daniel arap Moi. In 1997–98, several hundred deaths were recorded, 
mostly on the Coast and on the outskirts of the Rift Valley. The lieutenants of 
the regime had understood that the violent technique previously tested by their 
bosses made it easy to win parliamentary elections.
19. See Thomas (1997) who adapts to the Kenyan situation the concept theorised 
by Bayart, Ellis & Hibou (1998).
20. Branch & Cheeseman (2010) use this concept several times but without 
specifying its exact content.
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Box 1: The Goldenberg affair (1990–1992)
In 1990, Kamlesh Pattni, the young heir (he was twenty-five years old) to a 
gold and gem trading business, met James Kanyotu, the head of the Special 
Branch and a very close friend of President Daniel arap Moi. He explained 
that Kenya could export much more gold and thus have access to more 
foreign currency if the state could adopt more incentive policies. Following 
discussions with the Head of State, it was decided that gold exports 
would benefit from public export compensations of 35%. A new company, 
Goldenberg International Limited, co-owned by Kanyotu and Pattni, was 
granted a monopoly over gold and diamond exports (Hornsby, 2012). In 
a country that does not have any diamond reserves and hardly exploits 
gold, this company did not a priori have a promising future. Except that the 
governing elite saw in it the possibility of discreetly diverting public funds 
to finance the general election of 1992. This first multi-party competition 
for decades was expected to be very contested and therefore very expensive.
In the beginning, Goldenberg imported gold that it re-exported by 
overvaluing the volumes traded, but soon it made clearing requests that 
did not correspond to any merchandise. Transactions were done through 
so-called “political” banks that dealt exclusively with the affairs of the 
country’s ruling elite: Trade Bank, Delphis Bank,a and especially the 
Exchange Bank created and owned by Kanyotu and Pattni. According to 
Pattni’s statements during the official investigation in 2004, Goldenberg 
reportedly received nearly 170  million  USD from the state.b Part of this 
sum had been handed to Youth for KANU’92, the lobby group responsible 
for redistributing mone  during the election campaign (Maupeu 2000). The 
entire political class were generously spoiled, including the opposition. For 
example, Oginga Odinga received nearly 20 million KES that was allegedly 
used to finance the Migori and Ndhiwa by-election (Oloo 2007, 116).
The macroeconomic effects of this financial scandal were enormous. 
Daniel Branch sums up the situation perfectly: “Writing in July 1993, John 
Githongo remarked that Goldenberg ‘is shaking the very foundations of 
Kenya’s economy’. The shilling plummeted, losing about half its value against 
sterling in the eighteen months leading up to the public revelations about 
Goldenberg in mid-1993. The increase in money in circulation drove inflation 
to an annual rate of over 40 percent in August 1993” (Branch 2011, 220). 
As early as 1993, the opposition and the media exposed the mechanisms 
of this gigantic corruption case.c The IMF and the World Bank called for a 
public inquiry into the matter. The government rejected this request but the 
Exchange Bank was dissolved and the head of the Central Bank of Kenya 
was replaced. Despite a political changeover in 2002 and an official inquiry 
in 2004, most protagonists went unpunished.
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Is Goldenberg unique in the history of Kenya? Can this corruption case be 
compared to the scandals that were revealed in the regimes that followed? 
This is one of the questions that torments Michela Wrong in her study of 
the Anglo-Leasing Company scandal instigated by President Kibaki’s close 
acquaintances in the early 2000s. If we compare these two cases of high-level 
corruption, what should first be emphasised is that the amounts embezzled 
are not the same at all. It is difficult to reach the heights of Goldenberg. 
However, Michela Wrong (2009, 166) estimates the cost of overbilling 
by the Anglo-Leasing Company at close to 5% of GNP and 16% of state 
expenditure for 2003–04, in a context of solid economic growth, whereas 
Goldenberg took place in a phase of intense economic crisis. In the case of 
the 1990s scandal, the mechanisms for misappropriating public money were 
complex. From the 2000s, the techniques of high-level corruption became 
much more basic (over-invoicing, rigged public procurement tenders…). The 
media now disclose such cases with great efficiency. Yet, parliamentary and 
judicial inquiries are generally conducted without leading to convictions. 
Since 2018, the fight against high-level corruption has seemed to be more 
engaged but it is still too early to diagnose a change in policy.
Notes
a.  Delphis Bank belonged to Ketan Somia who had many common economic 
interests with the Moi family, Nicolas Biwott and Vice-President Saitoti.
b.  This is just the tip of the iceberg as Kanyotu and Pattni developed multiple 
speculations as part of Goldengerg: it is said that the Exchange Bank speculated 
on currencies; and the two schemers played on multiple compensation funds 
(Wrong 2009, 62–63).
c. The bulk of the information came from David Munyakei, an employee of the 
Central Bank of Kenya. On the story of one of the most important whistle-blowers 
of contemporary Kenya, see Kahora (2008).
financial support of the Western powers. Since the early 1980s, Kenya has 
negotiated many structural adjustment plans (SAPs). It accepted the loans 
but did not comply with the majority of conditionalities that the IGOs 
sought to impose. We know that the IMF, like the World Bank, explain the 
“permanent crisis” (van de Walle, 2001) situation of the African economies 
as governance problems. The centralisation of power, the notion of imperial 
presidency, the alleged failure of development policy by the state are called 
into question in favour of policies of liberalisation of the economy (including 
privatisation of public enterprises, sharp staffing decreases within the civil 
service, autonomy of the central banks, more orthodox monetary policy…) 
and rationalisation of administrative work.
Kenya has regularly eluded some of the constraints of the SAPS and donors 
have continued to lend to the country because the political leaders have 
made themselves indispensable to the United Nations system, for example 
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in 1991–92 when more than 400,000 refugees crossed over the border with 
Somalia. At other times, Kenya exploited the lack of coordination between 
the IMF and the World Bank.21 Thus, privatisation of public enterprises was 
limited (and it often benefited the Kalenjin elite) and the state structures 
controlling most agricultural sectors were not liberalised, particularly in the 
sensitive, grain sector. However, the state administration underwent severe 
reforms. The Civil Service Reform Program (CSRP) I of 1993 was supposed 
to improve the productivity of the state by injecting many techniques of 
the New Public Management into this heavy machine. The main objective 
was to massively downsize the workforce through a program of voluntary 
retirement and the abolition of more than 26,000 posts. The civil servant 
identification system was improved to combat the scourge of “ghost 
workers.” But CSRP I did not have the expected results and the state did not 
become more efficient.22
The SAPs, like the administrative reforms, are commonly presented 
as failures. Nevertheless, can we speak of a “lost decade,” because of a 
particularly low rate of economic growth?23 Morten Jerven (2014: 120) is 
more reserved: “It is not obvious that Kenya performed badly during the 
Moi era and it is even less obvious that it did so because of economic 
policy. During the Moi era, Kenya performed considerably better than the 
African average.”
3. In Search of a Developmental State
With the political alternation of 2002, the economic situation improved 
rapidly. Investors had more confidence in the Government of National 
Unity that was put in place. More orthodox macroeconomic policies also 
allowed a return of growth which went from 1% in 2002 to 7% in 2007. 
The ambitious Kenya’s Vision 2030 program launched in June  2008 set 
medium-term goals. In the words of President Mwai Kibaki, this program 
was “a roadmap for accelerating the transformation of our country into a 
rapidly industrializing middle-income nation by the year 2030” (quoted by 
Adam & al. 2010, 1). The political and administrative actors and, to a lesser 
extent, the business community perceived it as a change of reference. They 
21. On the various tactics of the Kenyan state during the negotiations with the 
IMF and the World Bank, see Murunga (2007).
22. According to the World Bank (2001), this failure is due to the usual wage 
increases that teacher unions obtain before each general election. In addition, 
shortly before the 2007 poll, a strong wave of recruitment of new officials called 
into question the effects of the reform.
23. Kempe Ronald Hope (2013) recalls in particular that growth was negative 
(-1%) in 1992 and 0% in 1993 and 1997. He uses data from the World Bank that 
many economists currently challenge.
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looked to Asia for their new model of development. Elsje Fourie (2015), 
who interviewed the designers of Vision 2030, highlights their fascination 
for Singapore and Malaysia as well as China. In a conception close to the 
modernisation theory of the 1950–1960s, they believe that a number of 
steps and recipes need to be followed to catch up with the Asian Tigers. 
Where the IMF and the World Bank recommended slimming down the state, 
democratising political regimes and relying primarily on private actors to 
develop an economy open to globalisation, the Asian model emphasises the 
crucial importance of the state in guiding an economy that is placed at the 
service of the national project—not necessarily a democratic one.
Without deluding ourselves about this doctrinal change, this episode 
must be situated in “the history of extraversion” (Leguil-Bayart 1999) of 
the state in Africa. Kenyan leaders, like those in neighbouring countries, 
are seeking to gain some leeway in relation to the Western powers and the 
United Nations system. They want to depend less on international aid since 
they can borrow amply from Chinese banks that do not impose political 
conditionalities and whose more or less transparent procedures favour 
the financing of certain patron-client networks. This new strategy takes 
the form of massive investments in large-scale projects (Fouéré & Maupeu 
2015): modernisation of the North Corridor (Mombasa-Africa of the Great 
Lakes) by developing highways, fully renovating the rail transport system, 
developing Internet cabling…; creation of a new transport corridor, LAPSSET 
(Lamu Port—South Sudan—Ethiopia Transport); increase in electricity 
production and its widespread distribution throughout the country… This 
also requires a strong use of public-private partnerships (PPPs).24
Vision 2030 has long made unanimity among Kenya’s elites. Francis 
Muthaura, the head of Civil Service, at the launch of the program, 
explained this popularity by two factors. First, Vision 2030 was conceived 
during the first Kibaki presidency, when the government included the 
main tendencies of the political spectrum. Many leaders of the opposition 
participated in its genesis. In addition, this national development project 
closely associated all the representative groups of the private sector.25 
However, since 2015, the focus of this program on “mega projects” has 
24. We are only talking about the economic component of this plan. The growth 
thus created is meant to serve particularly ambitious social objectives: achieve 
the Millennium Development Goals (in the area of education, health, access to 
running water, sanitation facilities); develop housing for the general public; 
fight for true equality between the sexes… (Otieno & Nd’ung’u 2010).
25. Mathaura, Francis. 2018. “Vision 2030 Holds the Key to a Better and More 
Inclusive Kenya.” Saturday Nation, 9  June. https://nation.africa/kenya/blogs-
opinion/opinion/vision-2030-holds-the-key-to-a-better-and-more-inclusive-
kenya-52474 [archive]
State, Economy and Development in Kenya
45
given rise to increasing vivid criticisms. The debate has been led by experts 
from the opposition. Patrick Mbataru recognises that infrastructure 
development promotes long-term growth, but regrets that these building 
projects are monopolised by large Chinese companies and do not include 
local companies.26 The influential analyst David Ndii warns against over-
indebtedness and recommends putting the focus on infrastructure that 
improves the lives and productivity of small-scale producers.27 This led 
major international financial analysis firms, such as Frost & Sullivan, to 
release reports that defend the relevance of the Kenyan government’s 
strategy.28 Yet, during the 2017 election campaign, the opposition rallied 
around a position hostile to the mega infrastructure projects29 that would 
prevent state investment in the social sector.
With ten years of hindsight, the effects of the Vision 2030 program are 
gradually becoming apparent. In 2018, the anniversary of the program 
was not widely celebrated. Undeniably, the Kenyan economy has changed 
but tensions remain intense. Peter Kagwanja, who was involved in the 
genesis of this development strategy, underlines the multiple indicators of 
economic growth as follows:
Kenya’s economy has expanded from GDP of Sh 1.3 trillion in 2002 to Sh 7.8 
trillion in 2017, with its GDP per capita expanding from Sh 27,000 to Sh 166,000. 
Its paved road network has expanded from 8,938 kilometers to 11,796. (…) The 
country’s electric power has grown from 1,142 MW to 2,264 MW, increasing 
its capacity to power industrialisation and enabling to connect 5.9  million 
households to the national electricity grid, up from 0.48 million in 2002.30
Let’s add that some large-scale infrastructure projects have been 
completed: the high-speed train between Mombasa and Nairobi; the 
modernisation of the port of Mombasa, which has tripled its cargo handling 
26. Mbataru, Patrick. 2015. “Mega Projects Have Little Impact on the Poor.” 
Sunday Nation, 9  August. https://nation.africa/kenya/blogs-opinion/opinion/
mega-projects-have-little-impact-on-the-poor-1118308 [archive].
27. Ndii, David. 2016. “Mega Projects and Hollow Men: What $50 bn Can Do for a 
Nation.” Saturday Nation, 30 January. https://nation.africa/kenya/blogs-opinion/
opinion/mega-projects-and-hollow-men-what-50-bn-can-do-to-a-nation-1165482 
[archive].
28. Kariuki, James. 2015. “Big Projects Recipe for Kenya’s Growth: Study.” Daily 
Nation, 13 August.
29. Ndii, David. 2017. “Forget About Mega Projects and Address Everyday Woes.” 
Saturday Nation, 29  July. https://nation.africa/kenya/blogs-opinion/opinion/
forget-about-mega-projects-and-address-everyday-woes-430904 [archive].
30. Kagwanja, Peter. 2018. “Kenya’s Vision 2030 Caught Between the Rock and 





capacity in ten years; a new deep-water port is under construction in Lamu; 
and the expansion of airports allows twice as many passengers as in 2002. 
The state budget increased considerably, as has its tax-raising capacity from 
202 billion KES in 2002 to 1,365 KES in 2017. This rapid development of the 
economy has been accompanied by anxieties and sometimes conflicts. New 
patterns of inequality are emerging. This is clearly visible in the regions 
affected by the large-scale works policies, and therefore primarily in the 
vast north and the north-east of the country, the agro-pastoral areas that 
until then had remained on the fringes, if not totally apart. The LAPSSET 
project (Lapsset Corridor Development Authority) aims to integrate these 
areas into the nation and to connect them to neighbouring countries 
through a network of infrastructure.
LAPSSET as a Major National Integration Policy of the North-East
The ambitious LAPSSET program, inaugurated in 2012, is now facing 
external and national constraints that were not anticipated. Adrian Browne 
summarises the situation as follows:
In its original and most ambitious imagined form, the LAPSSET corridor project 
would be transformative, enormously expensive, and very invasive, linking a 
major new port development on Kenya’s Indian Ocean coast to South Sudan 
and Ethiopia with an oil pipeline, railway and highway. Current circumstances 
make it unlikely that the pipeline will reach South Sudan or that the railway 
will be completed within this decade (Browne 2015, 5).
LAPSSET was designed primarily to develop an oil economy by 
making the best use of South Sudan’s reserves, as well as of new deposits 
discovered in north-eastern Kenya and Uganda. Ethiopia saw it as a way 
to export the electricity generated by dams on the Nile. Since 2014, the 
fall in international oil prices has called into question the viability of the 
project. Above all, the geopolitics of the region have undermined the whole 
program. South Sudan has been locked in a long-lasting civil war and 
has had no short-term need for a new pipeline. In 2017, Uganda and the 
company Total decided to build a pipeline passing through Tanzania to the 
port of Tanga. This plan was less costly than the LAPSSET solution, more 
viable from the point of view of the safety of the areas crossed, and it could 
contribute to the development of a central corridor between Dar es Salaam 
and the Great Lakes region of Africa that would be highly desirable for 
better integrating regionally Burundi and Rwanda in particular. The last 
nail in the LAPSSET coffin came from the Horn of Africa. Reconciliation 
between Ethiopia and Eritrea as well as the agreements with Somaliland to 
develop a transport corridor between their deep-water port and Ethiopia 
made the port of Lamu less attractive. Finally, Ethiopia has never been 
State, Economy and Development in Kenya
47
so accessible. It cleverly negotiated multiple accesses to the sea without 
depending on a single country.
Thus, one can understand why LAPSSET has so far reached few 
achievements. Yet paradoxically, the problems come less from ongoing or 
finished projects than they do from more distant and nebulous projects.
Hassan H. Kochore (2016) studied the social effects of the construction 
of the Isiolo-Moyale road which had just been completed at the time of his 
research. He wanted to test the validity of the thesis commonly accepted 
in academic circles according to which “technologies that lead from capital 
cities to the regions (…) are seen to have the power to bring development, 
progress, national inclusion and security” (Kochore 2016, 394). On the 
one hand, Kochore confirms the enchanted vision of the consequences of 
road infrastructures. Along this road, the distribution and quality of public 
services improved, particularly in terms of security, a particularly sensitive 
problem in this part of Kenya. Strong economic growth was quickly 
felt (better profitability of livestock; development of trade…). Moyale 
and especially Marsabit experienced exponential urbanisation. All the 
populations of these areas felt more attached to Kenya, but have they really 
become Kenyan? Kochore brings a nuanced answer to this question. Like 
Adeline Masquelier, he believes that the roads represent “an iconic space 
that condenses the histories gone by” (Masquelier 2002, 830). He shows that 
the state penetration also produces anxieties linked to the conflictual past 
that these populations have had with state power since colonial times.
In fact, all along the LAPSSET route, the project and the initial 
construction sites it brought about became issues that easily could cause 
tension. In Lamu, the development of a new port led to increased land 
speculation and antagonisms over the influx of labour from other parts of 
Kenya. Since the 2013 local elections, political elites have dangerously used 
the ideology of autochthony and reignited tensions with the communities 
from the hinterland that have farmed there since the 1960s. Local cells of 
the Somali Al-Shabaab movement have skilfully used the frustrations of the 
region and multiplied the attacks in Mpeketoni, targeting exclusively the 
Christian families of farmers from the Kenyan highlands. On the island of 
Lamu itself, the project to build a coal-fired power plant has met with a lot 
of resistance and given rise to various types of manifestations.
In the LAPSSET project, the corridor is supposed to split at Isiolo where 
one route goes to Ethiopia and the other to the west to South Sudan. The 
construction of the city’s airport in an area disputed by two counties has for 
years been the cause of intense armed tensions between Boran, Meru and 
Somali youth gangs. In the city itself, each community tries to control land 
(by obtaining land titles) and to ethnically homogenise the neighbourhoods 
where they are dominant. Relations between the local authorities and the 
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LAPSSET administration are often tense because the exact routes of the 
corridor’s roads tend to change under the pressure from different pressure 
groups.31 Beyond the geopolitical complexity of LAPSSET, economists opt 
for an optimist reading of the ambitious Kenyan policy for large-scale 
works, notably giving credit to the progress of the SGR project.
Mombasa-Nairobi-Naivasha-Kisumu Standard Gauge Railway 
(SGR), the Spearhead of the Large-Scale Construction Policy
In East Africa, large-scale infrastructure projects are usually integrated 
into a transport corridor system (Fouéré & Maupeu 2015). The construction 
of a new railway between Mombasa and Malaba, on the Ugandan border, 
which is to continue towards Rwanda, DRC and South Sudan, aimed to 
revitalise the northern corridor, which remains the main access route to 
the Great Lakes. But it competes with the corridor from Dar es Salaam, on 
which major investments have been made and which Uganda has favoured. 
Uganda plans to route both its railway and its pipeline through Tanzania, as 
this provides shorter and easier access to the Indian Ocean. This calls into 
question the viability of the SGR beyond Nakuru—as illustrated by China’s 
reluctance to fund the section between Naivasha and Kisumu.32
However, the Makadara Express that has been running between Mombasa 
and Nairobi since June 2017 was initially presented as an economic success 
that could bring to the country more than one point of annual growth. 
The construction of this route has been the biggest state investment since 
independence and President Uhuru Kenyatta saw it as the symbol of the 
success of his first term. In fact, this program revealed certain characteristics 
of the governance style of the government team in place. In 2009, Kenya 
rejected the low-cost option advocated by the World Bank of renovating 
the existing railway. A new route—diesel powered—was chosen whereas 
neighbouring countries such as Tanzania and Ethiopia favoured electrical 
systems that allow for faster travel.33 Shortly after construction began, 
controversies arose over the legality of the call for tender used to choose 
31. Jebet, Vivian. 2018. “Isiolo Leaders Allege Diversion of Lapsset Route, Want 
Details of Map.” Daily Nation, 19 September.
32. Marete, Gitonga. 2018. “Questions on Viability of SGR Refuse to Go 
away after China Cuts Funding.” Daily Nation, 17  September. https://www.
businessdailyafrica.com/news/Questions-on-viability-of-SGR-refuse-to-go-
away/539546-4761886-5fq1awz/index.html [archive].
33. The Kenyan system allows travellers to be transported at nearly 120 km/h 
and goods at 80 km/h. This leads to substantial time savings compared to the old 
arrangement. Apparently, a system of electrification of the lines was planned but 
it was called into question (Olingo, Allan. 2018. “Kenya Halts Plans for Electric 
Trains.” The East African, 27 January–2 February).
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the companies involved in the construction. In Parliament, two committees 
investigated this issue. The Public Investments Committee raised doubts 
regarding how the public works contract bidding was organised. Its 
hearings mainly disclosed a lot of information. There was no competitive 
bidding because the Chinese state financed the bulk of the project through 
a 3.23 billion USD loan. The China Road and Bridge Corporation that was 
chosen was apparently blacklisted by the World Bank. It was selected for 
both the project management and the construction, while the recommended 
practices encouraged dissociating the two. And the cost of the project 
proved to be much higher than its Ethiopian equivalent. It is said the rate 
of the bank loans signed were uncompetitive.34 Many elected members 
of the Public Investments Committee saw this as evidence of high-level 
corruption. Conversely, the Parliamentary Committee on Transport, Public 
Works and Housing considered that the procedures had been respected and 
that there was no reason to suspect embezzlement.35
Some political scientists interpret the different positions of the two 
commissions as the result of factions within the political elite. The Public 
Investments Committee was dominated by the camp of Vice-President 
William Ruto, who himself expressed reservations about the SGR tender. 
During the hearings, those close to him engaged in the most virulent 
attacks. The Transport Commission, just like the very lucrative Ministry 
of Transport, was run and controlled by people from the Central Province 
linked to the Kibaki and Kenyatta networks. This suggests that the leaders 
close to Ruto benefited too little from the patron-client redistribution linked 
to the SGR and made it known…
Two other anti-corruption agencies (the Ethics and Anti-Corruption 
Commission and the Public Accounts Committee) investigated the SGR 
construction contracts.36 Since the 2010 constitution, several Independent 
Administrative Authorities have specialised in the fight against corruption. 
The new charter also guarantees a more independent judiciary. Yet despite 
this institutional progress, very large public works contracts remain 
opaque and neither administrative actors nor parliamentary commissions 
can effectively control the procedures.
34. Notably, Juma, Victor. 2014. “Making of a Mega Scandal? Why Railway 
Figures Do Not Add up.” Sunday Nation, 26 January. https://nation.africa/kenya/
news/making-of-a-mega-scandal-why-railway-figures-do-not-add-up-942286 
[archive].
35. The boss of this Commission in 2014–2015, Maina Kamanda, became the 
Minister of Transport.
36. Njagi, John, and John Ngirachu. 2014. “Graft Team Opens Probe on Rail 
Deal.” Daily Nation, 8 January.
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Yet, the Mombasa-Nairobi line was built in due time, despite tensions at 
the time of the purchase of the land necessary for this route,37 strikes by 
local workforce,38 and discontent by politicians that the obligation to use 
local companies (for 40% of the supply) was respected.39 The management of 
passenger transport was entrusted to a Chinese company accused of failing 
to effectively train its Kenyan employees and of having racist practices.40 
Freight transport began in early 2018. It was planned that at least one third 
of freight and in particular the heaviest containers would be transported by 
rail in order to avoid overloading the rapidly deteriorating roads. But the 
success of this policy depended and will continue to depend heavily on the 
competitiveness of the rail transport prices.41
Water and Large-Scale Works
In keeping with the Vision 2030 policy, the Kenyan government focused 
on water resources development. This involved planning the construction 
of many large dams on the main rivers of the country. All regions are due 
to benefit from these infrastructure works generally aimed at producing 
electricity and developing irrigated agriculture.42 For example, the Thiba 
Dam (Kirinyaga county) is expected to double rice production in the region. 
And the High Grand Falls Dam on the Tana River, in Kitui and Tharaka 
Nithi counties, should bring nearly 250,000  hectares of irrigation to the 
Kitui, Garissa and Tana River counties.
At the local level, these projects are presented as vectors of general 
development because they are expected to have a positive impact on 
many areas. For example, the Thwake Multi-Purpose Dam in Makueni 
37. Kairu, Pauline. 2014. “Land Owners Along Rail Route Want Fresh Valuation.” 
Sunday Nation, 28 December.
38. Maundu, Pius. 2015. “Workers at New Railway on Strike.” Daily Nation, 
9  April. https://nation.africa/kenya/news/workers-at-new-railway-on-
strike-1083358 [archive].
39. Karambu, Immaculate. 2015. “Uhuru Faults SGR Contractor on 40pc 
Procurement Quota.” Daily Nation, 5 December.
40. Wafula, Paul. 2018. “Exclusive: Behind the SGR Walls.” The Standard, 8 July. 
https://www.standardmedia.co.ke/kenya/article/2001287119/exclusive-behind-
the-sgr-walls [archive].
41. In 2018, the company that manages the rail freight has lowered its 
prices twice in order to compete effectively with road transport. The state is 
encouraging importers to use the train by organising the customs clearance of 
goods at Embakasi, near Nairobi.
42. During Jubilee’s (the President’s party) election campaign in 2017, Uhuru 
Kenyatta promised to build 57 dams during his tenure, at least four of them 
being large dams (or “mega dams”).
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and Kutui counties is aimed to intensify economic and social exchanges 
between the two counties. Roads are to be built and economic structures 
(especially cooperatives) are to be promoted that will affect both counties. 
At the national level, the dams are due to contribute to producing more 
electricity but also to strengthening food security43 which, as we will see 
later, has been one of the main objectives of Kenyatta’s second presidential 
term. But the management of large irrigated areas will be complicated. 
Thus, for decades, the rice-growing region of Mwea has been plagued 
by a number of setbacks that the Thiba Dam will not necessarily solve. 
The Galana-Kulalu Irrigation Project, officially inaugurated in early 2014, 
is intended to develop irrigation on more than one million acres in the 
Tana River and Kilifi counties, but this program is increasingly looking 
like a white elephant. A report from the Auditor-General noted massive 
misappropriation of funds.44 Many NGOs denounce the negative impact of 
this project on the environment and, above all, the local communities reject 
this structure that has been imposed upon on them.45
The many conflicts over water use illustrate Kenya’s difficult management 
of its resources as common goods because multiple communities claim to 
embody the public interest. In the mountains, too much water is collected 
by the local populations and these water towers are drying up, threatening 
the survival of all the rivers in the country.46 In order to supply the 
capital city with drinking water, a vast system of water conveyance from 
the slopes of Mount Kenya is currently being built, but the governor of 
Murang’a county promised to stop these works if 25% of the water sale is 
not returned to the local authority, on the grounds that the Ndakai-ini Dam 
(the main water supply for Nairobi) is located in the Murang’a county.47 In 
43. Apollo, Silas. 2017. “Ministry Rolls out Dam Projects to Boost Food 
Production.” Daily Nation, 26  December. https://nation.africa/news/Govt-rolls-
out-57-dam-project-to-boost-food-production/1056-4242428-format-xhtml-
bvfav0/index.html [archive].
44. Report of the Auditor-General on the Financial Statements of National 
Irrigation Board. 30 June 2016. Nairobi: Republic of Kenya.
45. Lwanga, Charles. 2018. “Kilifi MCAs Move to Push State out of Galana-Kulalu 
Project.” Business Daily, 1  March. https://www.businessdailyafrica.com/news/
counties/Kilifi-MCAs-stop-Galana-Kulalu-project/4003142-4324908-148c21lz/
index.html [archive].
46. Komu, Nicholas. 2018. “How Greed for Water and Impunity Pushing a 
Community to the Brink.” Daily Nation, 25  August. https://nation.africa/
kenya/news/how-greed-for-water-and-impunity-pushing-a-community-to-the-
brink-80648 [archive]. The removal of forests in these water towers also helps to 
dry up the waterways.
47. Gachane, Ndung’u. 2018. “Now Wa Iria Slaps Nairobians with Water Levy as 
Revenue Row Escalates.” Daily Nation, 14 September. https://nation.africa/kenya/
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a context where decentralisation is proving to be particularly popular, local 
elected representatives are called upon to best defend the interests of their 
communities, particularly with regard to the central state.48 The demands 
of Kikuyu leaders are nothing exceptional. For example, Kipsigis elected 
representatives are campaigning for the tea multinationals operating in 
their region to pay 25% of their profits to their county. The political class 
has obviously learned from the Turkana experience. We will see below that 
the Turkana obtained that 25% of the revenue from oil produced in their 
region go back to the population.
Kenya and the Oil Economy
In the 2000s, the main countries of East Africa moved towards becoming 
gas or hydrocarbon producers. Tanzania has huge gas reserves, especially 
in the south-east of the country. Ethiopia signed contracts to build a gas 
pipeline for transportation to the port of Djibouti. In 2018, it launched 
the first production tests of the Ogaden oil.49 Uganda has the largest oil 
reserves in the region. They are estimated at 6.5 billion barrels, while South 
Sudan is estimated to have nearly 3.5 billion barrels and Kenya has only 
a meagre potential of 754 million barrels.50 As the Institute of Economic 
Affairs points out, oil in the whole of East Africa accounts for only 0.63% 
of world reserves.51 Apart from Uganda, no country in the region can hope 
to become self-sufficient in fuel. However, this sector triggers a very strong 
interest in many circles. Political elites see it as a great opportunity for 
political financing and personal enrichment. The media, many NGOs, 
associations and other civil society groups, not to mention pressure groups, 
fuel numerous debates that interest and shape public opinion. Some 
countries in the region are continually postponing the exploitation of their 
resources. This is the case of Tanzania and Uganda. Others, on the contrary, 
are starting small scale production. Ethiopia comes to mind, as does Kenya, 
a country that has been striving since 2018 to truck its first barrels to the 
news/wa-iria-slaps-nairobians-with-water-levy-as-revenue-row-escalates-86672 
[archive].
48. Komu, Nicholas. 2018. “Water Row: Leaders Break Ranks with Jubilee.” Daily 
Nation, 5 October.
49. Keprop, Victor. 2018. “Ethiopia Begins Production Tests at Ogaden Oilfield.” 
The East African, 30 June–6 July. https://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/tea/business/
ethiopia-begins-production-tests-at-ogaden-oilfield-1397200 [archive].8.
50. These are the estimates retained by the World Bank in its recent reports.
51. IEA (Institute of Economics Affairs). 2018. “How much Oil? Why East Africa’s 
Bounty Is neither Significant nor Exceptional.” The East African, 9–15  June. 
https://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/tea/business/how-much-oil-why-east-africa-
s-bounty-is-neither-significant-nor-exceptional--1395812 [archive]..
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port of Mombasa over more than 1,000 km. In this area, political calculations 
count as much as economic logic.
The debates and tensions in this sector differ from one country to another. 
In Uganda and Tanzania, it is the Heads of State themselves who engage in 
an often tough dialogue with multinationals. They negotiate concessions 
on revenues, tax rates and calculation, infrastructure financing, and 
refinery development. In Kenya, oil is not the preserve of the President, 
especially as the main discussions are about the sharing of the income 
between the central state, local governments and local communities living 
in the production areas. In 2014, the preparatory work on the legislation 
to govern the sector envisaged that almost 40% would go to the counties 
and populations of the production area. A significant part of the revenues 
was also to be incorporated into an investment fund for medium and 
long-term investments. This idea was inspired by Norwegian practices 
adopted by some African producers, such as Ghana, to avoid the famous 
“resource curse.” After an initial bill was passed by Parliament which the 
President refused to validate, the government agreed in 2018 to a sharing 
formula granting 75% to the state, 20% to the county, and 5% to the local 
communities. But when the state starting transporting the first barrels of 
oil to the coast, it was immediately blocked for several weeks as local elites 
were unhappy with the terms of the income sharing. These elites also 
demanded an improvement in the security situation and infrastructure. In 
early July, an agreement was signed and the first oil barrels were delivered. 
The government justified this early exploitation strategy by the desire to 
test the supply of logistics and to determine the price of this crude on 
the world market.52 This would also be a way of getting private investors 
interested in the construction of the pipeline between Turkana and Lamu.
In recent years, public policy on oil production has been structured 
around multiple actors with different visions. The state is trying to establish 
itself as the undisputed leader but so far, these tensions highlight above all 
the lack of transparency. Another sector of the oil economy where there 
are strong suspicions of corruption is transport. Transporting imported 
petroleum products (gasoline…) faster, cheaper and in larger quantities 
is becoming a vital economic issue. For ten years, domestic demand for 
refined oil has exploded. In neighbouring landlocked countries, economic 
growth is fuelling strong energy needs. Kenya has an interest in satisfying 
these markets. So far, gasoline has been the third most important export 
52. Otuki, Neville. 2018. “Oil Billions Not Our Major Aim for Now, Says PS 





product after tea and cut flowers (13% of export earnings). But here again, 
competition from the central corridor through Tanzania has been fierce.
The development of this sector depends on the efficiency of one public 
enterprise (wholly-owned by the state): the Kenya Pipeline Company 
(KPC). Long presented as a sleeping beauty, it has been real dynamic in 
recent years. The 40-year-old Mombasa-Nairobi pipeline was rebuilt at a 
cost of 484  million  USD. It can carry over one third more oil compared 
to the old structure. A new pipeline between Sinendet (Nakuru County) 
and Kisumu was inaugurated in 2018. It complements an older facility and 
allows the volume being transported to be tripled. This will have positive 
effects on the development of the whole of Western Kenya, a region that 
is rapidly urbanising and has a high demand for petroleum products. In 
addition, it will facilitate export to Uganda.
KPC is also promoting a decentralisation strategy for the pipelines. In 
the short term, several structures are expected to reach seven counties in 
the periphery and, most importantly, it is planned to develop large fuel 
depots with a volume of 20 million litres in the main cities of Kenya. In 
a country where the price of oil is different from region to region, these 
investments by KPC should significantly lower the price of transport and 
limit seasonal speculation.
Nevertheless, KPC’s policy faces resistance. First, its projects are 
regularly delayed because of multiple anti-corruption procedures. In a 
sector that handles a lot of money, and suspicions of misappropriation 
of funds are permanent. In addition, pressure groups hostile to these 
large-scale construction works use the control commissions to curb the 
development of the oil infrastructure. It is common knowledge that the 
road transport of fuel is controlled by large families of the political elite 
(notably the Moi clan for transport from Eldoret to Uganda) who do not 
appreciate the multiplication of pipelines. Finally, at the regional level, the 
Mombasa-Busia line should be extended across the border to Uganda and 
Rwanda. This project, strongly supported by the World Bank and Kenya, is 
met with indifference from neighbouring countries.53
The policy of large-scale construction promoted by Presidents Kibaki 
and Kenyatta has borne fruits. At least vital infrastructure has been built. 
But it is not certain that this policy of large-scale public investment will 
last.
53. Olingo, Allan. 2018. “No Pledges for Region’s Pipeline, Open Sky Deals.” The 
East African, 30 June–6 July. https://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/tea/business/no-
pledges-for-region-s-pipeline-open-sky-deals-1397178 [archive].
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4. Uhuru Kenyatta and the Big Four Agenda (2017–…)
Upon his re-election at the end of 2017, President Uhuru Kenyatta 
announced his intention to place his second term in office under the 
umbrella of a new national development program, the Big Four Agenda. 
He aimed to focus public spending on certain areas deemed crucial: low-
income family housing, universal health insurance, guaranteed food 
security for all Kenyans, and increased production capacity of domestic 
industries. This new program was presented as a personal initiative of the 
Head of State to make his mark. Throughout 2018, the media resituated 
the promotion of the Big Four Agenda within the growing divide between 
the President and the Vice-President. An anti-corruption campaign was 
launched and particularly affected William Ruto’s camp.54 The Kenyatta 
team was intent on presenting Ruto as the preeminent representative 
of the sins of the previous era and thus of rampant grand corruption. In 
this context, the Big Four Agenda program was supposed to restore the 
reputation of the Head of State… and give him room for manoeuvre in 
his upcoming succession. In many ways, the 2022 election campaign has 
already begun. It is still too early to give informed opinion on this new 
frame of reference for Kenyan public policy. We can only suggest a number 
of questions: does this program call into question the policy of large-scale 
works that characterised the first term in office of Uhuru Kenyatta? Is 
the Big Four Agenda compatible with the major decentralisation reform 
implemented since 2013? Should we believe in this development project or 
is it just a political communication exercise?
End of the Large-Scale Works Policy?
The Head of State announced that there would be no new large-
scale construction projects during his last term. Priority was given to 
completing the works already started. It is true that roads, dams and public 
buildings started years ago and abandoned are commonplace. However, 
the President’s promises only engaged him because mega projects have 
a strong international dimension. In this area, Kenya’s decisions are 
conditioned by a regional context from which it cannot escape. Thus, it 
should take into consideration Ethiopia’s firm desire to develop programs 
of interest to both countries (Moyale Joint City and Economic Zone 
Project; the Lamu–Garissa–Isiolo–Moyale and Moyale–Hawassa–Addis 
54. On the subject, see the analyses of one of the finest commentators of Kenyan 
political life, Opanga, Kwenda. 2018. “Big Four Agenda and 2022: Reasons Uhuru 





Ababa roads…).55 Moreover, Kenya benefits greatly from its geographical 
position on the Northern Corridor (Mombasa-Africa of the Great Lakes) 
but the modernisation of this major axis requires heavy investments 
involving several countries.56 The development of the LAPSSET corridor 
implies that Kenya be responsive to the needs of its neighbours as well as 
their schedules. Nevertheless, Kenya has limited room for manoeuvre. It 
cannot easily envisage any new large-scale projects in the medium term. 
Chinese loans seem to be drying up. In September 2018, China refused to 
participate in the financing of the construction of the railway between 
Nairobi and the Ugandan border even though Chinese companies had 
developed the section between Mombasa and Nairobi.57 In fact, Kenya is the 
most indebted country in the region. It is seeking to reduce its dependence 
on Asian loans. This was the objective of using Eurobonds, but it was done 
at a high political cost.58
For years, the governing team argued that the policy of large-scale 
construction was a source of economic growth. The opposition believed 
55. Olingo, Allan, and Victor Kiprop. 2018. “Ethiopia Reaches Out to Djibouti 
and Kenya to Partner on Mega Projects.” The East African, 12 May. https://www.
theeastafrican.co.ke/tea/business/ethiopia-reaches-out-to-djibouti-and-kenya-
to-partner-on-mega-projects--1393546 [archive].
56. The high level of public debt of all East African countries brings the risk 
of debt crisis, which leads these countries to limit their spending ambitions. 
Wanzala, Ouma. 2018. “Cash Crunch Hits EAC Integration Projects.” Daily Nation, 
26  June. https://nation.africa/kenya/news/cash-crunch-hits-eac-integration-
projects-59296 [archive].
57. Marete, Gitonga. 2018. “Questions on Viability of SGR Refuse to Go 
Away After China Cuts Funding.” Daily Nation, 17  September. https://www.
businessdailyafrica.com/news/Questions-on-viability-of-SGR-refuse-to-go-
away/539546-4761886-5fq1awz/index.html [archive]. Since a few years, many 
African countries have had great difficulty repaying their loans.
58. In 2014, Kenya raised 2.8 billion USD in Eurobonds. In early 2018, it took 
over 2 billion USD, officially to give the country a little air to breath during the 
repayment of public debt. The opposition believes that some funds disappeared 
and would have served as a bail out with regards to the exorbitant cost of Jubilee’s 
election campaign (the party of the President). Mwaniki, Charles. 2018. “Kenya 
Raises $2bn in Fresh Eurobonds Issue.” Business Daily, 22 February. https://www.
businessdailyafrica.com/markets/capital/Kenya-says-fresh--2bn-Eurobond-
oversubscribed-seven-times/4259442-4315350-14pr01l/index.html [archive]. On 
the doubts held by the opposition, see the always brilliant and enlightened 
analyses by David Ndii: Ndii, David. 2015. “If It Looks, Quacks and Walks Like 
a Duck, It Is the Lies About Eurobond.” Saturday Nation, 19 December. https://
www.nation.co.ke/kenya/blogs-opinion/opinion/if-it-looks-quacks-and-walks-
like-a-duck-it-is-the-lies-about-eurobond-1155142 [archive].
Recently, China seemed less willing to invest in Kenya, as Kenya is getting clo-
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that, if it produced growth at all, it was unequal growth. Above all, 
these massive investments prevented the development of social policies, 
particularly in the area of social protection. Apparently, the elite in power 
today are now listening to these criticisms. In doing so, they are joining a 
certain economic orthodoxy which believes that:
genuine public assets, the transport infrastructures generate externalities, 
as positive as they are negative (noise, accidents, pollution, destruction of 
landscapes, shared uses, etc.) and do not seem to offer a short-term economic 
return for the sponsoring authorities. This lack of immediate economic 
benefits—apart from those related to the construction itself, for the state 
operated enterprises potentially involved—is nevertheless counterbalanced by 
a political benefit (Carcanague & Hache 2017, 56–57). 
Yet, this political benefit has now been much reduced. Several polls show 
that these large-scale construction works do not bring significant gains in 
popularity. Material benefits for the political elite also tend to run out: 
the bribes that finance political life are reaped in the preparatory phase 
of these large-scale works. In this context, the country leaders seem to be 
more open to the idea of fostering “equitable economic growth.”59 In this 
respect, the Big Four Agenda remains true to the objectives of Kenya Vision 
2030: it aims to make Kenya a middle-income country.60 Above all, it allows 
for a redistribution that was no longer the priority of Kenya’s development 
policies. Several segments of civil society expressed support for this change 
in state priorities. Cooperatives, in particular SACCOS (Saving and Credit 
Cooperative Societies), indicated that they wished to participate actively 
in the public policies emerging from this new framework. Indeed, it seems 
difficult to develop social housing programs without involving SACCOS, 
the main providers of this type of housing.61 Kenyans in the diaspora could 
ser to the US (e.g. agreements to rebuild the road infrastructure between Mombasa 
and Nairobi…) and the UK.
59. Warutere, Peter. 2018. “Harmonise Relevant Laws for Equitable Growth.” 
Daily Nation, 31  May. https://nation.africa/kenya/blogs-opinion/opinion/
harmonise-relevant-laws-for-equitable-economic-growth--49308 [archive].
60. Muraya, Beth. 2018. “Will the Big Four Agenda Usher in Transformative 
Economic Growth?” Sunday Nation, 10 June.
61. Namlola, Juma. 2018. “Saccos Told to Cash In on Uhuru’s Big Four Agenda.” 
Daily Nation, 19 February; Ibid. 2018. “Co-operatives Key to Government’s Big 
Four Agenda.” Saturday Nation, 7  July; Mwololo, Millicent. 2018. “Sacco Turns 
Home Ownership Dream into Reality.” Daily Nation, 19  July. https://nation.
africa/kenya/life-and-style/dn2/sacco-turns-home-ownership-dream-into-
a-reality-68454 [archive]; Mwololo, Millicent. 2018. “Cooperatives to Deliver 





also fund this public policy. Their representative groups are making this 
known and calling for adapted tax policies.62 The Big Four Agenda also 
offers the prospect of new revenue for many economic agents.63
After a long career in politics, Uhuru Kenyatta has finally revealed 
his social streak. Yet, some analysts are sceptical and look for Kenyatta’s 
hidden agenda.
The Big Four Agenda as a Way to Recentralise?
The constitution of 2010 attempts to bring public decision-making closer 
to Kenyan citizens, notably through a decentralisation reform introduced 
in 2013. Despite corruption scandals and frustrations caused by new local 
governments in counties, the vast majority of Kenyans still support this 
level of governance.64 Most neighbourhood policies, which fundamentally 
affect the daily lives of citizens, fall under their jurisdiction. The four areas 
of the Big Four Agenda cut across the areas entrusted to the counties. 
Counties inherited health management and some of them have started 
to implement health insurance for all those living in their territories.65 
Food security, which also falls under their jurisdiction, tends to become 
a responsibility shared with the national government. In 2016–17, during 
62. Warutere, Peter. 2018. “Diaspora Remittances Can Fund ‘Big 4’ Affordable 
Housing Plan.” Daily Nation, 10  May. https://nation.africa/oped/opinion/
Diaspora-remittances-can-fund--Big-4---housing-plan-/440808-4553158-format-
xhtml-jctg13z/index.html [archive]. Kenyans in the diaspora transferred nearly 
USD 2.5 billion to their home country in 2018.
63. The digital industries know they will benefit from the new state program. 
And the President even asked them to invest in these sectors (Lang’at, Patrick. 
2018. “Technology to Drive My Big Four Promises, Says Uhuru.” Daily Nation, 
28  February). The chemical industries specialising in agriculture sponsor 
Farm Clinics in several provincial universities (where farmers explain their 
agricultural problems and where they are offered solutions) and nowadays place 
them under the mentorship of the Big Four agenda (Maina, Nelson. 2018. “Farm 
Clinics at Heart of Big Four Agenda.” Daily Nation, 7 July. https://nation.africa/
kenya/business/seeds-of-gold/farm-clinics-at-heart-of-big-four-agenda-63688 
[archive]). No one is fooled, many economic actors are positioning themselves to 
take advantage of future state spending (Ngugi, Brian, and Neville Otuki. 2018. 
“Faceless Cartels Lie in Wait for the Big Four Projects.” Daily Nation, 30 April).
64. Vidija, Patrick. 2018. “84% of Kenyans Support Devolution. Ipsos.” The Star, 
6 April.
65. “Kiambu County to Give Free NHIF Cover to 24,000 Families.” 2017. Daily 
Nation, 24  October; “Kisumu County Ready to Pilot Universal Healthcare.” 
2018. Daily Nation, 27 March; Komu, Nicholas. 2018. “Tharaka Nithi Launches 
TN-Care.” Daily Nation, 14 September. https://nation.africa/kenya/brand-book/
tharaka-nithi-launches-tn-care-medical-cover--111570 [archive].
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the election campaign, a long-lasting drought affected the country, putting 
many people at risk. The response of the national executive was late and 
the counties of the semi-desert areas proved to be ineffective, forcing the 
central state to take over and therefore to appear as the leader in this public 
policy. Economic assistance is a shared competence, but all governors 
particularly value their role in this area. In addition, some counties have 
come together to form economic blocs that pool resources to have a more 
incisive economic policy.66 In this context, the success of the Big Four 
Agenda depends on the establishment of strong collaborations between 
the national and local levels. In June 2018, the Governors’ Summit declared 
its willingness to work with the National Executive on these issues.67 Some 
counties negotiate directly with the Kenyan government to be involved in 
certain policies of the new agenda.68
For the moment, the doctrine of Kenya’s leadership on the place of local 
governments in the implementation of the Big Four Agenda is not known. 
For years, both Kenyatta and Ruto have expressed their hostility towards 
decentralisation. Since they have been in power, they have toned down 
their rhetoric but they are still suspected of having dark agendas against 
this reform. Some go as far as to suggest that the Big Four is their Trojan 
horse for devitalising decentralisation… But other observers believe that 
the Head of State may have an interest in working with the counties. 
He would thus establish patron-client networks that would allow him 
to manage his own succession from a position of strength, particularly 
against his Vice-President, even if he himself cannot constitutionally stand 
for re-election.
66. On the Lake Region Economic Bloc, which brings together 8 counties from 
western Kenya, see: Luvega, Derick, et Gaitano Pessa. 2018. “Eight Governors 
from Lake Region to Drum Up Support for Economic Bloc.” Saturday Nation, 
9  June. https://nation.africa/counties/Governors-to-drum-up-support-for-
economic-bloc/1107872-4602644-format-xhtml-byxs3c/index.html [archive].
67. Even if the majority of counties are run by elected members of Jubilee (the 
President’s party), the Governors’ Summit is led by an opponent of the regime 
and this body is particularly demanding if not suspicious of a national executive 
still suspected of not playing the game of the 2010 constitution sincerely. Oruko, 
Ibrahim. 2018. “State Told to Work with Counties for Big Four Success.” Daily 
Nation, 5 June. https://nation.africa/kenya/news/politics/governors-tell-state-to-
work-with-counties-for-success-of-big-four-agenda-51230 [archive].
68. This is the case of Kitui. Mutua, Kitavi. 2018. “How Kitui Mineral Wealth Can 





Should We Believe in the Impact of the Big Four Agenda?
There are indications that the President is serious about the success of his 
new development program. Thus, many ministerial departments as well 
as several public institutions involved in the Big Four were moved to new 
ministries and new senior officials were appointed. These rearrangements 
are generally interpreted as the executive’s desire to lock down these 
crucial administrative services by putting them under the control of those 
in power.69 However, the national budget presented in mid-2018 did not 
clearly prioritise the four areas to be developed. Some MPs called it an 
“illusionist budget” in that some of the usual entries (especially in education) 
were labelled “Big Four Agenda enablers” to make it appear that the new 
budget was given a significant place to the new agenda.70 This reminds us 
of the technical constraints of all modern states budgets, which are subject 
to large amounts of expenditure and have little room for manoeuvre to 
change to envelopes allocated. Changes are made in the medium-term, but 
in a democracy, citizens must be convinced of the state’s ability to change 
the daily lives of the country’s inhabitants. Political communication must 
therefore persuade public opinion of the sincerity of those in power in their 
project of change. It is still too early to know whether the message is getting 
through and whether public action is going in the direction announced.
Conclusion
Since independence, Kenya has continuously experienced what has been 
called a developmental state. Even in times of recession, the country recorded 
economic growth rates above the continental average. The characteristics 
of its economic system have changed significantly: the majority of wealth 
is now produced by the service sector, agriculture is modernising and 
remains largely in the hands of small-scale producers… This was done 
under the leadership of the state but the ways in which it intervenes in the 
economy and in society have evolved according to external constraints, the 
administration capacity to be truly engaged, and the forms of governance 
of the successive regimes.
69. Githae, Wanjohi, et Patrick Lang’at. 2018. “Uhuru Swaps Departments as 
Focus Shifts to Big Four Agenda.” Sunday Nation, 18  February. https://nation.
africa/kenya/news/politics/uhuru-swaps-departments-as-focus-turn-to-big-
four-agenda-14174 [archive].
70. For a detailed presentation of these false pretences in the 2018-2019 budget, 
Kisero, Jaindi. 2018. “Mistake: Rotich Budget Lumped ‘Big Four’ with Usual 
Spendings.” Daily Nation, 20  June. https://nation.africa/blogs/Henry-Rotich-
Budget-lumped--Big-Four--with-usual-spending/1949942-4620960-13t2pwb/
index.html [archive].
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Until the mid-1970s, Jomo Kenyatta consolidated the strong state 
inherited from the colonial era, to which he added an important neo-
patrimonial dimension. The political and administrative elites became 
heavily involved in all sectors of the economy, notably agriculture. Because 
of genuine political pluralism, especially at the local level, the political class 
had to take citizens’ demands into account, demands which were expressed, 
notably, during relatively free elections.
During the two decades of Daniel arap Moi’s regime (1978–2002), those 
in power benefited from a narrower social base than their predecessors and 
came to rule the country with increasingly authoritarianism. They captured 
the developmental state for their own benefit and gradually established a 
real divorce with the economic forces and civil society.
The presidencies of Mwai Kibaki (2002–2013) and Uhuru Kenyatta 
took place under the seal of democratisation, despite chaotic periods—in 
particular, the 2007 general elections and the short three-month civil war 
that followed. A new social contract was established between the state and 
the economic forces; it expressed in particular in the Kenya Vision 2030 
program. During these fifteen years, the state superstructure developed 
at the same pace as the economy. Its efficiency improved considerably 
under the effects of the New Public Management techniques to which 
national elites largely converted. Yet, neo-patrimonialism still rules from 
the national to the local level, thanks in particular to the decentralisation 
reforms implemented from 2013 onwards.
Under the tutelage and often the activism of the developmental state in 
its various facets, the economy modernised and in 2015. Kenya became a 
middle-income country. This undeniable success highlighted the level of 
inequality that persisted and which, according to some, threatened the order 
that had been created. Such inequality took diverse forms but two of them 
gave rise to controversies and public policy. Indeed, the debate focused, 
on the one hand, on territorial inequalities that are understood through 
ethnicity and, on the other hand, on inequalities between social groups.
Since the 1950s, the political system has been structured around the idea 
of territorial injustices that needed to be addressed. Small ethnic groups 
that feared being left behind joined together in a partisan structure that 
negotiated with larger ethnic groups deemed dominant. The democratisation 
of the 1990s exacerbated these tensions and strongly ethnicised political 
life. Following the 2007 crisis, institutional responses were adopted: a 
decentralisation reform gave the regions substantial material resources 
and real decision-making power; a special fund was created so that the 
poorest counties would have more money available; recruitment in the 
public service had to respect a certain ethnic balance, etc. Strong territorial 
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inequalities persist but the political elites took stock of the frustrations of 
the peripheries and put in place policies that were appreciated.
Inequalities between social categories have been relatively hidden from 
the political debate. Of course, the opposition and some of its leaders, like 
Raila Odinga, present themselves as the heroes of the poor. But politics is 
read more though the lens of ethnicity than in terms of the social question. 
Anti-poverty policies have failed. The development of universal social 
protection is still in its infancy, and in this area, Kenya (and East Africa in 
general) is lagging behind Southern Africa countries. We have seen that the 
Big Four Agenda, which is to serve as a benchmark for Uhuru Kenyatta’s 
last term in office, is aimed to provide solutions. For the time being, the 
poorest sections of the population barely appear in the public sphere, 
except through the multifaceted violence of the youth. The needy remain 
in what Kristin D. Phillips (2018) calls a “citizenship of subsistence.” They 
try to survive food crises (if not famines) by becoming part of patron-client 
networks that act as a fragile form of social security.
Since its inception, the Kenyan developmental state has been able to 
create economic growth but this prosperity is very unevenly distributed; it 
does not bring social justice, and therefore its legitimacy still remains fragile. 
Here again, great hopes are placed in decentralisation as it is expected 
to bring the state and its public services closer to the citizens. But will 
Kenya have the means for this ambition? Since 2018, several reports from 
the World Bank and the IMF have warned of the sharp increase in public 
debt across East Africa. In Kenya, this debt rose from 15.4 billion EUR to 
42.7 billion EUR during Uhuru Kenyatta’s first term in office,71 in particular 
due to the policy of large-scale works. Thus, the state has lost much of its 
room for manoeuvre.
The Kenyan developmental state has many similarities with the states in 
neighbouring countries, although some are more interventionist (Ethiopia, 
Rwanda), others more focused on social justice (Tanzania), and still 
others more neo-patrimonialist (Uganda). It is likely that greater regional 
integration would be of great benefit, at least at the economic level and 
particularly in the development of the large-scale transport corridors. For 
many years, competition and suspicion have prevailed over cooperation, 
especially when it comes to Kenya—a country that would highly benefit 
from integration.
71. The share of debt in Gross Domestic Product is 58%. See Douet, Marion. 2018. 
“Au Kenya, la forte augmentation de la dette publique inquiète la population.” Le 
Monde, 13 October.
State, Economy and Development in Kenya
63
Bibliography
Arriola, Leonardo R. 2013. Multi-Ethnic Coalitions in Africa: Business Financing 
of Opposition Election Campaigns. Cambridge Studies in Comparative 
Politics. New York: Cambridge University Press.    
https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781139108553.
Barkan, Joel D. (eds). 1984. Politics and Public Policy in Kenya and Tanzania. 
New York, Eastbourne: Praeger.
Barkan, Joel D. 1994. (eds). Beyond Capitalism vs. Socialism in Kenya and 
Tanzania. Boulder (CO) & London: Lynne Rienner.
Bart, François, Bernard Charlery de la Masselière, and Bernard Calas (eds). 
1998. Caféicultures d’Afrique orientale. Collection “Hommes et sociétés.” 
Paris: Karthala–IFRA.
Bayart, Jean-François, Stephen Ellis, and Béatrice Hibou. 1998. La 
criminalisation de l’État en Afrique. Bruxelles: Éditions Complexe.
Bjerk, Paul. 2015. Building a Peaceful Nation: Julius Nyerere and the 
Establishment of Sovereignty in Tanzania, 1960–1964. Rochester (NY): 
University of Rochester Press.
Boone, Catherine. 2014. Property and Political Order in Africa: Land Rights 
and the Structure of Politics. Cambridge Studies in Comparative Politics. 
New York: Cambridge University Press.     
https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781139629256.
Branch, Daniel, and Nic Cheeseman. 2010. “Introduction: Our Turn to Eat.” In 
Our Turn to Eat: Politics in Kenya Since 1950, edited by Daniel Branch, Nic 
Cheeseman & Leigh Gardner, 1–22. Afrikanische Studien. Berlin: LIT.
Branch, Daniel. 2011. Kenya. Between Hope and Despair, 1963–2011. New 
Haven & London: Yale University Press.
Bremmer, Ian. 2010. The End of the Free Market: Who Wins the War between 
States and Corporations? New York (NY): Portfolio.
Browne, Adrian J. 2015. LAPSSET: The History and Politics of an Eastern 
African Megaproject. Nairobi: Rift Valley Institute–Rift Valley Forum. http://
riftvalley.net/publication/lapsset#.XbwFldVCc2w [archive].
Carcanague, Samuel, and Emmanuel Hache. 2017. “Les infrastructures 
de transport, reflet d’un monde en transition.” Revue internationale et 
stratégique 107, no. 3: 53–60. https://doi.org/10.3917/ris.107.0053.
Connan, Dominique. 2014. “La décolonisation des clubs kényans : sociabilité 
exclusive et constitution morale des élites africaines dans le Kenya 
contemporain.” PhD Dissertation, Université Paris 1.
Cooksey, Brian, David Court, and Ben Makau. 1994. “Education for Self-
Reliance and Harambee.” In Beyond Capitalism vs Socialism in Kenya and 
Tanzania, edited by Joel Barkan. Boulder (CO) & London: Lynne Rienner.
Cooper, Frederick, David Anderson, Carolyn Brown, Christopher Clapham, 
and Michael Gomez. 1996. Decolonization and African Society: The Labor 




Durrani, Shiraz. 2018. Trade Unions in Kenya’s War of Independence. Nairobi: 
Vita Books. https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctvh8r4j2.
Fouéré, Marie-Aude, and Hervé Maupeu. 2015. “Une nouvelle Afrique de 
l’Est ? Introduction thématique.” Afrique contemporaine no. 253: 13–35.   
https://doi.org/10.3917/afco.253.0013.
Fourie, Elsje. 2015. “L’Éthiopie et le Kenya face au ‘modèle chinois’ 
de développement.” Afrique contemporaine no. 253: 87–106.    
https://doi.org/10.3917/afco.253.0087.
Fulcher, James. 2004. Capitalism: A Very Short Introduction. New York: Oxford 
University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/actrade/9780192802187.001.0001.
Green, Maia. 2014. The Development State: Aid, Culture and Civil Society in 
Tanzania. Woodbridge: James Currey.
Hope, Kempe Ronald. 2011. The Political Economy of Development in Kenya. 
New York: Continuum.
Hornsby, Charles. 2012. Kenya: A History since Independence. London & New 
York: I.B. Tauris.
Hyden, Goran.1980. Beyond Ujamaa in Tanzania: Underdevelopment and an 
Uncaptured Peasantry. London: Heinemann.
Jerven, Morten. 2014. Economic Growth and Measurement Reconsidered in 
Botswana, Kenya, Tanzania, and Zambia, 1965–1995. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. http://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199689910.001.0001.
Joireman, Sandra. 2011. Where There is no Government. Enforcing Property 
Rights in Common Law Africa. Oxford: Oxford University Press.    
http://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199782482.001.0001.
Kahora, Billy. 2008. The True Story of David Munyakei: Goldenberg Whistle-
Blower. Nairobi: Kwani Trust
Kelsall. Tim. 2013. Business, Politics, and the State in Africa. London & New 
York: Zed Books.
Klopp, Jacqueline M. 2000. “Pilfering the Public: The Problem of Land Grabbing 
in Contemporary Kenya.” Africa Today 47, no. 1: 7–26.     
http://www.jstor.org/stable/4187305.
Klopp, Jacqueline M. 2001. “‘Ethnic Clashes’ and Winning Elections: The 
Case of Kenya’s Electoral Despotism.” Canadian Journal of African Studies / 
Revue Canadienne des Études Africaines 35, no. 3: 473–517.    
https://doi.org/10.1080/00083968.2001.10751230.
Kochore, Hassan H. 2016. “The Road to Kenya? Vision, Expectations and 
Anxieties around New Infrastructures Development in Northern Kenya.” 
Journal of Eastern African Studies 10, no. 3: 494–510.    
https://doi.org/10.1080/17531055.2016.1266198.
Langdon, Steven. 1987. “Industry and Capitalism in Kenya: Contributions to 
a Debate.” In The African Bourgeoisie: Capitalist Development in Nigeria, 
Kenya, and the Ivory Coast, edited by Paul M. Lubeck. Boulder (CO): Lynne 
Rienner.
Leo, Christopher. 1984. Land and Class in Kenya. Toronto, Buffalo (NY) & 
London: Toronto University Press.
State, Economy and Development in Kenya
65
Leonard, David K. 1991. African Successes: Four Public Managers of Kenyan 
Rural Development. Berkeley: University of California Press.
Leys, Colin. 1975. Underdevelopment in Kenya: The Political Economy of Neo-
colonialism. London: Heinemann.
Lynch, Gabrielle. 2011. I Say to You: Ethnic Politics and the Kalenjin in Kenya. 
Chicago & London: University of Chicago Press.
Maguire, G. Andrew. 1969. Towards ‘Uhuru’ in Tanzania: The Politics of 
Participation. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Martz, John. 1992. “Shaping the Political Arena: Critical Junctures, the 
Labor Movement, and Regime Dynamics in Latin America.” Studies in 
Comparative International Development 27, no. 1: 76–80.     
https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02687106.
Masquelier, A. 2002. “Road Mythographies: Space, Mobility, and the Historical 
Imagination in Postcolonial Niger.” American Ethnologist 29, no. 4: 829–56. 
https://doi.org/10.1525/ae.2002.29.4.829.
Maupeu, Hervé. 2008. “Les autobiographies au Kenya. La production d’un 
genre littéraire.” In Le statut de l’écrit. Afrique, Europe, Amérique latine, 
edited by Christine Albert, Abel Kouvouama & Gisèle Prignitz, 171–89. Pau: 
Presses universitaires de Pau.
Maupeu, Hervé. 2000. “Vie et mort d’un groupe de pression électoral: l’exemple 
de Youth for Kanu’92.” In Annuaire de l’Afrique orientale 2000, edited by 
François Grignon and Hervé Maupeu, 395–421. Paris: L’Harmattan.
Mueller, Lisa. 2018. Political Protest in Contemporary Africa. New York & 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.     
https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108529143.
Murunga, Godwin R. 2007. “Governance and the Politics of Structural 
Adjustment in Kenya.” In Kenya. The Struggle for Democracy, edited by 
Godwin R. Murunga & Shadrack W. Nasong’o, 263–300. Dakar: Codesria 
Books; London & New York: Zed Books.
Nugent, Paul. 2004. Africa since Independence: A Comparative History. 
Basingstoke & New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
Ochieng, William R. 1995. “Structural and Political Changes.” In Decolonization 
and Independence in Kenya, 1940–93, edited by Bethwell A. Ogot and William 
R. Ochieng. London, Nairobi & Athens (OH): James Currey.
Oloo, Adams G.R. 2007. “The Contemporary Opposition in Kenya: Between 
Internal Traits and State Manipulation.” In Kenya. The Struggle for 
Democracy, edited by Godwin R. Murunga and Shadrack W. Nasong’o, 90–
125. Dakar: Codesria Books; London & New York: Zed Books.
Onoma, Ato Kwamena. 2009. The Politics of Property Rights Institutions in 
Africa. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.    
https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511691942.
Otieno, R. Owino, and Njuguna S. Ndung’u. 2010. “Unlocking the Future 
Potential of Kenya—Vision 2030.” In Kenya. Policies for Prosperity, edited 




Phillips, Kristin D. 2018. An Ethnography of Hunger: Politics, Subsistence, and 
the Unpredictable Grace of the Sun. Bloomington: Indiana University Press. 
https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctv4rfqsv.
Pratt, Cranford. 1976. The Critical Phase in Tanzania 1945–1968: Nyerere and 
the Emergence of a Socialist Strategy. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Provini, Olivier, and Sina Schlimmer. 2018. Étude monographique  : Kenya. 
FAPPA Livrable no. 3.
Republic of Kenya. 2016. Report of the Auditor-General on the Financial 
Statements of National Irrigation Board. Nairobi: Republic of Kenya.
Routley, Laura. 2012. “Developmental States: A Review of the 
Literature.” Working Paper no. 3. Manchester: ESID.    
https://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2141837.
Saul, John S. 1979. The State and Revolution in Eastern Africa. London: 
Heinemann.
Shivji, Issa G. 1976. Class Struggles in Tanzania. London: Heinemann.
Swainson, Nicola. 1987. “Indigenous Capitalism in Postcolonial Kenya.” In The 
African Bourgeoisie: Capitalist Development in Nigeria, Kenya, and the Ivory 
Coast, edited by Paul M. Lubeck. Boulder (CO): Lynne Rienner.
Thelen, K. 2012. “Varieties of Capitalism: Trajectories of Liberalization and 
the New Politics of Social Solidarity.” Annual Review of Political Science 15, 
no. 1: 137–59. https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-polisci-070110-122959.
Thelen, K. 2014. Varieties of Liberalization and the New Politics of Social 
Solidarity. Cambridge & New York: Cambridge University Press.
Thomas, Chris. 1997. “Le Kenya d’une élection à l’autre. Criminalisation de 
l’État et succession politique (1995–1997).” Les Cahiers du CERI, no. 35.
Thomas, Chris. 1998. “L’économie politique d’une succession annoncée.” 
Politique africaine, no. 70: 40–53.     
http://www.politique-africaine.com/numeros/pdf/070040.pdf [archive].
Van de Walle, Nicolas. 2001. African Economies and the Politics of Permanent 
Crisis, 1979–1999. Cambridge & New York: Cambridge University Press.
Wrong, Michela. 2009. It’s Our Turn to Eat. The Story of a Kenyan Whistle-
Blower. London: Fourth Estate Medias.
Media
Apollo, Silas. 2017. “Ministry Rolls out Dam Projects to Boost Food 
Production.” Daily Nation, 26  December. https://nation.africa/news/Govt-
rolls-out-57-dam-project-to-boost-food-production/1056-4242428-format-
xhtml-bvfav0/index.html [archive].
Gachane, Ndung’u. 2018. “Now Wa Iria Slaps Nairobians with Water Levy as 
Revenue Row Escalates.” Daily Nation, 14 September. https://nation.africa/
kenya/news/wa-iria-slaps-nairobians-with-water-levy-as-revenue-row-
escalates-86672 [archive].
Githae, Wanjohi, and Patrick Lang’at. 2018. “Uhuru Swaps Departments as 
Focus Shifts to Big Four Agenda.” Sunday Nation, 18  February. https://




IEA (Institute of Economics Affairs). 2018. “How much Oil? Why East Africa’s 
Bounty Is neither Significant nor Exceptional.” The East African, 9–15 June. 
https://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/tea/business/how-much-oil-why-east-
africa-s-bounty-is-neither-significant-nor-exceptional--1395812 [archive].
Jebet, Vivian. 2018. “Isiolo Leaders Allege Diversion of Lapsset Route, Want 
Details of Map.” Daily Nation, 19 September.
Juma, Victor. 2014. “Making of a Mega Scandal? Why Railway Figures Do 
not Add up.” Sunday Nation, 26 January. https://nation.africa/kenya/news/
making-of-a-mega-scandal-why-railway-figures-do-not-add-up-942286 
[archive].
Kagwanja, Peter. 2018. “Kenya’s Vision 2030 Caught Between the Rock and 
a Hard Place.” Daily Nation, 17  September. https://nation.africa/kenya/
blogs-opinion/opinion/vision-2030-caught-between-the-rock-and-a-hard-
place-87604 [archive].
Kairu, Pauline. 2014. “Land Owners Along Rail Route Want Fresh Valuation.” 
Sunday Nation, 28 December.
Kariuki, James. 2015. “Big Projects Recipe for Kenya’s Growth: Study.” Daily 
Nation, 13 August.
Karambu, Immaculate. 2015. “Uhuru Faults SGR Contractor on 40pc 
Procurement Quota.” Daily Nation, 5 December.
Keprop, Victor. 2018. “Ethiopia Begins Production Tests at Ogaden Oilfield.” 
The East African, 30  June-6  July. https://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/tea/
business/ethiopia-begins-production-tests-at-ogaden-oilfield-1397200 
[archive].
“Kiambu County to Give Free NHIF Cover to 24,000 Families.” 2017. Daily 
Nation, 24 October.
Kisero, Jaindi. 2018. “Mistake: Rotich Budget Lumped ‘Big Four’ with Usual 
Spendings.” Daily Nation, 20  June. https://nation.africa/blogs/Henry-
Rotich-Budget-lumped--Big-Four--with-usual-spending/1949942-4620960-
13t2pwb/index.html [archive].
“Kisumu County Ready to Pilot Universal Healthcare.” 2018. Daily Nation, 
27 March.
Komu, Nicholas. 2018. “How Greed for Water and Impunity Pushing a 
Community to the Brink.” Daily Nation, 25  August. https://nation.africa/
kenya/news/how-greed-for-water-and-impunity-pushing-a-community-
to-the-brink-80648 [archive].
Komu, Nicholas. 2018. “Tharaka Nithi Launches TN-Care.” Daily Nation, 
14  September. https://nation.africa/kenya/brand-book/tharaka-nithi-
launches-tn-care-medical-cover--111570 [archive].
Komu, Nicholas. 2018. “Water Row: Leaders Break Ranks with Jubilee.” Daily 
Nation, 5 October.
Lang’at, Patrick. 2018. “Technology to Drive My Big Four Promises, Says 
Uhuru.” Daily Nation, 28 February.
Hervé Maupeu
68
Luvega, Derick, and Gaitano Pessa. 2018. “Eight Governors from Lake Region 
to Drum Up Support for Economic Bloc.” Saturday Nation, 9 June. https://
nation.africa/counties/Governors-to-drum-up-support-for-economic-
bloc/1107872-4602644-format-xhtml-byxs3c/index.html [archive].
Lwanga, Charles. 2018. “Kilifi MCAs Move to Push State out of Galana-Kulalu 
Project.” Business Daily, 1er March. https://www.businessdailyafrica.com/
news/counties/Kilifi-MCAs-stop-Galana-Kulalu-project/4003142-4324908-
148c21lz/index.html [archive].
Maina, Nelson. 2018. “Farm Clinics at Heart of Big Four Agenda.” Daily Nation, 
7  July. https://nation.africa/kenya/business/seeds-of-gold/farm-clinics-at-
heart-of-big-four-agenda-63688 [archive]
Marete, Gitonga. 2018. “Questions on Viability of SGR Refuse to Go away 
after China Cuts Funding.” Daily Nation, 17  September. https://www.
businessdailyafrica.com/news/Questions-on-viability-of-SGR-refuse-to-
go-away/539546-4761886-5fq1awz/index.html [archive].
Mathaura, Francis. 2018. “Vision 2030 Holds the Key to a Better and More 
Inclusive Kenya.” Saturday Nation, 9  June. https://nation.africa/kenya/
blogs-opinion/opinion/vision-2030-holds-the-key-to-a-better-and-more-
inclusive-kenya-52474 [archive].
Maundu, Pius. 2015. “Workers at New Railway on Strike.” Daily Nation, 
9  April. https://nation.africa/kenya/news/workers-at-new-railway-on-
strike-1083358 [archive].
Mbataru, Patrick. 2015. “Mega Projects Have Little Impact on the Poor.” Sunday 
Nation, 9 August. https://nation.africa/kenya/blogs-opinion/opinion/mega-
projects-have-little-impact-on-the-poor-1118308 [archive].
Munguti, Richard. 2018. “Authority Orders Posta to Pay Ex-workers Billions 
in Pension.” Daily Nation, 26  April. https://nation.africa/kenya/business/
posta-to-pay-4-000-ex-staff-more-benefits-36724 [archive].
Muraya, Beth. 2018. “Will the Big Four Agenda Usher in Transformative 
Economic Growth?” Sunday Nation, 10 June.
Mutua, Kitavi. 2018. “How Kitui Mineral Wealth Can Drive Uhuru’s Big Four.” 
Daily Nation, 19  June. https://nation.africa/counties/kitui/How-Kitui-
mineral-wealth-can-drive-Uhuru-s-Big-Four/3444936-4619212-mxlyqp/
index.html [archive].
Mwaniki, Charles. 2018. “Kenya Raises $2bn in Fresh Eurobonds Issue.” Business 
Daily, 22  February https://www.businessdailyafrica.com/markets/capital/
Kenya-says-fresh--2bn-Eurobond-oversubscribed-seven-times/4259442-
4315350-14pr01l/index.html [archive].
Mwololo, Millicent. 2018. “Sacco Turns Home Ownership Dream into Reality.” 
Daily Nation, 19 July. https://nation.africa/kenya/life-and-style/dn2/sacco-
turns-home-ownership-dream-into-a-reality-68454 [archive].
Mwololo, Millicent. 2018. “Cooperatives to Deliver 500,000 Social Housing 
Units.” Daily Nation, 19  July. https://nation.africa/lifestyle/dn2/
Cooperatives-to-deliver-social-housing-units/957860-4670584-format-
xhtml-1o51vjz/index.html [archive].
State, Economy and Development in Kenya
69
Namlola, Juma. 2018. “Saccos Told to Cash In on Uhuru’s Big Four Agenda.” 
Daily Nation, 19 February.
Namlola, Juma. 2018. “Co-operatives Key to Government’s Big Four Agenda.” 
Saturday Nation, 7 July.
Ndii, David. 2015. “If It Looks, Quacks and Walks Like a Duck, It Is the Lies 
About Eurobond.” Saturday Nation, 19  December. https://www.nation.
co.ke/kenya/blogs-opinion/opinion/if-it-looks-quacks-and-walks-like-a-
duck-it-is-the-lies-about-eurobond-1155142 [archive].
Ndii, David. 2016. “Mega Projects and Hollow Men: What $50 bn Can Do for 
a Nation.” Saturday Nation, 30  January. https://nation.africa/kenya/blogs-
opinion/opinion/mega-projects-and-hollow-men-what-50-bn-can-do-to-a-
nation-1165482 [archive].
Ndii, David. 2017. “Forget About Mega Projects and Address Everyday 
Woes.” Saturday Nation, 29 July. https://nation.africa/kenya/blogs-opinion/
opinion/forget-about-mega-projects-and-address-everyday-woes-430904 
[archive].
Ngugi, Brian, and Neville Otuki. 2018. “Faceless Cartels Lie in Wait for the Big 
Four Projects.” Daily Nation, 30 April.
Njagi, John, and John Ngirachu. 2014. “Graft Team Opens Probe on Rail Deal.” 
Daily Nation, 8 January.
Olingo, Allan. 2018. “Kenya Halts Plans for Electric Trains.” The East African, 
27 January–2 February.
Olingo, Allan. 2018. “No Pledges for Region’s Pipeline, Open Sky Deals.” The 
East African, 30 June-6 July. https://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/tea/business/
no-pledges-for-region-s-pipeline-open-sky-deals-1397178 [archive].
Olingo, Allan, and Victor Kiprop. 2018. “Ethiopia Reaches Out to Djibouti and 
Kenya to Partner on Mega Projects.” The East African, 12 May. https://www.
theeastafrican.co.ke/tea/business/ethiopia-reaches-out-to-djibouti-and-
kenya-to-partner-on-mega-projects--1393546 [archive].
Opanga, Kwenda. 2018. “Big Four Agenda and 2022: Reasons Uhuru Is 
Unhappy with His Deputy.” Sunday Nation, 10 June. https://nation.africa/
kenya/blogs-opinion/opinion/big-four-agenda-and-2022-reasons-uhuru-is-
unhappy-with-his-deputy-52754 [archive].
Openda, Joseph. 2018. “Retired Teachers Resume 18-year Pension Battle.” 
Daily Nation, 27 July.
Oruko, Ibrahim. 2018. “State Told to Work with Counties for Big Four Success.” 
Daily Nation, 5  June. https://nation.africa/kenya/news/politics/governors-
tell-state-to-work-with-counties-for-success-of-big-four-agenda-51230 
[archive].
Otuki, Neville. 2018. “Oil Billions Not Our Major Aim for Now, Says PS of 
Export Plan.” Daily Nation, 31 May. https://www.businessdailyafrica.com/
economy/Govt--Early-oil-export-not-a-profit-venture/3946234-4587156-
12xfs2b/index.html [archive].
Vidija, Patrick. 2018. “84% of Kenyans Support Devolution. Ipsos.” The Star, 
6 April.
Hervé Maupeu
Wafula, Paul. 2018. “Exclusive: Behind the SGR Walls.” The Standard, 8 July. 
https://www.standardmedia.co.ke/kenya/article/2001287119/exclusive-
behind-the-sgr-walls [archive].
Wanzala, Ouma. 2018. “Cash Crunch Hits EAC Integration Projects.” Daily 
Nation, 26  June. https://nation.africa/kenya/news/cash-crunch-hits-eac-
integration-projects-59296 [archive].
Warutere, Peter. 2018. “Diaspora Remittances Can Fund ‘Big 4’ Affordable 
Housing Plan.” Daily Nation, 10  May. https://nation.africa/oped/opinion/
Diaspora-remittances-can-fund--Big-4---housing-plan-/440808-4553158-
format-xhtml-jctg13z/index.html [archive].
Warutere, Peter. 2018. “Harmonise Relevant Laws for Equitable Growth.” 




The World of Banks  
and Finance in Kenya
Adeline Pelletier
Translated by Morgan Carmondy
Kenya is the dominant banking centre in East Africa with 43 commercial 
banks (as of 2014). This sector evolved considerably over the course of the last 
decade with the regional expansion of African banks, along with financial 
innovations and regulatory banking changes. As a result, the banking 
industry is particularly dynamic and is characterised by the coexistence 
of several types of banks; local Kenyan banks (31), subsidiaries of foreign 
banks (including global banks in developing countries, 4), emerging banks 
(mostly from Asian countries, 4), and regional African banks (4).
Between 2010 and 2015, some local banks, such as Kenya Commercial 
Bank and Equity Bank, experienced strong growth of their assets, to 
the point of exceeding the subsidiaries of multinational banks, such as 
Barclays or Standard Chartered.1 These big domestic banks have expansion 
strategies in East Africa, and more generally in Sub-Saharan Africa, opening 
subsidiaries in Uganda and Tanzania—thereby emulating the expansion 
of Nigerian banks (i.e. the United Bank of Africa) and Sub-Saharan banks 
(i.e. Standard Bank). With new models based on technological platforms, 
integrated mobile payment and bank branches2 (agency banking), these 
banks have rapidly developed and made large profits. A fieldwork conducted 
at the end of 2013 in Nairobi, including interviews with senior credit and 
risk managers, as well as managers of subsidiaries of 26 banks, sheds light 
on the credit practices of these banks.
1. In 2012, Standard Chartered’s total assets in Kenya were 195  billion  KES, 
compared with 91  billion  KES in 2007. For Barclays, these figures were 
185 billion KES in 2012, compared with 158 billion KES in 2007. Total assets of 
Kenya Commercial Bank amounted to 304 billion KES in 2012, compared with 
120 billion KES in 2007, while for Equity Bank, these figures were 216 billion KES 
in 2012, compared to 53 billion KES in 2007 (source: Banking Survey 2013, Kenya 
Bankers’ Association).
2. Non-banking entities that provide, on behalf of a financial institution, 
transaction and payment services. Small businesses, pharmacies, postal 
agencies, etc. can play this role.
Adeline Pelletier
72
1. Who Do Kenyan Banks Lend to?
The large majority of the banks surveyed lend primarily to the 
manufacturing, trade, construction and real estate sectors. While most 
bank managers interviewed highlighted the fact that there is currently a 
boom in the construction and real estate sector, the financing of this sector 
is mainly done by the domestic banks. The “global” foreign banks are more 
reluctant to finance it, because of a different risk appetite. The agricultural 
sector is largely forgotten financially by banks despite being one of Kenya’s 
most important sectors.
Concerning the composition of the lending portfolio of banks, loans to 
large companies generally make up the largest share (42% in total for the 
banks surveyed) followed by loans to Small and Medium-sized Enterprises 
(SMEs) (35%) and individuals (18%). The remaining 5% concerns loans to 
cooperatives (savings and credit cooperatives) or microfinance. However, 
domestic banks tend to offer more individual loans than the other types of 
banks, whereas foreign banks are more exposed to large businesses (more 
than 50% of loans for subsidiaries of regional African Banks, 61% for global 
banks, versus 36% for domestic banks). Regarding SMEs, subsidiaries of 
African regional banks have a level of exposure similar to domestic banks—
representing on average, for these two groups of banks, about one third of 
their loan portfolio. In comparison, the share of SME loans in the portfolio 
of global banks’ subsidiaries is about 20%. It should be noted, however, that 
banks’ definition of SMEs can vary considerably. The classification is often 
based on the turnover or the amount of the loans, but, depending on the 
bank surveyed, this amount varies between 3,000 USD and 1 million USD. 
Finally, it should be noted that the “business model” of some domestic banks 
is very focused on SMEs, as is the case for Equity Bank. Meanwhile some 
large foreign banks, such as Citi, do not participate in this sector, focusing 
instead on large companies or institutional clients.
2. Favourable Perception of the SME Finance Sector  
by Banks, but Important Constraints
Banks generally have a favourable impression of the SME segment, with 
92% of respondents considering it offered good financial opportunities. 
However, banks face significant constraints concerning their SME lending 
operations, which some believe limits the growth of their loan portfolio 
to this sector. Among the most cited problems for banks was insufficient 
or lack of collateral (24% of responses), lack of information (24%) and 
managerial insufficiencies for some SMEs (29%). Despite these obstacles, 
some respondents indicated that their bank had initiated a reallocation of 
their loan portfolio towards SMEs, due to the intense competition for loans 
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to large companies, and the potentially high returns offered by the SME 
segment. In addition, given the banking restrictions on the concentration 
of loans,3 the small domestic banks do not have the capacity to offer large 
loans, contrary to large domestic banks, such as Kenya Commercial Bank, 
and the subsidiaries of foreign banks.
3. Banking Innovations and Evolution  
towards Automation of Lending Practices
The large majority of banks surveyed operate a centralised organisation 
for credit functions, and for 89% of them all decisions concerning loans are 
executed by this central office. Some of the banking managers interviewed 
explained that this practice increases the operational efficacy of their bank. 
In addition, the development of credit bureaus4 facilitates banks’ screening 
of loan applicants.
To evaluate the demands of loans, the majority of banks concentrated on 
the “character” of loan applicants (through an analysis of the management 
of bank accounts), a criteria which could be subjective. But numerous 
banks have also established, or are in the process of establishing, Credit 
Core systems.
Generally, financing SME requires systems of screening and monitoring 
loans which can be expensive to set up for small banks. Equity Bank is an 
interesting model. Originally a mortgage bank, it became a microfinance 
institution before operating as a commercial bank. One of the peculiarities 
of Equity Bank is its Universal Banking Software, which automates the 
majority of decisions and helps client advisors in their lending work. 
Coupled with a remuneration system for their staff based on performance, 
this system allows for efficient evaluation and monitoring of the customers, 
private individuals, and SMEs.
One of the latest successful banking innovations is mobile payment. Half 
of the banks surveyed offer this service (100% for African bank subsidiaries), 
although this may have forced banks to rethink their business model by 
encouraging them to establish partnerships with telecommunications 
companies.
3. The loan limit is set at 25% of the bank’s own funds per borrower.




4. A Competitive Environment Marked by Judicial 
Slowness but a Benevolent Regulator
The intensity of competition and the difficulty to access customer deposits 
are the two challenges most cited by the banks surveyed. 80% of bank 
executives interviewed considered that the competition for deposits was 
strong or intense. The competition between banks for SME loans is equally 
high, with 66% of banks considering it as strong or intense. But this figure is 
even greater in the corporate lending sector, rising to 75% of banks surveyed. 
The vast majority of banks (70%) consider that banking regulations do not 
constitute, or constitute a minor obstacle to their activity. However, the 
legal system and the slowness of tribunals are often mentioned by banks as 
a hurdle to their activities (62% of people surveyed consider it to represent 
an important or extreme obstacle). The judicial procedures are often long 
and this route is used only as a last resort because it is difficult for banks to 
recover collateral in this way.
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Chapter 2
The Large Gaps  
in Development in Kenya
Bernard Calas
Translated by Geoffrey D. Hilton, Elliot Brennan & Catherine S. Davis
The purpose of this chapter is not to re-examine each point previously 
discussed in 1998 in my contribution to Le Kenya Contemporain (Grignon 
& Prunier 1998). First, some of the characteristics of the country have not 
fundamentally changed: there is no need to revisit them. This chapter 
rather seeks to present the major geographic changes that have taken 
place in Kenya—which I call “the ageing” of places—with reference to the 
double ageing that the novelist Georges Pérec highlighted in his Des Lieux: 
that of my writing, and that of my own subjectivity. This contribution will 
thus be marked by these three forms of ageing but will focus solely on the 
dynamics of Kenya’s different areas. It will be less about “accounting for 
extreme diversity”—as was the case in 1998—but more about shedding light 
on the major geographic changes of the last 25 years by distinguishing two 
types of areas: the attractive and integrated areas, and the unattractive and 
marginalised ones.
Before all else, it is important to present two important factors that 
influence the majority of challenges in Kenya and Africa in general.
First of all, in 28 years, the Kenyan population has more than doubled, 
growing from 23  million inhabitants to nearly 53  million (Pison 2019)! 
These numbers should be considered carefully. Imagine if the population 
of France1 grew from its current 64 million people to 120 million in 2040… 
and, during the current migration “crisis,” imagine the debates, tensions, 
and changes begotten by such growth. This change is the most important 
and must be kept in mind. Kenya is obviously not the only country to have 
experienced this kind of boom. Indeed, the country’s growth was not the 
most significant in either relative or absolute terms. Neither unique nor 
extreme, the growth of the Kenyan population demonstrates the vitality of 
the African demographic transition, and this without falling into unseemly 
Malthusianism. Regardless from what angle we consider the country or the 
continent beyond, we must embrace this amasing vital dynamic that makes 
1. This text was originally published in French for a French-speaking audience: 




half the population younger than 18 years old! It places the politics of men 
and of numbers at the centre of debates and this perspective influences the 
analysis of inequality and development in Kenya. Furthermore, instead of 
opening with a discussion on the physical base, one should better introduce 
the people and their most important characteristics.
Next, it must be emphasised that Kenya is still, and will remain for decades, 
affected by development problems more than anything else. Of course, it 
has developed to the point of being struck off the list of Least Developed 
Countries (LDC). An average annual economic growth rate over 30 years of 
5-6% per year—despite declines and slowdowns due to political, climate, and 
cyclical risks—made it possible for the country’s GDP (67 billion USD, 68th 
globally) and GDP per capita (1,380 USD per capita) to rise. Nevertheless, it 
is still not an emerging market in the eyes of commercial banks and rating 
agencies. Although Kenya is no longer on the LDC list, analysts envisage 
it as one of the “African lions” (Mac  Kinsey 2013). Its elites expect the 
country to emerge around 2030 (Vision 2030) and flaunt their aspiration 
of joining the other “tigers” and Asian “dragons.” Yet the country remains 
fundamentally crippled by development problems. The slightest drought 
can lead to shortages and famines, with repercussions on the economy and 
society as a whole. A minor adverse El Niño-related weather event can 
paralyse the economy. Even if it is above the African average, Kenya’s HDI 
(0.548 that ranked 145th in the world in 2014; 0.43 in 1990 ranked 156th) 
remains relatively low. Its development is extremely unequally distributed, 
both socially and geographically: 45% of the population still live on less than 
2 USD per day and its Gini index (0.51), far from decreasing, is growing and 
makes it one of the most unequal societies in Africa. In total, the average 
Kenyan’s monthly income of USD 115 places it 140th in the world.
These two introductory ideas underline the importance of the changes 
in the way in which the country has faced three major challenges 
of development: demographic transition, economic diversification, 
and structural transformation to end its dependence on aid, but also 
environmental sustainability as growing needs push productivity beyond 
environmental limits in a context of intensified globalisation. The challenges 
have brought about changes—spectacular for some, subdued for others—
that must now be discussed.
1. First Challenge: Demographic Transition
In the 2009 census (before the most recent one of August 2019), the Kenyan 
population was growing at a rate of 2.8% per year, doubling every 25 years. 
Since then, according to international organisations, growth has decreased 
to 2.3% per year (Pison 2019). The Kenyan population is therefore in the 
midst of a demographic transition. Growth is decelerating (3.3% in 1990), 
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under the influence of the decreased birth rate, itself correlated with the 
decrease in the Total Fertility Rate (6.6 in 1990, 4.7 in 2009, 3.4 in 2019). 
Kenyans are having fewer children than their Ugandan and Tanzanian 
neighbours or than their parents. According to the last Demographic and 
Health Survey (2014), after stagnating for a decade and even rising back to 
4.6-4.9 children per woman at the end of the 1990s, the national fertility rate 
fell below 4 children per woman. This was the result of an increase in the 
uptake of contraceptive practices. At present, 60% of women older than 15 
use contraceptive methods, compared with a third in 2000. This increased 
uptake is partially due to the introduction of free primary schooling in 
2003. If the uptake of contraceptive practices continues at this rate, it may 
allow the country to benefit from a “population dividend.” This occurred 
in South-East Asia fifty years ago where it lowered the dependency ratio 
before it raised again due to the ageing population. For Kenya, this may 
quickly increase GDP per capita—the central measure of development.
The growing use of contraception is combined with the slight rise in 
the age at marriage (20 years old), the rise of the age at first birth, and the 
decline of the proportion of teenage pregnancies (from 12.7% in 1990 to 9% 
today), all linked to tangible women’s empowerment. Infant mortality has 
also decreased (from 98‰ in 1990 to 79‰ in 2009 to 35‰ in 2019; see Pison 
2019), improving children’s chances of survival. Classically, improvement 
of girls’ education results in a decline in women’s desire to have children, 
and an increase of inter-birth intervals.
However, the geography of this demographic transition and the 
decrease in birth rates and fertility show a clear contrast between the 
Central Highlands and the rest of the country. In the counties of Meru and 
Kirinyaga, more than 70% of women have access to contraception while, 
in the lowlands of the north-north-east (counties of Wajir, Mandera, and 
Garissa) less than 7% of women use it. The Western Highlands, the Great 
Rift Valley, and the Coast are in the middle.
Life expectancy, after having fallen to 51 years old in 2000 due to the 
effects of the AIDS pandemic, has risen back to 67 years old, which marks 
entry in the post-AIDS period. However, some 1.6 million people still have 
HIV in Kenya. Large geographic inequalities in the struggle against death 
have appeared: in the Lake Victoria region, particularly in Luo lands, HIV 
prevalence remains high.
Has Growth Changed the Spatial Distribution  
of the Kenyan Population?
In 2009, the average density of Kenya was 66 people per square kilometre. 
This is meaningless, given the large differential between, for instance, the 
rural density of Vihiga county with Asian-like levels of 973 people per 
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square kilometre in 2009, and the quasi-Saharan levels of Marsabit with 4 
people per square kilometre. High densities are centred in the highlands, 
particularly in the west (Kisii 877; Nyamira 659; Bungoma 452; Kakamega 
546; Trans-Nzoia 324) but also in the eastern slopes of the Central 
Highlands (Nyeri 204; Kirinyaga 352; Muranga 366; Meru 193; Embu 180; 
Machakos 175; even Makueni 109). These higher densities correspond with 
the Luhya, Kisii, Kikuyu, and Kamba lands. The foothills and fringes of 
these highlands (Baringo 50; West Pokot 56; Laikipia 46; Narok 47) and the 
coast are in the middle (Kwale 78; Kilifi 87). The lowest densities (often less 
Figure 1. Usage of modern contraceptive methods
Bernard Calas, Valérie Alfaurt, 2019.
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than 10 people per square kilometre) are spread across the northeastern 
half of the country.
Fundamentally, the dynamics that were identified 25 years ago still 
hold: densification in already populated areas, pioneer fronts that are 
spontaneously loosening on the margins, migrations towards agrarian 
townsites from the old ‘White Highlands’, along with urbanisation through 
the creation of new towns, through the increasing size of existing towns, 
and the sprawl of suburbs and urban peripheries of the biggest cities. The 
Brownian motion is accentuated and polytopic ways of life have multiplied, 
Figure 2. Map of population densities
Bernard Calas, Valérie Alfaurt, 2019.
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facilitated by mobile telephony (89% of Kenyans had a mobile telephone 
number in 2017) and the improvement of automobile accessibility in 
many areas of the country. However, use of mobile phones, the Internet, 
the boda boda and the matatu have not radically upset the density map. 
The crowded highlands are becoming increasingly crowded while the arid 
lowlands of the north and the north-east are still relatively empty, even 
though the density is increasing. Two-thirds of the Kenyan population 
used to live above 1,500 m. Although this has now fallen to 1,200 m, the 
famous butterfly-shaped highlands remain the home of the majority of the 
population, together with the coastal border.
This does not mean that Kenyans are not moving, however. In 2009, 
20% of Kenyans did not live in their county of birth. At the county level, 
mobility numbers express the different level of attractiveness of the regions. 
Unsurprisingly, the less attractive areas are in the arid and sometimes 
unsafe parts of north-eastern Kenya (Mandera, Wajir), the north (Turkana, 
Marsabit) and the small farms areas in semi-arid parts of the east (Kitui, 
and to a small extent Makueni or Tharaka on the eastern piedmont of 
Mt Kenya). The only exceptions in this unattractive environment are the 
Dadaab camps populated by Somali refugees (Meyerfeld 2016; Chkam 2016, 
79-97), county seats, and border checkpoints. In contrast, the attractiveness 
of the Lamu-Garsen region is tied to its large harbour and agricultural 
projects. Uasin Gishum, Elgoyo Marakwet, Trans-Nzoia, Nyandarua, and 
Laikipia are also attractive counties: farmers establish there, sometimes on 
the White Highlands or at the expense of forests and protected lands that 
were delisted at the start of the 2000s, and as a result of the creation of 
several displaced persons camps from the 2007–08 crisis. The net migration 
in the cities of Nairobi, Mombasa, Kisumu, Eldoret, and Nakuru but also 
in the central areas around the capital (suburban countries of Kiambu and 
Kajiado) underline how important cities have become to Kenyans. This 
urban attractiveness can be found on all scales: for example, more than 
half of the inhabitants of Isiolo, a town set in the arid foothills to the north 
of Mt Kenya (Samburu and Shaba region)—generally not a particularly 
attractive area—were born in another county. Likewise, the migration maps 
of the Socio-Economic Atlas of Kenya (Wiesmann, Kiteme & Mwango 2014, 
38-39) show the attractiveness of Namanga, Oliotoktok, Kasigau, Maralal, 
Marsabit, or even Lodwar, and of a whole series of small and medium-sized 
towns (Calas 2007, 3-22).
Indeed, one of Kenya’s decisive trends today is urbanisation—in the 
same as in the rest of Africa. It affects both men (and women) and places. 
The population is urbanising at a rate of 4% per year. Firstly, this is due to a 
daily increase in the number of people living in cities resulting from natural 
growth and moderate rural exodus. Secondly, urbanisation concerns areas 
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where the small towns become denser: a large range of activities are taking 
place in locations that previously were only cross-roads, weekly markets 
and police stations. The population is also urbanising because of increased 
mobility and because the ties thus created are “rurbanising” the countryside 
(Racaud, Nakileza, Bart & Charlery de la Masselière 2016)—that is, because 
the countryside is increasingly integrated with the urban world. As a result, 
the macrocephaly of the urban network is decreasing.
Figure 3. Map of attractive and unattractive counties
Bernard Calas, Valérie Alfaurt, 2019.
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2. Second Challenge: Structural Diversification
This second challenge relates to the analysis of economic activity which, as 
it is linked to the issue of development, is about the reduction of dependence 
on primary materials and prices through economic diversification and by 
moving up industrial value chains, that is to say, through what is well 
known as “structural transformation.”
Table 1. Contributions to GNP and employment  












KENYA 1990 30 66 19 7 51 26 26 31 24
KENYA 2016 36 61 19 9 45 30 15 23 17
Sources: World Development Indicators Database, 3 January 2018.
The relative increase of the share of agriculture in GNP between 1990 
and 2016 is surprising as it seems to contradict not only the theories of 
development that promote structural transformation at the expense of 
agriculture and profits for manufacturers or service providers, but also 
ideas that development should rely upon industrialisation, the expansion of 
the tertiary sector, and de-agrarianisation (Bryceson & Van Der Laan 1994).
Far from declining in the production of wealth, agriculture is, in fact, 
progressing even though the GDP is growing by 5% per year! The concurrent 
relative shrinkage of agriculture’s contribution to employment confirms 
the improvement of agricultural productivity. However, it is important 
to remember that in absolute terms, the number of people working in 
agriculture has increased substantially even though farmlands have not 
extended in proportion, which implies an actual increase in yields. This 
joint growth of productivity and agricultural yields underlines the extent to 
which agricultural transformation is at the heart of the dynamic of growth 
and development in Kenya.
Some people in the countryside are becoming big farmers and even 
agrobusinessmen. This transformation takes the intensification route: 
better crop varieties (but not GMOs yet), more extensive and careful use 
of inputs, and shorter crop rotations along with more frequent use of small 
hydropower are all part of this dynamic. This is made possible through 
the integration of defined areas (terroirs) in a number of national, regional, 
and global value chains and to the production in Kenya of products with 
higher added values, notably through the procurement of certificates for 
selected products. The rise of cash-subsistence crops for urban areas, “the 
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supermarket’s revolution,” the emergence of East African agri-food trade 
(mainly legumes and grains), the multiplication of shipping contracts for 
fruits and vegetables to be exported fresh or packaged, frozen or tinned, 
and horticultural investment all determine the increased value of labour, 
land, water, and agricultural production. Green beans, mangetout, onions, 
basil, roses, milk thistle, mangos, pineapples, wheat, corn, chicken, etc. find 
their way to markets in major cities in Kenya, East Africa, Europe, Russia, 
Japan, or Arabia, thereby allowing farmers to improve their conditions. 
This integration has come about through the opening of the localised 
areas (terroirs) to traffic, contracts, credit, bank accounts, small scale 
irrigation equipment, cold storage rooms, and to better access to inputs. It 
is supported by the Kenyan government’s proactive strategy to improve its 
network of agricultural technicians tasked to mercilessly enforce Western 
importers’ prescriptive requirements regarding Maximum Residue Levels2 
and quality in order to open new markets for export. These commercial 
and productive reconfigurations complicate technical farm trajectories for 
which diversification is becoming widespread. They accentuate rural socio-
economic contrasts while favouring the structuring of the countryside 
into production basins that reduce the Kenyan agricultural geography 
of agricultural belts. However, the rural socio-economic contrast is not 
totally eradicated due to the resilience of some localised areas (terroirs) that 
specialise in coffee production and the successful production of tea.
The time has passed when Kenya’s post-colonial economy was 
dominated by coffee and tea: these two crops represent no more than 30% 
of export revenues and this decrease in overall share of production shows 
the extent of recent diversification and structural transformation. However, 
the two still play an important role in many farmers’ access to cash. Despite 
pessimistic predictions, coffee has not disappeared, even if it is shrinking 
around the best-performing coffee factories that play the label card 
(Barjolle, Quinones-Ruiz, Bagal & Comoé 2017, 105-119), quality label, and 
even prestige origin labelling. Above 1,800 m, tea crops have progressed in 
profiting from high prices and the performance of Kenyan tea.
Thus, far from being homogeneous, Kenyan agriculture has various 
production speeds: large agricultural holdings with more than 20 ha (27% of 
the value of commercial agricultural production)—which were sometimes 
inherited from the large colonial estates (tea, coffee) or result from recent land 
investment (sugar cane, market gardening, biofuel)—coexist and compete 
with commercial farmers often from the cooperative sector or from contract 
farming; and a multitude of smallholders who combine as much as they can 
subsistence and cash farming in varied proportions. They often diversify in 




an attempt to escape the hard lot of farmers or smallholders, who often live 
in the arid or semi-arid borderlands or the hinterlands landlocked by the 
coast and devoid of the resources of commercial integration such as pluri-
activity. Agriculture reflects Kenyan society: fragmented and profoundly 
unequal. At the same time, it is the most important sector of the economy 
contributing 60% of export revenue, and the most important segment of 
society in that it provides an often poorly paid and precarious living to 
the majority of Kenyans. Consequently, the economic and social future of 
the country rests on agriculture. In light of this, agriculture should be the 
focus of decision-makers and development brokers. This is also why the 
two most important factors of agricultural production—land and water—
are at the heart of Kenya’s development issues.
On average, terms of trade are becoming increasingly unfavourable for 
agricultural products: from the index of 100 in 2001, they fell to 49 in 2016! 
Only the exacerbation of contrasts and inequalities, within the agricultural 
sector itself, can at the same time explain the growth of agriculture’s 
contribution to the GDP and the global deterioration of the terms of trade.
Table 2. Evolution of performance of colonial commercial crops
2006 2011 1016
Coffee
Price (KES) for a 100 kg 




Cooperatives 128,888 85,000 88,000
Plantations 42,000 25,000 26,000
Production 
(Tonnes)
Cooperatives 27,000 27,000 30,000






Price (KES) for a 100 kg 




Cooperatives 95,000 125,000 140,000
Plantations 51,000 65,000 80,000
Production 
(Tonnes)
Cooperatives 191,000 218,000 265,000
Plantations 120,000 151,000 207,000
Yields  
(Kg/ha)
Cooperatives 2,225 2,037 2,084
Plantations 2,700 2,953 2,908
Sources: KNBS Economic Survey 2011 and 2016.
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Table 3. Change in indices of the main agricultural types  
of production in quantity and value (index 100 in 2001)
2005 2009 20013 2016
Quantity Value Quantity Value Quantity Value Quantity Value
Grains 105 109 66 171 98 227 95 213
Sugar 123 95 139 132 146 167 172 169
Horticulture 179 93 197 106 223 165 277 151
Tea/Coffee 105 100 101 162 119 218 146 217
Meat/milk 150 128 179 147 260 261 328 321
Sources: KNBS Economic Survey 2011 and 2016.
Table 4. Exports (weight and value) of cut flowers, fruits, and vegetables
2005 2012 2016
Flowers
81,000 t. 108,000 133,000
23 billion 65 billion 71 billion
Fruits
18,000 t. 31,000 t. 50,000 t.
2 billion 5 billion 7 billion
Vegetables
64,000 t. 66,000 t. 80,000 t.
14 billion 20 billion 23 billion
Sources: KNBS Economic Survey 2011 and 2016.
Landscapes3
Following the increase of human and agricultural development, natural 
landscapes have practically disappeared and only really exist in protected 
areas (15% of Kenya’s territory): or, on the decline, they are being eroded 
by the stubble-burning of charcoal makers in dry regions with low pastoral 
densities, as for example in the Nyaki desert between Mombasa and Voi, 
where wood charcoal is a fast, but predatory, path to profit. However, 
cultivated areas cover no more than 20% of the territory.
The Kikuyu, Meru, and Embu lands remain the agricultural heart of 
the country. The commercial orientation of this agriculture is recognised 
and intensification is at its height. Following the abandonment of coffee 
plantations, the polycultural diversification of large holdings, their opening 
to commercial sectors, the involvement of agricultural households in non-
agricultural activities, and often polytopic multi-activity have reinforced 
a multitude of small commercial urban centres linked by genuine linear 
desakotas along the roads. On a smaller scale, these dynamics form a genuine 
agro-urban region centred around Nairobi (Calas, 2004): the strategies of 
3. See Said, Okwi, Ndeng’e, Agatsiva & Kilele (2007).
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sectoral or spatial overlapping related to Brownian movements integrate the 
terroirs into a large area harnessed to the capital city. This homogenisation 
impedes neither unequalisation between farmers of the same village, nor 
the emergence of landless farmers, nor the relative specialisation of specific 
productive basins in terms of physical amenities and technical solidarity.
In the West (Luhya, Luo, Teso, and Kisii lands), crop combinations are 
very complex and oriented towards subsistence intensification adapted to 
extremely high densities, to the low scale of land holdings, to the relative 
poverty of many farmers, and to a lesser integration if compared to the 
Central Province and its commercial networks. There, people strive to 
minimise subsistence risks and to diversify farming on smaller and smaller 
plots by relying on old agricultural know-how and fine-tuning farming. For 
example, the commonly used corn/sorghum combination allows farmers to 
prevent their crops from being ravaged by corn borers.
Agroforestry and bocage dominate the highland landscapes. Contrary to 
the widely accepted perception, trees are spreading, and this is especially 
true of faster-growing species (grevillea mainly, even if numerous projects 
expect to restore native trees).
In the lowlands, vast, parched and scrubland, attacked by the axes of 
charcoal producers and the buckets of diggers highly contrast with the 
green ribbons of irrigated lands. In between these two extremes, one finds 
semi-arid regions such as, for instance, in Ukambani or the Tugen region 
where drillings and wells allow citrus orchards and mango trees to thrive 
and alternate with traditional pluvial grain farming, often cultivated in 
terraces (Tiffen, Mortimore & Gichuki 1994).
However, this agricultural performance does not contradict the growth 
of manufacturing or services. In these sectors, diversification has occurred, 
even if it has been partially hidden on the macroeconomic scale.
As the driving force of employment (Twining-Ward, Li, Bhammar & 
Wright 2018) and an early diversified sector, tourism has also undergone 
diversification. The mass tourism of 1970–1980 is now combined with more 
distinctive kinds of tourism underpinned by a diversification of activities 
offered, notably Outdoor Physical Activities (Calas 2015). However, being 
very sensitive to political and security risks, Kenya’s international image 
has suffered due to the Westgate Shopping Mall attack in Nairobi (2013), 
the attack at Garissa University College, and the Al-Shabaab attacks in the 
Lamu region (2014). Faced with this situation, tour operators have reoriented 
themselves to cater to domestic and African tourists. While not a perfect 
substitute for the previous tourist flows—hotel occupancy rates (6 million 
overnight stays with capacity for around 20 million) remain notoriously 
low—they allow hotels to maintain the minimum level of activity necessary 
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to remain open all year round and maintain tourist infrastructure. However, 
since 2016, the international situation has slowly been improving.
In terms of the number of guests, tourism is mainly focused on the coast 
and its white sands, its coconut trees, its turquoise waters, its transparent 
lagoons, and even its nightclubs—which is typical of a tropical destination; 
yet, in a less expected way, the capital city is the second destination 
chosen by tourists. Being a national airport hub but also due to its many 
conferences and symposiums, Kenya’s capital looms large in the country’s 
tourist geography. National parks and animal reserves are only the third 
Figure 4. Land use in Kenya
Bernard Calas, Valérie Alfaurt, 2019.
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most important destination. Notwithstanding, fauna and nature are the 
emblem of Kenya as a destination in the international market: they shape 
tourism and, through it, the country itself.
In the cities, the growing number of malls and supermarkets, the rise 
in the value of manufacturing, the financialisation of the economy, the 
relative openness to high-tech industries, to artistic industries, and business 
process outsourcing, all embody the diversification of the secondary and 
tertiary sectors. However, they must not—in turn—conceal the informal 
sector, small scale street vending, handicrafts, domestic work (Lanne 2018), 
Figure 5. Protected forests and protected animal areas
Bernard Calas, Valérie Alfaurt, 2019.
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recycling, and even petty theft that provide an income to the majority of 
urban residents. “Coders,” the “iHub” teleworking platform, the future 
“Silicon Savannah” (Johari 2015), French and Chinese investors amongst 
others, are attracted by the authorities’ pro-business attitudes and by the 
prowess of the “start-up nation.” Whilst they delight in trade forums and 
their employees frequent stylish bars in the city, the majority of urban 
residents remain concerned about poor employment opportunities, misery 
and the daily insecurity of “jua kali.” Of course, factories have flourished 
and the road between Jomo Kenyatta International Airport and Nairobi city 
centre is no more than a succession of warehouses, factories, showrooms, 
conference centres, and business hotels that employ a significant portion 
of the population. But the day-to-day workers and subcontractors wander 
along the edge of the city’s roads before dawn and again late in the evening, 
hoping to save money on public transport by walking. Nairobi appeared in 
the ranking of global competitive cities (115th out of 120, 5th in Africa after 
Johannesburg, Cape Town, Durban, and Cairo according to the Economist 
Intelligence Unit in 2012) but many women in Nairobi stand at the roadside 
selling small piles of tomatoes and onions and their second-hand clothes or 
plastic Chinese products. In the gaps between the industrial zones, slums 
like Mukuru—less iconic than Mathare or Kibera, yet all the more squalid—
are entrenching themselves. Despite their spectacular intrusion into urban 
landscapes, the notably architectural landmarks of economic success do not 
change the sectoral power relations that pull more than 80% of the workers 
entering the urban labour market into the informal sector and precarious 
work sector. The rhetoric about the emergence of a Kenyan middle class is 
over-optimistic and a myth (Darbon & Toulabor 2014). In effect, if 10% of 
the population earns more than 5,000 USD per year, that means that 90% 
earns less. A large floating population—with incomes just more than 2 USD 
per day—has certainly emerged from poverty, yet without reaching middle 
class. Is that to say that we are dealing with illusory development? How 
does this make up society?
Beyond the cosmopolitanism of Nairobi and other large cities, urban 
landscapes display in nuanced ways an increasingly complex social 
stratification: sheet metal slums, tenement cities of concrete and greyish 
basalt blocks (Hurzschmeyer 2007), housing developments of semi-detached 
dwellings, groups of posh buildings, towers, and gated communities are all 
side by side, separated by walls and railings, by bigger and bigger avenues 
that receive more and more traffic, urban highways, and bypasses that do 
not prevent traffic jams but only mitigate the delays.
The classical dynamics of a liberal metropolis govern urban extension. The 
cleaning of the CBD (Morange 2015, 247-269), the emergence of alternative 
centralities (Westlands and Upper Hill), segregated urban sprawl, and 
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generalised bunkerisation, all suggest a Brazil-type metropolisation, as far 
as urban mega-projects are plenty (Saraswati 2014), such as the new Tatu 
City (built on old coffee plantations on the initiative of an investment fund) 
or the Two Rivers Mall that hosts a Carrefour hypermarket. The role of 
China in a massive 800-million-dollar real estate project bolsters this idea 
of Nairobi’s liberal metropolisation. These urban megaprojects embody 
to the extreme the growing gap between the often-closed-minded visions 
which are occasionally realised in the form of localised enclaves, and the 
ordinary reality of the majority of Nairobi’s inhabitants (Watson 2013, 215-
231; Jaglin, Didier & Dubresson 2018).
This economic diversification goes together with a reorientation of 
customers and suppliers. As Europe becomes less dominant, and the 
countries of the sub-region and COMESA become important commercial 
partners, Asia, now represents half of the imports (notably petroleum 
products from the Gulf and manufactured goods from China and India).
Table 5. Commercial deficit and commercial balance in 2016
Exports 500 billion KES Imports 1,400 billion KES
Tea 120 Oil 183 (300 in 2014)
Flowers 110 Animal fats 53
Textiles 30 Plastics 60
Coffee 21 Machines 253






Steel 13 Steel 75
Source: KNBS Economic Survey 2011 and 2016.






(China 25% of total imports)
Other 10%
Sources KNBS Economic Survey 2011 and 2016.
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3. Third Challenge: Environmental Sustainability in a 
context of Pressure on the Environment
Combined with the growth of the population, these geoeconomic changes 
require the intensification and broadening of exploitation activities, even 
putting pressure on the environment in order to increase productivity. 
This concerns not only the surface but also the substrate, that is to say, the 
subsurface and the lower atmosphere. Productivity beyond environment 
limits necessitates drilling, catchments, levelling of the ground, the 
installation of pylons and antennas, the laying of cables and pipes, 
the construction of dams, of electricity grids, which are all signs of the 
increasing anthropisation of the environment. However, for the last thirty 
years, the paradigm of sustainability has been imposed on the world’s 
development agenda, which means that increasing productivity should 
ideally be “eco-economic friendly.” The question is therefore no longer to 
describe the environment as such but to focus on exploitation operations 
and the relationship between humans and their environment, as well as the 
tensions that these relationships stir up, considering also the regulations 
that target them.
Decision-makers, environmental lobbies and the civil society worry 
about deforestation and its effects, the reduction of wild fauna, the erosion 
of biodiversity, the increasing risks of, most notably, floods and erosion, 
and generally the accentuation of the negative externalities of Kenya’s 
development. This is why, in the wake of the Brundtland report (World 
Commission on Environment and Development 1987), environmental 
requirements were imposed on development projects and programmes 
in Kenya like in the rest of the world. In the South, Socio-Environmental 
Impact Assessments (SEIA) became widespread, environmental clean-ups 
or at least their monstration were made obligatory to the point that the 
environmental concern is no longer limited to conservationist circles, but 
permeates the entire economy.
Of course, the common classification produced by the “tropico-
developmentalist” ideology of the 1950s-1960s that distinguished nine 
agro-ecological zones by combining physical diagnostics and agricultural 
objectives is still relevant to understand the country. However, it must 
be pushed further by observing the physical potentialities and the ways 
these are turned into commodities, and then into resources. This trend is 
brought about by the increase of needs caused by the combined pressure of 
demographic and economic growth. The top commodities converted into 
resources are water, fossil fuels, renewable energy sources, biodiversity, 
and mineral matter. For the last 30 years, they have been—and continue 
to be—the central issues of Kenyan development. Today they point to its 
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contradictions and tensions even more significantly—or perhaps more 
explicitly—than before. The result is that a certain number of places with 
these potential resources are becoming “eco-economic” hot spots and 
concentrate some of Kenya’s geopolitical issues.
The whole of Kenya suffers from water scarcity as its renewable water 
resources amount to less than 1,000  m3 per person per year (Bates et al. 
2008, 93–94). As a consequence, hydrous potentials have become important 
issues and hydro-political hot spots. The most important of these hot spots 
are the country’s “water towers,” that is to say, the major mountainous 
ranges: Mt Kenya (5,199 m), Mt Elgon (4,321 m), the Mau Forest and the 
Aberdares (4,000 m), and the Cherangani Hills (see also Rouillé-Kielo in this 
volume). These ranges where it rains more and more often than elsewhere 
(2,300 mm at 2,000 metres high on the southeast face of Mt Kenya) have 
bogs and forests that, like sponges, slowly release water, supporting the 
flows of springs and rivers that diverge from them. Deforestation and 
land clearing, therefore, impact the water balance of these mountains by 
diminishing retention efficiency, even though total rainfall may increase. As 
a consequence, the rivers originating from these mountains, their high and 
low water patterns, as well as lakes, have become a centre of attention and 
controversy, of debates and passionate polemics. Yet, the trend has returned 
to hydroelectric dams that also create irrigation reservoirs for downstream 
agricultural areas (Tharaka Dam) and the large flat areas that border them 
are coveted by large property developers (Leauthaud et al. 2013).
From the Sahara to the United States, deep fossil aquifer exploitation has 
also become common. How would Kenya escape this trend? The discovery 
of the Lotikipi basin aquifer in northern Turkana has thus been a windfall 
for the people in a region that is regularly threatened by droughts but 
also—but less publicised—by the disastrous effects of the construction of 
Ethiopian hydroelectric dams in the Omo valley.4 Even more discretely, it 
certainly serves as a windfall for the oil companies that will need large 
volumes of water to extract oil in the depths of Lake Turkana (see more 
below).5 Kenyan hydro-politics are particularly heated and conflicts around 
water resources are multiplying, constituting an especially pertinent part 
of the analysis of power relations (Rouillé, Blanchon, Calas & Temple-
Boyer 2015). The conflicts about the usage of water from Lake Naivasha 
4. Since 2015, hydroelectric and hydraulic initiatives in the Ethiopian Omo 
Valley have lowered the water level of Lake Turkana by over 1.5 metres and 
this will likely occur again, reducing the surface of the lake in the areas with 
the most fish (Human Rights Watch -14 February 2017). This could turn Lake 
Turkana into an African Aral Sea just as giant agricultural projects such as Give 
IV (the largest dam in Africa) and Give V are being built.
5. 4/5 barrels of water are needed to produce a barrel of oil.
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Figure 6. The physical base and its “eco-economic friendly” commodities
Bernard Calas, Valérie Alfaurt, 2019.
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and Lake Baringo and the conflicts between residents living upstream or 
downstream of the Ewaso Ng’iro or Tana rivers, are textbook cases of a 
myriad of hydro-political conflicts.
Towards a Green Kenya? The Energy Problem and the Electricity Mix
The growth of energy needs requires an increased use of energy resources 
that punctuate the country’s geography with extraction and exploitation 
sites. In effect, the growing pressure of needs combined with the 
diversification of technical capabilities is transforming certain aspects of 
Figure 7. The agro-ecological zones
Bernard Calas, Valérie Alfaurt, 2019.
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the environmental resources which a short while ago were considered to 
be of no interest. As with most African countries, energy is chief among the 
preoccupations of decision-makers such as investors. Investment experts 
point to the Kenyan electricity sector as a growth market, ranked 4th on 
the continent (Havas Horizon 2016). The objective is to increase electrical 
production to 15,000  megawatts in 2030. Rivers and streams coming 
down from the mountains, hot gases escaping the bowels of the Rift, the 
consistency and regularity of trade winds and sunshine, all allow Kenya 
to use clean electricity, which is relatively innovative on a world scale. In 
effect, 80% of electricity is produced thanks to renewable sources, topped 
by hydroelectricity, mainly from the upper and mid Tana, that provides at 
least 40% of the 2,200 megawatts produced, followed by geothermal energy 
(30% of the Kenyan electricity mix) (Berggren & Österberg 2017).
Having innovating in the Hell’s Gate site for more than 30 years, Kenya 
is now one of the world leaders in geothermal energy behind Iceland. 
Following the example underway in the Akira Valley near Naivasha, 14 sites 
are spread along the Rift Valley that must increase geothermic production 
to 10,000 MW.
Another path being explored is wind energy. In effect, the country has 
found itself with a major site for producing this kind of energy: the eastern 
bank of Lake Turkana. There, strong winds gust through the topographic 
threshold between the Kenyan highlands and the Ethiopian highlands 
before further accelerating thanks to the adiabatic effect of the vast heated 
body of water of Lake Turkana. Regular strong winds blow for years, 
constituting an amasing potential energy source (3,000 megawatts) in the 
process of being developed as a wind farm with a capacity of 310 megawatts 
as already been built in Loiyangalani.
The last path to increase renewable electricity production is solar. 
Of all energy sources, solar is the most versatile as it can combine two 
different approaches and technical options: large and small solar farms, and 
individual solar panels. When combined, these two types of production can 
help even out investments in energy grids by responding to the industrial 
and urban demand and connecting regions and even off-grid households. 
The state has shown that it understands the importance of this energy 
source when it required that all buildings that use more than 100 litres of 
water per day be equipped with solar water heaters. Private individuals, 
even in the depths of the jungle, can follow Premier League matches thanks 
to ingenious devices made from batteries and solar panels.
However, electricity is not synonymous with energetics and it must not be 
concluded from its rather virtuous energy mix that Kenya is in the process of 
becoming a green economy. Although it banned the export of wood charcoal 
in 1975, 70% of households still cook over wood fires using, on average, 
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between 1.4 and 2.4 m3 of wood charcoal per year which has contributed 
to accelerated stubble-burning and deforestation. Furthermore, they still 
largely light fires with paraffin wax which further increases greenhouse gas 
emissions. This nuance reveals the extreme discrepancy between, on the 
one hand, a modern society and economy connected, to some small extent, 
to globalisation and, on the other, the marginal majority of people who still 
make up Kenyan society and economy. Apart from such inequity, the current 
energetic model still has several weaknesses, notably because industrial 
growth and the increasing number of vehicles have caused oil imports to 
increase by 6% between 2004 and 2014. Moreover, fluctuating rainfall affects 
the level of dams and directly weakens the electricity supply of cities and 
industries. The resultant recurring power outages slow investments and at 
any rate cause over-expenditure for entrepreneurs.
In the days of the “Anthropocene” and the “6th extinction,” and as tourism 
brings in more than 20% of the country’s foreign currency reserves and 
contributes around 12% of its GDP, the protection of biodiversity has become 
a common refrain, a requirement, and a major issue. This explains why there 
are plenty of associations, lobbies, and interest groups that, in the name 
of that imperative, are working towards the protection of an emblematic 
animal, an exceptional place or even a specific habitat. To this day, the 
preferred spatial arrangement to achieve this goal remains the protected 
area, whether it is public (50% of Kenyan protected areas), private (25%), 
or communal (25%). The animal archipelago was formed in three phases: 
the colonial phase (1945–1963) and the post-colonial phase (1970s) that 
both created Kenya’s public patrimony (90% of wildlife tourists and 75% of 
revenues), then a third phase, starting in the 1980s and especially in the 2000s, 
during which large landowners and pastoral communities transformed their 
lands into conservancies. This recent dynamic is as important in terms of 
biodiversity as it is in terms of territorial organisation since it has allowed 
for the extension of protected areas as only 35% of fauna is protected within 
the limits of public areas (National Parks and National Reserves).
Moreover, most of the new protected areas are located in the arid and 
semi-arid regions where 20% of the population (and incidentally 80% of 
the livestock) reside, often in poverty. Conservation, if well managed, can 
constitute an economic alternative for these people. In these regions, we 
note therefore an almost paradoxical change in the growing besiegement 
of protected areas, but also their extension. Emblematic of this change: the 
Laikipia Plateau (Evans & Adams 2016), the surroundings of the Samburu-
Shaba, Amboseli, the Masai Mara and the northern mountains between 
Maralal and Marsabit. Vast areas combine pastoral activities and wildlife 
tourism, but the monotony of the savannah conceals the signs of land 
property.
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The viability of fauna in protected areas rests on three conditions: 
rejuvenation of the fauna gene pools in these increasingly beleaguered 
areas, incentive plans for conservation targeting neighbouring populations, 
and the establishment of collective governance that subsumes state and 
institutional land fragmentation. In short, the main issue at stake is 
integration of wildlife isolates into a territorial archipelagic system. The 
emergence of a wild fauna market to transport animals from one reserve 
to another, the efforts to turn the large mammals migratory corridors into 
sanctuaries, and the scientific and political networking of the conservancies 
all aim to try to resolve the contradiction between the necessity of cross-
fertilisation to ensure the renewal of the gene pools of these areas, and the 
growing isolation of these areas that reduces the scope of local biodiversity. 
They also aim to act as a political lobby capable of influencing ad hoc local 
collectives, county-level institutions and the state, whose preoccupation 
with development sometimes contradicts the necessity for environmental 
conservation.
A Rentier Future?
Since the mega-cycle of raw materials of the 2000s, all over the world, 
multinational oil and mining corporations—often with governmental 
blessing—have increased the number of explorations and investments in 
extractive industries, leading to the exploitation of more deposits. For now, 
the raw materials sector remains minor in Kenya. Even if titanium from 
Kwale and gold from the minor deposits in Transmara are added to the salt 
that has long been extracted from Magadi (mostly for the Japanese optics 
industry), Kenya is nothing like a rentier state. However, things could 
change, radically, due to the 1992 discovery of oil reserves in Lokichar in 
South Turkana (Augé, Nkayi & Médard 2013). The recoverable oil resources 
are valued at 750 million barrels and their exploitation is considered viable 
at 55  USD per barrel. In January  2018, after several years of diplomatic 
dithering, the exploitation of the Turkana reserves was relaunched. The 
geopolitical crises in Venezuela and Iran have increased the price per barrel 
back over 50 USD, Tullow has announced profits, and in April 2018, Total 
joined the project. This operation has accelerated the pre-exploration phase 
of Turkana’s oil field. Furthermore, “Total has confirmed its commitment 
to make the Lokichar-Lamu pipeline the only method of delivery of crude 
oil in Kenya from Lokichar fields” (Le Point 2018). The Turkana operation 
should, therefore, begin production at the start of 2022, after the completion 
of the 700 km pipeline linking each production unit to the coast. Kenya 
could then become, for better or worse, a rentier state!
The whole of these operations produces a planting of variable sized 
but territorialised enclaves that, together, accentuate one of the major 
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geographic characteristics of the country: its fragmentation. Yet, this is 
coupled with another contradictory dynamic: a dynamic of integration 
brought on by the need for the connection of these extractionary enclaves 
to meet growing globalisation.
4. Fourth Challenge: Multiscale Integrations, 
Construction of the State, and National Solidarity
It is not sufficient to produce, exploit, and extract resources. Distribution, 
allocation, and commercialisation are also necessary for techno-commercial 
networks. Yet, these are Kenya’s weak points—which is typical of developing 
countries.
Despite appreciated progress with regards to the economic environment, 
investors continue to point out the recurrence of outages and load shedding 
as a weakness (World Bank 2019). Progress in production is not yet 
sufficient. As such, the wind farm already in place in Lonyangalani serves 
no purpose for the moment since the electrical lines that carry current to 
consumers have not been installed! Once again, we see a white elephant.
But beyond these setbacks, logistical integration is progressing. The 
road network is expanding and strengthening thanks to the East African 
Community along with multilateral and bilateral donors, Chinese among 
others. The widespread asphalting of roads, the inroad of motorway and 
peripheral bypasses, the construction of fly-overs and other massive 
roundabouts improve traffic flow, reduce congestion, and promote national 
integration.
Further, new technologies that Kenyans have quickly adopted (67% 
regularly use the internet and 89% have a mobile phone plan) are intensifying 
the links between areas, promoting polytopism and contributing to 
integration. At the global scale, the country has innovated by experimenting, 
since 2007, through the M-Pesa system, with electronic transactions to the 
point that today, half of the GDP moves through this channel and two-
thirds of the population would use money kiosks to deposit and transfer 
money. However, even as 60% of the population has an account, at the same 
time, 80% does not have access to mortgage lending.
Since the 1990s, the acceleration of globalisation has reinforced integrative 
dynamics and a complex interdependence between the states of the world. 
On the East African scale, they are reinforcing Kenya’s integration with 
its subregion. For the last 30 years already, the country’s economy has 
relied upon transit activities, focusing on the pivotal role of the Mombasa-
Nairobi-Busia/Malaba corridor for the subregional geography (220 million 
people). This corridor has been strengthened: The railway has been rebuilt, 
the Mombasa-Kisumu pipeline is being modernised, and the Mombasa-
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Nairobi high-voltage power line has been built. The road is regularly re-
surfaced (Porhel & Léon 2013) and the links between the coastline and 
the continental hinterlands have been considerably improved. Today, this 
corridor still serves as the backbone of the country and in 2012, 91% of 
GDP was produced within 100 km of it. The volume of goods that passes 
through Mombasa comes close to 30 million tonnes (10 million tonnes in 
2003), which makes it the second largest port in sub-Saharan Africa and 
more than 700 lorries cross the Ugandan border at Malaba each day.
Globalisation has also tightened links between Kenya and its Ugandan 
and Tanzanian neighbours. For 20 years, the institution-building of the East 
African Community has laid the foundation for a “New East Africa” (Fouéré 
& Maupeu 2015), which materialised in the construction of the Namanga-
Taveta border checkpoints, the largest connection with the Tanzanian 
and Ugandan road networks. On the regional scale, the flow of goods and 
peopled has been reinforced while certain tariff and customs barriers have 
been eliminated. Since 2005, the Machakos Protocol for peace agreements 
has permitted the extension of Kenyan commercial and banking networks 
towards Juba and South Sudan, networks that are dormant today due to the 
civil war, but are real, nonetheless (Calas, Racaud & Torretti 2016). Likewise, 
in the north, the interconnections of electric grids and asphalt-coated road 
networks are integrating Kenya with the sub-region’s other dominant 
economy: Ethiopia. Finally, since 1990, the Somali crisis and its surges 
have intensified Somali investment in Nairobi, the city thus becoming the 
“Global Somali Hub.” The boom of Eastleigh—Nairobi’s Little Mogadishu—
can be explained by the convergence of three factors on different scales: 
the strength of transnational Somali networks, the momentum of the 
Kenyan economy and housing market, and the emergence of Asia as the 
world’s factory (Carrier 2016). Furthermore, the Somali crisis has allowed 
the Kenyan economy to continue to profit from humanitarian operations.
This integration is increasing towards a very dynamic and populous 
East African space (220  million people), the opening of the southern 
borders of countries of the Horn and the rise in traffic have imposed the 
modernisation of new infrastructure on the coast. In Mombasa, the port’s 
capacity has been increased thanks to the construction of a new container 
terminal of 450,000 TEU. In the north, the digging of a new deep-water port 
is creating a new development corridor, from Lamu to the north-western 
borders and beyond, to South Sudan and Ethiopia: the famous LAPSSET 
(Coloma 2013; Fouéré & Maupeu 2015; see also Maupeu in this volume). In 
this context, Isiolo, 400 km further west, is thought of as a junction between 
this corridor and the Nairobi-Addis road (Pan African Highway). Currently 
planned are 6,500 acres for a new seaside resort, a new dam on the Ewas 
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Ngiro, a slaughterhouse with a capacity of 400 heads of cattle per day, and 
an international airport.
This infrastructure and these projects demonstrate the importance of 
major works and especially the large corridors of opening-up, the growth 
of “eco-economic” approaches harnessed to development rhetoric, and the 
legitimisation and funding of the elites. In 2017, President Uhuru Kenyatta 
and his Vice-President William Ruto campaigned on the finalisation 
of large infrastructure projects, such as the Nairobi-Mombasa train 
line. Cooperation with China was cast as a major success of Kenyatta’s 
presidency, underlining the link between land use policy, territorialisation 
of the state, and electoral politics.
Integration in globalisation is noticeable in the balance of payments in a 
rather ambivalent way. The remittances of emigrants represent the second-
largest source of foreign currency growing from 139 million USD in 1990 to 
1,700 million USD, 3% of the GDP.6 The growth of FDI to 400 million USD 
from 57 million USD in 1990 underlines the increasing attractiveness of the 
country for globalised investors. However, aid remains at a high level at 
2,200 million USD (compared to 1,181 in 1990) and demonstrates how much 
the country still depends on aid. Likewise, as debt servicing has diminished 
(falling from 36% to 10% of exports), the public debt has exploded, now 
representing more than half of GDP and Chinese lenders now more than 
3/4 of the creditors.
Beyond this economic, financial, logistical, and multiscale territorial 
integration, the question is now how the benefits of growth are being 
distributed. In effect, it is through redistributive mechanisms, notably 
taxation, land use planning, and the sharing of powers between different 
administrative layers, compounded by decentralisation in 2013, that draw 
on contours of national solidarity as well as the effectiveness of nation-
building thanks to the windfall of economic growth. This question is 
obviously an excuse for debates and intense bargaining, on different scales, 
between different actors.
One of these debates between foreign corporations and the government 
revolves around the corporate tax rate. The rate envisioned by the 
government, between 30 and 37.5% of capital transactions, is evidently 
thought to be too high and prohibitive by oil companies and generally 
by private corporations in all other sectors. In this way, plans to tax 
horticulturalists have provoked an exodus towards Ethiopia, fiscally the 
lowest bidder. Another debated point is the nature of taxation. Should 
6. As opposed to emigrants in other African countries such as Morocco, Kenyan 
emigrants do not represent a significant part of the populations (500,000 people 
are less than 2% of the population) but their remittances are an important part 
of the nation’s accounts.
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capital transactions or transactions in the financial market be taxed? The 
government favours the latter (5% instead of 30/37%) since corporations 
have an incentive to go public, which would have the collateral effect of 
energising Nairobi’s stock exchange.
Furthermore, in the context of the stabilisation of rules surrounding 
the 2010 Constitution and the decentralisation of 2013, a second level 
of discussion pits the central government, the county governments, and 
productive municipalities against each other. It seems that for the moment, 
tax sharing is favourable enough to the intermediate level of the counties. 
Does this mean it will be good for citizens? Won’t it be better for local 
notables and potentates?
More or less, these debates on the allocation of the benefits of growth 
also find themselves in the conservationist sphere. How do populations 
engage in animal conservation and how are they rewarded for their agreed 
efforts? Around Masai Mara, conservancies are managed on the basis 
of contracts between traditional landowners and tourism investors. The 
latter pay between 37 and 50 USD per hectare, per year, for 10 to 15 years. 
Even if this system solidifies the land monopolisation established by Masai 
elites when communal lands are subdivided, it improves local population’s 
perception of fauna and no doubt of the sustainability of its protection and 
development as a tourist site. However, they now wonder about the identity 
of the representatives of these famous “local communities” and the borders 
of these “communities” themselves.
These tensions about sharing the benefits of growth and about political 
representation form the context in which a localised civil society is 
emerging. This civil society use these questions as opportunities to engage 
with debates that point to national and even international integration. Local 
elites and intermediary bodies are taking full advantage of their abilities to 
mobilise their zealots or external support to pressure companies and the 
central government in view of gaining access to the benefits of predation. 
Thus, in 2013, Turkana notables incited young people to pillage the Tullow 
oil exploration sites. Still, in 2013, it was in the forest of Arabuko-Sokoke 
in Kilifi county that local authorities successfully limited oil explorations 
by invoking their Unesco biosphere reserve. The following year, in 2014, 
the notables of the Kerio Valley organised protests to demand that the 
government hand over the communal property titles for the explored lands 
as a precondition for seismic exploration. This is only a common, localised 
process through which civil society, gathered around its notables and 




Malthus or Boserup, who will Kenya prove right? This paper illustrates 
few certainties as the reality of the situation offers us with as many 
reasons to be optimistic about the future as to make us worry. How do 
we reconcile Nairobi and the aridity of the North-East; how do we keep 
in mind Mukuru next to Muthaiga; how do we put together so disparate 
pieces of the Kenyan puzzle as the hyper-populated terroirs of Vihiga and 
the Laikipia ranches? How can we consider the decentralisation of the 47 
counties and the simultaneous reinforcement of presidentialism? Kenya 
seems to be caught between large investments and small ventures, between 
devolution and recentralisation, between the myth of a middle class, even 
one of new millionaires7 and despite a slow decline, the persistent spectre 
of extreme poverty (see Thibon in this volume). How do we critically report 
growing territorialisation but do justice to an ever-grander aspiration for 
more effective spatialisation (Jaglin 2007)? Indeed, if national integration 
is progressing well, territorial inequalities have not disappeared, and the 
reverse even seems to be true.
The Coast seems to be the archetype of a more difficult region. The 
poverty rate there is 13% higher than the national average and only 38% 
of its inhabitants hold an ownership title compared to 62% for the rest of 
the Kenyan population. Politico-religious turmoil, economic frustrations, 
trafficking and mafia investments are the fertile ground for constant 
tensions ready to ignite at the slightest incident (see Willis and Mwakimoko 
in this volume). The northern coast and its hinterland (Garissa, Tana, 
and Lamu) have been especially impacted by incursions by Al Shabaab 
(Mpeketoni, 60 dead near Lamu—15 to 17 June 2014); interethnic insecurity 
is controlled through curfew. The Coast does not have a monopoly on 
tensions and interethnic violence may soon resume elsewhere, notably 
during elections when leaders wield identities for political ends, such as 
in Isiolo and Marsabit counties during the 2017 election campaign or in 
Laikipia, Uasin Gishu, or Elgeyo Marakwet when concurrent appetites for 
land collide, or shepherds and farmers confront each other. This violence 
especially affects the arid and semi-arid outskirts of the country that are 
unsafe, have been marginalised for a long time, and are subject to shifta and 
other cattle raids. Devolution, large projects, mining and oil prospecting, 
foreign investments, land allocations generally monopolised by highland 
residents or urban elites, and identity vexations stir resentment and can 
7. With a value of 500 million USD in 2016, Kenya is the second largest luxury 
market in Africa behind only South Africa (2.3 billion USD) (The Wealth Report 
2017, Knight Frank Johannesburg) and has the 4th highest number of millionaires 
in Africa after South Africa, Egypt, and Nigeria and will attain 3rd place in 2026 
with about 17,000 millionaires.
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threaten the stability of these regions and can even impact on the stability 
of the whole country.
In contrast, in 2007, the World Economic Forum ranked Kenya 10th out of 
29 African countries using the criteria of global competitiveness. It showed 
that Kenya has the characteristics of an economy in transition between 
an economy dependent on commodity prices and global business cycles, 
and an economy based on innovation thanks to a qualified labour force, an 
innovative financial sector, and a green energy mix. Kenya is in the process 
of harvesting the fruits of its former investments in higher education.
Twenty years ago, I concluded with the idea that the Kenyan development 
model was tired. Since then, it has shown a certain degree of longevity that 
demonstrates its resilience. Should we conclude today that this model is a 
deceptive development model or, alternatively, an emerging development 
model?
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Chapter 3
Emerging Elites, Oligarchy,  
and the Kenyan Middle Classes
Christian Thibon
Translated by Felix Lambrecht
The topic of emerging elites raises many questions and arouses multiple 
interests. What is brought to light through these elites is the significance 
of the ongoing economic, social and political changes as well as their 
historical trends and their nature. The approach adopted in this chapter 
extends and completes the above presentation (cf. introduction to the 
volume). General trends in Kenyan society are often analysed in terms 
of risk-tensions and following a fatalistic view of society stalled by 
inequality, while the changes within the elite circles are cast in a rather 
positive light through the lenses of renewal and opportunities. Moreover, 
there is a lack of statistical proofs as the question of emerging elites is 
mainly approached through qualitative and biographical research methods 
or through prosopography. These methods nevertheless benefit from a 
stream of academic research on social configurations, the national classes 
and the elites, and on the nature of economic development, all initiated in 
the 1960s and 1970s and still underway (Leys 1975; Van Zwanenberg 1972; 
Swainson 1980; Kaplinsky 1980).
1. Capitalism, Bourgeoisie, Peasantry,  
and the Middle Classes in Debate
In the 1970-80s an important academic debate left its mark on the social 
sciences. It involved the question of Kenya’s unique brand of capitalism—
in comparison with that of its neighbours—and what it represented more 
broadly, not just in relation to the nature of economics but in terms social 
history. This debate borrowed from the dependency, Marxist, liberal, and 
developmentalist paradigms then in vogue. While it did not escape the 
theoretical hypotheses of the time about modes of production, it questioned 
and contributed knowledge about the social dimensions of development 
and its chaotic performances, the growth of the 1960s, and the slump of 
the 1970s-2000s interspersed with a few periods of growth (notably the 
coffee boom in 1976–77, and the years 1980–83 just before the drought of 
1984). Important for our purpose, then, are the questions of accumulation, 
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the existence of a national and multinational agrarian power, of a national 
bourgeoisie, be it comprador or not, of a petite bourgeoisie, of African 
or Indian bourgeoisies (Himbara 1994), and finally of the entrepreneurial 
spirit and capitalist ethos of certain groups. The same is true of research 
on the small and medium peasantry, on its rise from the colonial period—
whether this peasantry was captured or not—and on peasant-state relations 
(Kitching 1980; Hyden 1980).
This collective reflection continued in the years of transition, in the midst 
of the economic crisis, which were also a period of hope and questioning 
of economic policies and their state rationality. These times signalled the 
return to the market and privatisation, the rise of civil society and the 
democratic experiment, but also a succession of major politico-financial 
scandals. The “Kenyan malaise” (Gibbon 1995) was thus questioned. 
It had two sides: on the one hand, the economy was in the process of 
liberalisation, struggling with inherited burdens, including corruption 
and social predation; on the other, the resources of entrepreneurship were 
brought forward, including the capacities of the informal sector based on 
the strength of jua kali and its expected resources.1
These past and continuing scholarly debates are important for two 
practical reasons: they raised questions and built knowledge that are still 
relevant today, all the more so as the hypotheses put forward and the 
prospects evoked have or have not been confirmed in the course of the 
history of the last twenty years, which allows us to understand current 
events and even their evolution. The somewhat historical method used 
here—proceeding from the present to the past—could only meet these 
debates, yet requests the adoption of a double historical perspective: firstly, 
that of the present time dating back to the post-World War II colonial 
period; and secondly, that of the “immediate time,” from the 1990s up to 
the present, and particularly of the acceleration of the last two decades.
2. The Formation of a National Political  
and Economic Oligarchy?
Understanding the nature and evolution of economic development and 
capitalism sheds light on the formation of a national elite and its current 
social embodiment—“political economic entrepreneurs”—and, beyond that, 
on a social class that can be characterised as more oligarchic than bourgeois. 
The defining feature of this social class is that economic development and 
modes of accumulation were intertwined through the politico-economic 
1. On the debates about enterprises, see Jean Copans (1991).
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elites—a phenomena referred to as straddling that was partly inherited 
from colonial dependency.2
It is possible to reconstruct the history of straddling and its different 
times. From independence onwards, the overlap between the state, 
public interests and private interests, between private business and 
public administration—which was already in its infancy in colonial 
dependency—was reinforced because of the significant economic power of 
an interventionist state at the head of a public economy controlling the 
economic machinery. During the time of Daniel arap Moi, this system was 
reproduced through the strengthening of state power and the protection of 
a nascent industry. But the economic results of this economic management 
were mediocre and irregular. The international context (energy crisis, price 
of major exports) was partly to blame. The double economic predation of 
the state and its public servants through—depending on one’s perception—
corruption or weak governance aggravated the situation. The lack of return 
on investment of financial aid, public debt, and difficulties in food security 
were visible manifestations of this dire economic situation.
The turn of the 1990s with authoritarian decompression, democratisation 
of the transition, and the imposed new liberal economic order (the opening 
of the market, privatisation, adjustment programs…) did not change this 
established politico-economic system. On the contrary, the public-private 
link was maintained through a strategist state, admittedly advised by the 
international financial institutions, that pursued its own strategic interests. 
It then privatised a modern public sector in order to respond to national 
entrepreneurial owners who purchased certain public goods and public 
shareholdings in private companies. This was de facto a second wave of 
Africanisation3 (Aseto & Okelo 1997; Thomas 1998, 40–53).
From the 2000s-2010s, straddling became subtler, more complex and 
more competitive. Mirroring private-public partnerships in major projects, 
it adapted to new economic contexts (with the return of growth), regional 
transformations (with the growth of the East African Community) and 
international change (characterised by the rise of funding and of non-
Western partners). It also adjusted to new commercial and technological 
opportunities, notably in the field of communications. This showed that 
even if the economic situation improved, neither predation nor corruption 
nor bureaucratic red tape disappeared. Dirty business and scandals 
continued, some of them even reaching a peak, but they did not affect in 
2. Presented as a form of dependency on a peripheral economy inherited from 
the colonial period during which the white racial minority negotiated with the 
government




the same way the economy, growth, financial results, and attractiveness 
(the public debt/GDP ratio fell below the 50% mark in the mid- 2010s). On 
the contrary, a steady flow of international and domestic investment was 
betting on the Kenyan economy as a regional economic hub, on its liberal 
management and on the expected payoffs they may have had in resources 
and domestic productions as well as in its domestic market.
The economic history of the straddling is sometimes limited by many 
unknowns, notably its external relays and the levels of its international 
dependence, and it keeps grey areas when it comes to financial exchanges. 
Yet, its social history can be written by looking at the experience of 
accumulation. From independence to the present day, successive political 
and economic systems have given rise to a neo-patrimonial managerial 
elite with both political and economic power. These “political economic 
entrepreneurs” have grown rich in connection with political cycles, while 
the circle of beneficiaries has widened with ethnic renewals or alliances 
at the highest level of power—first Kikuyu then Kalenjin. This circle of 
beneficiaries has also become more diverse since the transition and political 
reforms have opened up the political game. The paths to success were 
varied. Primitive accumulation followed different scenarios: some resulted 
from heroic self-made individuals—of the adventurer and “coal-merchant-
become-millionaire” types—while others were draw from historically and 
family predestined situations, thus benefiting the kin-heirs of political 
dynasties or the descendants-heirs of chiefs from the colonial period. The 
various economic cycles and proximity with the regime turned to their 
advantage. They also owed their trajectories to the allocation of real estate, 
public contracts, concessions, positions in international companies, and 
positions at the State House and in other institutions (Central Bank, Stock 
Exchanges, ports, transport, commercial banks, etc.) as well as to access to 
public funds (Simiyu 2012). Some of these success stories took on a quasi-
dynastic form by following a diversified strategy. Others, often achieved 
through land accumulation, came to an end after a generation in a manner 
reminiscent of kleptocratic trajectories or because they were broken by 
family quarrels. But the majority of these political entrepreneur families 
have been able to overcome the pitfalls of generational change, although 
some have been increasingly confronted with the Buddenbrooks effect.4
The success of these “political entrepreneurs” came from their ability to 
take advantage of various public policies, both interventionist and liberal, 
of agreements with foreign companies and also of privatisations. It also 
lay in lucky or rational choices to invest in booms or speculative cycles, 
to react to various business environments, and to circumvent the political 
4. In reference to Thomas Mann’s novel about the decline of the third generation 
of families.
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setbacks while retreating into economies of affection and making use of 
their ethnic and regional network. Finally, as internationalisation and the 
financial opening of the 2000s progressed, these great fortunes discovered 
the resources of regional markets with sub-regional, Eastern and Middle 
Eastern partnerships, and with deals and investment. It was then that Dubai 
eclipsed London as their business destination. At the end of this evolution, 
the impression was that on turning “millionaires,” these “political economic 
entrepreneurs” have become economic entrepreneurs only, and that as 
wealth has built up, economic interests have had more importance than 
political interests.
This overlap between political and economic calculation is also found in 
a game between closure—a nationalist temptation to Africanise and protect 
markets—and openness, that is, association with foreign companies, or in 
other words between independence and dependence. This state of mind also 
explains the association of these political entrepreneurs with professional 
entrepreneurs, whether Indian or Kenyan (mainly Kikuyu), who have been 
somewhat independent but competent in their field and who ensured the 
recognition of politicians through donations or political commitments.
Paradoxically, distance from power has been a vector of accumulation 
and an explanation for the success of some families. This was first the case 
for the Indian elites who, faced with competition from the Africanisation of 
trade and transport, moved in the 1960s towards the technical and industrial 
sectors, partly abandoning their historical model of the retail shop—the 
duka system—which had allowed them to prosper. Next, this was the case 
for the Kikuyu elites, especially for the generation carried by the Kenyatta 
period but discredited during the Moi period or divided during the time of 
transition-democratisation. The same was true of the new circles promoted 
and then deposed by the successive powers, but which retained their assets 
and escaped the legal fallout of financial scandals. Political decline did 
not automatically translate into economic decline, while the learning of 
new techniques and new industrial, commercial and financial processes 
or their imitation, helped by the capacities of locally trained executives, 
was quickly mastered in contact with the White Kenyan large landowners, 
with representatives of foreign companies and with the Asian masters of 
industry. This interweaving and circulation of the economic and political 
elites can be seen in institutional networks, professional chambers and 
the Kenya Private Sector Alliance (KEPSA), created in 2004, or through 
more informal forms of sociability, such as the large national and regional 
agrarian events (Agriculture Shows), the promotional networks of 
prestigious schools, corporate associations or more exclusive associations 
such as clubs (Connan 2013).
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The conclusion is hardly moral, but today one could say that neo-
patrimonialism, after having prospered in a parasitic way on the economy, 
is accompanying growth and benefiting from the development of a 
national and regional market. This evolution, common to several emerging 
economies as shown by scholars (Bach & Gazino 2012), is illustrated and 
confirmed by individual and collective trajectories, and accumulations and 
investments. Indeed, through case studies, biographies and prosopography5 
and as testified in the increasing number of autobiographies (Ndegwa 2006; 
Wanjui 2013), one can grasp the various generations or historical cycles of 
accumulation, and ultimately, the pace of the formation of an oligarchic 
elite in Kenya.
The first cycle of accumulation was carried out under the presidency 
of Jomo Kenyatta. His family and the dignitaries and collaborators of 
the regime, from KANU and KADU, benefited from the public income. 
Paradoxically in this neo-colonial period, businessmen and their families, 
although nationalists, imitated, at least got closer in their way of life, their 
sociability (clubs and networks of sociability) and land accumulation, to the 
colonial aristocracy of “gentlemen capitalists” and agrarian landowners. In 
similar ways, they exploited land, financial assets, and services. The model 
of success that is representative of this period, apart from the Kenyatta 
family, is exemplified by Kikuyu dignitaries: Sir Charles Njonjo, Njenga 
Karume, John Michuki, Duncan Nderitu Ndegwa… and more generally by 
large Kikuyu owners and their associates (GEMA: Gikuyu Alliance, Embu, 
Meru) often referred to as “mafia,” that is, a network of businessmen and 
politicians relying on their relatives, their clients and their dependents to 
negotiate with state power.
The second cycle coincided with the arrival in power of Daniel arap Moi 
in 1978. It marked a turning point in Kenyan political life with the coming 
to power of the Kalenjin and their allies, but also with a drift towards a more 
authoritarian and dictatorial regime. Wealth accumulation in this period 
followed the path of the previous cycle and developed by taking advantage 
of urban growth, major construction projects, the tourism boom and a 
partially protected private consumer goods and processing industry. Yet it 
expanded to include new families which, besides the Moi family, included 
the first circle of the faithful, often Kalenjin. In a practical way, the Moi 
system, as under Kenyatta but in a more systemic way, surrounded itself 
with allies and local potentates—“big men”—who relayed the central power 
to the periphery and the regions. The latter, in return for their affiliation 
and their political and electoral support, ensured protection in access to 
land and in particular urban land (Bourmaud 1988). This politico-economic 
context also saw the prosperity of an Asian industrial bourgeoisie that 
5. This section uses Damien Thibon’s data and analyses (2014).
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discovered in Kenya a haven of peace (compared with the expulsion of the 
Indians from Uganda in 1972) and invested in the basic industrial sectors, 
agribusiness and consumer goods which were then protected. Individuals 
from this period who represented success were, for example, Nicholas 
Biwott, Joshua Kulei and some large Indian families.
Paradoxically, the 1990s—characterised by the economic crisis and 
political instability—were the glory years of this politico-economic oligarchy. 
This period coincides with the second generation: those of the sons then 
building upon the work of the founding fathers and matriarchs (the wives 
of the founding fathers). Indeed, the new political and economic context 
presided over two noticeable changes: on the one hand the privatisation of 
cooperatives, public enterprises, commercial enterprises, and hotels turned 
to the advantage of the established great fortunes which then recovered 
industrial, tertiary or agribusiness tools which they later cannibalised and 
added value to. On the other hand, the political stakes of the time renewed 
the political class: there were new leaders, new opposition parties and a 
new generation in the image of the “young Turks of KANU.” In a context 
of bargaining between the ruling politicians and the opposition but also 
of ethnic clashes, these newcomers took advantage of the prevailing 
instability and of the opportunity it created to access power and enrich 
themselves. This was the time of the big yet consensual cases of corruption, 
“the Goldenberg era,”6 and of many new promoted fortunes, following the 
example of the new barons of a regime that co-opted them. The newcomers 
to the powerful circle included George Saitoti, William Ruto, Ole Ntimama 
or former opponents like Raila Odinga.
From the 2000s, the return of growth and the economic take-off 
confirmed the economic reputation of these several established families. 
They comprised political families including allies-customers-parents 
(Kikuyu, Kalenjin) close to Kenyatta and Moi, and local entrepreneurs, 
mostly Indians and Kikuyu but also a certain number of established big men 
who were Kisii, Kamba, Luo, Masai, Luhya, Kikuyu7 and from the Coast. 
However, the novelty of this period lay in the emergence of businessmen 
attached to the urban market and involved in transport (matatu networks), 
real estate, finance and insurance, and services. They were joined by new 
personalities from the world of media, Internet, and new technologies. 
These new entrepreneurs, who for some came from the informal sector, 
were certainly supported and sponsored, but they were foreign to 
previous generations. Some of them came from the upper middle class 
promoted by growth. They were either skilled educated individuals who 
had often studied in international universities and possessed prestigious 
6. See in this volume Hervé Maupeu: “State, Economy and Development in Kenya.”
7. Coming from Muranga while those who preceded came from Kiambu or Nyeri.
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Kenyan school degrees, or entrepreneurs in the digital economy and the 
services sector, having started in their careers as senior civil servants in 
national agencies or as executives in foreign companies. Last, there were 
some scandalous trajectories of success through transit and regional or 
international trafficking using informal and illegal ways. The politico-
economic oligarchy and this new generation were connected to Foreign 
Direct Investments (FDI) respectively through private/public partnerships 
and major construction projects and through investments participation in 
the new digital economy.
This broadening and diversification of politico-economic elites can be 
seen in the use they made of symbolic and cultural capital. Great families, 
like the “great notables,” maintained their traditional symbolic capital 
and identity affiliations, relied on patron-client and religious networks, 
invested in local anchorage in their region of origin and in compassionate 
activities (e.g. through humanitarian associations like the Red Cross, Saint 
John Kenya…), and controlled large press groups—print and audio-visual 
media that proved to be economically very profitable (Nyanjom 2012). 
Contrastingly, the new notability was present in social media, radio, 
university spaces, civil society, and even in certain religious spaces in 
connection with the rise of the new Born-Again churches, Pentecostalism, 
etc. For some, notably those who had emerged recently, opportunism and 
commitment to the regime were no longer the rule.
Recently, through cross-investments or even alliances, these different 
generations and different political, economic and ethnic circles have been 
working together in business associations and consortiums, as if the class 
logic of a national “de place” or “réticulaire” capitalism was now prevailing! 
A “depoliticised” type of capitalism has emerged, which has become 
autonomous from the political sphere and escaped from the practices of 
straddling from which it was born. This trend, which only the future may 
confirm, is perhaps a guarantee of political stability, but it owes its success 
to the somewhat forgotten history of Kenyan capitalism: that of the “non-
political entrepreneurs.”
3. A Second Overlap: Society and Entrepreneurship
This longer history highlights a second overlap, this time between business 
and society. Here, social mobility and low-intensity accumulation in an 
economy of affection, where sociability, often built along ethnic lines, 
plays just as much a role as public protection or the invisible hand of the 
market. The socio-historical and cultural roots of this economic history 
take the form of a spirit of capitalism and an individual moral achievement 
perceptible through various—both long and short termed—collective 
trajectories.
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Colonial history reveals the existence of business associations that 
already had a cultural dimension (Kikuyu, Luo, Kamba…) as well as of 
cooperatives. These two opposed types of organisations competed or 
entered into relations with Indian entrepreneurs, already well established, 
and participated in the emergence of an “economic” proto-elite and a 
comprador proto-bourgeoisie. As early as the 1960s, their members were 
running for associate-dealers or were co-opted by Western companies, and 
then invested in new economic sectors. The same goes for a “rural petite 
bourgeoisie”—often accused of loyalty during the Mau Mau insurgency—
that benefited from the boom in coffee growing, land privatisation, and 
urban market demand. Moreover, social mobility was taking place in cities. 
From the 1950s, new urban categories emerged made of the educated, a 
working class and working aristocracy, and in the public space the Black 
staff of the colonial state (clerics, officials, police, military, etc.).8 From 
independence, these social groups—some of them somewhat marginal 
or out of step with the new power—were still very active because they 
were essential elements. A few among them were called upon for the 
construction of public power and the state apparatus and for economic 
revival. This happened at several moments throughout the period: firstly, 
in the 1960s, due to the Africanisation of certain economic sectors (through 
business licenses); then, in the 1970s, through the entry of civil servants 
into business (Ndegwa 1971). And finally, in the 1990s, in the mobilisation 
of the informal sector—jua kali—through the entrepreneurial performance 
or resilience of this sector in certain areas of the urban market. These 
micro-accumulations stumbled on technical or financial limits, yet others 
succeeded and testified to a creative energy. This was the case in artisanal 
production for tourists (Chouabi 2009), in industrial subcontracting, and 
in innovations in tourism services. These promotions, equally understood 
as ways of life and as careers, evolved between survival logics that 
resulted from the hazardous paths of migration and social opportunism, 
between meritocratic ambitions leading to successes and resourcefulness, 
between individual adventures and family strategies through domestic and 
community relays. It is therefore not surprising that some of the successes 
and accumulation paths of the 2010s have been grounded upon these 
experiences and continued to be part of such trajectories.
Moreover, to the extent that the moral economy of affection framed 
and normalised these industrial-commercial adventures, one may wonder 
whether certain inherited or acquired anthropological models shaped such 
an evolution by distilling a certain spirit of capitalism. The topic has given 
rise to stereotyped tribal analyses but it deserves to be addressed. Some 
8. As shown by the latest works of social history on the colonial period, 
following on from Bruce Berman (1990).
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populations traditionally lived in densely populated areas and some ethnic 
groups fed into the groups of migrants and social dependents (cadets) who 
would leave, clear the land and follow a logic of expulsion and expansion. 
Since the colonial period, both fed professional migrations, clearing the 
margins of rural areas in the past and of the cities since independence. 
The same is true of groups who relied on family networks that were fit 
for dispersion and the maintenance of commercial networks, such as 
Kenyan Asians and Somalis. These cultural predispositions—alternatively 
called “ethnic ethos” or “ethnic habitus” (Droz 1999)—become important 
and decisive when, for geopolitical and historical reasons, some of these 
ethnic groups benefited from services, training, openings and employment 
opportunities. This first happened under colonisation with schooling-cum- 
evangelisation, controlled mobility, then access to the state, and it continued 
more so with public modernisation after independence, favouring certain 
territories and certain ethnic groups. Such environments associated with a 
culture of mobility gave them an “entrepreneurial” bonus, forging modern 
models of social ascension and accumulation, at least social primacy. This 
was particularly the case for the Kikuyu, who benefited first from this.
More generally, the historical existence of a social ascension outside the 
oligarchic circuits—even marginal promotion with or without the umbrella of 
the political and economic elites in power—raises the question of grassroots 
opportunities, capacities and potentials. Such mobility contributed to a 
renewal of the economic oligarchy from below. We find this problem of 
upward mobility in the rise of the middle classes as will be shown now.
4. The Emergence of the Middle Classes?
The question of the middle classes, already at the heart of past debates, 
has recently resurfaced for economists particularly as well as for all those 
who, in marketing or commercial potentials, examine the consumer habits 
of these new classes and of their related sub-constituencies, like the youth, 
women, urban households and specific generations. This first approach 
takes into account and favours economic data, income and consumption 
levels.
To date, however, macroeconomic data and their analysis have been 
unsatisfactory for measuring the weight of the middle classes. While the 
GDP that was reached and re-evaluated in 2014 ranks the Kenyan economy 
within the “middle-income countries,” this does not allow for a mechanical 
conclusion that there exists a middle-income class. The link between 
the GDP and the emergence of a middle class has been verified in many 
national contexts, yet a striking phenomenon is also at play: inequality 
distorts income redistribution. In addition, standards defined according to 
international criteria and identifying thresholds, such as that of a “global 
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middle class” defined by an income of 16,800 USD to 72,000 USD per year 
per household, are not relevant. Relative thresholds are more informative 
as they estimate, depending on the country and economy considered, a 
floating daily consumption of between 2 USD and 20 USD per capita for 
emerging countries.9
Practically, definitions and sufficiently precise trend data for the recent 
period starting from 2005 are lacking. For instance, the KNBS sets the 
middle-class in the range of 23,000 KES to 199,000 KES monthly income. 
Such an overly broad approach cannot therefore quantify the share of the 
middle classes, except through a vague consensus figure of 10% to 20% of 
the population, depending on the source used, which is corroborated by 
household wealth surveys about assets and equipment targeting the first 
quintile of “the richest 20%” (KIHBS and DHS). These regular national 
surveys make it possible to classify and better capture an improvement in 
household lifestyle and household wealth in the two top quintiles (from 
20% to 40% of the population), but with strong regional differences. Only 
estimates10 based on labour income (both formal and informal) appear to 
be accurate. These are based on a threshold taking inflation into account—
evaluated between 76,000–100,000 KES monthly in 2015—and places about 
270,000 people into this category. This figure is currently growing as it is 
said to double every 5 years—i.e. 2% of the 15.2 million active employees in 
2015—while high-income earners above 100,000 KES would correspond to 
2.9%, giving a total of middle and upper classes of 4.9%, that is, 700,000 active 
employees. By extrapolating these figures into a number of households, this 
would represent more or less 600,000 households for a population of around 
4 million. However, these data do not take undeclared income into account 
such as rent, real estate income, undeclared activities, and non-taxed trade.
This statistical weakness can be compensated for by using sectoral or 
microeconomic surveys and by studying supply, the economic, social and 
cultural environment and consumer practices. They reveal a process of 
general enrichment, distributed regionally, but do not distinguish social 
variations. Yet, they can help to draw a positive general context. This is 
the case in surveys about financial inclusion for the middle classes as well 
as the poor. For example, they show that the number of bank accounts 
increased from 4.6 million in 2005 to 33.6 million in 2014 while the number 
of mobile accounts rose from 1.3 million in 2007 to 25.2 million in 2014 
(Gubbins 2015). Even if multiple factors—including the boom in mobile 
phones, access to secure transfers, the importance of exchanges on the part 
9. The US poverty line is estimated at 17 USD a day.
10. See the “Middle Class Study” and its presentation by Ivory Ndekei 




of domestic and international migrants, and the evolution of the banking 
system—played in favour of this take-off, this indicator of the financial 
environment reflects a general improvement in living conditions.
The same is true of studies that focus on the lifestyle and consumption 
of the middle classes, the demand for housing and construction (Arvanitis 
2013), consumption patterns and consumer perceptions that give priority 
to quality criteria or appearance (Deloitte 2013), the level of Internet 
connection and use of social networks including Facebook, and the number 
of vehicles and imports…. even if these are goods of distinction that 
households only display on certain days and on special occasions. Other 
indicators confirm this trend. The increase in wage and employment in 
the tertiary economic sector and in the private sector—and particularly 
in national and regional commercial services—that followed on from new 
public policies in the fields of education, local administration, and national 
security testify to a growing number of intermediate socio-professional 
categories, among them the managerial staff even though their income is 
not stable.
Finally, the polling and surveys institutes11 in need of data for their 
sampling frames use two thresholds: a monthly income of 25,000–40,000 KES 
and a high income of above 40,000 KES per household, respectively 11% and 
5% of the population. The former estimate corresponds to the 10% “rich” 
of urban surveys conducted in working class neighbourhoods. It confirms 
the extrapolation from employment statistics, that is, 10% and 16% of the 
population.
In all the cases studied, one constant emerges. The search for intermediate 
variables highlights two key factors: the education of heads of household, 
whether male or female, and urban residency (among which Nairobi stands 
out). The middle classes are aware of this prerequisite, which has a positive 
influence on social advancement and accumulation of domestic wealth. 
Having themselves benefited from the ambitious school policies from 2002, 
they in turn invest in the training of their children and in their continuing 
education, as well as in urban estate, at the risk of going into debt.
The aggregated and cross-tabulated quantitative data thus refute the 
hypothesis of a pivotal middle class, even if average intermediate incomes 
only provide imperfect data about the emerging middle class—and 
considering also that this income is relative: the majority of Kenyans are 
in survival while the levels of wealth accumulation are very high among 
the oligarchy.
As a consequence, the sociological qualitative approach can be of help 
in identifying social configurations. It notably helps us to distinguish and 
11. See the Barometer data for May 2017, and the Ipsos Public Affairs opinion 
polls.
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model three situations. Firstly, there is an “upper middle class” with high 
monthly household incomes, owning one or more real estate properties 
and that is westernised in its way of life and consumer patterns. In this 
group there are successful small-scale entrepreneurs in the informal and 
service sectors, employees in certain private sectors, and high-ranking 
civil servants or employees of the Nairobi hub. Secondly, there is a large 
array of employed “managerial middle class,” following on from the petite 
bourgeoisie of the 1980–1990s but at the limits of the poverty line as they 
are “neither poor nor rich.” Although they are assured of income and have 
accumulated wealth, they are impacted by price variations and inflation, 
to economic conjuncture and to the instability of professional statuses. In 
practical terms, this second group, an erratic middle class, has access to 
malls, franchised restaurants, etc., but they consume little. The remaining 
group are “social entrepreneurs.” Studies have particularly focused on them 
(Ontita 2015) because they exemplify the Kenyan top-down growth that 
takes into account the market of both the urban and the rural poor. This 
group, limited in size but very visible in the media, tells about Kenya’s 
double history of the middle classes. Indeed, these economic actors are 
present in the services (financial, personal, production assistance…) where 
they implement the modernist efforts of the managerial petite bourgeoisie, 
of bureaucrats imbued with development ides—or at least who see 
development as a moral goal—but are also innovative because they master 
the new tools, use the new technological opportunities and walk the lines 
between commercial logic and moral vocations, between private interest 
and collective interest.
These three categories, that is, the “upper middle class,” “managerial 
middle class” and “social entrepreneurs,” share the same social model, but 
without all having the same means. This is confirmed by the study of the 
new demographic behaviours and their evolution within households. A 
minority of households (corresponding to the two upper quintiles) have 
common consumption behaviours and attitudes and refer to a typical 
middle-class family model valuing the nuclear household, the couple and 
the individual (Thibon 2015). This reading is corroborated by the more 
qualitative studies of sociologists, anthropologists and geographers on 
lifestyles. These studies reveal, among other things, the spread of new 
consumer patterns and of practices of social distinction and appearance 
geared towards branded products, new services, safe housing, but also new 
types of interest such as sea and national parks domestic tourism (Rieucau 
2014). In all three cases, modernisation does not call into question the 
links with peasant and provincial kinship based upon economic exchanges 
(through investment, intergenerational transfers or cultural transactions 
during family ceremonies), yet it gradually distends them (Resnick 2015). 
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These diverse and complex middle classes sharing common denominators 
(family model, lifestyle, etc.) reflect how much its current formation is a 
difficult process: the middle classes are learning to live in relative ease and 
are becoming urban, yet they retain their peasant character.
5. The Middle Classes,  
an Ongoing Process of Formation
Therefore, to better understand the ambiguities of the middle classes 
and overcome statistical and conceptual vagueness, if not a hesitant and 
approximate foresight, it is necessary to put this topic into historical 
perspective. This means, among others, reconnecting with scholarly works 
on the social classes and on a two-sided social structuring: one side is about 
the social biography of a group in formation, and the other concerns the 
ways in which these new classes relate to society and the regime, and the 
perceptions they have of these as well as of themselves.
Such history of social representations helps us to grasp continuities as 
well as innovations. It begins at the end of the colonial period. Its starting 
point is the end of the colonial period. The question of the middle classes 
appeared in the 1950s and since then, the public policies put in place 
have consistently aimed to promote the “intermediate classes,” then the 
“national elites,” and now the “middle classes” that are expected to be at the 
foundation of society. All these policies, from the Swynnerton Plan to Vision 
2030, have also carried political projects in search of economic leaders, then 
political leaders who could act as intermediaries or mobilisers depending 
on the projects considered—colonial, nationalist mixed with African 
socialism, democratic, and last, liberal. In this respect, the abundance of 
concepts used to describe these classes is an advantage, yet it can also be 
risky if one uncritically makes use of the “social entities” which political or 
technocratic discourses designate with terms such as “executive managers,” 
“modern sector,” and “national elites” or of the sometimes ideological 
theoretical tools of academic works.
The contribution of the prehistory and history of the middle classes, 
from the 1950s to the present day, is useful to grasp the historical movement 
and its current effects. It can be found in different social figures—similar 
to ideal-types—that each period has promoted. Three figures emerge that 
correspond to three different moments: “the evolved,” “the bureaucrat,” and 
“the entrepreneur.” In reality, the social actors combined a bit of each of 
these three roles depending on the historical context. Yet, their experiences 
and representations converged and participated, together with income and 
heritage, in the formation of a social class.
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Thus, colonisation, in its last decade, implemented a policy targeting 
the “evolved.” This term is borrowed from other colonial experiences 
yet it is appropriate to qualify the Kenyan case—although the condition 
of the Asians and that of the “non-native” somehow blurred the racial 
colonial vision of society. This policy was coherent: it aimed to reinforce 
social intermediaries in rural areas through the creation of an enlightened 
“rural petite bourgeoisie,” as Gavin Kitching observed in the 1950s-1970s 
when studying the social structuring of peasant property. It also aimed to 
supervise its auxiliaries—the African bureaucracy—in the cities as they had 
become essential for colonial action. Such a developmentalist and modernist 
project, weakened by the Mau Mau insurrection that divided the rural 
world between nationalists and loyalists, was pursued and defended by the 
supporters of Western modernisation and of a “third political path.” They 
advocated the promotion of a meritocratic urban-rural petite bourgeoisie 
and the formation of intellectuals, aiming to make up for the structural 
constraints that had delayed the creation of national civil servants. The 
broader objective was the emergence of Kenyan capitalism and the creation 
of liberal urban elite. Such a project was part of the search for a third political 
path (Diouf-Kamara 1991; Charton 2000, 27-48). From independence, such 
a vision had its political supporters but they were contradicted by an 
increasingly authoritarian power in search for hegemony, with its ethnic 
governance and the elitist management of Kenyan universities. This does 
not mean that these “historical losers” disappeared: some emigrated, and the 
majority nestled in economic activities, including coffee production. This 
was the case of the average Kikuyu peasantry who invested in real estate 
in Nairobi (Charlery de la Masselière 1997, 7-8). They also retreated into 
intellectual and legal activities. They initiated internal immigration or were 
taken in by the regime, thus becoming its servants-clients, spokespersons 
and organic intellectuals.
It is in the independence context that the figure of the “bureaucrat” was 
foregrounded and replaced the neo-colonial image of “the evolved.” The 
national elites in charge of an interventionist and regulatory state that 
promoted them and who were reinforced by the single party then fit best into 
the nationalist projects of President Jomo Kenyatta and even more of Daniel 
arap Moi. A small directorial bourgeoisie then appeared. It was quite diverse 
and hierarchical, and maintained (or not) links to the rural petite plantation-
holding bourgeoisie and the bureaucratic class of the colonial period. Its 
emblematic professional figures ranged from the school teachers to high-
ranking civil servants—thus reproducing the colonial wage hierarchy. They 
also ranged from the askari to the district or provincial commissioners, in 
continuity with a colonial public order turned national order… They all 
benefited collectively but unequally from public employment, jobs in the 
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politico-economic system or in the formal parastatal sector, and the welfare 
state—more precisely from the salaries that the welfare state provided as 
well as from some privileges in health and housing, bridges between the 
public and the private sector, the Africanisation of employment, and access 
to commercial licenses. This managerial petite bourgeoisie, endowed with 
intellectual capital, inherited respectability and a somehow symbolic capital 
of command that compensated for limited income. Yet in the 1990s, such 
social advancement stalled. The economic crisis and adjustment programs, 
followed by political and ethnic struggles, changed the situation: they 
weakened the managerial petite bourgeoisie, hindered its evolution and 
destabilised it. Confronted with reduced resources and with economic and 
adjustment programs, it became divided between resilience, corporatist 
withdrawal, and ethnic temptation. A first group, dismissed, was tempted by 
the promise of private enterprise and fell into informality. A second group, 
impoverished, downgraded by inflation and prey to general instability, 
protected itself as best it could according to the power of the professional 
unions they could rely on. And a third group supplemented their insufficient 
wage by resorting to related sources of income, such as public/private 
duplication, a return to the private sector, and corruption. Since 2002, this 
declining managerial petite bourgeoisie has unevenly benefited from growth 
while it has rubbed shoulders with the social ascents of certain private 
activities. Only a part of it—the high civil service, the liberal professions, 
and some professions in education and health—has managed to maintain 
its symbolic and cultural capital as well as its revenues through traditional 
areas that could be safeguarded (the university, the exercise of law) and 
through new services to business which the new economic and political 
contexts had enhanced.
The growth of the 2000s legitimised a new dominant figure among the 
middle classes, if not a whole new generation: “the small entrepreneur.” The 
social rise of “micro-entrepreneurs,” caught between survival and desire for 
accumulation, has played out on several levels: public and private resources, 
wage income, and investments in the informal sector (mechanical, electrical, 
computer repairs, etc.), agriculture and its new commercial productions and 
outcomes (e.g. foodstuffs kiosks), services (e.g. matatu), land and property 
return, and speculative urban and rural income. These entrepreneurs 
without an enterprise—who, since the 1990s, research on the informal 
sector has tried to understand by going beyond the image of the jua kali 
(handicraft and informal sector)—have taken advantage of new markets, 
new technologies and a high-tech D system with the intelligence of survival. 
They did it through new services and even through illegal activities that 
ensured a quick return on limited investment in an untaxed informal sector. 
These entrepreneurs can be found in the city where the most opportunities 
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are available, including in the slums (where they play the role of “little 
big men”) and in the countryside where petite peasant landowners—
following the former model of peasantry or in break with it—have occupied 
production niches linked to the urban market (horticulture, dairy farming, 
khat, meat…). These post-coffee modes of exploitation are often at odds with 
those of the elders, so much so that these innovative rural entrepreneurs 
are very often young people and women. Could this be an effect of the 
demographic dividend? Indeed, this educated youth familiar with digital 
technologies has quickly adapted to new products and marketing. Or could 
it be an effect of the gendered dividend? However, this energy overflow is 
not enough. In addition to skills and domestic mobilisation, the economy 
of affection and relationships have become necessary to reap the benefits 
of new interdependencies and new jobs and opportunities (Mbataru 2009).
As spectacular as this emergence of the new middle classes may be—
with its social markers and models, its car fleet, its material culture, its 
sociability, its modernity, and especially its role in the civil society and 
through the intellectuals—, they remain the minority, both in the city and 
even more in the countryside. Taking up Marxist phraseology, they are a 
“class in itself,” in gestation, not a “class for itself.” Certainly, the boundaries 
and social practices defining collective identity are gradually solidifying, 
but they remain porous. The new middle classes are confronted either with 
dangerous popular classes, at least perceived as such, or with networks of 
poor rural kinship, from which they come and to which they are related 
and often indebted. Yet the risk of overflow and downgrading still lingers, 
and the control of rural elders is still significant. Moreover, the new 
middle classes are also limited in their social ascent by the shortcomings 
of the Kenyan political economy, by the reserved domains of the higher 
political-economic elites—although some can access them—and by cyclical 
variations. This in-between situation and this social mobility are a source 
of anxiety, all the more so as the public systems and services and the liberal 
economy do not offer them any guarantee. Hence the cautious behaviours 
they develop by multiplying socio-economic, spatial and moral protections. 
It is noticeable that they embrace political modernity and the defence of 
human rights, which both serve as security for their acquired rights, but also 
the defects of political life such as ethnic residency, ethnicity and tribalism 
(Maupeu 2012). Moreover, these attitudes vary according to the power 
relations—of a quasi-demographic nature—that the middle classes can exert 
in some urban spaces. They also depend on associations with some groups, 
on more or less close contact with their Asian social neighbours, and on 
their ability to transcend ethnic divisions through inter-ethnic marriages, 
which enables them to become cosmopolitan and urban Nairobians and to 




This reading of the social changes within the Kenyan elites—that is, 
within both the oligarchy and the middle classes—and of their historical 
trajectories completes and modifies the bipolar or tripolar analysis of an 
exclusive society in accordance with and inherited from the past. It reveals 
a society that is as unequal as in the past, with a continually high level of 
poverty. It is a conflictual society, but a society in motion that is constantly 
changing the lines of social partition and collective identities. Changes 
are very real within the social structures, with frequent and commonplace 
discrepancies12 between the rapid pace of economic and technical changes, 
the slower social practices experienced by societies as well as the slower 
trends or weight of collective representations. Such discrepancies are 
reflected in variations between social norms and individual and household 
practices, which sometimes involves authoritarian cultural constraints. 
They also result in cultural tensions that crystallise on social issues 
debated by the press but also experienced within households (the freedom 
of the youth, clothing…). Public opinion delights in gauging the scope of 
individualism’s moral pitfalls, and though social mobility imperceptibly 
shapes and creates new opportunities for generations to come, it also 
imposes a debt from the fallout of such growth. The nature of economic 
growth, however, even if it benefits all but unequally, remains poorly 
integrative. It leaves to the political power and public policies the task 
of redistribution and the creation of national solidarity, a new political 
economy (Bourguignon 2004), a social protection policy 13 and the 
maintenance of a national community bond that is hampered by identity 
and ethnic biases that modernisation has not yet erased.
The challenge ahead lies in the political capacity of the elites to cushion 
the social effects of liberal growth and to accompany the stratification or 
social mobility processes. Ultimately, those living in periphery societies 
that had long been confined to particular space-times remain in the shadow. 
In these societies, there has been a rapid advancement amongst the elites 
thanks to structural and politico-economic changes, and the numbers of 
university graduates are high. The question now becomes: will they come 
12. According to the expression and image of the discrepancy of changes used 
by historian Fernand Braudel, who speaks of “the delay of culture on the social,” 
and of “the delay of the social on the economic.”
13. Sectoral policies were launched for the youth and vulnerable people based 
on both common type and innovative programs, including cash transfers to 
OVC and the elderly.
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soon on to the scene of Kenyan society, or will they conversely be tempted 
to break away?14
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Between Hopes and Disillusionment
Constitutional Reforms  
and Decentralisation in Kenya, 2000–2020
Chloé Josse-Durand
Translated by Matteo Réveillon & Sarah Levy Klimpke
In 2010, Kenya made a bold decision: it reformed its constitution by launching 
a decentralisation—also called devolution—which the World Bank referred 
to as “ambitious” and “unprecedented” in Africa (World Bank 2012, xi). The 
exceptional nature of this decentralisation lied not only in its large-scale 
territorial reform but also in the large number of functions delegated to 
new local levels of governance, called counties. Each of the new 47 counties 
was granted a large share of civil servants and financial and administrative 
means to elaborate its own local public policies and to pass laws in its 
parliamentary assemblies. This institutional change rekindled academic 
thinking on decentralised governance in Africa, inspiring new research 
aimed at comparing, discussing and studying this innovative governance 
mechanism.1 Recent academic studies have underlined the significant 
progress that might be made in the distribution of basic services, the 
reduction of economic inequalities between regions, and the appeasement 
of land disputes and identity claims in Kenya.2 They have, however, also 
emphasised the limits of this reform. Among other things, they have 
highlighted shortcomings in the reform’s formalisation and implementation, 
including the conservation of a national level pre-eminence, an increase in 
political competition and violence, the proliferation of cronyism, and the 
growth of inequalities in the counties (as opposed to in the regions).3 This 
chapter, noting the continued relevance of the debates on the impact of 
1. In the early 2005–2010, many publications analysed this original form of 
governance: Ghai (2008), Branch & Cheeseman (2008), Cheeseman & Tendi 
(2010), Githinji & Homlquist (2008), Kanyinga & Long (2012). More recently, see 
Burbidge (2019).
2. For some—far less numerous—optimistic prospects: Shilaho (2015), Steeves 
(2015), Elszasz (2016), Crawford & Hartmann (2008), World Bank (2011; 2012; 
2015), Bouka, Berry & Kamuru (2019), Elfversson & Sjögren (2019).
3. For some more critical perspectives: Mudida (2009), Hassan (2013), Adbille 
& Abdi (2016), Cannon & Ali (2018), Chome (2015), D’Arcy & Cornell (2014; 
2016), Githinji & Holmquist (2012), Berman, Cottrell & Ghai (2009), Boone et al. 
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constitutional reforms and the consequences of decentralisation on Kenyan 
society and political system in Kenya and in the academic realm, aims to 
contribute to these debates.4
Debates over this reform relate to Kenya’s long-term political history. 
Decentralisation is a political process through which—as a result their 
acquisition of a share of national income and the ability to raise their own 
funds—territorial authorities gain greater autonomy in decision making 
and action, as well as more financial resources. This concept has been 
at the heart of Kenyan political debates since the 1950s (Burbidge 2019). 
Until independence in 1963, these debates revolved around the issue of 
Majimboism,5 that is, the granting of power to regions. Between the 1960s 
and the 1980s, under the presidency of Jomo Kenyatta (1963–1978) and the 
first mandate of Daniel arap Moi (1978–2002), Majimboism vanished from 
political debates despite the fact that Daniel arap Moi had been a strong 
advocate of the Majimbo ideology during the fight for independence (Maxon 
2016, 20). This disappearance was the result of both a secessionist threat 
(especially in the North of the country6) and the authoritarian regime 
maintained by Kenya’s first two presidents (Nyong’o 1989). From 1982 
onwards, Daniel arap Moi implemented pro-rural development measures, 
it seemed, under the pretence of deconcentrating, but not for the purpose 
of real decentralisation (Southall & Wood 1996, 508–9). In the early 1990s, 
the political opposition, together with students and civil society, called for 
(2019), Burbidge (2015), Cheeseman, Lynch & Willis (2016), and more recently 
Cheeseman, Lynch & Kanyinga (2020).
4. This chapter benefited from the sound suggestions of Marie-Emmanuelle 
Pommerolle, Claire Médard and Marie-Aude Fouéré, who I warmly thank, along 
with Paul Kembala (alias Maddo) for sharing his nuanced approach of Kenyan 
politics with me.
5. The Swahili word majimbo means “region.” Directly after independence, 
these regions took the form of 8 administrative provinces, which were replaced 
by 47 counties from the 4th  March 2013 elections and the implementation of 
decentralisation.
6. Just before Kenya’s independence, the 1960 independence of Somalia 
contributed to push the Majimbo ideology into the background during the 1960s. 
The Somali political elites, as well as the Kenyan political elites originally from 
Somalia, claimed that Kenya’s Northern Frontier District belonged to the new 
Somali State. Two weeks before independence, President Jomo Kenyatta declared 
the state of emergency and deployed the army in North-East Kenya. This region 
immediately became one of the 8 Kenyan provinces (North-Eastern Province), 
which triggered a secessionist conflict at the regional level (Ethiopia, Djibouti, 
Somalia, Kenya). This conflict is known as the Shifta war (meaning “bandits” 
in Amharic) in 1963–1967. On the reformulation of these secessionist debates 
within the frame of decentralisation, see Brancati (2006).
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the return of multipartyism in Kenya and a radical change of its political 
system. They faced strong state repression (Pommerolle 2005, Ruteere 2010).
The notion of decentralisation resurfaced with the writing of a new 
constitution during Mwai Kibaki’s 2002 presidential campaign. The 8 
majimbo created after independence were divided in 47 counties. The 
borders of these counties correspond to the borders of some former districts 
which had been subdivided in the 1990s (Barkan & Chege 1989) before being 
“reassembled” to form counties led by locally-elected governments. The 
local administration remains however highly centralised and monitored 
by County Commissioners. This system is somewhat reminiscent of the 
former provincial government (Bourmaud 1988, 217). The conjunction of 
a local government appointed by the central governing power (national 
level) with the election of a local government (which appoints a local 
administrative staff) highlights the combination of two distinct power 
structures. Note that while these power structures intertwine, they also 
compete with one another (Médard 2006). Nonetheless, elected local 
officials—including governors, senators, women’s representatives, member 
of parliaments or members of local assemblies—enjoy flexibility in terms 
of governance. They play a leading role in public decision-making and, 
thanks to local parliaments (the County Assemblies) and the new budgets 
at their disposal, are capable of developing local projects. The political 
class is showing growth and, because of the governors’ political weight 
and as their governments enjoy a local base, a reconfiguration of power is 
emerging (Cheeseman, Lynch & Willis 2016).
For Kenyan citizens and activists, the constitutional reforms and 
the political openness of the early 2000s fostered some hope for the 
democratisation of Kenya’s political and media spheres.7 In theory, such 
developments would ensure the improvement of governance (notably 
through public participation), transparency in the use of public funds, and 
a better redistribution of national financial resources. Hence, these reforms 
appear to be the long-awaited answers to both the territorialised and 
ethnicised resource-related tensions (including land) and the reduction of 
the historical inequalities and injustices that fuel these tensions.8 Because 
they would guarantee greater transparency and strengthen the control of 
public finances at the national level, the reforms could also reconciliate 
citizens with their elected officials. Be that as it may, this new wave of hope 
7. The hopes of the Kenyan activist sphere—soon to be shattered—were 
transcribed in an article by Robert Press (2012) that gave voice to some activists.
8. On the question of “historical injustices” in Kenya and the entrenchment 
of the land issue in Kenyan power relations since the implementation of the 
constitutional reforms and decentralisation, see Francesca Di Matteo in this 
volume and D’Arcy & Nitstotskaya (2019).
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must be put into perspective.9 While decentralisation structures political 
practices and representations, it does not transform them completely. 
Quite the opposite: it reinforces some dynamics that should be brought to 
light through a macro and a micro analysis of the reforms that have been 
implemented since the 2013 general elections.
Debates over the structure of the Kenyan state (unitary, decentralised, 
federalist) keep causing much violence. This violence is less the consequence 
of ethnic contention than of past or broken pacts between political 
elites at every level of authority and of the administration (Oucho 1998; 
Atieno Odhiambo 2004; Klopp 2002). Driven by a deep-rooted capitalist 
accumulation logic, these elites tend to defend their own economic and 
political interests through an ethnic rhetoric. This type of rhetoric succeeds 
in mobilising voters, but overlooks social, political and economic inequalities 
(Lonsdale 2004; Berman & Lonsdale 1992, II). Changing the rules of this 
neo-patrimonial, paternalist and clientelist game—which underpin the 
interpersonal relationship between elites themselves, and between elites 
and citizens—is neither in the interest of elected local officials, nor in that 
of territorial administrators10 (Bach & Gazibo 2012; Githinji & Holmquist 
2012; Hornsby 2013, 260–1). The governance system established through 
decentralisation also ensures the subsistence of political and economic 
agreements concluded between local and national elites; and, what is 
more, it guarantees the protection of their respective interests (D’Arcy & 
Cornell 2014; Gadjanova 2019; Waddilove 2019). Ultimately, the effective 
implementation of decentralisation is restrained mostly by vicissitudes 
inherited from the past and the permanency of the central state’s weight 
(Hassan 2013). Corruption, for its part, has been decentralised, or at least 
enhanced, at every level (Burbidge 2015a; D’Arcy & Cornell 2016). And 
even if local assemblies and elected representatives (called Members of 
County Assemblies or MCAs) counterweigh the local executive, public 
participation of citizens in defining the priorities of development is not 
convincing (World Bank 2015; Rwigi, forthcoming).
This chapter aims to illustrate the changes initiated by these administrative 
and political reforms since the early 2000s. Its purpose is also to display the 
perceptible continuities of the political practices of Kenyan politicians. The 
first section offers an introductory political chronology of the elections, 
9. Many academic publications aimed to nuance these flourishing hopes during 
that decade, for instance: Kagwanja (2003), Murunga & Nasong’o (2006), Otieno 
(2005), Githinji & Holmquist (2012), Berman, Cottrell & Ghai (2009), Branch & 
Cheeseman (2010), Kanyinga & Long (2012).
10. On the persistence of neo-patrimonial practices in Kenyan public 
administration, see Cohen (1993) for the provincial administration, and Onyango 
(2017) for the counties’ administration.
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partisan debates, and proposed reforms about Kenya’s historic inequalities 
and political moralisation since the early 2000s. This part aims to explain 
how decentralisation has been implemented as a means to resolve the 
issues inherited from Kenya’s political history—taking into consideration 
the fact that Kenya was built upon a strong legacy of administrative 
centralisation on the one hand, and major political crises on the other 
hand. The second section offers thoughts on the decentralisation project 
itself and its implementation. In particular, it questions the emphasis on 
local democracy and the approach of “local elected representatives.” The 
final section sheds light on the government’s development-centric vision, 
explains the cooperation arrangements between counties, and, on the basis 
of concrete examples, explores how these levels of authority interact.
1. Decentralisation Grappled with the Turbulence  
of Kenya’s Political Life
Decentralisation is at the heart of Kenya’s contemporary public and political 
debate. It is a long-standing political project whose identity and territorial 
dimensions have always been questioned by both Kenyan elites and 
citizens. In the 1960s and the 1970s, “decentralisation” denoted Majimboism 
(regionalism). The Swahili Majimbo and Majimboism refer to the distribution 
of power to the regions. A controversial political project, regionalism was 
championed by Jaramogi Oginga Odinga, former Prime Minister of Jomo 
Kenyatta having joined the opposition. Like Jomo Kenyatta’s plan of unitary 
government, Odinga’s political project proposed a territorial and ethnic 
definition of access to resources based on administrative regions (Médard 
1999). Indeed, at the time of independence, the Kenya African National 
Union (KANU), the political party led by Kenyatta, played a key role in 
the struggle against British colonial rule. KANU promoted national unity 
and the advent of a centralised state based on “Kikuyu constitutionalism,” 
which was inspired by the monarchical and imperial system established by 
British authorities (Kenyatta 1938, Lonsdale 2006). Representatives of ethnic 
minority groups, like Ronald Ngala (mijikenda), Masinde Muliro (luhya) or 
Daniel arap Moi (kalenjin), were opposed to this idea. With the support of 
the British, they proposed establishing a multi-racial governance system 
based on a “Majimbo Constitution.” This would guarantee the interest of 
minorities as well as the establishment of a regional power base.11 The 
representatives of these ethnic minority groups first formed their own 
regional parties, which united behind the Kenya African Democratic Union 
11. These minority groups were supported by the British (including the settlers) 




(KADU). In the 1960s, KADU received the support of the Rift Valley, the 
coastal region and the Western part of the country. The populations of 
these areas with little government presence favoured a federal state and the 
decentralisation of the public authority to the regions. The 1961 elections 
settled the matter: KANU won with 67,4% of the votes against 16,4% for 
KADU. As the KANU leaders called on those of the KADU to rally behind 
efforts to create a government of national unity, the “Majimbo Constitution” 
project came to an end and Kenya became a de facto one-party state.12
To put an end to the violence associated with the Majimbo claims in 
the 1960s and 1990s, the 2010 Constitution introduced and provided for 
the use of the more neutral Swahili terms ugatuzi13 (decentralisation) and 
usambazaji wa madaraka (responsibility sharing). These terms, which have 
their origins in the constitutional debates of the 1960s, were used in the 
official reports that followed the 2007 post-elections violence. Note that 
this change in terminology was less about promoting regional preference 
than about reforming the provincial government’s system, which had 
resulted from colonisation and was considered inadequate.14 The districts 
were indeed perceived as fostering political ethnicity as they stimulated 
politicised ethnic disputes and entrenched local identities (Hassan 2016). 
Since their establishment at independence, these districts had been 
subjected to much political manipulation. For instance, between the 1992 
and 2002 elections, Daniel arap Moi created 30 new districts in an effort to 
sway votes, as did Mwai Kibaki between 2002 and 2013.15 Indeed, although 
Moi had been a strong supporter of the Majimbo system, once he was in 
power (1978–2002), his promises of reform gave way to a process of power 
deconcentration aimed at strengthening his base in the regions through 
the strategic appointment of Provincial and District Commissioners, 
representing the central administration, and the establishment of police 
stations in the different provinces of the country.
12. In 1964, less than a year after independence, the opposition was dissolved 
and a decree—adopted by a 2/3 majority in the House of Representatives—buried 
the Majimbo Constitution by amending its prerogatives.
13. On this topic, see the definition of the Swahili Oxford Living Dictionaries (2018) 
at the ugatuzi entry.
14. It should be made clear that the local political level has been built as a 
political arena since colonisation. The politicisation of the districts rests on 
a double dynamic: 1) the creation of new districts to fight the 1990s requests 
for multipartyism (Hassan 2016), but also 2) the non-reform of the provincial 
administration which made it possible for the central power to control the local 
level (Médard 2006).
15. Mathenge, Oliver. 2009. “All Constituencies now Turned into Districts.” The 
Nation, 13 July [archive].
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As this debate involves a long chronology of events, we should be aware of 
the political episodes that preceded and shaped the decentralisation project 
as it exists today, as well as its use in the political debates of the 2000–2020 
period. In the 1990s, the KANU’s strategy was mainly aimed at reviving 
the Majimbo ideology to win the elections in the Rift Valley and the coastal 
region. It put forward the ethnic argument, that is, indigenous claims, to pit 
the “natives” (or “self-convinced ‘locals’” or “new indigenes” as Gabrielle 
Lynch calls them, 2011) against the more recent “migrants” (Jenkins 2012), 
without taking any concrete steps towards decentralisation. Following the 
violent and biased 1992 and 1997 elections, the December 2002 elections 
marked a historical transition in Kenyan political history with the end of 
the KANU monopoly of power (which had been de facto in 1969, and de 
jure in 1982 and 1991) and the victory of a multi-party coalition (Throup & 
Hornsby 1998, Maupeu 2003). These presidential and legislative elections 
took place in a peaceful context despite fears and the first terrorist attacks 
in the area.16 The victory of the NaRC (National Rainbow Coalition) led 
by Mwai Kibaki against Uhuru Kenyatta—who, in this first candidacy, had 
been designated as Moi’s successor—was unexpected. It raised high hopes 
for the establishment of a social contract that the increasingly authoritarian 
practices of the previous regimes had torn apart (Grignon & Maupeu 1998).
But these hopes were quickly dashed by the inertia of the first Kibaki 
government, which did not seem inclined to keep its promises to liberalise 
the political system. The work of the government agencies created to 
oversee the constitutional reform and transform a basic law inherited from 
the colonial period failed to convince the Kenyans. This was especially true 
in the case of the National Cohesion and Integration Commission (NCIC) 
whose function was to ensure the healing of ethno-political conflicts 
by promoting greater inclusiveness; and that of the Truth, Justice and 
Reconciliation Commission (TJRC) aimed at redressing the injustices of the 
past (Bosire & Lynch, 2014). In 2003, the NaRc introduced the Constituency 
Development Fund (CDF). The CDF was intended to encourage the transfer 
of funds from the national level to the local level: as a result of the CDF 
2.5% of the national income was allocated to Members of Parliament 
(MPs) for the development of their constituencies. The CDF was not so 
innovative in that it was an institutionalised version of harambee (literally 
“all together”). Collective fundraisings encouraged local leaders to initiate 
local development projects with the population (creation of health centres, 
schools, etc.), the operating costs of which would then be covered by 
the government. The existence of this decentralised fund—albeit highly 
16. The attacks on the American embassies in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam in 
August 1998 left a deep impression because of their violence and death toll, in 
the same as the attack on a Mombasa hotel in November 2002.
Chloé Josse-Durand
136
corrupt (Cheeseman 2008)—led some to describe Kenya as a country with 
a “high degree of decentralisation” (Ndegwa 2002) even before the 2010 
Constitution had been passed. However, these measures satisfied neither 
the Kenyan Human Rights Commission (KHRC), nor the activists and 
associations, which mobilised and demanded action from the government. 
This move shed light on the fragility of the change in power.17 Clear 
objections were also perceived among the victorious (and profoundly 
heterogeneous) coalition (Otieno 2005), and within which the Kikuyu elite 
was itself divided (Branch 2010, 304).
Frustrations materialised in the creation of the “orange movement,” a 
multi-party alliance of MPs rallied around the person of Raila Odinga, the 
son of Jaramogi Oginga Odinga, who opposed Kibaki’s draft constitution. 
In November 2005, the rejection of the draft by referendum completed the 
break-up of the NaRc and set apart the political factions that would be 
part of the opposition during the December 2007 elections. As the leader 
his new party—the Orange Democratic Movement, ODM—, Raila Odinga 
pledged to carry out an ambitious program during the first 90 days of 
his presidency: to implement a constitutional reform (as announced in 
2002) and decentralisation. He condemned the corruption of the Kibaki 
government, which had failed to put an end to thievery inherited from the 
Moi era. His program focused on setting up a more equitable redistribution 
of resources, strengthening the counties’ capacities (60% of public funds 
would go to regional and local governments), limiting the executive branch 
and establishing a parliamentary system. For its part, Kibaki’s program was 
not surprising and represented a straight continuation of the promises he 
had made during his first term, namely: free secondary education, improved 
public services, and job creation.
In the aftermath of the 27 December 2007 presidential election, in which 
more than 14 million Kenyans came to the polls, sometimes waiting more 
than six hours to enter a polling station.18 The results of the elections 
were clear: Mwai Kibaki had been re-elected with 4,584,721 votes, while 
his opponent Raila Odinga had obtained 4,352,993 votes—a difference of 
only about 230,000 votes. Even before the official results were announced, 
the Raila Odinga camp actively denounced a massive fraud ordered by 
the incumbent government. The Electoral Commission of Kenya (ECK), a 
17. While alternation was a source of optimism in Kenya and elsewhere, it was 
quickly put into question. See in particular the critical introduction by Godwin 
Murunga and Shadrack Nasong’o (2006). 
18. Turnout reached an all-time high of 69%, or 9,886,650  voters. The 2013 
election (the first general election under decentralisation) beat this record with 
a rate of 85,01% and 14,352,533 registered voters (a rate never seen before).
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supposedly independent but often denounced body,19 was seized upon the 
discovery of an illegal voters’ list in Raila Odinga’s precinct a few days 
before the elections, and because of internal irregularities in the system 
put in place: multiple registrations of the same voter or of deceased voters, 
circulation of false ballot papers, and suspicious movements of buses or 
coaches—escorted by the police or the Kikuyu militia Mungiki—which 
were suspected to transport full ballot boxes towards the regions which 
were won over to the opposition.20
On the evening of Sunday, 30 December, ECK’s president Samuel Kivuitu 
proclaimed the final results: Mwai Kibaki had won the presidential election. 
Yet, the results previously announced during the counting of votes—which 
did not take the representativeness of the local results for the whole 
country into account—showed that Raila Odinga led by a considerable 
amount.21 Once again, political violence was used to weaken both electoral 
competition and democracy (Connan & Brisset-Foucault 2008). While there 
was a suspicion of widespread fraud at all the levels of the presidential 
election (a suspicion on which the ECK did not comment), the parliamentary 
elections resulted in a clear victory of the ODM candidates. These events 
triggered demonstrations and the first acts of violence in two informal 
settlements of Nairobi that Raila Odinga had won over: Kibera, which was 
his stronghold in the Langat’a constituency, and Kawangware. In the four 
months following the election, from December 2007 to April 2008, nearly 
1,100 Kenyans lost their lives and about 600,000 people fled the violence, 
becoming internal refugees (Internally Displaced People, IDP, ICG 2008).22 
Fuelled by deep historical inequalities and territorial tensions over access to 
land (Médard 2008), the discords affecting Nairobi’s poor neighbourhoods, 
medium-sized cities (Kisumu, Mombasa, Eldoret) and cosmopolitan regions 
of Kenya were reduced in unjust ways to the effects of ethnic antagonisms 
by political elites and the international media. Above all, these discords 
19. Both for its proximity to the authorities and also for the intimidation of its 
representatives. 
20. The Mungiki political militia is a prophetic religious movement, particularly 
influential in the Kikuyu diaspora of the Rift Valley and in the cities of the 
Central Province. It has been mobilised in times of political crises by Kikuyu 
elites since the late 1980s (Kagwanja 2003; Maupeu 2013).
21. The day after the vote, on the evening of December 28th, 50% of the votes 
of the presidential poll were counted at the Kenyatta International Conference 
Centre by the ECK: 3.3 million votes for Odinga and 2.4 million for Kibaki. The 
next day, on December 29, the gap gradually narrowed to around 30,000 votes. 
And the day after, Kibaki was declared winner of the presidential election, with 
250,000 more votes (4,584 million votes for Kibaki, 4,352 million for Odinga).
22. See the issue of Afrique contemporaine on this theme, especially the article 
by Christian Thibon (2013).
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were territorialised class conflicts inscribed in the trajectory of a capitalist 
state that had developed globalised neoliberal policies and whose neo-
patrimonial mechanisms structured the economy, politics and the society 
(see Calas as well as Maupeu in this volume). International mediations were 
carried out under the aegis of UN Secretary General Kofi Annan; and led to 
a coalition and a power-sharing agreement in April 2008. In an attempt to 
guarantee peace, a government of national alliance (Grand Coalition) was 
established. Mwai Kibaki held the position of President and worked closely 
with his former opponent and Prime Minister Raila Odinga to develop a set 
of policies aimed at reuniting the country politically and socially. Protecting 
the economy from the vicissitudes of politics was a priority.
Thus, Kibaki’s second term was guided by a strong consensus on 
national development to defuse the main socio-economic gaps which had 
led to the 2007 crisis. This new direction led to the promotion of Kenya’s 
Vision 2030 development plan: a set of reforms and major infrastructure 
projects expected to bring Kenya to the status of a middle-income country 
within the next 20 years. The current “Building Bridges Initiative” (BBI) is 
one of these projects.23 The new direction was also reflected in a complex 
consensus around the redefinition of the constitution which, beyond a 
global reform of the Kenyan system, intended to pacify the elections in 
Kenya.24 From 2008 onwards, the coalition government led to a process of 
co-writing of the 2010 Constitution (known as the Bomas Draft) by Mwai 
Kibaki’s and Raila Odinga’s political entourage and some elected officials 
close to them. The latest version of the draft promoted decentralisation 
(Kasfir 2005). In an effort to restore credit to his government, Kibaki used 
decentralisation as a facade while his camp’s recommendations conferred 
a significant economic and political power to the governors. The MPs 
contributed to the draft Constitution by committing to decentralise power 
at the level of 47 counties (and not at that of the 8 existing provinces). This 
decision, however, went against the principle that minority groups and 
some opposition parties had been defending for almost 70 years.25 Indeed, 
the chosen political units (from the ward to the county) were generally 
thought to be too small to constitute a real counter-power capable of 
threatening the central government (see later in this section).
Following a second referendum which received a 67% “yes” vote, the 
adoption of the new Constitution in the summer of 2010 promised a better 
balance of power and mediation of land conflicts. The new text retained the 
23. The BBI Initiative is an extension of the Vision 2030 project (see conclusion).
24. Indeed, the violence and their recollection profoundly influenced the 
campaign and the management of the election announced for March 4, 2013.
25. See the article by Justin Willis and Ngala Chome (2014), which details these 
expectations from the perspective of the Coastal region and elites.
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presidential system, but subjected presidential appointments (ministers, 
prosecutors, ambassadors) to approval by the Parliament—which could 
now dismiss the President. Two new bodies were also set up: the Senate, 
composed of 47 members elected from the new administrative districts (the 
counties);26 and the Supreme Court, responsible for arbitrating disputes 
concerning the presidential election, as well as challenges to judgements 
handed down on appeal. “Traditional” civil liberties (of expression, worship, 
association, etc.) are guaranteed,27 and dual nationality is now possible. 
The land reform component was more controversial. It provided for the 
establishment of a National Land Commission (NLC). It also included the 
legal review of “historical injustices”—including “land grabbing issues”—
and the limitation of private ownership, in particular the duration of 
emphyteutic leases for foreigners. This measure challenges the illegal 
acquisition of land involving the highest levels of the state and its elites 
since independence (Boone et al. 2019). Both the National Land Policy (2009) 
and the 2010 Constitution adopted principles—which are not always put in 
practice, especially with regards to so-called “community lands”—intended 
to emancipate land institutions from the centralised bureaucratic system of 
land administration inherited from the colonial era.28 These debates show 
that decentralisation raises a crucial question: which level of power—local 
or national—is entitled to control land and legislate on land ownership 
as well as on past and present disputes? This question relates to the very 
principles of the new decentralised political system aimed at establishing 
local and participatory control over resources.
2. The Principles  
of the New Decentralised Political System
Consider the following sentence: “Politics in tune with community 
(…), building from the ground-up a participatory system of governance 
that stays in touch with communities by staying in communities” 
(Burbidge 2019, 12). It sums up the principles at the heart of the Kenyan 
decentralisation experience in a nutshell. It describes a participatory and 
inclusive system of governance anchored in public opinion and decision-
making at the local level.
26. Also sitting in the Senate are 16 representatives designated by the political 
parties on the basis of their representativeness, two youth representatives and 
two representatives of persons with disabilities.
27. It should however be pointed out that while the new Constitution raised 
many hopes for freedoms (especially with the creation of various commissions), 
the political context hardened under Uhuru Kenyatta’s presidency, between 2013 
and 2017, and particularly regarding media freedoms.
28. See Di Matteo in this volume.
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The 47 counties created by the Constitution have equivalent legal and 
political status. Each county government has an executive branch headed 
by the Governor, his cabinet of ministers (the County Executive Committee) 
and all the County Chief Officers, namely, sub-county-, wards- and village- 
administrators. The county government’s legislative branch consists of 
the County Assembly and the county’s representation at the national 
level (through the election of one MP per constituency and one Senator 
per county). The County Public Service Board recommends candidates for 
appointment as Ministers by the Governor, and manages human resources 
at the county level. The diagram below shows the relationship between the 
executive and legislative branches of government at the level of Kenyan 
county structures, and their equivalent in the national structure of power 
(Republic of Kenya 2014).
The Governor leads his county government, just as the President leads 
the national government.29 In the national government, the President 
appoints the Cabinet Secretaries. The Public Service Commission 
recommends the candidates for appointment as Principal Secretaries to the 
President. The civil servants of each department answer to their Principal 
Secretary. In the counties, the Governor appoints the County Executive 
Committee members (CEC or CECs). They head the local ministries, which 
perform the functions partially-decentralised by the central government, 
namely: agriculture, health services, cultural activities, trade and finance. 
Ministers participate in the preparation of the so-called County Planning 
Development Plans (five-years development plans). CECs (equivalents of 
ministers) and County Chief Officers (equivalents of Principal Secretaries) 
are recommended for appointment to the Governor by the County Public 
Service Board. The latter manages civil servants at the county level, just 
as the Public Service Commission does at the national level. These are two 
separate commissions in the context of which the national level cannot 
influence the local level (the national civil service, i.e. the state civil service, 
is not in a position to re-centralise its responsibilities).
To carry out the functions of the national government at the local level, 
a decentralised administration accountable to the central government 
has been maintained alongside the counties’ administration. This local 
administration is connected to the national level and consists of Local 
Civil Service Administrations governed by Regional Coordinators (i.e. 
29. While the president must be Kenyan, a governor is not required to be from 
the county he represents. Yet, in practice, and because of political ethnicity, all 
governors come from the counties that elected them. See the detailed results in 
the appendices provided by Dominic Burbidge (2019): 2013 Gubernatorial Election 
Results (Appendix C: 239–48) and 2017 Gubernatorial Election Results (Appendix 
D: 249–51), as well as governors’ biographies (Appendix E and F).
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County Commissioners), Deputy County Commissioners (at the head of 
sub-counties) and chiefs (at the head of wards), all of whom answer to the 
Ministry of the Interior. They have no say in the direction of local affairs and 
their missions are limited to the functions that have not been decentralised. 
The County Commissioners’ authority places them in a role similar to 
those who, in the former provincial administration, were called Provincial 
and District Commissioners. The counties therefore have a decentralised 
administrative machinery to carry out their functions. This machinery has 
been developed at the sub-county, ward (an elected MCA) and village levels 
Fig. 1: Executive and legislative functions at the national and county levels
Adapted from two graphs from Burbidge (2019):  
Fig. 1.1: The Executive branch of county and national governments (p. 14);  
and Fig. 1.2: The Legislative branch of county and national governments (p. 16).
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(with Village Administrators gathered in a village council, which is made 
up of a handful of “elders”). The elders are not necessarily elderly men, but 
they occupy a central role in the local community they represent. For each 
ward, the elected MCA must work closely with the chief appointed by the 
central government. Counties cannot negotiate constitutional changes and 
do not have their own sovereignty (unlike in the federalist systems, for 
instance).
Now turning to the legislative branch. The Parliament consists of two 
chambers, the National Assembly and the Senate. The National Assembly 
is composed of 290 MPs who are elected in their constituencies. To promote 
gender parity, each county elects a woman (the Women Representative) who 
sits in Parliament with the MPs. Note that she represents her county rather 
than a particular constituency. The mission of the County Assemblies is very 
similar to that of the National Assembly’s. They pass budgets and laws, and 
are both responsible for deciding on the impeachment of their respective 
executives. Naturally, the County Assemblies discuss and vote only on 
county budget and expenditures (county bills). The Senate is composed 
of 47 senators from the 47 counties. Their role is to pass laws that, while 
having a national impact, concern the counties in particular. If the MCAs 
request it, the Senate is also responsible for deciding on the impeachment 
of governors with a final vote, following [its own] investigation.
National laws regulate the distribution of national income between 
the central and county governments—as laid down in the Constitution. 
The National Assembly decides on the division of revenues between the 
national and county governments. It then determines how the national 
revenue is divided and allocated to the counties. The counties can also 
raise their own taxes. Note that their available sources of revenue fall into 
five main categories: [1] local revenues (taxes on services, property, etc.), 
conditional and unconditional grants (allocated to the counties by the 
national government for specific funding, such as “Level 5 hospitals,” public 
hospitals previously managed by the provincial administration and that 
have become county referral hospitals), [2] equalisation funds (allocated 
to the most disadvantaged counties), [3] national equitable share (share 
given by the national government, corresponding to 15% of the national 
revenue),[4] private donors (e.g. the French Development Agency, which 
supported the Kisumu County Urban Renewal Plan), [5] and loans (repaid 
by the counties, with interests, and only with the agreement of the national 
government, which will pay the counties’ debts if they cannot pay it). The 
Commission on Revenue Allocation (CRA) is in charge of administering 
the national equitable share, which determines the division of the national 
revenue of up to 15% per county each year (excluding income generated by 
the counties themselves) on the basis of five criteria: county population, 
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basic services, poverty, land and fiscal responsibility. Note that this fund 
differs from the smaller equalisation fund, which is reserved for the least 
developed counties (CRA 2013) and intends to ensure the distribution of 
basic services at a level similar to that of other counties (Bosire 2017). It 
only represents 0.5% of the national revenue every year.
Fig. 2. Flows of revenues from different sources for county governments.
Source: World Bank (2011, 42).
Health has been the most decentralised sector (Kimathi 2017); other 
sectors, such as agriculture and education, have undergone only partial 
decentralisation (Republic of Kenya 2014). In the field of education, for 
instance, some training centres—such as vocational training centres—are 
now managed by counties. However, school curricula are still developed at 
the national level.30 What is more, some sectors have not been decentralised: 
heritage management, still carried out by the public and research institution 
called the National Museums of Kenya; conservation, handled by the Kenya 
Wildlife Service; security has not been decentralised either. Apart from 
relying on the police, the national army, the NCIC and networks of national 
and international NGOs, the counties have little capacity to maintain peace 
and social cohesion at the local level (Republic of Kenya 2014). Ultimately, 
the absence of decentralisation in some policy areas, such as security, 
reflects a political and legal concern to maintain the central government’s 
base in certain areas. This absence also has a political origin and can be 
explained by fear of the governors’ instrumentalisation of the counties 
police forces; the fear that governors could have more or less organised 
30. The functions carried out by the national government and which have not 
been decentralised are: international relations, national defence and security, 
labour and employment, social security, education, housing, health, agriculture, 
tourism, the formulation of public policies for the economy, and the currency. 
See Constitution of Kenya (GoK 2010), art. 186, “Respective Functions and Powers 
of National and County Governments.”
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local armies capable of threatening the central government and, to a larger 
extend, the monopoly of violence held by the Kenyan state—according to 
the Weberian principle (Burbidge 2019, 167). However, the limitations to and 
the division of powers that the new constitution provided for have not yet 
been implemented in the local practices of the counties. Mombasa County 
has, for example, established its own county police as well as infrastructure 
(football pitches, street lighting in poor neighbourhoods such as Majengo) 
and activities (dance, drama) to keep young people busy after school. Recent 
studies conducted by political scientist Fathima Badurdeen showcase the 
counterpart of the unique experiment held by Mombasa County. This 
county has a dedicated counter-terrorism department to secure the coast,31 
reduce inequalities and poverty, and alleviate the sense of marginalisation 
among the youth—who are readily recruited by Somali Al-Shabaab gangs 
and terrorists (Badurdeen, 2018). But the county police are poorly trained, 
have insufficient resources and therefore make up an additional layer of 
state repression—and are perceived as such by the youth. The county police 
thus exacerbate violence, conflicts and the recruitment of young people 
from the coast by terrorist and criminal organisations. Similarly, in the 
Kenyan conservation environment, land tenure tensions continue to be a 
source of conflict, fuelled by politicians. This is partly because conservation 
has mostly remained the preserve of White Kenyans. The state violently 
responds to these conflicts, as it did when the Kenya Defence Force was 
deployed to quell the invasion of private ranches in Laikipia County in 
April 2017.32 These two examples highlight a problematic overlap of action 
levels, as well as the strong interdependence between the national and local 
levels when it comes to managing critical issues. Beyond the adoption of a 
new constitution and the legal framework presented above, the overlap is 
most visible in the practical implementation of decentralisation.
3. Decentralisation in Practice: Actors  
and Apparatus of Local Politics
Decentralisation was part of Mwai Kibaki’s political project (2002–2013), 
which focused on growth and the achievement of major development 
projects. From 2013 to 2020, Uhuru Kenyatta implemented a policy 
program in line with the so-called “Big 4” Agenda, a development agenda, 
the primary objective of which was to foster an industrial revolution in 
31. Lamu, Tana River, Kilifi and Kwale counties are among the poorest in the 
country (KNBS & SID 2013).
32. Ogada, Mordecai. 2019. “Decolonising Conservation: It is about the Land, 
Stupid!” The Elephant, 27 June. https://www.theelephant.info/culture/2019/06/27/
decolonising-conservation-it-is-about-the-land-stupid/ [archive].
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Kenya (9.2% of the country’s GDP today against 20% of its GDP in 2022). 
To that extent, national issues are of concern to local elected officials. 
Nevertheless, it is interesting to question their relative independence 
and the nature of their approaches on the local political scene—a scene 
closely linked to that of national politics. The practical application of their 
approaches in relation to citizens—especially the strengthening of public 
participation and the representativeness of ethnic minorities and social 
cadets—are also being debated.
Decentralised Governance,  
a Political Project of a Developmentalist State and its Elites
While inherited from the Kibaki era, the developmentalist discourse of the 
Vision 2030 governmental project is still relevant today. It has accompanied 
decentralisation: each region must join in the national effort and throw 
its weight behind the emergence of an economy that does no longer rely 
solely on its urban middle classes, but also on the wealth of the rural world 
and the economies of counties now presented as the touchstone of national 
construction. As part of the national development agenda, and in the 
context of an economy of public expenditure and debt,33 Uhuru Kenyatta’s 
government (2013–2022) revaluated the Kenyan worker in his public 
speeches and political communications. In doing so, he played a role in 
the interlocking between political and development objectives (Hagmann 
& Reyntjens 2016). To guarantee the peaceful environment needed for 
business, Kenyatta even “shook hands” with Raila Odinga.34 This symbolic 
handshake, which took place in March 2018, was supposed to put an end 
to the political crisis that ensued after the 2017 elections. The Supreme 
Court had overturned election results, leading to a re-run, which took place 
two months later and was boycotted by Raila Odinga (Pommerolle & Josse-
Durand 2017).




34. Despite this handshake, Raila Odinga is still running in opposition to the 
government’s policies and more specifically to William Ruto, the current Vice-
President and candidate for the 2022 election. He claims that some counties 
are not economically viable, advocates for constitutional changes and wants 
the country to be divided in 14 regions to better address the deep inequalities 
between counties. See Kahura, Dauti. 2019. “Building Bridges to Nowhere: Some 





At the county level, this development policy began to take root in 2013 
and is now focused on local development. In regions abandoned by the 
government or plundered by their elected representatives, numerous 
development projects (including hospitals and ambulances, water access 
systems, improvement of the road networks, etc.) have since been 
completed. The policy has also been extended to the county level. Citizens 
gradually seem to show as much—if not more—interest in the development 
projects set up by the counties and their representatives (who organise 
themselves in a more concrete way) as in those promoted by the President 
of the Republic35 (Cheeseman, Lynch & Willis 2016; Waddilove 2019, 347). 
Since the implementation of decentralisation, the counties’ dynamism has 
thus reinforced the competition between the central government and the 
counties, as both sides strive to be central players in Kenya’s political life 
by emphasising their role in the development of their respective levels or 
fields of work (county, constituency, ward). This is particularly true in the 
case of productive regions resulting from colonisation (the former White 
Highlands), now transformed into counties (Laikipia, Trans-nzoia, Nandi, 
Kericho and counties of the former Central Province: Murang’a, Kirinyaga, 
Kiambu, Nyadarua, Nyeri). Today, these counties are working hard to 
develop their factories, cooperatives and export processing zones. This 
governmental approach to local innovation consists in capturing the added 
value of local products by allowing them to be manufactured locally, as in 
the case of coffee or fresh pasteurised milk dispensers for example (Muranga 
County), and by controlling export (the Chemalel Export Processing Zone 
in Nandi County).
This developmentalist ideology, according to which every individual 
and every county must play a role in the national economic effort, is now 
visible at all levels of the state. However, the authoritarian translation of this 
ideology is seen at county level; it is, in fact, reflected in the rationalisation 
of local development by the local and central governments. As the official 
slogan of the decentralised government points out—“48 governments, 1 
Nation”—, the integration of counties into globalisation will also be that of 
the Kenyan nation. Indeed, there is a clear overlap between the political and 
economic programs of the central government and those implemented by 
the counties despite the challenges or power games at play. The proximity 
of local elected officials to political and partisan networks is still relevant 
and continues to play a decisive role in the electoral battle. During the 2017 
elections, governors who had Uhuru Kenyatta’s support had an easier time 
winning the elections (with an average of 53% of the vote) than independent 
candidates who were not aligned with Kenyatta’s Jubilee alliance (with 
35. This is also reflected in the additional 5 million voters registered for the 
2017 elections, while the 2013 elections marked a turning point in voter turnout.
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only 17% of the vote on average). This held true for the governors of Embu, 
Laikipia, Mandera and Meru, who won the elections by large margins 
despite a strong competition for their positions (Gadjanova 2019, 277). 
Note that, it is also a strategy on the part of some, whose credibility and 
legitimacy are reinforced when they criticise the central government: the 
MP of Nandi Constituency, Alfred Keter, was re-elected although he had 
been in clear opposition to Vice-President William Ruto throughout his 
campaign. In any case, local elected officials cannot exist independently of 
the national level, whether in electoral times or during the implementation 
of local development programs and projects—which are strongly influenced 
by the directives and the necessary support of the national political and 
economic elites.
Mode of Action of Local Elected Officials:  
The Members of County Assemblies (MCAs)
The 2013 elections marked the coming into force of both the new Kenyan 
Constitution and decentralisation. On Monday, 4  March, voters went to 
the polls to elect candidates for six different positions. The competition 
had been particularly fierce due to a drastic increase in the number of 
candidates. While elections always require much “trickling-down” of 
national resources to the local level, the 2013 elections—which were 
organised at the ward, constituency and county levels—gave even more 
visibility to the decentralisation process. Indeed, this “trickling-down” to 
the county level took very concrete forms as a result of the multiplication 
of positions at the local level: jobs, vote buying, bribes, local or regional 
projects had been promised by all candidates. In addition, prior to the 
elections, the electoral commission had obtained international funding 
to organise staff training (polling station officials such as the Presiding 
Officer, his deputy and the clerks in particular). Note that most of the staff 
had been recruited locally (most of the clerks were young people from the 
county who had completed their primary schooling or were students). With 
the implementation of decentralisation, the local scene, and particularly 
the arena of local legislative elections, became a central arena for political 
participation within the (wider) Kenyan political scene. The 2013 general 
elections mobilised unprecedented resources. Electoral material had to be 
replaced: in addition to the purchase of electronic kits for biometric voting 
(KIEMS), ballot boxes were given their own colour. Pink represented the 
Women Representative (or Women Rep); and confusingly similar colours 
represented the MPs and MCAs (one’s ballot boxes were beige and the 
other one’s pale yellow). Moreover, before and during the campaign, many 
candidates made numerous requests for funding from the private sector 
or from local politicians who were already holding positions in the local 
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or national governments. Urban centres were also overwhelmed by a wild 
public display of posters printed by candidates. The candidates started 
campaigning with pre-checked, fake ballots bearing their photograph and 
displaying the party symbols (a rooster, an elephant, a key, etc.), in addition 
to displaying the colour associated with the position they were seeking.36 
For its part, the national government deployed numerous corps (military, 
youth, forest rangers and animal park guards37) to ensure the safety of the 
40,883 polling stations (with two guards per station, one at the entrance 
and one inside). In doing so, the government underscored the attention 
paid to this first ballot and the ever-present suspicions of electoral fraud.
With these first general elections, came the hope that following 
representatives of citizens and “bottom” actors—including the “social 
cadets”—would enter politics: young people, women, disabled people, families 
and clans, squatters or migrant workers, civil servants of intermediary 
bodies and institutions. Prior to decentralisation, the electoral format 
rarely—if ever—allow these actors access to political positions. This new 
hope drew its strength from a deep collective belief in elective democracy 
and the strength of legislative institutions—an ambiguous legalism which 
characterises Kenya’s political culture (Katende & Kanyeihamba 1973; 
Warris 2013). However, while the 2013 elections initiated and put into 
practice this new decentralised administrative and political system for 
the first time, there was a clear, strong political continuity in the local 
elections. Thus, many “big men” as well as traditional and influential 
local figures—personalities who were often MPs in their region of origin 
before becoming ministers in the national government38—ran for governor 
positions. Nevertheless, the introduction of a large number of local elected 
officials, the MCAs, raised the question of the political staff’s renewal 
36. These comments are drawn from the observation of the 2013 election 
campaign in Nandi and Trans-Nzoia counties with Dominique Connan, 
complemented by the author’s experience as an international observer during 
the 2017 elections. On the subject of vote materiality in Africa, see the special 
issue of Politique africaine edited by Sandrine Perrot, Marie-Emmanuelle 
Pommerolle and  Justin Willis (2016): https://www.cairn.info/revue-politique-
africaine-2016-4.htm.
37. KDF, KWS, KFS, NYS, police, etc.
38. On the subject of “big men” in Kenya, see the work of Jean-François Médard 
(1992) and François Grignon (1997). Among the most prominent big men were 
Henry Kosgei, who was re-elected six times as MP for the Tinderet constituency 
and held eight ministerial positions between 1979 and 2013, but also Charles 
Njonjo (Attorney General for more than 17 years (1963–1979), MP for the Kikuyu 
constituency and twice minister), who was profiled in an article by Jean-François 
Médard (Médard 1987). The list is long and one could also name Matu Wamae, 
Nicholas Biwot, Kiraitu Murungi, Joseph Ole Nkaissery, etc.
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and that of the potential rapprochement between the state and citizens 
as a result of the implementation of decentralisation. Indeed, while the 
MCAs represented the smallest level of governance, they made up most 
of the candidates at the national level (1450 elected, 700 nominated). 
As of the 2013 elections and the establishment of local Assemblies, this 
position replaced the comparatively pale Ward Councillor position. The 
Constitution assigns the MCAs a dual role: the role of local legislators in 
County Assemblies and the role of territorial administrators, with access 
to the county budget for the citizens of the ward that elected them. This 
gives them a definite influence on the award of scholarships and local 
public contracts. The profiles of these elected officials have been quite 
atypical for Kenyan political scene: not being “professional” politicians, 
MCAs have seemed to be on the fringes of the traditional networks of 
clientelism.39 They were often elected because they had acted on behalf of 
their compatriots—for example, as union representatives, local shopkeepers 
or businessmen, or as young graduates who had returned home to put 
their skills at the service of their rural communities. Their credibility 
was also enhanced by the possibility of impeaching the county governor, 
a procedure which must, however, ultimately be validated by the Senate. 
It seems that their appearance on the political scene encouraged voting 
decisions less influenced by ethnicity considerations than before. Voters 
based their choice on local elected officials’ credibility, respectability and 
progress on development projects. Therefore, local elected officials had to 
convince voters of their deep-seated link with the community as well as 
their ability to act as intermediaries between voters—as is the case for MPs 
at the constituency level—and the state with its traditional elites. These 
logics of moralisation of representatives question the pre-eminence of the 
ethnic affiliations upon which the logics of political representation are 
based in Kenya (Atieno Odhiambo 2004; Berman, Cottrell & Ghai 2009). 
However, generally speaking, voting on the basis of ethnic considerations 
remains very common, particularly in cosmopolitan constituencies—not 
to mention constituencies where political divisions are aligned with sub-
identity divisions (for instance, at the clan level) (NCIC 2014; 2016; Burbidge 
2019, 91–120; Onyango 2018).
During the 2017 elections, changes in political personnel and institutional 
hierarchies took place. They were all the more visible at the county level, 
in particular at the positions of MCAs and the 47 Women Rep’s (one per 
county). Among other things, one notes a form of power redistribution 
to the “social cadets,” since young people and women—sometimes young 
39. Waddilove, Hannah. 2017. “Kenya Voted for Change and Got it… at the Local 




women—were elected; indeed, the 2017 elections saw more women 
entering politics thanks to the creation of a position reserved for women 
(Bouka, Berry & Kamuru 2019). Several young graduate students who 
could not find jobs, Youth Group Leaders, young entrepreneurs, citizens 
from the civil society as well as—more expectedly—individuals from the 
trading class (especially local figures who had their own financial means 
and influence at the local level) were elected as MCAs. Simon Muturi, an 
unemployed 24-year-old candidate who campaigned on a bicycle for the 
Jubilee (that is, the coalition that enabled Kenyatta to be elected in 2013 and 
2017) and was elected for the Muruguru-Gatitu ward, was emblematic of 
this “new generation.” So was Cynthia Muge, a 24-year-old civil engineer 
and the country’s youngest candidate, who was elected as an MCA for 
the Kilibwoni ward. As a young graduated in civil engineering, she 
unsuccessfully tried to get a job in Nandi County administration before 
deciding to run a political campaign, which she primarily envisioned as 
a platform to carry the voice of the youth to the county’s politicians and 
the people in her home ward. Among other things, she proposed and 
introduced a technical and precise plan to renovate the deteriorated road 
infrastructure to the population during her campaign meetings. Note that 
her ward, being almost the size of a constituency (an MP being responsible 
for a constituency), had been divided in a peculiar way. In order to 
overcome the difficulty of meeting her constituents—who would have had 
to travel long distances to reach her office—and to take the diversity of 
their demands into account, she chose to set up a mobile office, moving 
between the different locations where she would meet them on certain 
days of the week.40
However, the role of women in politics remains to be nuanced. Most 
of those who have reached the counties’ highest positions are influential 
women who had already held national positions.41 This holds true in the 
case of the three women candidates who were elected as Kirinyaga’s, 
Bomet’s and Kitui’s first female governors during the 2017 elections.42 
40. Field notes, interview with Cynthia Muge, April 2018, Hotel Eden Spring, 
Kapsabet, Nandi County. See also her detailed interview by the Kenyan media 
Daily Nation: “Cynthia Jepkosgei, 24, Speaks on her Victory as MCA.” 2017. Daily 
Nation, 11 August. https://www.nation.co.ke/news/politics/Nandi-MCA-elect-24-
beats-odds/1064-4053920-nnbwikz/index.html [archive].
41. More broadly, many local candidates are elected thanks to their inclusion in 
regional and national patronage networks. On the Kenyan logic of the partial 
renewal of local elites, see Grignon (1999) and Cornell & D’Arcy (2014).
42. Anne Waiguru (former CS for Devolution) for Kirinyaga County, Charity 
Ngilu (former minister and presidential candidate) for Kitui County, and Joyce 
Laboso (former Vice-President of the National Assembly) for Bomet County.
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Laws on gender balance in politics and positive discrimination (according 
to the 2/3 principle) promoted by the Constitution have not yet been 
passed by the Parliament which, like the rest of the Kenyan institutions 
and bodies, function according to a marked patriarchal habitus (Nyabola 
& Pommerolle 2018). Furthermore, the role of the Women Rep remains 
unclear in the Constitution. The mission of these representatives is to 
express the specific needs and demands of Kenyan women and to be the 
“voice of women” in politics. The missions carried out under this new 
position are the subject of considerable debate. This is because they vary 
significantly from one profile to another. Incidentally, this new position 
is sometimes reduced to a springboard to access more positions deemed 
more prestigious and influential, in particular that of MP (ibid., 67–71). 
Finally, the effectiveness of administrative reforms aimed at ensuring the 
counties’ ethnic diversification is called into question by the almost mono-
ethnic composition of the executive, legislative and civil service of the 
counties. It underlines that the majority of power positions still belong to 
the dominant local ethnic group.43 In addition, political competition being 
increased by the number of candidates running, decentralisation seems to 
have reinforced localised violence often spurred by the political class to 
the detriment of citizens, who are its “foot soldiers.”44
Thus, it is difficult to give a clear answer to the question whether 
decentralisation has brought the state and citizens closer. It is clear that this 
new political chessboard allows some elected officials—notably governors 
and senators—to position themselves in relation to national elected officials, 
who take up their political function to strengthen their local legitimacy, 
sometimes by expressing their allegiances to the central power, sometimes 
43. In this regard, see the damning reports of the Auditor General (2019) on 
the ethnic composition of the executive and legislative branches at the county 
level. These reports point out that a large majority of counties do not comply 
with the provisions detailed in section 65 of the County Governments Act of the 
2010 Constitution. The latter provides that 30% of positions must be occupied 
by people who are not coming from the dominant ethnic group in the county. 
However, the latest audit reveals that, on average, only 10% of county staff come 
from minority groups. Figures on the ethnic group of elected officials and civil 
servants in the counties’ administrations are given by the NCIC (2016). See also 
the “Decentralisation in Kenya” section of the article by Nicholas Cheeseman, 
Gabrielle Lynch & Justin Willis (2016), and Dominic Burbidge’s chapter on 
counties described as “ethnic mini-states?” (2019, 92–101). For an analysis of the 
ethnic group of public servants from the 1960s to 2010, see Rebecca Simson (2017).
44. Lynch, Gabrielle. 2014. “Devolution Has Made Politics more Local and 





by criticising the government’s actions in their region (Waddilove 2019; 
Gadjanova 2019). Nonetheless, the emergence of new levels of power and 
objections by the MCAs to the projects or decisions made by the governors 
and MPs—who used to be unquestioned leaders on their lands—indicates a 
kind of rapprochement between these new “local” elected officials and their 
voters. Increased citizen participation, which resulted from decentralisation, 
is supposed to strengthen this proximity between representatives and those 
they represent in the conduct of public affairs.
Citizens’ Modes of Action: The Mixed Experience  
of a Decentralised “Participatory Development”
Public participation is a core element of the constitutional reform. It is up 
to citizens to identify local development issues (Rwigi, forthcoming), and 
this occurs during public forums organised by each county through the 
retrospective plebiscite—by show of hands—of priority development projects. 
This procedure—which follows the model of participatory governance 
created in Porto Alegre (Participatory Budgeting)—aims to tie up strategies 
of local development with the will of the citizens, who must actively 
deliberate budget orientations. The local and decentralised co-production 
of public policies (co-production because it brings together citizens and 
elected officials) is intended to enhance the managerial transparency of the 
counties as well as the political legitimacy of their elected officials (Fung 
& Wright 2001, Wampler & Avritzer 2005). The reality is that these forums 
are either neglected or monopolised by supporters of the dominant party 
or group in local politics; or composed of citizens paid to participate or 
intimidated into self-censorship on the conduct of public affairs. Therefore, 
“participatory” democracy—as a fairer model and a system of good local 
governance—needs be put into perspective; as do the “democratisation” of 
Kenya’s political space and its opening up to civil society.45
Indeed, the participatory approach has not yet proved its worth in 
Kenya—except, perhaps in Makueni County, which is presented as a 
success story. Makueni County’s success is partly due to the career and 
technical expertise of the county governor in office since 2013, Kivutha 
Kibwana. Kibwana is a recognised law professor, human rights advocate 
and former member of the opposition. However, this specific participatory 
process seems to work more to the advantage of his government’s political 
legitimacy than to improve his management. Public participation is “a 
structured way of consulting with persons, groups and entities before 
45. For an updated and transdisciplinary analysis of these debates, see Chauveau 
& Lavigne-Delville (2013). These questions also intersect with the work of French 
sociologist Christian Le Bart (2003) on local citizenship.
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decisions are made” (GoMC 2016). Participants must come from six 
different levels: Village People’s Forum, Cluster People’s Forum, Sub Ward 
People’s Forum, Ward People’s Forum, Sub County People’s Forum and 
the County People’s Forum. In Makueni County, citizens at each of these 
levels nominate eleven people of their choice to form a Development 
Committee (DC). The mission of each DC is to represent the interests of 
the citizens of the level they represent. The DCs of the first four levels 
negotiate and deliberate with each other on the allocation and distribution 
of resources for the development of the ward. At the sub-county or county 
level, the DCs merely reiterate their vested interests in the verification 
and validation of their proposals as they were validated during the public 
participation forums held in the 30 wards of Makueni County. Thus, 
in principle, public participation is supposed to help Makueni County 
achieve two objectives: [1] to include marginalised constituencies in public 
decision-making, and [2] to consolidate the government’s authority over 
its political-administrative territory (GoMC 2016).
To some extent, this system has allowed citizens to influence spending 
in their ward according to their own priorities. There are, however, many 
participation gaps, which highlight the fact that the constituted assemblies 
are not always inclusive or representative. Local figures (e.g. teachers, 
religious leaders, activists, social workers and union representatives), 
particularly men, take up much of the speaking time in these meetings. 
Young people, for instance, often feel excluded from these forums because, 
in the continuity of the baraza tradition, they are usually reserved for 
“elders” and associated with values of respectability, maturity an honour.46 
At the same time, MCAs are demanding that the government grant them 
their own fund (the Ward Development Fund) to carry out their projects 
at the grassroots. So far, they have been denied funding. According to the 
constitution, the ward is not intended to be a financial entity per se, and 
it is the county government that decides on the allocation of funds, based 
on the county’s (that is, not the ward’s) overall priorities. This situation 
creates deep frictions between parliamentarians and the executive. It also 
underscores once more the limits of citizen participation in defining local 
development priorities. The existence of People’s Parliaments—or Bunge 
la Wananchi—also highlights the fact that decentralisation has not really 
made it possible to involve Kenyan citizens in public decision-making 
in satisfactory ways. These People’s Parliaments offer an alternative 
framework for public discussion of political, social and economic affairs; 
and, on the basis principles close to those of “street parliaments” found 
46. Baraza are community forums for public debate, often associated with or 
overseen by councils of elders (Haugerud 1995).
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in several African countries, they have been organised in a national and 
activist network.47
However, the partial renewal of the county elites between 2013 and 2017 
showed that voters had not been fooled and had the means to influence 
the careers of elected officials. To a certain extent, by electing MCAs from 
their communities, citizens used the decision-making mechanisms at their 
disposal to restructure power relations that had hitherto disadvantaged them. 
They did so by mobilising the institutions and machinery of decentralisation 
to bring about the local reconfigurations they needed: namely, access to 
schooling, road construction, obtaining property titles, passing local laws 
to protect local labour or sectors of activities, etc. This has also been 
evidenced by demonstrations, petitions and increased appearances in local 
courts. While they are not new, these local mobilisations are becoming 
more effective and gaining visibility as a result of decentralisation (Lynch 
2011). Employment and working conditions are central issues in the 
national and local political life, where corruption and co-optation are often 
denounced by citizens and activists who feel powerless outside election 
times. These grievances, directed at elected officials and the state, are 
relayed by the new institutions of power (the County Assemblies) and local 
figures (especially Senators) who question the decisions taken by national 
institutions and the state on their territory. To take a concrete example: 
a law to limit the number of machines authorised by multinational tea 
companies for automated tea leaf picking was passed in November 2018 by 
the MCAs of Nandi, a large tea-producing county. This measure allowed 
plantation workers to keep their jobs in spite of the mechanisation of the 
tea sector.48 The governor of Kericho too rallied against the multinational 
Finlay, which intended to dismiss its horticultural workers and close some 
of its tea plantations, on which the county’s economy. Obviously, these 
elected officials were also acting to protect their own interests and secure 
their individual re-election (MCAs among others). They did not hesitate to 
go against interests of the people, when necessary to ensure the continued 
support of agri-food lobbies and private sector individuals who finance 
and support the political campaigns and local actions of governors and 
their ministers.49 One final note. The so-called “Councils of Elders”—the 
47. See the special issue on “Public Spaces of Speech and Practices of Citizenship 
in Africa,” of Politique africaine, edited by Richard Banégas, Florence Brisset-
Foucault and Armando Cutolo (2012), or Rasmussen & Omanga (2012/3).
48. Two workers can carry this machine, where manual harvesting requires an 
average of 30 workers per plot.
49. Donors can indeed contribute to the counties’ finances but their contribution 
must be declared in the budget, which is certainly not always the case (bribes, 
illicit financing, money laundering).
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traditional authorities in Kenya—still play a major role in guiding local 
policy,50 especially at the village level, where they are often appointed as 
administrators (see diagram).
4. Decentralisation in Question:  
Political Ethnicity, Corruption and Inequality
While decentralisation has raised high hopes, it has also caused wariness, 
especially of the “ethnicisation” of local governments, the potential impact 
of decentralisation on corrupt practices and the persistence of regional 
inequalities—now measured at the county level.
Towards Increased Ethnicisation of Politics
Between 2007 and 2008, fear of ethnicisation was the strongest in counties 
regarded as hotspots of violence. Such counties are often the scene of 
protracted conflicts over the control and monopolisation of resources. For 
example, in counties of the former North-Eastern Province like Turkana 
and Marsabit, lack of access to water for Turkana and Samburu pastoralist 
groups remains a driving force behind violent and armed conflicts (Scott-
Villiers 2017). In cosmopolitan counties such as Nakuru—one of the 
counties that hosts many IDPs in the Rift Valley—, tensions over access to 
and ownership of land are a source of political tensions (Boone 2013). This 
is also the case in counties where a majority of the population belongs to 
a single ethnic group. For instance, in Uasin Gishu, the Kikuyu occupation 
of land and ownership of trade has long been contested by Kalenjin elites, 
who mobilise indigenousness to maintain their political and economic base 
in the region (Elfversson & Sjögren 2019, 8).
The counties’ response to these fears, tensions and conflicts has been 
ambiguous as the initiatives of elected officials and administrators have 
been driven by their own interests. In the case of Nandi County, a market 
has been established on the western border—which Nandi County shares 
with Kakamega County. Land disputes and tensions over use of the forest 
by the two main communities of the region, the Nandi and Luhya, have 
long been a source of friction in the border are between Nandi County and 
Kakamega County. In November 2014, violent clashes erupted in the area 
after the arrest of three Luhya men suspected of killing a Nandi because 
of a land dispute. A meeting between Nandi County’s governor, Cleophas 
Lagat (2013–2017), and the governor of Kakamega, Wycliffe Oparanya 
(2012–2022), ensued. The two men proposed to set up a “peace market” in 
Kamungei; an initiative supported and approved by the president of the 
50. On the role of Councils of Elders in the conduct of local political and public 
affairs in Kenya, see Josse-Durand (2020) and Nyamweru & Chidongo (2018).
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NCIC, Francis Ole Kaparo.51 With the agreement of the governors of the 
two counties, the NCIC decided to reinforce police patrols in the area and to 
allocate additional vehicles to the two counties on a temporary basis in case 
of conflicts. In addition, the idea of deploying the army in temporary camps 
along the border emerged. From 2017 onwards, on the southern border of 
Nandi County, Cleophas Lagat’s successor—the young governor Stephen 
Arap Sang (2017–2022)— campaigned for the integration of eight lowland 
localities with Nandi names, but which belong to Kisumu County.52 The idea 
was to set up an Export Processing Zone, which cannot be built in Nandi 
County because of the pressure that intensive tea production already exerts 
on the arable land of the Nandi escarpment, there. A local industrial park 
specialised in tea manufacturing would mainly benefit Nandi County; this 
fact is a source of tension between not only the Luo and Nandi farmers of 
the area but also the Nandi inhabitants and migrant tea plantation workers—
who are often of Luo, Luhya and Kisii origins. What can thus be said is that 
the role of the counties in conflict management has been restricted to local 
and small-scaled actions, which are sometimes limited to the mandate of 
a particular governor. Moreover, their choices and the modalities of their 
actions have underlined a lack of coordination with the central government 
and a lack of coherence in the actions carried out—in particular with the 
NCIC—depending on the type of issues that the conflicts give rise to.
Towards Acute Corruption at the Local Level?
Decentralisation and major development projects driven by Vision 2030 
have led to the decentralisation of corruption (Burbidge 2015, D’Arcy & 
Cornell 2016). Scandals are no longer just national or international, as 
was the case with Goldenberg or Anglo-leasing, but mainly involve the 
corruption of local public funds.53
51. Wekesa, Grace. 2015. “NCIC Chair Francis Kaparo Warns Nandi, 
Luhya Leaders against Incitement.” The Standard, 25  January. https://www.
standardmedia.co.ke/article/2000149182/ncic-chair-francis-kaparo-warns-
nandi-luhya-leaders-against-incitement [archive]; Sirma, Evans. S.d. “Governor 
Lagat Commissions Amani Market to Foster Unity in Kamung’ei Border.” County 
Government of Nandi. https://nandicounty.go.ke/governor-lagat-commissions-
amani-market-to-foster-unity-in-kamungei-border/ [archive].
52. Jelima, Rael. 2018. “Nandi County Claims Seven Towns along Border 
with Kisumu.” The Standard, 28 May. https://www.standardmedia.co.ke/
article/2001281967/nandi-county-out-to-reclaim-seven-towns-from-kisumu 
[archive].
53. This corruption also concerns the CDF, managed by the MPs, as it was 
already the case before the implementation of devolution. The Auditor General’s 
report on public finances for the year 2013/2014 reckons that corruption affects 
270 constituencies (out of a total of 290) and is estimated at 38.5 million EUR. 
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Yet, what is sometimes associated with simple corruption actually reveals 
tensions between county and national governments over the allocation 
of funds. The “wheelbarrow scandal” provides a perfect example of this 
phenomenon. The scandal burst forth in 2015 when the Bungoma County 
Ministry of Agriculture bought ten wheelbarrows at a price of 109,000 KES 
each (about 965 EUR) while the market price was around 5,000 KES (about 
45 EUR).54 Shortly after that, seven county officials were fined 300,000 KES, 
the non-payment of which was punishable by imprisonment of 18 months.55 
Price inflation in county budgets and the justification of expenses are also 
crucial issues because unspent funds are returned to the County Revenue 
Fund at the end of the fiscal year—which is set for 30 June—after the Budget 
Controller’s audit. Such funds are then put back into play for the following 
year.56 Incidentally, while—by voting for supplementary budgets—local 
assemblies have enabled local governments to move money previously 
allocated to a budget line, project or ministry within a county, to do so 
is often difficult. Note that local assemblies may also occasionally clash 
with the executive when they wish to “settle score” with certain county 
officials or expose local corruption. One such tussle ensued the Assembly’s 
refusal to transfer funds four days before the deadline for the 2019 fiscal 
year in Laikipia County. Because of this—and because of limited funding—
the wages of county employees were frozen for three months in a row.57 
These practices, which are sometimes too quickly labelled as corrupt, 
highlight the challenge of spending locally and on the basis of the county’s 
development properties and non-fungible budgets. They also underline the 
issue of the politicisation of budget management.
One finding bears note. Corruption has not so much been decentralised—
or in the words of the Kenyans, “corruption has [not so much] been 
“NEW: Billions Unaccounted For in CDF Audit.” 2016. RoggKenya, 5 December. 
https://roggkenya.org/new-billions-unaccounted-for-in-cdf-audit/ [archive].
54. Oteba, Titus. 2015. “Uproar as Bungoma County Buys 10 Wheelbarrows 
at Sh1m.” The Standard, 8 September. https://www.standardmedia.co.ke/
article/2000175604/uproar-as-bungoma-county-buys-10-wheelbarrows-at-sh1m 
[archive].
55. Amadala, Benson. 2018. “Seven Former Officials Sent to Jail over 
Wheelbarrow Scandal.” Daily Nation, 25 June. https://www.nation.co.ke/counties/
bungoma/7-sentenced-in-wheelbarrow-case/1183258-4630664-10cux86z/index.
html [archive].
56. Shiundu, Alphonse. 2013. “Six Counties Fail to Spend Allocated Funds.” The 
Standard, 14  August. https://www.standardmedia.co.ke/article/2000090917/six-
counties-fail-to-spend-allocated-funds [archive].
57. Munyi, Martin. 2019. “Laikipia Assembly Rejects Supplementary Budget.” 




devolved”— as multiplied; meaning that it has multiplied due to the increase 
in the number of contexts that are conducive to corrupt practices. Since 
2015, successive reports of the Auditor General have revealed that at least 
20 counties out of 47 experience irregularities in the management of their 
public finances. In fact, many county governors are involved in serious 
corruption cases: following the disappearance of about 17  million  EUR 
(2 billion KES), Governor Obado and several officials from Migori County 
have been monitored by the Ethics and Anti-corruption Authority (EACC) 
for “abuse of office and corruption.”58 For his part, the controversial Nairobi 
County Governor, Mike Sonko—who was, until recently, thought to be 
very close to President Kenyatta [who made the fight against corruption 
the touchstone of his second term]—was arrested in December 2019 as he 
was trying to flee to Tanzania. He [and his immediate political circle] is 
being proceeded against for the embezzlement of public funds amounting 
to 3.2  million  EUR.59 In 2012, an opinion poll conducted by AfriCOG 
highlighted that a third of the surveyed Kenyans who were against 
decentralisation justified their opinion by saying that the new system would 
lead to a “decentralisation of corruption.”60 Decentralisation was, at least in 
theory, supposed to provide checks and balances mechanisms by affording 
better representation in national and local governments and institutions to 
minority groups, social cadets and opposition parties. In practice, however, 
it has also opened new windows of opportunity for corrupt practices, among 
other things, through the levying of local taxes and the allocation of local 
budgets and public contracts.61 At the same time, these practices—which are 
simultaneously rooted in local clientelist networks and connected to the 
national scene—are those of elected officials who are increasingly “close” 
to citizens. Thanks to their proximity to citizens, these officials are in a 
58. Mbula, Ruth. 2019. “Migori County Official on Graft Charge Detained for 
Four Days.” Daily Nation, 9 May. https://www.nation.co.ke/counties/migori/
Court-detains-Migori-official-four-days/1183306-5097492-xcc1yrz/index.html 
[archive].
59. “Nairobi Governor Mike Sonko Denies Corruption Charges in Court.” 
2019. Al-Jazeera, 9 December. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/12/nairobi-
governor-mike-sonko-pleads-innocent-corruption-charges-191209134806019.
html [archive].
60. Two years later, a second survey showed that 33% of Kenyans believed that 
“all or most” of the county governors were “involved in corruption,” with the 
figure rising to 37% for members of the county assemblies (MCAs). In 2016, the 
perception of corruption at the county level was even higher: 78% of Kenyans 
believed that the county government office “uses corruption, sometimes or 
systematically.” 
61. I warmly thank Alexia Van Riij for shedding light on my understanding of 
corrupt practices in Kenya.
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position to both challenge and denounce corruption; or, conversely, have a 
front-row seat to benefit from corruption—including in electoral times, in 
which bribes are commonplace.
Recentralisation as a Response to the Strong Persistence  
of Inequalities between Counties?
Governors have also complained about inequalities between counties; 
inequalities related to differing state-issued budget allowances, varying 
abilities to raise taxes, and the presence (or, for that matter, absence) of 
county-managed resources. The inequitable redistribution of resources 
between counties is at the heart of political debates and alliances. For 
example, while it is very sparsely populated—albeit very poor, much 
revenue is allocated to Turkana County.62 These allowances should be 
based on the counties’ own available resources to raise funds and taxes 
(for example, Narok County benefits from important revenues from local 
tourism thanks to the presence of Masai Mara National Park, a major 
luxury safari destination in the East-African region). As noted above, each 
county receives 15% of the national revenue annually, and some counties 
benefit from the equalisation fund that amounts to 0.5% of the annual 
national income, and is earmarked for the country’s poorest counties. This 
additional but minimal funding is not enough to “brush up” these counties, 
which are lagging far behind in terms of access to the most basic services. 
Furthermore, due to the legal and constitutional framework, which severely 
limits the counties’ ability to obtain cash flows, the levying of local taxes 
leads to circumventions in counties whose economic stability depends on 
an unstable source of revenue (natural and cultural heritage sites, national 
parks) or sector of activity (tourism, agriculture, etc.). It also generates 
localised corruptive practices which limit the generation of revenue such as 
untimely taxes on public transport (matatu) between counties, levied at the 
entrance to cities.63 These inequalities have persisted since colonial times, 
and have been reinforced since then. The ghost of the former provincial 
administration and its functioning still hovers over the counties, whose 
borders are not so new, as they sometimes overlap with those of the old 
districts. This underlines the central state’s maintained control over its 
peripheries, which explains the difficult and partial implementation of 
62. On inequalities between counties, see the report of the Kenya National 
Bureau of Statistics and the Society for International Development (2013). On 
the political aspects of territorial inequalities in Kenya, also see Owiti (2014).
63. Owiti, Maugo. 2015. “Matatu operators decline proposal to remit tax through 





decentralisation. In the counties, structural spending reduction is also 
among the main challenges of decentralisation: huge amounts of resources 
are channelled into recurrent expenditure. And some counties spend up 
to 80% of their budget on wages. This is, in part, due to the fact that they 
inherited staff from the provincial administration (CRA 2013; Franceschi, 
Memusi & Muhindi 2015).
Finally, a trend towards recentralisation—through the creation of 
regional economic blocs—highlights the limitations of the possibilities 
that decentralisation offers county governments to raise sufficient equity 
capital to carry out their five-year plans. A law aimed at clarifying the 
administrative and financial organisation of regional blocs and the potential 
public/private partnerships set up by counties is also under consideration. 
This was initiated by the Council of Governors (CoG), which is composed 
of the county governors who meet to promote good governance and local 
development.64 In September  2019, the governors voted in favour of the 
so-called the Ugatuzi Initiative, a constitutional reform to strengthen 
decentralisation. This reform provides for, among other things, the 
establishment of a three-tier system of government (national, county 
and regional) and the creation of regional governments to strengthen the 
devolution of responsibilities. Over the past five years, under the leadership 
of CoG’s President Wycliffe Oparanya, governor of Kakamega County 
and leader of the largest regional bloc (the Lake Region Economic Bloc, 
which includes 14 multiparty counties), the following regional blocs have 
flourished and strengthened their capacities: the North Rift Economic 
Bloc (7 counties), the Frontier Counties Development Council (7), the 
Lake Region Economic Bloc (14), the Central Kenya Economic Bloc (10), 
the South Eastern Kenya Economic Bloc (3) and the Jumuiya ya Kaunti za 
Pwani (6).65 These six blocs group the counties into large economic regions 
independently of the partisan affiliations of the governors. The Lake 
Region Economic Bloc is one of the first to have formalised this economic 
pact between counties. It brings together 14 counties in an unprecedented 
combination, uniting the counties bordering Lake Victoria (which was 
won over by the opposition) and those of the Highlands (won over by the 
coalition in power since the alliance between Kenyatta and Ruto in 2013). 
The Lake Region Economic Bloc Investment Bank was created to serve as 
a joint; and, in it, each of the counties deposited an equivalent amount of 
money: 200 million KES per county, for a total amount of 2.8 billion KES 
(about 25 million EUR). The objective of these blocs is to strengthen the 
64. “Ugatuzi Initiative.” 2019. The Council of Governors. https://www.cog.go.ke/
component/k2/item/179-ugatuzi-initiative [archive].
65. See the map of the blocs made by the CoG (s.d.): https://cog.go.ke/regional-
economic-blocs [archive].
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counties’ comparative advantages, optimise their economies of scale and 
attract regional investments—following the model of the European Union 
and the East African Community and with the support of the central 
government. In the case of the Lake Region Economic Bloc, the objective 
is to revive the tea, sugar, dairy and fishing sectors by: [1] providing start-
up capital for local entrepreneurs that are supported by their county; and 
[2] building regional industrial parks to create jobs in these sectors and 
increase the local added value.
While the policy of regional economic blocs is still topical, it lacks a 
legal framework; the central authorities and institutions have been slow to 
legislate on this issue. Thus, the governors’ Ugatuzi Initiative was quickly 
abandoned and incorporated into the Building Bridges Initiative (BBI), a 
new national initiative for a general reform of the Constitution through 
a series of amendments. The BBI was launched in March 2018, following 
the symbolic handshake between Kenyatta and Odinga. A team of 14 well-
known figures appointed by the two leaders have since formed the task 
force at the heart of the BBI. These 14 figures—who, like the president of 
the commission Yusuf Haji (senator and former minister), are from the 
activist, political and religious spheres—are in charge of drawing up a 
program of reforms aimed at restoring the pact of confidence between the 
rulers and the ruled, and facilitating the concrete implementation of the 
2010 Constitution. The taskforce issued its report on 27 November 2019, 
with one month’s delay. The highest state dignitaries—President, Vice-
President, speakers from both assemblies—and the main political leaders 
were present for the report’s release. While this text is not legally binding, 
it puts forward major institutional reforms. As far as decentralisation is 
concerned, the proposals for improvements are many. Examples include 
the strongly recommended grouping of counties into “regional units.” 
According to the report, the share of the national income allocated to the 
counties should be increased from the current 15% per year to a minimum 
of 35% per year, and should be distributed more equitably between counties 
by taking into account the actual population density (up to a maximum of 
50%); branches of the Auditor General’s offices should be set up at the local 
level for greater control of public expenditures and accounts; the ward level 
should have greater decision-making power in access to public services; 
etc. The year that has elapsed since the task force began its national tour, 
mobilising nearly 8,000 citizens and elected officials, has been marked by 
criticism, hopes and rumours.66 From a political point of view, the BBI is, 
66. Their activities and the preparation of the report were widely covered by 
the media, fuelling numerous rumours and spreading false reports. Only one 
member of the committee is a lawyer, and some measures remain vague, such 
as the range of 35%-50% of the budget allocated to the counties or the possibility 
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above all, the expression of a rapprochement between the president and 
his main opponent Raila Odinga, also aimed at William Ruto and his 
presidential ambitions for 2022 keeping at bay.67 As a matter of fact, the 
main reform proposals (namely, to transition to a semi-presidential regime; 
strengthen anti-corruption measures, parity and inclusion in institutions; 
rationalise wages and the decentralised system; and introduce a Prime 
Minister position chosen by the President from among the parliamentary 
majority) are clearly reminiscent of the opposition’s demands and programs 
at the time of the 2005 referendum.
Conclusion: Decentralisation in Kenya,  
“Everyone’s Turn to Eat”? 68
The Kenyan decentralisation experience raises the inevitable question 
of the consequences of the disruption of the political hierarchy on local 
development, corruption and political competition. In Kenya’s political 
history, local development income has often benefited only large landowners, 
state-owned companies—often led by powerful elected officials or the 
president’s entourage—and multinational corporations such as Unilever in 
the tea sector, owner of the Lipton brand, or Monsanto in the grain sector—
and often protected by the state (Holmquist, Weaver & Ford 1994, 76). 
Decentralisation has resulted in the creation of funding as well as human 
and institutional means of encouraging local and regional development. Yet 
development gains are under imminent threat of monopolisation. The taking 
of public action at the local level, by the ministries and county assemblies, 
is in fact ambiguous since it can be put sometimes at the service of citizens 
and sometimes at the service of the interests of elected officials and local 
authority representatives. Elected officials in the new local governments—
from the MCA to the governor and his cabinet appointees—all have 
taken a keen interest in the economic benefits brought and multiplied by 
decentralisation. Evidence shows that there are strong tensions between 
that the newly reintroduced figure of the Prime Minister could be the leader of 
the opposition at the same time.
67. William Ruto, who aims to become President in 2022, indeed suffered 
from the rapprochement between the President and his former opponent Raila 
Odinga, which left him in the shadows. Present at the ceremony alongside the 
latter two, he gave his official support to the report but would suffer from a 
referendum campaign of which he would only be the third man. 
68. According to the expression often used in reference to the “politics of the 
belly” (Bayart 1989) and taken up in relation to Kenya by Michela Wrong (2010), 
Daniel Branch, Nicholas Cheeseman & Gardner (2010), and more recently by 
Michelle D’Arcy & Agnes Cornell (2016) to refer to the corrupt practices of the 
new decentralised system.
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members of the local governments over access to and management of the 
various local budgets, not to mention the repeated scandals that illustrate 
the misuse of these funds—for example, when they are squandered on 
unjustified per diem and personal investments. At the same time, some 
tenuous overlaps create a strong interdependence between elected officials 
and the existence of a system of territorial administration deployed in 
the counties by the central government. These overlaps underline the 
persistence of the national level administrations, bodies and representatives 
in the conduct of local development and in the access of candidates to the 
positions they covet. In this respect, it seems that the establishment of a 
new political order, raising of national consciousness and building of unity 
that should have followed the collective catharsis announced in the early 
2000s have not worked properly. The new decentralised structure is, as a 
matter of fact, still precarious in its practices, which attest to the presence of 
the central state and the lingering vicissitudes of the provincial era and the 
country’s political history. The latent lack of confidence in the institutions 
of power and government committees, as well as the persistent distrust 
of the procedure of popular participation in public hearings, confirm this 
hypothesis (Lynch 2018).
However, it must be noted that—while they are tainted by corruption—
fundings earmarked for the counties (i.e. equalisation funds and equitable 
share funds) and the development projects that have been implemented 
reflect the progress made since 2013. Decentralisation—which enjoys 
unwavering public and voter support—strengthens state power and, 
to some extent, state legitimacy. It also fuels clientelist networks, at the 
head of which newly elected officials take advantage of the possibilities 
that corruption has multiplied, at all levels. These officials blithely enjoy 
symbolic (career, legitimacy) and concrete (bribes, embezzlement) benefits 
from the redistribution and trickling down of national resources to the local 
level. And while some local elected officials and county servants act as 
counterweights in the distribution of public funds among constituencies, 
others become decentralised actors in a national accumulation strategy, the 
possibilities of which decentralisation has multiplied. The local scene is 
emerging as the new network of regional patronage, which is maintained by 
corrupt political practices and fuelled by the intimidation and/or purchase 
of a local electorate. To that extent, the emergence of elected officials at the 
county level has not resulted in a thorough renovation or transformation 
of the political culture of post-colonial elites (Haugerud 1995). The question 
then becomes whether decentralisation functions as a tool for the elites to 
engage in nepotistic behaviour; and we must determine to what extent local 
mandates are part of the debate on the colonial legacy and the formation of 
the post-colonial state in Kenya (Bourmaud 1988).
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The unprecedented experience of Kenyan decentralisation provides 
concrete answers, but also leaves open questions about the effects of 
decentralised governance on the transformations—and the continuities—
of the country’s political culture. Future research will provide a better 
understanding of the consequences of decentralisation, as well as a 
rethinking of the political registers shaped by development issues. This 
will allow us to deepen and nuance the classical theories of politics in 
Africa, which are articulated around the notions of clientelism, nepotism 
and neo-patrimonialism. As the many examples and dynamics detailed in 
this chapter highlighted, decentralisation unites the 47 governments which 
make up a single nation in a complex motion. But towards which horizon? 
Both county governments and the central government have, on more than 
one occasion, claimed that “decentralisation works” or “is working.” As a 
matter of fact, the official slogan of the Annual Decentralization Conference, 
where county and national officials meet, reads as follows: “Devolution 
is working!” Optimist slogans aside, however, we are confronted with the 
following question: what could the initiatives for constitutional amendments 
and institutional reforms bode for Kenya’s future? The BBI initiative is 
ongoing, but it already suggests that, once again, popular participation 
in constitutional amendments and in shaping public and political life is 
partial, and will certainly, as in the past, lack concrete implementation. 
The restructuring of the political camps is happening in the run-up to the 
2022 presidential election, in which Uhuru Kenyatta is not eligible. Many 
governors—such as Gideon Moi, son of Daniel arap Moi and governor of 
Baringo, or Ali Hassan Joho, governor of Mombasa—as well as national-
level and government politicians, headed by the current Vice-President 
William Ruto, will lead a campaign that will certainly be colourful. During 
this campaign, the issues surrounding the reform of the constitution and the 
effective implementation of decentralisation—as well as the preservation of 
the interests of the economic and political elites and of some counties that 
influential elected officials playing in the foreground on the national stage 
represent—will be key elements of political competition at all levels.
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Low-Cost Business in Kenya  
from the City to the Countryside
Sylvain Racaud
Translated by Roxane Heidrich & Nathan Mwangi Kariuki
“Everybody knows now, everybody is a trader now, and that’s the problem 
now,” said George in April  2015 from his rudimentary stall in a Nyeri 
commercial street, where he sells ballet flats made in China on an almost 
daily basis. He represents the average response of the urban and rural 
populations to the obstacles of the Kenyan economy. Indeed, the formal 
economy is unable to absorb in a structured way the increasing share 
of labour force. Therefore, the sector referred to as informal is the main 
alternative, offering employment to more than nine out of ten businessmen 
and merchants (World Bank 2016). The National Bureau of Statistics 
estimated that, in 2014, the informal sector represented 82.7% of employment 
excluding the agricultural sector (ibid.). The informal sector is considered 
to be a shock-absorber and a crisis regulator (Charmes 1992; Hugon 2003) 
but George stresses that there are constraints because, according to him, 
the market is saturated with vendors and mainly imported goods.
Everyone is a witness to the arrival of massive amounts of low-cost 
goods, especially ballet flats, plastic sandals, fashion accessories, clothes, 
etc., which have flooded the urban commercial spaces and the rural 
markets. China is Kenya’s primary importer with its share of total imports 
that grew from 12% to 23% between 2012 and 2014 (Sanghi & Johnson 2016) 
and that remained at 23% in 2017.1 The price of commodities imported from 
China fell by 10% between 2012 and 2014 (Sanghi & Johnson 2016). Among 
these products, cheap junk (“pacotille” in French) ranks high. It is available, 
accessible, and adapted to the limited purchasing power and capital; thus, 
the exchange and the circulation of these goods extend the large commercial 
outlets up to the rural areas. In East Africa, this commercial route crosses the 
one of the second-hand clothing, another relatively inexpensive category 
of merchandise. The second-hand clothing trade sector is older and is a 
common driving force of informal sales.
In the context of these new combinations, how does the unprecedented 
circulation of vendors and cheap merchandise structure the trade route 




between the city and the countryside, between the formal and the informal 
sector, and between agriculture and commerce? How do specific regional 
dynamics develop? The trade route is the combination of all the actors and 
places that are connected by long-term commercial relations. Who are the 
actors engaged in these exchanges and what are their relations? What are 
the places where these movements take place and how are they structured? 
This project focuses on a specific segment of the transnational route of 
Chinese junk as well as its local cross-linkages with the trade route of 
second-hand clothing. Most of the work focuses on the visible displays of 
the trade route of products made in China, or in other terms, the cities with 
their global trade routes (Bertoncello & Bredeloup 2007; 2009) that do not 
reach the rural areas (Pliez 2009). What happens to the hidden rural side 
at the opposite of the urban scenery? This work examines the geographic 
configurations of the route between Kisumu and its hinterland in Western 
Kenya and between Nyeri and the West side of Mount Kenya, and integrates 
their connections with the East-African trading posts.
The suggested hypothesis is that the development of the junk trade 
route generates an “in-between” resource space (Pliez 2007) located midway 
between the city and the countryside, between the formal and the informal 
sector. This space is more or less a vehicle for new opportunities and more 
or less suitable for those actors pursuing their goals in this in-between 
setting. The “in-between” is a paradoxical interstitial space which is not 
only between two objects but also within those objects. We can see it, 
for example, in the urban aspects of the countryside as well as the rural 
elements of the city (Brient 2007; Racaud 2006). More than a complex 
combination of city and countryside elements (Bonerandi et al. 2003), the 
in-between is a resource space between the formal and informal economy, 
a contradictory landscape with porous borders. Since it is both between and 
within objects, at times it also questions their very nature, as in the case of 
the formal economy when it lives from the informal. Therefore, this work 
focuses on the most flexible expressions, on an order of things marked by 
uncertainty and precariousness, and on the everyday life of the majority of 
the population while examining examples of self-employed businesspeople, 
people involved in the cycle of temporary markets, and those who sell in 
the streets.
The empirical data were collected during several field missions carried 
out in Kenya in 2015 and 2016. The data were drawn from interviews 
(35) mainly conducted with either sedentary or mobile vendors. Three 
group interviews were conducted and three life stories were recorded as 
well. Documenting precarious workers’ testimony, also known for their 
economic vulnerability and their often non-recognised status, can of course 
present some obstacles (Steck 2006). An effort has been made to overcome 
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them by adopting a comprehensive approach consisting in capturing the 
actors’ practices and actions in their specific context.
In order to examine the regional dynamics of the trade route and the 
resource space of the in-between setting, this paper is organised into three 
sections. The first deals with the organisation of commercial spaces, the 
second with the accessibility of commercial networks rooted in the city and 
in the countryside, and the third concerns mobility and commercial linkages.
1. Commercial Spaces
Nyeri and Kisumu:  
Two Densely Populated Agricultural Inland Cities
Nyeri, at the foot of Mount Kenya, is located 150 kilometres from Nairobi, 
while Kisumu, at the edge of Lake Victoria, is located 340 kilometres 
from Nairobi. The cities of Nyeri and Kisumu, with 119,200 and 383,000 
inhabitants respectively in 2009 (KNBS 2015), are administrative and 
service centres and venues of social and economic interactions that play 
a bridging role between the city and the countryside, notably through 
agricultural exchanges (Rondinelli 1988). Nyeri Municipality and Kisumu 
City fall within an East African urbanisation marked by the densification 
of the urban structure (Calas 2007). These cities are witnessing increasing 
growth rates; 1.12% per year for Nyeri and 1.04% per year for Kisumu 
over the 1999–2009 decade. They are the hubs of their agricultural inland 
which are characterised by high rural population densities. They exceed 
300 inhabitants per square kilometre on the Mount Kenya hillside (with an 
average of 280 inhabitants per square kilometre in Nyeri County, GROK, 
2013) and count an average of 440 inhabitants per square kilometre for the 
old Nyanza Province. There is, therefore, a growing tension between the 
limited extension of the land and the size of the population.
The main part of the rural population is engaged in small-scale 
agricultural activities that strongly depend on the climate; it combines 
food crops (mainly corn and beans) with commercial crops. To the West 
of Mount Kenya, depending on the type of terracing, producers plant tea 
and coffee on the hillsides and foothills, whereas the sugar cane is the 
main commercial crop in the West. The commercial crops of the Central 
region are better connected to the market. “The economic activity of the 
city of Nyeri is primarily linked to agriculture” (Mitullah et al. 2006, 76) 
and the area produces lots of food cash crops (potatoes, market gardening 
products) for the cities, primarily Nairobi. In the West, the agricultural 
market opportunities pose a problem and the agricultural relay function for 
Kisumu is more reduced, notably because of the bad condition of the rural 
communication infrastructure and the situation in the periphery.
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With the neo-liberalisation of the economies (markets opening up, 
private actors increasing their influence, etc.), their intermediation 
functions have been renewed (Mainet & Édouard 2013) and East African 
small- and medium-sized cities have become fully-fledged actors in the 
structuring of transnational trade routes (Mainet & Racaud 2015). The 
transformation of the urban economic fabric no longer follows the pace of 
the population growth; for instance, these cities have not become industrial 
hubs. The urban economic landscape both feeds into and takes from the 
spatial and economic “in-between.” A strong “lasting interdependence 
between the city and hinterland” (Mitullah et al. 2006, 76) exists, often 
pegged to the informal activities. In Kenya, the informal sector employs on 
average 53% of the urban workforce with the most significant rate being 
registered in Kisumu (61%) (KNBS 2015). The urban commercial spaces and 
the rural markets are the privileged places of the low-cost business and the 
relationships between the city and the countryside and the formal and the 
informal sectors.
The Organisation of Commercial Spaces
Shopping districts and urban and rural markets are places of multiple 
intersections. They fulfil economic functions by allowing exchanges 
between client and merchant, city and countryside, and formal and 
informal economies—whether they are in the city or in the countryside. 
They also foster social relationships because not only the merchandise 
is exchanged. Information and rumours circulate, friendships are tied 
and broken, etc. Just like most rural markets, the regular markets of 
Nyeri County are mirrors to their hinterland because local agricultural 
productions are found there. The health of these markets depends on the 
health of the local economy, primarily the agricultural one. Tea, the main 
Kenyan export, is the most important crop on the South-Western hillside 
of Mount Kenya. The tea industry, like the coffee production, is structured 
around cooperatives that circumvent rural markets. Thus, the latter do not 
play any role in the gathering and the redistribution of local products. The 
markets of Monyu, Kiamariga, and also Kiaruhiu do not stand out as the 
dynamic regular markets that can be found, for example, on the Western 
slope of Mount Elgon, on the slopes of Uporoto in South-West Tanzania, 
or even in Western Cameroon. The infrastructure financed by the county 
notwithstanding, market days are dull: they lack the fervour of a rural 
market day that is supposed to be the highlight of rural life (Chaléard 1996). 
As a consequence, these markets play a limited role in the distribution of 
imported products due to the limited number of merchants that are present. 
Nobody comes from the cities to sell their merchandise because the rural 
tea trade scene is not a very flourishing one. On the contrary, in Endarasha, 
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despite the absence of infrastructures, the agriculture based on food crops 
meant for urban markets is very active and attracts merchants from Nairobi 
or even from Mombasa. The rural economy, far from being rich, allows 
nevertheless for numerous commercial exchanges. The market attracts 
local customers and mobile vendors coming from Nyeri or Mweiga that sell 
low-cost goods. The development of the junk trade route also includes the 
goods that are grown in the fields.
Kisumu and Nyeri’s commercial infrastructure is composed by a few 
small supermarkets, many boutiques in the main streets of the Central 
Business Districts (CBD), some daily markets, and countless makeshift 
vendor stalls. The latter occupy the streets with the most significant flows 
of passers-by, which correspond to the routes used by CBD employees 
heading to the bus stations. These routes are also traversed by peddlers, 
the most precarious type of street vendors. In Kisumu, four streets around 
Jomo Kenyatta Ground (a vast park between the CBD and the bus stations) 
are cluttered on both sides with countless stalls of various second-hand 
items or Chinese junk. The two sides of Otieno Oyo Street, approximately 
ten metres away, are also occupied by a multitude of merchants and their 
products. On the main street Oginga Obinda, the street vendors, stand 
at the entrance of and around stores and coexist with them, while in the 
streets of Ang’awa, Jomo Kenyatta Highway, and Ojino Okew, the right 
to sell is almost exclusively granted to a few hundred street vendors. The 
points of sale have various forms, from a display made of a cut-out bag 
placed on the ground, to the covered table called kibanda. Street commerce 
has thus various shapes, and it is hard to the observer to make distinctions 
within the commercial landscape of these extended markets. In any case, 
whether it is street vending or a market, under-equipment is the norm. The 
pictures below demonstrate the contradictions of street vending between 
some very reduced stockpile and equipment placed right next to numerous 
bags of second-hand items stacked indoors in an open hangar.
Despite their differences, these two types of commerce operate in spaces 
that were never intended for these activities; therefore, according to the 
legislative frameworks, they are informal and are not subject to an annual 
license. However, the same authorities who do not recognise their formal 
status, do grant them a temporary license valid for one day, averaging 
30 shillings per day. For the local authorities, the criterion of “sell[ing] 
in a space that is not intended for that purpose” is a major criterion of 
the definition of informal commerce. According to the head of the Urban 
Planning Department of Kisumu City County, these activities “are informal 
in the sense that they are carried out in a space not designated for that.” It is 
noteworthy that Kisumu’s last urban plan for dates back to 1975. Therefore, 
at the highest level of the political rhetoric, the Kenya Vision 2030 plan 
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Photo 1. Diversity of sales points, JK Highway and Ojinjo Okew St
Sylvain Racaud, 2016.
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articulates that “the informal sector must be supported in ways that will raise 
productivity and distribution and increase jobs” “to provide them [informal 
sector] with permanent and serviced facilities, training and access to credit 
and markets” (GROK 2007, 10, 14). The institutional framework presents 
contradictions within its different levels because the non-recognition of 
informal vendors by Kisumu City County, by Nyeri County, or by Nairobi 
City County challenges two laws: the Urban Areas and Cities Act of 2011 
and the Micro and Small Enterprise Act of 2012. The latter states that 
“enterprise’ means an undertaking or a business concern whether formal or 
informal engaged in production of goods or provision of services” (NCLR 
2012, 7). The daily management of the informal economy resides within 
the national political and legislative framework and the local politics. 
Being placed in this in-between means, for the informal sector, being kept 
in its precariousness; it is also an open door to abuses such as the ongoing 
corruption of the officers in charge of ensuing adherence to rulings or even 
the political exploitation at the highest levels. For example, the Economic 
Strategy Action Plan of the National Rainbow Coalition political alliance, 
which won the 2002 presidential elections, recognised that 88% of promised 
jobs allegedly came from small informal business enterprises (Kamunyori 
1999, 13). This temporary legitimacy, albeit renewed daily, contributes to 
the blurriness of the definition of informal. The common understanding of 
the latter refers to economic activities operating outside of state regulation 
whose boundaries with the formal sector are blurred (Lindel 2010).
The regulation of low-cost commerce, characterised by a strong informal 
component, constitutes a permanent fluctuation of powers in the local 
political arena. The latter is a volatile ensemble of multiple actors and 
various sectors (public/private, economic/political, authorities/civil society, 
formal/informal) with porous borders (Blundo 2002). Despite its official 
“informal” status, the world of street vendors is indeed organised. This 
bottom-up regulation is generated in the institutional in-between because 
this activity, although considered informal, is regulated by numerous 
groups registered with the Ministry of Gender, Children, and Social 
Development. This framework comes with requirements (daily meetings, 
periodic elections, record-keeping, etc.) and offers services such as savings, 
loans, and social assistance. These groups, called self-help groups, typically 
count between ten and fifty members. In Kisumu there are about forty of 
them and in Oginga Odinga Street, no less than eight. The most precarious 
vendors, i.e. those who have very limited capital, are less often members of 
collective organisations for a lack of trust or of capital to be converted into 
contributions. The price of trust and the risk of losing the little that has 
been accumulated curb the collective engagement. Nevertheless, the groups 
are an asset to the power relations between the local authorities and their 
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leaders are key contacts whose favour is persistently pursued if not even 
bought. It is not uncommon for kiosks to be set aside for specific leaders 
when commercial spaces are created (Bus Park in Kisumu in 2003). These 
groups can be in competition among themselves (e.g. KITES and KISTA in 
Kisumu) and often, there are leadership problems (e.g. KASVIT in Kisumu), 
if not collusions between politicians and the mafia. The Apindi back lane in 
Kisumu is a commercial road with several dozen small shops. This project 
was financed in 2004 by a Constituency Development Fund generously 
funded by the local member of parliament at the time. The space is managed 
by a committee headed by two individuals that we met in a nice vehicle 
with tinted windows, where they were negotiating the sale of a store to a 
Somali merchant for the modest sum of 350,000 shillings. “We are the ones 
who negotiate with the County government on their behalf [vendors],” they 
say, in particular on the allocation and the transfer of ownership of shops. 
Low-cost business is an economic resource for both visible and less visible 
actors and it is also an electoral asset. This way, for example, businessman 
E. Anayo, elected Member of the County Assembly in 2013, in Kisumu, was 
able to reclaim to a certain extent the investment made by co-financing 
dozens of kiosks on a section of the JK Highway. For politicians, street 
vendors represent either an electoral resource or terrible grabbers of public 
spaces—a relationship that changes with the electoral calendar.
2. Access to Commercial Networks Rooted  
in the City and the Countryside
Traders, Capital Accumulation, and Access to Commerce
Low-cost business is flourishing because there are numerous business 
contenders and the number is growing. The oldest vendors have been 
practicing for about fifteen years but the majority of them for less than ten 
years. This influx of merchants also reflects that of the goods as Kenyan 
imports coming from China (in terms of value) increased to about 1500% 
from 2000 to 2010 (Patroba 2012) and about 60% between 2010 and 2017. 
The trade of imported products is the main activity to the majority of young 
people. Showing us her market stall, Joyce, a street vendor in Kisumu, 
confesses that “this is where we report immediately after school”; we 
may rephrase “this is where we work even after completing school, since 
formal jobs are hard to get.” There is no typical profile of a merchant and 
trying to sort out typologies seems far-fetched and inappropriate insofar as 
these actors are flexible in nature and likely to move from one category to 
another from one day to the next. Men, women, young people either done 
with their secondary studies or in the process of doing so, public service 
retirees, former employees enticed by the adventure of entrepreneurship, 
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poor, less poor, a few rich people—in short, a wide range of individuals 
–engage in this world of low-cost business. It is possible to differentiate 
between those who chose to do this kind of a job; either those unsatisfied 
or perhaps fed up by their salaries in the formal/informal, agricultural, 
or service industry and the majority who had no other choice other than 
engaging in small business.
The itineraries in stages are typical for a number of those vendors who 
have previously experienced the life of earning salaries. In the merchant’s 
experience, beginning with the second-hand clothing trade is a classic; 
access to the business of new products is already more ambitious and 
vendors are flexible: they adapt not only their range of products according 
to the seasons, but also based on opportunities and setbacks. On the 
other hand, street trading also known as hawking and street vending 
are preliminary attempts at achieving a stationery selling spot in a daily 
market or a shop or even selling in periodic markets. The duration of these 
stages depends on the success of the business venture. The circumstances 
of people who buy and resell goods are more or less evolving; some of them 
succeed at accumulating capital, others do not make any progress from 
the initial stage, which is often misery, a hardship experience. The lack of 
adequate financial capital, together with inadequate educational and social 
capital, limits the chances of success while the most successful merchants 
are those who can rely on a combination of numerous social, professional, 
and political networks (Walther 2015).
The starting capital is typically generated through several ways: 
donations (which is rare), loans (somewhat common), or accumulated 
capital from previous activities (in most common cases); combinations of 
the above is not common. Capital can be raised from savings from one 
or several jobs which can be combined with a loan or a donation, both of 
which are quite often obtained from parents or a spouse. Despite broad 
variations, the starting capital is typically less than 15,000 shillings and it 
is not uncommon for some begin with less than 5,000 shillings, sometimes 
even less than 1,000 shillings. Those who start with more than 20,000, 
perhaps even 50,000 shillings, have, for example, been able to obtain a bank 
loan or a loan from a mutual-aid group. Public service retirees may begin 
with tens of thousands shillings of capital.
The main access to the trade route is through another vendor or through 
some form of apprenticeship. In both cases, access occurs through one 
person with whom the new vendor has a social relationship, which is quite 
often a family member, village, or community acquaintance. The would-be 
businessmen receive guidance throughout their first steps and are often 
accompanied in the commercial neighbourhood to be recommended to 
suppliers and become familiar with the urban scene, especially if the latter 
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is a merchant who buys goods in a big city like Nairobi. Vendors remember 
this experience even after several years, like Job, who still remembers the 
date, ten years ago, and to be specific 2 February 2005, when for the first 
time he obtained his supplies in Nyeri together with his merchant friend 
who just like him had just set up a stall in Endarasha (3,000 residents in 
2009). Cooperation can defy the market competition rules. In the biweekly 
Kiamariga market, a small city situated at an altitude of 1,800 m on the 
Western hillside of Mount Kenya, Florence, a merchant of clothing, layettes, 
plastic sandals, and small household accessories, was accompanied to Nyeri 
for her first procurement by her direct competitor, whose adjacent display 
is totally similar. She was accompanied to Nyeri by a merchant from the 
same market. The following photo demonstrates the proximity of the two 
stalls, with Florence’s stall located just behind the one in the foreground. 
There are forms of collaborations that go beyond the simple rules of 
competition whereby merchants try to gain for themselves the better share 
of the market. Other merchants were instead guided towards Kamukunji, 
Nairobi’s large trading post for Chinese junk.
It is not surprising that most merchants were formerly shop assistants 
in a family business or businesses owned in the community or perhaps 
a friend’s business. This system links us back to the practice of placing 
children under apprenticeship and to the group solidarity that can be 
found in many African communities. This process allows beginners to gain 
experience, contacts, and sometimes capital. For example, despite his young 
age, George, a street vendor in Nyeri, got his bachelor in Information and 
Technology in 2015. He has been working as street trader for more than 
five years. He began selling on part time after his classes, while still in Form 
4. George used to sell his merchandise at a lower price compared to others: 
“As I started my final year in High school, having lived for so long without 
any source of income, I tried part time business under the inspiration of 
my friend, he’s a very good friend.” It is not surprising to see high school 
students getting goods on credit or small capitals from close acquaintances 
and becoming vendors during the school holidays. Getting the experience 
and accessing capital are usually the fruit of close relationships, work, and 
solidarity. The city expands the number of possible combinations between 
genealogical links and extra-familial relations (Agier 1981), while the 
penetration of the merchant route into the countries, via the markets, also 
offers new possibilities of forming relationships and social networks.
Activity System Based on City-Countryside Synergies
Vendors from the countryside and numerous vendors from medium-sized 
cities combine the city and the country into their activity system. Synergies 
derived from these combinations that result in the mobility and circulation 
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of resources (capital, goods in kind). The activity system is understood as 
the “dynamic and structured set of interacting activities implemented by a 
given corporate entity that mobilises the resources available in a given social 
and ecological environment” (Gasselin et al. 2014, 106). The permanent or 
periodic sale is thus often associated with agricultural work within a given 
household or within the personal schedule of an individual, leading to 
flexible arrangements that are based on agricultural and market calendars. 
Alfred, a small 60-year-old woman, follows the itinerary of the dynamic 
periodic markets for the better part of the week (Endarasha on Fridays, 
Nairutia on Saturdays, Mweiga on Thursdays) to sell ballet flats, plastic 
sandals, and slippers, cultivating her field during the rest of the week. The 
daily market vendors of Othaya, a small town of 5,200 residents (KNBS 
2015) about 15 kilometres south of Nyeri, never arrive before ten o’clock in 
the morning because most are busy in the fields working from dawn. The 
cultivated areas in Nyeri County are moderate in size, often an acre, where 
corn, beans, etc., are grown, i.e. merchantable food supplemented by tea or 
coffee, and livestock often consisting of only one a cow under zero grazing. 
In the western parts of Kenya, the areas may be larger, about two acres 
for each household, but access to the market is more reduced. Whether 
it is in the western parts of Kenya or in Nyeri County, merchant-farmers 




believe that agriculture does not yield sufficient revenues and that low-
cost business is a cheap complementary activity. This business is strongly 
linked to the seasons because clients themselves derive their income in 
part or in full from agriculture. The harvest period is therefore the most 
prosperous period for merchants as money is more abundant.
Engaging in trading of cheap imported goods represents an alternative 
to those in rural areas who cannot engage in in agriculture due to some 
limitations, it could also be a means of purchasing land and investing in 
agriculture. Regular merchants have invested in commercial food crops 
destined for the urban market, like potatoes and cabbage that are sold in 
Nyeri, or melon sold in Kisumu. Rosemary, wholesaler of second-hand 
clothes who moves between Nairobi and Kisumu, no longer relies on her 
employment but instead uses farm workers on her land in the County 
of Siaya. The relative absence of merchant-farmers on their plots and 
investments can alter the production systems. The latter become more 
intensive in terms of inputs, and labour. Whether it is in Nyeri or Kisumu, 
vendors have been able to purchase plots in their villages thanks to the 
revenue generated from their business. Paul was able to buy a plot in the 
village after about five years; Henry, after fleeing Rift Valley, was able to 
build his own house in Nyeri; and Fredrick was able to extend the size of 
Photo 3. Street vendors, Oginga Odinga Street, Kisumu
Sylvain Racaud, 2016.
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his inherited land by purchasing more pieces. On the other hand, nobody 
would envisage their retirement outside of their home villages, except 
perhaps the young people, who are yet to think about it, together with 
those who have made investments in the city. The business in town makes 
it possible to build a house on the inherited or purchased plot; the objective 
is to secure resources for the future. Investments in the village rather 
depend on the success of the economic activities in the city as well as the 
setbacks, which is particularly true for the street vendors whose work is 
not recognised by the authorities. This affects life in the village. This is the 
case, for example, when all or part of the stock is lost, sometimes even as a 
consequence of planned destruction by authorities as was the case during 
the fire evacuation of Oile Market in September 2014 in Kisumu. On the 
other side, for those whose origin is rural areas but living in the city, getting 
cash or resources such as food is a necessary in order to afford life in the 
city, particularly for street vendors with limited financial capital like most 
of those specialising in Chinese junk along Oginga Odinga Road in Kisumu.
Vendors are local vehicles of global products distribution, the grassroots 
links in the chains of the transnational route. The majority of vendors in 
medium-sized or small towns or in rural markets are of rural origin. Whether 
they are sedentary or mobile, permanent or seasonal, they often have one 
foot in the farm and the other in the market. They integrate agriculture 
and urban business in their activity system, which leads to specific flows 
of capital and goods.
3. Mobility and Network Logic
Within East African Villages, Cities, and Trading Posts
The expansion of the trade route, driver of economic opportunities, has led 
to unprecedented levels of mobility between the countryside, secondary 
cities, and metropoles. The movement of individuals and objects is functional 
to the business and takes place on several scales according to the available 
capital: it’s all about stocking up and selling. The street vendors who follow 
the cycle of periodic markets can sell for up to seven days per week, like 
Job, a very mobile merchant. On Mondays he stocks up in Nyeri (or Nairobi, 
if the capital allows him) and sells in Mweiga on Tuesdays, a trading centre 
on Wednesdays, Mweiga on Thursdays, Endarasha on Fridays, Nairutia 
on Saturdays, and Kiawara on Sundays. This schedule changes based on 
agricultural seasons because crops differ in type and harvest time depending 
on the agro-ecological zones. Job’s areas of mobility is within Nyeri County, 
even if, at times, he’s able to get his supplies from Nairobi. The vendors 
who work in the periodic rural markets often have moderate capital, which 
constrains their radius of action or movement. Endarasha’s periodic market 
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becomes lively from eleven o’clock, once most of the merchants have set up 
their stalls. A large number of them comes from Nyeri, some from Mweiga 
(3,500 residents, KNBS, 2015), and others from Endarasha. Out of more than 
one hundred merchants, two thirds sell second-hand clothing, a dozen sell 
imported junk, and only three sell new clothes; the selection of available 
goods is an indicator of the local purchasing power.
When it comes to the supply of goods, the movement of goods and 
people from the cities to the countryside intertwines with those from the 
cities to the countryside or from the secondary cities to the metropoles. 
Limited capital leads to less movements because the reduced stock that 
one can purchase must often be replenished. In Nyeri County, the lowest 
number of trips is one per month (which is the case mostly for those who 
sell between one and three days per week) and the highest frequency is 
two trips per week to the source of supply and back. The location of the 
latter depends on the point of sale and the volume of the supply. Among the 
least dynamic markets is the South-Western side of Mount Kenya, where 
the economy is based on the production of tea, Karatina (8,500 residents, 
KNBS 2009) and Nyeri are the main trading posts. The markets located 
on the North-Nairobi axis from Kenya towards Ethiopia and the markets 
located northwest of Nyeri, where the business of commercial food crops 
Photo 4. Endarasha’s periodic market
Sylvain Racaud, May 2015.
Low-Cost Business in Kenya from the City to the Countryside
189
generates connections with Nairobi, have easier cash exchanges. Gikomba 
and Kamukumji are the major trading posts for second-hand clothing and 
Chinese junk respectively in Kenya. These popular marketplaces are also 
major supply centres for Nyeri vendors. Most vendors, whether mobile or 
sedentary, rural or urban, engaging in the business of low cost products 
went less frequently to Nyeri Town and even less in Nairobi. These more 
recent commercial exchanges have created unprecedented fluxes, mobility 
areas with variable geometry, volatile “merchant territories” (Grégoire 
2002) that entirely depend on the interrelations between agriculture and 
other economic opportunities.
On the shores of Lake Victoria, the development of the low-cost trading 
route has generated connections and commercial hubs on several levels. 
In Kisumu, Kibuye is a daily market whose peak is on Sundays since the 
wholesalers from Nairobi, Nakuru and Mombasa, come to redistribute their 
stocks of second hand clothes. Bus park, the main bus station in Kisumu, 
is the main regional trading post for the junk. It is here where wholesalers, 
retailers, and street vendors coexist or interact. The place attracts merchants 
who operate in the cities and towns within the region. Furthermore, a 
significant part of the Kisumu supply of goods made in China is ensured by 
numerous wholesalers and retailers who get their supplies from Kampala 
at a similar rate as those who get their supplies from Nairobi, meaning two 
to four times per month. Despite its landlocked location, Kampala is an 
East-African hub for imported goods. The Ugandan capital offers attractive 
conditions for businessmen from East Africa. This is also the case for a few 
merchants from the South-West of Tanzania, more than 1,300 kilometres 
away, who also obtain their supplies there, leaving aside Dar es Salaam. The 
goods that can be found in the Owino market and in the “golden triangle” 
(Calas 1998, 177), mainly on William Street, Kikuubo Street, and Nakivubo 
Street, arrive through the port of Mombasa and passes through Nairobi. 
However, the favourable exchange rates, the low taxes, and the less than 
transparent negotiations at the border between Uganda and Kenya lead to 
the fact that the price per unit of a sandal made in China is more cheaper 
in Kampala than in Nairobi. The development of the Kisumu-Kampala 
trade route took place at the same time when traders were forming some 
groups or associations, for example the Kampala Friends, created in 
March 2016, which has 33 members. One of the members, who had been 
doing his business in Kampala for 15 years, now prefers Mwanza, a North-
Western Tanzanian metropolis; the East-African competition is keen and 
the network is labile.
With its goods, actors, facilitated methods of access, and places, the 
low-cost commerce has been generating alternative trade routes, the 
expansion of which results in unprecedented connections between the city 
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and countryside, between medium-sized cities and metropoles, and across 
borders. The movement of products, capital, the layout of activities between 
business and agriculture, as well as the unprecedented movements are a 
result of new economic opportunities, which are resource spaces of the 
“in-between” that showcase the specific territorial dynamics integrating 
Western Kenyan territories, villages, and grassroots actors, with global 
commercial networks. These territorial dynamics represent the way 
“inconspicuous areas of globalisation” (Pliez & Choplin 2015) play an active 
role in the system of global networks.
Commercial Links Integrated into the Network Logics
Besides the physical flow of goods, the organisation of a low-cost trade 
route also occurs through intangible commercial relationships. The 
mobility of traders exchanges is unprecedented for some of the vendors in 
rural markets or in the commercial areas of small towns (e.g. Othaya); by 
stocking up at their outlets, these merchants get used to the windows and 
opportunities of globalisation where they maintain more or less ongoing 
relationships with their suppliers. Professional merchant networks also 
develop. Partial credit or the granting of an advance on goods are common. 
They allow customers’ attractions and also create the conditions for faster 
or easier exchanges. Maintaining long-term relationships allows for the 
development of trust, which can be leveraged during hard times (Berrou 
& Gondard-Delcroix 2011). A supplier can “help” his client with a one-
time advance on goods. Close relationships also facilitate negotiations. 
However, vendors are not bound to their suppliers but it is rather “the 
goods that lead.” In most cases suppliers will call their clients to promote 
new goods or even to take on new potential clients who would cunningly 
change suppliers. Furthermore, intangible connections are facilitated by 
the use of smart phones equipped with the WhatsApp application and by 
the use of phone payments with the Mpesa system, widely used since its 
release in Kenya in 2007.
Due to influence of the city, the rural mobile street vendors and the 
urban youth from small cities sell new products that are on fashion: they 
are medium of fashion trends, which they actually wear themselves. The 
“items constitute an essential part of socialising contexts” (Kaufmann 
1997, 111) and the junk contributes to the emergence of a class of small 
entrepreneurs of rural origin, actors that play a key role in connecting places 
and societies of the world. In rural communities that are opening up more 
and more, this relationship shaping the demand for globalised products, 
which represent the interconnections between the global socio-cultural 
factors and economic system. When people’s relationship to space changes, 
their relationship to time changes too. The easy access to non-durable, if 
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not short-lived goods, the giving rise to a sense of urgency or excitement 
of the gain, and unprecedented movements, all contribute to shaping the 
identities of the “in-between”—a social shifter (Durham 2000) in this city-
country space connected to the global. These identities, in part built through 
cyclical movements and increasingly individual trajectories, question the 
status of the territory, a collectively owned space created over time and a 
conveyer of identities (Charlery de la Masselière 2013). This itinerant trade 
therefore contributes to the unprecedented time-space relationships that 
shapes the city and the countryside and their complementary attributes 
within a resource space that is integrated on various levels in the systems 
of the network.
The commercial links that emerge within the low-cost route combine 
themselves with the daily local sociability and tie themselves around an 
identity soaked in entrepreneurship. The sector of low-cost merchandise 
is not a selective one: products are available and accessible and their 
sale allows for the establishment of group unity that combine social 
and economic systems. In the rural and urban commercial spaces, some 
merchants feel that what makes most sense is the social relationship rather 
than the trading function of this “togetherness.” A group of saleswomen 
in Othaya admitted that the profits are small, yet business allows them to 
get away from the farms, out of the home, the village, and to be in town, 
together, and share a life between the farms and the stall on the side of the 
street. At the very least, this commercial activity allows to escape, if not the 
condition, the very image of the farmer; this is how old Wilson explains it 
while standing in front of his pile of old second-hand clothing spread over 
a piece of sheet at the Endarasha market. He proudly proclaims: “I’m a 
farmer and I’m a business man.” The old man only sells twice per week, and, 
judging by the state of his stock, his prospects to expand it are uncertain. 
The examples of self-made men like Victor Maina or Davis Mukuha, 
founders of their respective supermarket chains that were initially small 
inherited shops, steer people’s imagination in an East-African country 
with a neoliberal economy where entrepreneurship is strongly valued. The 
entrepreneurial spirit promoted through national programmes (e.g. Kenya 
Vision 2030) and anchored as a positive value in Kenyan society, can be 
found in those freelance or mobile entrepreneurs and equally as easily in 
the neo-liberal systems at the city level especially when it comes to urban 
planning practices (Morange 2013). From the field to the city, from the 
individual to the state, the development of the trade route in Kenya allows 
us to detect several geographical effects of globalisation.
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Conclusion: Between the Places  
and the “Mobile Spaces” 2 of low-Cost Business
Leaving aside any geographic interpretation, this chapter revolved around 
the question of how the movement of vendors and merchandise creates a 
resource space that is generated by the relationships between city/country, 
formal/informal and agriculture/business. The space of the analysed route 
extends from the country to the cities. It is integrated within the systems 
of a porous network that combines social, professional, and political links. 
From the country to medium-sized cities, the majority of the actors along 
the route of low-cost business sells basic equipment and combines within 
their activity systems agricultural revenues and the retail sale of small 
items. Access to this business is possible with limited capitals and through 
social friends. The professional experience is marked by subsequent 
steps. Private actors, through their movements and intangible commercial 
connections, are the grassroots building blocks of the route that connects 
in an magnified way the biggest centres. The itinerant or sedentary street 
commerce, with its numerous and flexible forms and permeable borders, is 
a privileged expression of the “in-between” setting that emerges between 
formal and informal activities.
The “in-between” resource space demonstrates the existing geographic 
tension between a physical place on the one hand (a localised, named, 
represented, and engaged point in space) and on the other hand, a mobile 
space that is a relative and shifting physical reality. The commercial routes 
are parcels of recognised (toponymy), materialised (points of sale), and 
collectively owned space that have become so often after conflicts between 
vendors and authorities (but also between vendors themselves). Conflicts 
and competition over the use of space express the conflictual nature of 
space, which “always represents the challenge and becomes the main stake 
in struggles and actions that have a specific objective” (Lefebvre 1974, 471). 
Low-cost business associates (relatively) fixed devices with the fluidity of 
vendors who follow the waves of clients mainly when they leave work. 
In Kisumu, Nyeri, Nairobi, etc., every day at the end of the afternoon, a 
uninterrupted flow of potential customers populates the space between the 
CBD and the bus stations.
This form of resource space reminds of the “ambulantism,” an 
opportunistic and stealthy style of selling that shapes the geography of 
the village in a blurry and fluid way (Monnet 2006). This human tide is 
synonymous with economic opportunities for the vendors that have 
abandoned their daily points of sales in favour of the crowded and self-
appropriated sidewalks. The space, therefore, temporarily changes its 
2. Rétaillé (2005). 
Low-Cost Business in Kenya from the City to the Countryside
193
Photo 5. JK Highway Road in Kisumu (above) and Gakere Road in Nyeri (below)
Racaud, 2015 and 2016.
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nature just like the CBD employee who becomes a client. Movement is 
the driving force of this change: traffic zones move, urban areas become 
merchant spaces, the form of the space changes, and so does the nature 
of the object in movement (Retaillé 2005). In conclusion, the geography 
of the trade route of low-cost merchandise, through its unprecedented 
mobility, its unstable merchant spaces, its grassroots precarious private 
actors, and its unpredictable fluctuations between formal and informal, can 
be interpreted as the product of a precarious context affecting the largest 
part of the rural and urban Kenyan society and also as the product of the 
local connections to the global.
I express my sincere gratitude to Nathan Mwangi Kariuki for the English editing.
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The Politicisation of Land Policy 
Reform in Contemporary Kenya
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Translated by Sara Stavchansky
In Kenya, as in other African countries, the colonial experience was the 
foundation of a centralised and authoritarian bureaucratic institutional 
apparatus that continued shaping the state after independence (granted in 
1963). In this former British settlement colony, state institutions, including 
those governing property rights, have been structured to provide territorial 
control,1 including through the deployment of the Provincial Administration, 
the branches of central state power in the Districts (Bourmaud 1988). The 
centralisation of state control gradually took hold in the 1970s, under 
the aegis of the first independent government. It gained strength in the 
1980s with the second president of the Republic of Kenya, Daniel arap 
Moi, when the regime turned to autocracy (Nyong’o 1989). Social and 
political movements emerged in the 1980s and 1990s in opposition to the 
dictatorial state power: they called for the reshaping of the social contract 
through the revision of the constitution (Haugerud 1997; Klopp 2001; 
Murunga & Nasong’o 2007). The democratisation of land management and 
administration systems has been an integral part of this overall movement 
calling for the restructuring of the state.
In this context in which the action of the territorial administration has 
allowed local political pluralism while framing and linking it to the central 
state through a selective redistribution of resources, i.e. a “rationalised 
clientelism” (Bourmaud 1988, 138), the institutions governing the land 
have become porous to political interference. They have thus drawn on 
the land resource, held de jure in trust by public authorities, to maintain 
clientelist networks, according to a well-known “neo-patrimonial” logic.2 
This politicisation of land governance has contributed to the exacerbation 
of conflicting community relations in many local contexts, some of 
1. The territorial nature of the colonial state (and postcolonial in its wake) in 
Kenya was conceptualised by Claire Médard (1999) in her doctoral thesis in 
Geography. She shows that the state territorialise its power through the control 
of both natural resources and populations.
2. For a discussion of the concept of “neopatrimonialism” applied not only to 
African political systems, see Bach & Gazibo (2012).
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which, as in the Rift Valley, have resonated in the national political arena. 
The analysis of the conflict dimension of land issues is fundamental to 
understanding the triggers and vehicles of reform processes in Kenya, 
both constitutional reform and land governance reform. Land disputes 
have indeed been the basis of many institutional processes (such as the 
many commissions of inquiry appointed by the Kenyan presidents in 
the 1990s and 2000s) but also of less institutional processes (such as the 
constitution of a transnational network of actors) that contributed to the 
legal-institutional transformations of the country’ systems.
From 2000 to 2010, the Constitution of Kenya Review Commission 
(CKRC) worked on the drafting of a new supreme law. Land reform was 
one of the pillars of the proposed constitutional changes. Not only were 
land issues incorporated into constitutional deliberations, with a chapter 
of the new Constitution fully dedicated to it, but a National Land Policy 
(NLP), was developed in parallel within the Ministry of Lands as early 
as 2004. The NLP had to unravel the land question and formulate general 
policy principles, unifying the corpus of land laws by deciding on their 
aims and their orientations. These two parallel reform processes were 
completed between 2009 and 2010. Since 2011, the legal-institutional 
framework proposed by these texts was progressively, albeit very slowly, 
put into place.
Among the salient points of land reform, the restructuring of the roles 
and functions of institutions governing property rights emerged, since 
the early 2000s, as the only policy instrument that could tackle both 
the colonial legacy and dysfunctional land administration (i.e. lack of 
efficiency and neo-patrimonial practices). Above all, it was necessary to 
deconcentrate and decentralise the politico-administrative power of the 
executive, especially limiting the hold of the president on land allocations, 
and thereby revising the legislative framework inherited from colonisation, 
now considered obsolete and plethoric. The structure of land ownership 
was also re-examined, including a number of principles that had remained 
dogmatic since independence, such as the sanctity of first registration and 
the inevitability of the individualisation of land tenure.3
From the beginning of the process of enactment of land reform provisions, 
several authors argued many actors resisted institutional change. They 
noted the “difficulties” in reforming institutions (Bassett 2017), as well as 
the existence of “counter-reform” (Klopp & Lumumba 2017) attempts by 
3. These remarks were notably expressed in the documents at the base of the 
reform elaboration: see Constitution of Kenya Review Commission, The People’s 
Choice. The Report of the Constitution of Kenya Review Commission (2002), Report 
of the Commission of Inquiry into the Illegal / Irregular Allocation of Public Land 
(2004), and Sessional Paper No. 3 of 2009 on National Land Policy (2009).
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the political and bureaucratic class, namely the government of the Jubilee 
Coalition—in power since 2013—officials of the Ministry of Lands, and, 
more generally, all the beneficiaries of the old regime (McAuslan 2013, 
262; Manji 2014; Boone, Dyzenhaus, Ouma, et al. 2019). All these works 
differentiate the process of formulating land reform texts (the Constitution 
and the NLP) from the elaboration of laws meant to operationalise the 
reform provisions. Thus, the progressive impetus of the 2000s would stand 
in contrast to the resistance to implementation of transformative measures 
of the 2010s. But these analyses do not explain why the bureaucratic-
political establishment, beneficiaries of the old regime, would initially 
have accepted land reform. Why would blockades and sabotage attempts 
have waited for the implementation of a new law radically reorganising 
the governance and structure of property, but have quietly allowed its 
formulation and promulgation?
This chapter aims to show that resistance has been a constant feature of 
the policy process of land reform from the early stages of its formulation 
to its implementation. In order to do this, it analyses precisely the process 
of reform starting with its setting on the government agenda and exposes 
the negotiations taking place before and after the promulgation of the two 
founding reform texts. In addition, this chapter anchors the interpretive 
framework of the emergence and progress of the process of land governance 
reform in the political history of Kenya to better understand debates and 
blockages. After a brief discussion of the colonial legacy and postcolonial 
continuity of Kenya’s bureaucratic and economic-political structures, I 
will first show how the politico-land conflicts of the 1990s, particularly 
those in the Rift Valley, prompted certain stakeholders to advocate for 
policy change. I will then explain the reasons why the political system 
suddenly became more receptive to reform narratives and highlight how 
the international context contributed to the pro-reform movement as well 
as to the design of procedures for concerted decision-making. Finally, I 
will dwell on the political events that both obstructed and promoted the 
reform process.4
4. The analyses presented here are the result of doctoral research conducted 
in Kenya for eighteen months. I adopted several qualitative methods of data 
collection: semi-structured interviews with a wide range of actors (members of 
associations, public authorities, representatives of rural communities, etc.), press 
review, participatory observation in civil society and government workshops, 
notably through the integration of a non-governmental organisation lobbying 
for reform, the Kenya Land Alliance.
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1. The “Land Question”:  
Construction of a Dominant Narrative
It was expected that the transfer of power from colonial authorities to 
indigenous elites would lead to fundamental restructuring of the legacy on 
land. This did not materialise and the result was a general re-entrenchment and 
continuity of colonial land policies, laws and administrative infrastructure. This 
was because the decolonisation process represented an adaptive, co-optive and 
pre-emptive process which gave the new power elites access to the European 
economy. (Republic of Kenya 2009, 5.)
This excerpt, taken from the NLP, is meant to exemplify the political 
aspects of what is called in Kenya the land question.5 It first associates the 
land question with the incompleteness of the process of decolonisation 
during transition to independence. The colonial legacy would thus be the 
first pitfall in the resolution of problems related to land management. This 
colonial legacy refers particularly to the “historical land injustices” caused 
by the expropriation of many Kenyan populations by the colonial enterprise, 
which have never been rectified. The establishment of a settlement colony 
in Kenya is indeed the result of large-scale land acquisitions, which the 
colonial government justified “legally” by a reversal of sovereignty.6 The 
lands targeted were mainly those located in areas of high agricultural 
potential: the Central Highlands and the Rift Valley, later known as the 
White Highlands.7
Although many communities in the highlands were dispossessed by the 
colonial enterprise, the land claims of some groups in the Rift Valley, namely 
Maasai and Kalenjin, have resonated most in the national and international 
political arenas at specific historical moments, such as during the transition 
to independence in the 1960s and the return to multi-party politics in the 
year 1990. In order to understand the advent and regular resurgence of 
one of the major social cleavages structuring the partisan Kenyan system, 
it is important to note that until the 1940s, the colonial administration 
had encouraged the migration of populations deemed fit for agriculture, 
such as the Kikuyu of the central region, to the European farms of the Rift 
5. For a discussion and definition of the “land question” in Africa, and / or in 
East Africa, see Okoth-Ogendo (2007), Moyo (2008) ou Manji (2013).
6. This aspect of colonial history has been largely studied by historians and 
jurists: see Sorrenson (1968), Péron (1995), Okoth-Ogendo (1991) and Hughes 
(2006).
7. They are formed in the central region, namely the Kikuyu country, named 
after the farmers who populate this area, and the Rift Valley, where groups who 
engaged in pastoralism, but also agriculture, coexisted.
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Valley.8 In the independence negotiations, these migrations were disputed 
by the delegations representing the Maasai and Kalenjin herders and agro-
pastoralists who called themselves “indigenous” to the Rift Valley and 
feared that European farms would be handed over to the Kikuyu, who 
lived there as squatters.9 At the Second Constitutional Conference, held 
in London (Lancaster House) in 1962, the Maasai delegation demanded 
the return of 70% of the White Highlands (Kantai 2007, 109). The leader 
representing the Maasai, Justus ole Tipis, along with the representative 
of the Kalenjin, Daniel arap Moi (both from the same party, the Kenya 
African Democratic Union, KADU) and Donald Ngala, representative of 
some coastal communities—all three leaders from the periphery—defended 
the land rights of “indigenous” communities. They opposed the claims of 
the Kikuyu-dominated Kenya African National Union (KANU), under 
the leadership of Jomo Kenyatta, who emphasised the rights acquired by 
sedentary communities on the basis of colonial policies (TJRC 2013, 199-
206). The criteria used to redistribute lands occupied by the British became 
the bone of contention structuring power struggles between groups. The 
KANU won the first political elections of 1963. The political project of this 
organisation became then dominant and engulfed KADU, but it could not 
suppress the claims of the periphery, bound to resurge.
The independence land deal concluded in London was condensed in 
Article 75 of the 1963 Constitution protecting land rights acquired during 
the colonial period, regardless of the process of acquisition. This article 
endorsed the spoliations of the colonial period and made any land restitution 
impossible. To appease KADU leaders and representatives of minority 
groups, Kenyatta promised that the ancestral lands would not be transferred 
to other ethnic groups, but this promise was not kept. The Africanisation 
of the White Highlands followed neither the logic of restitution to the 
first occupants (land to the “natives”) nor that of redistribution (land to 
the landless). The state orchestrated both sales of the old White Highlands 
and their financial conditions10 without any restructuring of the property 
system. The prevailing historical narrative argues that there was a quasi-
8. This is especially true before the outbreak of the political and military 
emergence known as the Mau Mau revolt, as a result of which migrations, 
including Kikuyu, were strictly controlled, and Africans residing on the settlers’ 
farms “repatriated” to the reserves: (see Kanogo 1987; Berman & Lonsdale 1992).
9. Polysemic term which, according to the historical periods and the regions of 
the country, can describe different socio-economic and political relations: see 
Kanogo (1987) for an analysis of the conditions of the Kikuyu on settler farms 
in the Rift Valley. 




ethnic monopoly of land redistribution in favour of the first government’s 
ethnic group. This narrative persisted despite the regime change at the 
end of the 1970s, which reoriented the neo-patrimonial strategies of land 
redistribution.
This moment in Kenyan history is seen as crucial because it has sown 
the seeds of discord among several groups, as their land claims have been 
neglected or even simply ignored. These claims were perpetuated and 
reaffirmed, in particular, by the use of the notion of historical land injustices. 
This notion is ambivalent and subject to successive reinterpretations 
according to the stakeholders and the context.11 What is important to 
emphasise here is that the construction of the cleavage between the Kikuyu 
and Kalenjin dominated and structured the national political scene, despite 
the salience of spoliations and injustices suffered by other groups in other 
parts of the country.
It follows that upon independence, the Kenyan economic structure 
remained intact: the role of the state remained that of “creator and protector 
of the great landowners” (Holmquist, Weaver & Ford 1994, 76). Rural 
development policies continued to be tied to the myth of the productivity 
of large farmers,12 and social inequalities were fueled by neo-patrimonial 
management of resources, including land.13 The Ministry of Lands and the 
provincial administration system in particular were caught up in this system 
of selective redistribution of resources, putting themselves at the service 
of the powerful and thus impoverishing the quality of services delivered 
to the citizens.14 Land allocations, as well as the issuance of land titles, 
played a major role in such political strategies of building and maintaining 
clientelist networks that served political and electoral purposes, especially 
since the return to multi-party politics.
11. To delve more deeply into the historical-political construction of Kalenjin 
claims, see Médard (1999) and Lynch (2011). For a necessary detour into other 
regions of Kenya, see the works on the Swahili coast: Willis (1993), Cooper (1980). 
For northern Kenya, see also Schlee (1989) and Oba (1992).
12. For a discussion of the political economy choices, see Leys (1984).
13. Jean-François Médard (1992, 191) has described the phenomenon of straddling 
between the private and public spheres in Kenya, showing how individual 
enrichment is a function of access to the state. Other authors have revealed 
that the redistribution of resources by those in power is accomplished through 
regional and ethnic affiliation: Bradshaw (1990), Wrong (2010), Boone (2012). 
For a historical discussion of neo-patrimonial logic in Kenya, see the thesis of 
Jaqueline Klopp (2001).
14. See the Ndung’u Report (Republic of Kenya 2004) for a detailed description 
of so-called irregular and illegal land transactions of which land administration 
has been responsible since Kenyan early independence years.
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Indeed, coinciding with the advent of multi-party electoral competition, 
the question of land “restitution” to the Kalenjin dominated political debate 
and the rhetoric of the electoral campaigns.15 The Kalenjin claimed to be 
doubly dispossessed, both by the British and by the distributive policies of 
the Kenyatta era, a Kikuyu president who favoured his own. The Kikuyu 
became targets of deadly attacks in the Rift Valley throughout the 1990s 
and in 2007–2008, as well as elsewhere in the country.
2. Historical and Contingent Reasons  
for the Land Reform Agenda
The concept of historical land injustices is essential to understand the 
sensitivity of the land issue in Kenya. The national land policy defines 
these injustices as having arisen from the land spoliations of the colonial 
period, perpetuated by the independent governments (Republic of Kenya 
2009, 42). This concept became very relevant beginning with the post-
election violence of 2007–2008 that threw the country into civil war 
for several months. In the wake of the 2008 National Reconciliation 
Agreement, the Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission, inaugurated 
on August 3, 2009, was established as an instrument of transitional justice. 
In particular, it examined the extent to which post-election violence had 
resulted from historic land injustices.16 The Commission report published 
in 2013 explains that the formulation “historical injustices” was adopted in 
everyday language in Kenya as part of the social mobilisations demanding 
the revision of the Constitution beginning in the 1980s.17
The 1990s were a turning point in the launching of constitutional reforms 
as well as land reforms. First, the concerted mobilisation of various sections 
of Kenyan civil society18 exerted considerable pressure on President Moi’s 
15. The term “restitution” refers to the British, but because of the intertwining 
of ethnic and territorial claims, it is used in everyday language in Kenya to refer 
to land injustices perpetrated by independent governments.
16. In December 2007, following the denunciation of electoral fraud, violence 
erupted notably in Nairobi and in the Rift Valley, throwing the country into 
deadlock for several months, causing the death of 1,200 people and displacing 
500,000 (Human Rights Watch 2008). In the 1990s, this confliction associated 
with the electoral meetings had also affected the coastal and northern region, 
showing that the grievance was not localised but diffuse.
17. Through this term, the activists aimed to denounce the political and socio-
economic marginalisation of social groups and regions, whereas, more generally, 
this expression refers to the dispossessions and inequalities that result from the 
land policies implemented since colonisation: see TJRC (2013, 68).
18. In the 1980s and 1990s, this designation referred to the first human rights 
organisations, religious figures and organisations, student university unions, 
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regime, pushing him to establish the CKRC in 2000. This commission was 
tasked with reforming the constitution.19 Then, to understand the reasons 
that led the president to make political concessions, it is necessary to 
plunge into the internal mechanics weakening the regime. Indeed, because 
of an increasingly predatory mode of government—notably plundering 
public land and redistributing resources through new clientelist channels 
that excluded groups previously in power—President Moi renewed and 
narrowed the networks shaped by his predecessor, Mzee Kenyatta (Branch 
& Cheeseman 2008, 1-26).
Finally, added to the political practices spurring exclusion was the 
deterioration of the economic conditions of the 1970s, which led to 
exasperation of the regime autocratic style, while laying the foundations 
for the discontent of a section of society. Due to the slowdown in the 
economy, which resulted from, among other things, the implementation of 
structural adjustment plans, the nascent Kenyan middle class was unable 
to maintain high levels of consumption (Holmquist, Weaver & Ford 1994, 
90). Finally, an alliance between elements economically disadvantaged by 
the regime and international bodies were put in place. It can be said that the 
pro-democracy movement was well-anchored in the economic structure 
while also being the “product” of external forces (ibid., 96). In fact, it was 
through the action of the urban middle class, and not by peasant or worker 
organisations (largely absent from the mobilisations), that the demand for 
a return to a multi-party system took shape.
The advocacy movement for land reform has its roots and fed on the 
pro-democracy struggles of the 1980s and 1990s: it is their continuation, 
although metamorphosed. In the international context of the end of 
bipolarism, the wave of international programs of the 1990s, which 
funded advocacy activities, focused on human rights and pro-democracy 
lobbying and invested heavily in civil society organisations, designed by 
the aid industry as the democratising element in the face of predatory state 
devices.20 These aid flows led to an exponential increase in the number of 
non-governmental organisations (NGOs) (Kanyinga 2013).
cultural professionals (such as traveling and participatory theatre actors), as 
well as private sector professionals, including lawyers who actively participated 
in the pro-democracy struggle corporately and individually by providing pro 
bono legal services to political prisoners.
19. For narratives presenting a participant point of view on the momentum of 
these mobilisations and the struggles between the mobilised groups and state 
authorities, see Mutunga (1999), Mutua (2013) and Maingi (2011).
20. For a detailed reconstruction of this movement in Kenya, see Pommerolle 
(2005).
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In Kenya’s land sector, donors were indirectly influential in the agenda 
setting of land reform when funding the creation of the Kenya Land Alliance 
(KLA). The KLA was originally conceived as a platform for NGOs dealing 
with land issues. It was meant to introduce new narratives and directories 
of commitment to these questions in order to influence the decision-making 
process. The KLA is a model of political participation that was promoted 
by Oxfam GB,21 itself funded by British cooperation, strictly in connection 
with Kenyan personalities with highly-internationalised profiles.22 This 
strategy worked well: not only did the KLA form a federation of various 
organisations and gain leadership, but it also managed to impose itself, in 
the early 2000s, as a key interlocutor of governmental and bureaucratic 
land institutions. This symbolic capital was built during the formulation of 
the land policy, the National Land Policy (NLP).
It is in this context of multiple influences that, in the wake of reports 
produced by the commissions inquiring into the violence of the 1990s (Kiliku 
Commission, 1993, Akiwumi Commission, 1998), which pointed to land 
claims and their ethnicisation as the cause of the conflicts (Kameri-Mbote 
2008), President Moi established in November 1999 another commission of 
inquiry to examine the land laws in place and propose a restructuring of the 
legal-institutional system. The recommendations of the so-called Njonjo 
Commission (named after its chairman, the former Attorney General, 
Charles Njonjo), published in 2002, constituted a fundamental precedent 
for the start of the land reform process. This Commission documented the 
excessive (too many laws) and inefficient (lengthy and costly) nature of the 
legal framework governing land, while also highlighting the concentration 
of power within the executive branch. These land-related findings helped 
to justify, more broadly, a political-administrative decentralisation of public 
authorities in Kenya. For the first time, an official document issued from 
the circles of power argued for the need to reform laws and harmonise 
them through the development of a national land policy.
The appointment of this Commission also galvanised the transnational 
network (of which the KLA was part and parcel) of Kenyan and international 
activists, aid professionals, and consultants who had previously been 
waiting in the shadows of a regime, seemingly impenetrable to change, for 
the window of opportunity (Kingdon 1984; 2002) to convey new narratives 
21. The creation of a Land Alliance is not unique to Kenya but is part of a 
regional or sub-continental strategy. Land Alliances have been created in 
Zambia, Zimbabwe, Malawi, Tanzania and Uganda, still under Oxfam GB’s 
impetus, at the start of land reform formulation processes, to federate NGOs and 
thereby strengthen their advocacy capacity.
22. These are consultants, experts or academics recruited by international 
organisations, and / or activists operating in connection with the aid system.
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and references to the government forum to fuel the process of change. Both 
the Njonjo Report (Republic of Kenya 2002) and the first version of the 
constitutional text, a document called “The People’s Choice” (CKRC 2002), 
were partly dependent on the contributions of the Law Professor H. W. O. 
Okoth-Ogendo, building stone of the transnational network. The KLA also 
significantly contributed to the production of these two documents. Since 
its founding in 1999 and during the decade of land reform law formulation, 
it was funded to produce research and foster the development of a policy 
incorporating provisions that “international standards” recognise as pro-
poor.23
In 2002, the electoral debacle of President Moi’s heir apparent Uhuru 
Kenyatta, son of Jomo Kenyatta, sanctioned the first political alternation, 
as well as the demise of KANU, the independence party. The rise to power 
of the National Rainbow Coalition (NaRC), a coalition of opposition 
parties and KANU’s dissenters, seems to have been crucial for the start 
of constitutional reforms as a result of the relative injection into the state 
machine of personalities from civil society (Anderson 2003).
At the dawn of the electoral victory of the NaRC, a group of donors24 
initiated an intense collaboration with the Ministry of Lands to jointly 
design the methods of formulation of the NLP.25 The so-called National 
Land Policy Formulation Process (NLPFP) was fully funded by donors. They 
established a Memorandum of Understanding with the Ministry of Lands, 
held regular consultations with senior officials of the Ministry, and recruited 
consultants to manage the budget and support the conceptualisation of the 
land policy text.
23. It should be noted that the terms and contents of land reforms in so-called 
developing countries have historically been debated primarily between bilateral 
and multilateral donors (and only to a lesser extent with the governments 
concerned), who discuss the best formula for economic growth. This was true 
until the turn of the twenty-first century, when the focus was instead on poverty-
reduction strategies ideally formulated through involvement of key stakeholders 
(see, for example, Mosse & Lewis 2005). In this overall framework, the KLA, like 
other Land Alliances in Africa, is indeed an emanation of this specific historical 
moment when some development aid agencies tried to formulate alternative 
models to the dominant dogma of privatisation and the primacy of the market 
(see Toulmin & Quan 2000). 
24. The Development Partners Group on Land is made up of UK Aid, Irish Aid, 
Swedish International Development Authority, USAID and UN-Habitat.
25. The Minister of Lands at the time, Amos Kimunya, was not a politician, 
but a chartered accountant who had chaired the professional organisation of 
accountants in Kenya and had also been a consultant for British cooperation. It 
was the advent of new players in high-level positions, such as Kimunya, who had 
some familiarity with donors, which no doubt made the start of reforms possible.
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In this context, it is instructive to put the NLPFP in perspective with 
the constitutional revision process. Although both processes involved to a 
certain extent the same actors and produced the same content, the constituent 
conference was fully funded by the Kenyan government and became the 
scene of consequential political bickering, while the NLPFP was apparently 
immune to conflict. The unprecedented collaboration of NGOs with the 
Ministry of Lands produced a document partly traversed by decolonising 
motives, asking, for example, for the legal recognition of local land rights 
of rural communities (based on the conceptualisation of the legal category 
of community), and the comprehensive treatment of historical injustices, 
thus endorsing a principle of social justice which, for some stakeholders, 
remained very dangerous.26 The political stakes of the NLPFP process were 
nonetheless highly significant,27 even if they were relatively shadowed by 
the strong politicisation of the constituent conference. This is explained by 
the fact that politicians were the main absentees of the NLPFP, while they 
dominated the last phase of the constituent conference. The NLPFP was 
led by transnational actors; only a few Ministry of Land bureaucrats were 
involved. The final version of the land policy was completed in 2007, but it 
would take two years before Kenyan government institutions endorsed it.
In this context, it is important to relativise the fall of KANU and the rise 
to power of the NaRC government as catalysts of change. It is true that 
following the political alternation of 2002, the process of formulating the 
NLP started, and the process of constitutional revision, which President 
Moi had interrupted before the December  2001 general elections, was 
revived. However, the reluctance of some parts of the coalition to work for 
change was visible as early as in 2005, when internal disruptions stalled the 
reform process. The NaRC was, in effect, composed of two political forces28 
that joined hands by political expediency (to get rid of Moi), though de 
facto remained divided. Their honeymoon was very short, and discord in 
the constitutional referendum of 200529 was visible. The intra-government 
26. See the report of USAID on the analysis of the NLP (USAID 2009 [2008]).
27. One need only refer to USAID’s lobbying activity that tries to convince DfID 
to stop supporting KLA.
28. On one side, the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) of Mwai Kibaki, former 
executive of KANU, who in 2002 became president; on the other side, the 
National Alliance Party of Kenya (NAK) of Raila Odinga, opposition leader, 
who had allied with KANU’s dissident fringe because of the promise of creation, 
through the constitutional revision, of a prime minister position. A two-headed 
government was therefore formed, allowing the coalition to self-perpetuate.
29. Mr. Kibaki broke his promise at the Constitutional Conference by leaning 
towards a strong presidentialist. The constitutional draft was changed by the 
Attorney General, Amos Wako, just before being submitted to the popular vote 
(hence the name of this version of the constitutional text, the Wako draft).
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feud froze the reform process until 2007, during the presidential elections 
in December, which plunged the country into interethnic clashes in 
Nairobi, in the Rift Valley, and other places throughout the country. The 
peace agreement materialised from a power-sharing agreement between 
the two parties, who committed to the fulfillment of constitutional reforms 
(including land reform) in order to restore peace in the country. The 
NLP was adopted in December 2009 by Kenyan Cabinet and Parliament; 
in the same context of the end of the crisis, the new Constitutional was 
promulgated in August 2010 via referendum.
Both interviews and observations as well as the re-reading of 
historical events from 2000 to 2010 show that the entire process of land 
reform elaboration (six years for the NLP, and approximately ten for the 
Constitution) suffered the ups and downs of partisan ruptures and re-
compositions of the Kenyan political system. Indeed, if the reform agenda 
had fed on the political violence of the 1990s (Njonjo Commission appointed 
in the wake of commission reports investigating the causes of conflict in the 
1990s), it was the brutal resurgence of conflict arising from local arenas at 
the centre of the national scene in 2007 (Boone 2014) that made it possible to 
unblock the political impasse crystallised by the 2005 referendum rejecting 
the Constitution. It seems that the transitional government created in 2008 
had no other choice but to endorse the constitutional text in order to fulfil 
its commitments to restore peace in the country.
The reform of land governance was, in this sense, imposed (by 
concomitant internal and external forces) upon a political class that was at 
reluctant to reform the land administration because of the historical system 
of territorial control and centralised authority over land rights in place since 
colonisation. The initial relative enthusiasm of the incoming government 
(especially between 2003–2005) may have reflected an initial desire both 
to stand out from the past and probably also to recast political alliances 
through, among other things, the restructuring of land governance. Yet, 
the overhaul of land governance systems would prove too expensive (in 
political terms), especially for the bureaucratic establishment. The analysis 
of negotiation of norms during the formulation of land laws, meant to enact 
constitutional principles, corroborates this assumption, as illustrated here 
below.
3. Inter-Institutional Impasse or Necessary 
Adjustments?
As we have seen, the report issuing from the Njonjo Commission served 
as a reference for the development of the National Land Policy. The 
content of the land chapter of the Constitution is also inspired by the 
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recommendations of this report. The commission of inquiry indicated that 
the concentration of decision-making power in the hands of the President 
and Commissioner of Lands (appointed by the President), particularly with 
regard to land allocations, was among the most blameworthy elements of 
the system of land governance. Several pages of the Njonjo Report describe 
this system of land administration as vulnerable to political interference. 
Another commission of inquiry—the Ndung’u Commission, named after its 
chairman, Paul Ndung’u30—appointed by the NaRC government in 2002 and 
charged with investigating fraudulent land allocations, also unveiled the 
many methods of abuse of an excessively concentrated and personal power.
Indeed, by virtue of the land laws previously in force (like the 
Government Lands Act), the President had the right to dispose of public 
lands (then classified as government lands) and to delegate this power 
to the Commissioner of Lands. Both ignored the “public interest” clause 
that was to govern such measures: they allocated public land to clients of 
the regime. This phenomenon is commonly referred to as land grabbing 
in Kenya. The omnipotence of the President and his Commissioner was 
illustrated in the jargon of the sector by the expression “green pen.” In 1997, 
during a parliamentary debate on the revision of the Constitution, the (then 
opposition) MP Prof. Anyang’ Nyong’o,31 declared:
Mr. Speaker, Sir, we must, in the new Constitution, ensure that we are no more 
enslaved by this presidential authoritarian system. From the moment the new 
Constitution comes into being, no President in the Republic of Kenya should 
be a demi-god. No President should have the power of taking a green pen 
and signing a piece of paper and bequeathing to an individual thousands and 
thousands of acres of lands of Kenyans. (National Assembly, Official Report. 
The CKRC Bill, the 14th of October, 1997.)
On the basis of these findings, the recommendations of the two 
commissions converged on the establishment of a new institutional 
framework that would bring efficiency, transparency, and accountability to 
the land administration system, thus converging towards the establishment 
of an independent commission, the National Land Commission (NLC), 
30. It is instructive to note that the KLA Director was also appointed a member 
of the Ndung’u Commission, which confirms the success of his organisation in 
integrating institutional forums for debate and the development of public policy 
solutions and tools.
31. This politician was, by the time of writing this paper, Governor of the 
Kisumu County, at the time of the quoted speech, a member of Ford-Kenya, the 
progressive wing of the NaRC, among the members of the coalition from the 
ranks of civil society; he was indeed a professor at the University of Nairobi then 
head of programs at the African Academy of Sciences in Nairobi.
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responsible for the management of the public and community land domain.32 
This mandate would be included in the articles of the NLP, from 232 to 238 
(Republic of Kenya 2009), thus envisaging the creation of a constitutional 
body, independent from the Ministry of Lands, accountable to Parliament 
and composed of eight commissioners33 with strong powers. The NLC was 
supposed to administer all public lands, establish a register of all land areas, 
exercise the compulsory acquisition of property, and establish and manage 
the National Land Trust Fund, a fund that was to finance the implementation 
of several reform processes, such as the resolution of historical injustices.34
Through these recommendations, the historic mandate of the Ministry 
of Lands was drastically reduced and even stripped of strategic functions, 
such as those related to land registration. However, the profound 
restructuring of the mandates and institutional powers proposed by the 
NLP had less legislative than programming value. The whole challenge of 
the work of the activists and members of the advocacy coalitions was to 
ensure that the contents of the NLP be included in the final version of the 
constitutional chapter on land in order to ensure its future implementation. 
In August 2010, following the meeting of the Parliamentary Committee on 
Land and Natural Resources in Naivasha to revise the constitutional text 
in order to resubmit it to the referendum vote, certain crucial functions 
attributed to the NLC were excluded from its jurisdiction. This included the 
clause giving the Commission the right to manage community and private 
lands35 as well as the clause giving it the power to co-execute (with the 
Ministry of Lands) the land registration program. In this respect, the final 
32. Regarding (unregistered) community lands, the Njonjo Report agreed on the 
relevance of securing this land area through the legal recognition of customary 
land practices. The report also pointed to the abuses of the trusteeship model, 
a system whereby community lands were held in trust by local authorities, 
the County Councils, which eventually allocated these lands by confiscating 
them or giving them as concessions to private investors, while robbing the 
communities. Lastly, it recommended that the registration of community lands 
be under the jurisdiction of the decentralised bodies of the NLC.
33. The commissioners are recruited by competition, and their appointments 
are sanctioned by Parliament to ensure that recruitment reflects the imperatives 
of representation, experience and integrity: Republic of Kenya (2009); art. 232.
34. Similarly for the decentralised entities of the NLC, the County Land 
Management Boards, whose members were to be accountable to county 
parliaments. They were assigned crucial functions by the NLP in land 
administration, such as land use planning, land registration, record keeping of 
land transactions, and the issuance of titles: ibid., art. 241-246.
35. “Art. 84(2)(c) to advise the national Government and devolved governments 
on a policy framework for the development of selected areas of Kenya, to ensure 
that the development of community and private land is in accordance with the 
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version of the constitutional chapter conferred on the NLC only a meagre 
role of advisor.36
These last-minute revisions made little contribution to an unequivocal 
reading of the respective mandates of land institutions. They were 
mainly used to trigger endless disputes over the “real” perimeter of the 
NLC’s mandate, and by extension the Ministry’s, and the formulation and 
enactment of laws defining in detail the functions of the Commission. The 
NLC Act was enacted in 2012 in conjunction with two other land laws 
(the Land Act and the Land Registration Act). Although the process of 
formulating these laws has been described by academic Ambreena Manji 
(2013) and other stakeholders (including NGOs) as yet another attempt 
by the political establishment to obstruct the reform process, these laws 
broadened the NLC’s mandate by restoring to it some of the functions of 
which it had been relieved by the politicians at the Naivasha meeting.37 
Some confusion nevertheless resulted from the non-repeal of laws dating 
from the old regime (pre-Constitution 2010) in contradiction with the new 
legislative provisions.38 This laid the foundation for an inter-institutional 
conflict fought with obstructionism, polemical statements in the press, and 
above all litigation to tip the scales of interpretation of norms.
Controversies related to these land laws began as soon as they were 
formulated. The work of the Ministry’s consultant to draft the laws (a 
Kenyan, head of a notorious law firm in Nairobi) was harshly criticised 
by KLA and its members, who accused the consultant of writing the laws 
by “copying and pasting” Tanzanian land legislation. In addition, land 
laws were introduced into Parliament very late, two weeks before the 
constitutional deadline. The KLA and the surveyors’ body, Institution of 
Surveyors of Kenya, then protested against the lack of public consultation 
during the formulation of these laws. These organisations then requested 
development plan for the area.” Committee of Experts on Constitutional Review. 
2009. Harmonised Draft Constitution, Published on 17th November: 48.
36. “Art. 83(e) to advise the Government on, and assist in the execution of a 
comprehensive programme for the registration of title in land throughout Kenya 
(Committee of Experts on Constitutional Review 2009). We have highlighted the 
deleted words in the final version of the Constitution.”
37. Namely: “Art. 5(2)(b) monitor the registration of all rights and interests in 
land; (e) manage and administer all unregistered trust land and unregistered 
community land on behalf of the county government” (Law of Kenya, National 
Land Commission Act, No. 5 of 2012). Moreover, management of land registries 
was conferred upon it by Articles 6 and 7 of the Land Registration Act (Law of 
Kenya, Land Registration Act, No. 3 of 2012).
38. For example, the Adjudication Land Act, according to which the Ministry of 




and obtained a sixty-day deadline extension. Thus, debates about land laws 
continued within and beyond Parliament, but it seems, without inscribing 
in the body of laws a legal distinction between the roles and functions of 
land governance institutions. Indeed, in May 2012, after enactment of the 
laws, the President of the NLC, university professor Mohamed Swazuri, 
appointed a taskforce to identify provisions that were contradictory or 
inconsistent with other laws in order to propose amendments.39 Thus, 
barely enacted, the land laws were already in the process of being amended.
It was only in 2015, two years after the establishment of this taskforce, 
which was supposed to report on its work within three months, that the 
Land (Amendment) Act was published by the Ministry of Lands and not 
by the NLC. It is important to note that the 2013 presidential elections saw 
the rise of Uhuru Kenyatta, who was elected president of Kenya at the 
head of a coalition government (Jubilee Coalition) with William K. Ruto, 
leading to a fundamental transformation of the partisan opposition game.40 
Unlike in the days of the NaRC, the Jubilee government adopted a decidedly 
conservative approach to land management, returning to the promotion 
of individualised land titles as an instrument of “unblocking” economic 
capital.41 The Jubilee administration made the title deed into an ideological 
foundation, which went hand in hand with business and private enterprise 
incentives, typical of its neoliberal approach. It is clear that the political 
environment was no longer conducive to the discussion of NLP’s principles 
of social justice, especially considering that NLP’s decolonising intentions 
may have been detrimental to the private interests of the Kenyatta family, 
who were beneficiaries of the Mzee-era allocations.
From 2013 to 2016, during the elaboration of amendments to the land laws, 
relations between the land institutions of the old and new regime further 
deteriorated. Ellen Bassett (2017) described the successive developments of 
the tension of these relations. It would seem that as soon as the NLC’s eight 
members were appointed in 2013, the government was reluctant to support 
the new institution.42 Not only did the High Court require the President to 
39. Gazette Notice No.7503. 2012. The National Land Commission Act (No. 5 
Of 2012) Taskforce to Develop Rules and Regulations under the National Land 
Commission Act, Dated the 28th May, 2013.
40. The Kalenjin and the Kikuyu became national allies, benefitting from a 
demographic majority due to ethno-regional alliances that were apparently 
decisive during elections in Kenya.
41. It is instructive to observe that in 2014–15 and again in 2015–16, the Treasury 
allocated 2.2 billion and 2.9 billion KES, respectively, to the Ministry of Lands 
for the issuance of 1 million land titles (HakiJamii 2015). See also Doyle (2016).
42. The government was also in favour of maintaining centralised administrative 
power within the Ministry, particularly during the enactment of Executive Order 
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publish the names of commissioners in the Official Journal (prompted by a 
complaint filed by a KLA member), but the first budget allocation to the NLC 
from the Ministry of Lands was well below expectations (241 million KES, 
compared to 2 billion envisaged by the NLP).43
A few months before the establishment of the NLC, differences over 
the interpretation of the respective powers became public. The minister 
and the chairman of the NLC both claimed power to register land, issue 
land titles, and manage the resettlement processes of evicted persons. More 
specifically, the debate focused on the signing of land titles, symbolising 
authority in the land sector.44
4. Pro-NLC Mobilisation,  
but Failure on the Historical Land Injustices Test
In response to this institutional and political impasse, NGOs, including 
KLA, aligned with the NLC, creating an opposition front against the 
Ministry, and thereby the government. The Commission thus renounced 
its non-political character when it was defended by NGOs and by some 
representatives of the Council of Governors who joined the anti-old-guard 
front because of the reluctance of the central government to decentralise 
powers, as envisaged by the new Constitution.45 This is particularly true 
in the case of the KLA fundraising campaign from a number of donors 
(including USAID, but also the Ford Foundation and Swedish cooperation) 
for the benefit of the NLC.
NGOs were also very active in supporting the NLC requesting an 
advisory opinion from the Supreme Court in April 2014 (Reference No. 2 
of 2014) on certain aspects of its mandate: two civil society organisations, 
Katiba Institute and Haki Jamii, who specialise in legal advice, declared 
themselves amicus curiae in favour of the NLC. The verdict, issued on 
December  2, 2015, clarified the roles of the two institutions, and on the 
thorny issue of the issuance of titles, the Court stated that, although 
N.2/2013, when the Kenyan executive gave the Ministry a mandate that rendered 
the existence of the NLC meaningless.
43. Indeed, the budget allocation to the NLC was the prerogative of the Ministry, 
but only until 2015-2016, when Haki Jamii, a member of the KLA, registered a 
29% increase over the previous year (with allocations of 896 million KES and 
1.153  billion  KES, respectively), which remained undersized but increasing 
(HakiJamii 2015).
44. Mutambo, Aggrey. 2014. “Confusion Mars Land Ownership Transfers.” 
Sunday Nation, 2 February. https://nation.africa/kenya/news/confusion-mars-
land-ownership-transfers-944944 [archive].
45. For more details on governors’ positions, see also Bassett (2014).
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the involvement of the NLC in the preliminary stages of land allocation 
was not under discussion, the signing and issuing of titles remained the 
mandate of the Ministry.46 The NLC and the Ministry then jointly set up 
an inter-ministerial commission so that its members could interpret and 
operationalise the verdict of the Court. It was therefore an interpretation 
of interpretation, or as the chairman of the NLC sarcastically defined it, the 
opinion of a “Superior Supreme Court”47—a formulation that denounced the 
legalistic approach of senior Minister of Lands’ officials seeking to dilute 
the role of the Commission.
If the civil society was convinced that the NLC was going to spearhead 
change, the positioning of some of these NGOs was recalibrated as of 2015 
because the NLC failed the test of historical land injustices (HLI). Due to 
its constitutional mandate to begin investigations into injustices, the NLC 
formally announced on May 20, 2014, the formation of a taskforce to conduct 
hearings and public consultations to define the scope of injustices and to 
propose a law systematically dealing with land grievances. Expectations 
were high: this working group had awakened the hopes of Kenyans.48 
Nevertheless, nine months later, when the HLI bill was presented to the 
public, it was rejected by NGOs, including the KLA.49 The taskforce was 
disappointing, first, because of its composition: two members had been 
singled out, accused of being “beneficiaries of injustices.”50 In addition, 
the public hearing seemed to have been conducted in a rushed manner, 
sometimes reduced to a brief visit to the counties, where participants 
sometimes lamented that they had not received any preparation regarding 
the questionnaires distributed during the hearings,51 on which the bill 
should have been based. The drafting of the bill was eventually entrusted 
46. Musa, Kurian. 2015. “Supreme Court: The National Land Commission Has 
no Mandate to Issue Land Title Deeds.” The Standard, 2 December. https://www.
standardmedia.co.ke/nairobi/article/2000184276/supreme-court-national-land-
commission-has-no-mandate-to-issue-land-title-deeds [archive].
47. Interview with Mohamed Swazuri conducted on April 4, 2016.
48. Burrows, Olive. 2014. “Historical Land Injustices to Be Resolved ‘Once and 
for All.’” Capital News, 1 September. https://www.capitalfm.co.ke/news/2014/09/
historical-land-injustices-to-be-resolved-once-and-for-all/ [archive].
49. “Draft Bill Proposes Tribunal to Address Historical Injustices.” 2015. Daily 




51. “Taskforce on Historical Land Injustices in Marsabit.” 2014. Marsabit Times, 
16 October. https://marsabitimes.com/task-force-on-historical-land-injustice-in-
marsabit/ [archive].
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to a consultant who did so without taking into account the public hearings 
report, only compiled a posteriori because of the criticism. Moreover, the 
bill merely established an ad hoc tribunal expected to tackle the cases of 
historical injustices. This amounted to relieving the NLC of its constitutional 
mandate by delegating it to another entity whose establishment would 
have called into question the relevance of the NLC.
Because of all these criticisms, the bill was shelved. To fulfil the 
constitutional mandate of the NLC, a shortcut was to be found: as part 
of the amendments to the 2016 land laws, the NLC was conferred the 
power to investigate and deal directly, on a case-by-case basis, with the 
complaints and historical grievances, without however a comprehensive 
legal framework to which refer to. All the amendments to the 2012 land 
laws were enacted on August  4, 2016. Ultimately, the NLC found itself 
deprived of its decentralised bodies, while the most strategic functions were 
attributed to the Ministry, such as the management of all land transactions 
as well as the registration of so-called community lands.52
Conclusion
The reform of the land system would not have been put on the Kenyan 
agenda in the early 2000s if different dynamics, both domestic and 
international, had not converged fortuitously at the very moment when 
policy entrepreneurs (Kingdon 1984), operating within the framework of 
transnational networks, were able to seize the “window of opportunity” 
that was offered to them. The analysis of these accidentally-convergent 
dynamics helps to unlock the black box of decision-making to comprehend 
institutional change as itinerant, contradictory, and decidedly hybrid.
The case of the Kenyan land reform highlights the fact that the “window 
of opportunity” is contingent and does not last long, as shown by the political 
vicissitudes in 2005 and 2007, as well as the successive changes made to the 
texts of the land reform. Secondly, the political economy of the decision-
making process revealed the multi-scale power dynamics in which the 
decision-making machine is embedded, in Kenya as elsewhere. The legal-
institutional processes of policy-making have been put into perspective 
with political contingencies to show their intertwining: partisan power 
struggles, the weight of personalities, and individual interests participated 
in the negotiation of norms and of the political-legal status of the actors of 
the reform process.
52. For an empirical discussion of the reform of land tenure categories, namely 
the attempts to instigate a paradigm shift, moving from the land trust model 
introduced at the time of colonisation to the recognition of a “community” legal 
personality, see Di Matteo (2017).
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Policy and politics are very closely linked, as the process of developing 
land reform in Kenya has been the source of intense political activity 
resulting in alliances, ruptures, and many re-compositions. This case study 
challenges a conceptualisation of the decision-making process as eminently 
technocratic, depoliticised or extroverted, especially in an African country 
under aid-regime. The stalling of contemporary land reform in Kenya 
must be understood in a historical perspective so to account for the multi-
dimensional politicisation processes of issues, procedures, and actors 
themselves. The in-depth analysis of the multiple processes and power 
struggles leads to relativise the concept of “resistance” and to consider the 
complexity of the “land question” from its historicity and its entrenchment 
in the power dynamics structuring the Kenyan state and polity. If, on the 
one hand, it appears that political and land institutions are strongly defined 
by habitus and neo-patrimonial practices, we can see, on the other hand, 
that the institutionalisation of change and democratic practices is not a 
clearly linear process, which is reflected in particular in the reluctance 
of some NLC commissioners to confront the spectres of corruption and 
historic land grievances.
This chapter has benefited from the advice of many researchers whom I would 
like to acknowledge: Claire Médard, who reviewed and commented on several 
versions of this article, as well as Philippe Lavigne Delville, Catherine Boone 
and the editors of this book, notably Marie-Emmanuelle Pommerolle and 
Marie-Aude Fouéré, who offered valuable advice. Omissions and inaccuracies 
are my responsibility.
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Introduction
In the eyes of the world, and especially in the West, Kenya is largely associated 
with its vast savannah landscape and its exceptional, but endangered fauna. 
The country also regularly attracts the attention of the international media 
because of extreme weather events, such as the particularly long and intense 
drought of 2017. In a country already exposed to significant water stress,1 
the effects of global warming raise concerns about the potential enhanced 
frequency and intensity of such events. On the regional and international 
stage, Kenya occupies a special place in the field of environment protection. 
Its capital city, Nairobi, is the seat of several regional and international 
organisations, which are highly influential in the field, such as the United 
Nations Environment Program (UNEP), established there in 1972.
From the twentieth century, the protection of natural resources in Kenya 
has been predominantly characterised by the creation of protected areas 
subjected to more or less strict protection measures, depending on their 
status. Today, these protected areas cover 12.7% of the total area of the 
country.2 However, the presence of economic activities and infrastructures 
1. As per the Falkenmark indicator (1989), a country is considered to be 
experiencing “water stress” when the amount of available water is less than 1,000 
cubic metres per person per year. In 2009, the available water per person per year 
in Kenya was estimated at 647 cubic metres (RoK, WRMA, 2009). However, this 
number is constantly evolving, depending on demographic changes, as well as 
the changes of known available water and water reserves. The discovery of two 
giant aquifers in the county of Turkana in 2013 largely modified the estimation 
of the global volume of water resources that may potentially be mobilised on the 
national territory.
2. Kenya has 348 protected areas, covering a surface of 75 237 km² (KWTA 2016, 
11). Around 8% of the country’s surface area is covered by reserves and national 
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in the vicinity of, or even sometimes inside national parks,3 regularly 
sparks tensions between, on one side, the proponents of strict conservation 
measures and, on the other, those who support a more flexible approach of 
natural resources use to enable the economic development of the country.
In a chapter of the last edition of Contemporary Kenya (1998), entitled 
“Conservation of natural resources. From exclusion to community 
involvement,” Jean-Luc Ville presented the evolution of the methods used 
for the protection of natural resources and pointed to the beginnings of 
participation of the local populations. In the 1990s indeed, several initiatives 
supported by the Kenya Wildlife Service (KWS) emerged in order to allow 
communities living nearby national parks to participate in the development 
of eco-tourism (Nelson & Agrawal 2008).
The new mantra for “integrated management” of natural resources 
promoted for several decades on the international scene, which notably 
encourages involvement of the resource users, has found some favourable 
echo in Kenya like in many other countries worldwide. The prevailing 
“integration paradigm” on the international scale along decision-makers 
and actors of the environment sphere (especially after the publication 
of the World Conservation Strategy in 1982 by IUCN, UNEP and WWF) 
corresponds to a “broadening of the objectives for environmental protection 
towards considerations that are not ecological but more broadly social” 
(Depraz 2008, 1094). The management models that draw inspiration from this 
vision encourage participation of local population in conservation projects 
and favour the delegation of some central government prerogatives to local 
stakeholders so that decision-making is performed through a bottom-up 
approach (Rodary & Castellanet 2003). This different approach does not 
only concern large environmental organisations, but also inspires changes 
in the national legislative frameworks of countries—Kenya being one of 
them.
On the national level, the issue of encouraging stronger involvement of 
populations in natural resources management was also subject to increasing 
politicisation in the 1990s as state monopolistic control was being challenged 
by Kenyan “civil society.” This context also served as a background to 
the reforms implemented in the 2000s, which were characterised by the 
willingness to delegate to lower governing levels some prerogatives of the 
central government with regards to natural resources management.
parks run by the Kenya Wildlife Service.
3. We can point out as an example the Olkaria geothermal station inside the 
Hell’s Gate park in Naivasha, or the new Standard Gauge Railway (SGR) fast rail 
line, linking Mombasa to Nairobi and passing through Nairobi’s National Park.
4. Translations from French are made by the author.
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In order to explore the new orientations in environmental policies in 
Kenya from the beginning of the 2000s, this chapter will look into the cases 
of forest and water resources in particular. These are regularly portrayed 
as endangered resources due to various pressures linked to demographic 
growth and hunger for land, as well as to inadequate governance. It will 
mainly rely on a literature review relating to these questions, as well as on 
empirical data, which were primarily collected in the region of Naivasha5 
and to which reference will occasionally be made. Some information is also 
drawn from interviews with members of associations and staff members of 
public institutions. After presenting the evolution of the water and forest 
resources protection issue, which is strongly linked to political issues, we 
will question the effects of the reforms in the management policies of these 
natural resources, and in particular the introduction of water and forest 
users’ associations.
1. New Political and Ecological Concerns  
in the Protection of Kenya’s Forests
The forest areas classified as “reserves” are primarily located in the Kenyan 
highlands, at the heart of the “agriculturally useful Kenya” (Raison 1994), 
i.e. the area located “between 1,500 and 2,500 metres of altitude [which 
forms] an ecologically optimal setting for human settlement” (Calas 1998, 
17, translated by the author). The forest reserves are therefore in direct 
proximity to the more densely populated areas of the country since they 
are among the most watered and fertile areas. These forests, primarily 
composed of endemic tree species, are qualified as indigenous forests6 
(Wass 1995). The usage of resources there is limited to dead wood collection 
and livestock grazing. Cutting down trees and cultivation are completely 
prohibited. The management of these areas has become a major ecological 
and political challenge for Kenya over the last decade, especially after the 
implementation of the “rehabilitation” programmes for highland forests, 
often referred to as “water towers.” These programmes are part of the 
national effort to increase tree cover nationwide.
Putting into Question the Control of the Central Government  
over the Forests
After the colonial era, many forest reserves were degazetted in order 
to authorise the settlement of private individuals or public institutions 
5. 10 months of fieldwork between March 2014 and December 2016.
6. Defined by the authorities as “a forest which has come about by natural 
regeneration of trees primarily native to Kenya, and includes mangrove and 
bamboo forests” (RoK 2005).
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(schools, hospitals, etc.). Degazettement was done by central governments 
that took office successively (Boone 2012), but was particularly prevalent 
under Daniel arap Moi’s mandate (1978–2002). The publication of the 
Report of the Commission of the Inquiry into the Illegal/Irregular Allocation 
of Public Land, better known under the name of “The Ndung’u Report” 
(in reference to the name of its lead author) in 2004, allowed for the 
magnitude of this phenomena and the direct implication of the ruling class 
and the central administration to be uncovered (Southall 2005). While the 
national parks were spared, the forest reserves were subjected to high 
levels of misappropriation. The report also revealed that the classified 
forest areas covered only 1.7% of the national territory at the time of 
the study, compared to 3% in the aftermath of independence. The illegal 
allocation of forest reserves was especially intense during the 1990s, under 
Moi, when a period of political liberalisation was beginning (Klopp 2012). 
The interventionist and predatory attitude of the central government in 
matters relating to natural resources management is considered to have 
led to the uncontrolled and unreasonable exploitation of the public forest 
areas (Constantin 2000; Kariuki 2006; 2007). The denunciation of these 
irregularities by civil society movements and some influential public 
figures (such as Wangari Maathai), became a major reason for political 
mobilisation during the 1990s. Greater transparency was being claimed in 
the management of these forests, which were increasingly considered as 
an integral part of the national natural heritage.
A New Environmental Challenge:  
The “Rehabilitation” of Kenya’s Water Towers
Since the end of the 1990s, the degradation of forest areas has been 
highlighted in several reports. Rehabilitating7 them has been part of the 
main national projects adopted in the field of environment protection for 
several years now.8 The measures taken to evict people settled in these 
forests gave this environmental issue a strong political dimension.
For over a decade, the main mountain forests in Kenya have commonly 
been qualified as “water towers” and presented by the authorities as “the 
fountains of life and lungs of the country” (KWTA 2015, 1). Eighteen forests 
were gazetted in 2012 and now bear this status (map 1). It is expected 
7. This terminology seems to indicate that the protection activities undertaken 
in these areas reference a previous state (Rouillé-Kielo 2020). However, neither 
the documents on the subject, nor the responses obtained during the interviews 
specify any specific timeframe of reference.
8. For example, the Kenyatta government declassified around 6,100 hectares of 
forest reserves in the Aberdare Mountains in 1970 by (UNEP, KWS, Rhino Ark 
& KFWG 2003). 
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that the same will be done for seventy others in the near future. Mount 
Kenya, the Aberdare Range, the Mau forest Complex, Mount Elgon and 
the Cherangani Hills are considered to be the five main water towers of 
the country. These “Water Mountains” [montagnes d’eau] (Bart 2006) are 
 
Map 1. The main Kenya’s water towers
Source: UNEP (2005; 2009); KWTA (2015). Author: Gaële Rouillé-Kielo.
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presented by the authorities and by UNEP as providing considerable support 
to the economy for water supply in the agricultural, industry and energy 
sectors (70% of which is of hydraulic origin). The economic losses related 
to their deforestation are estimated to be around 6 billion KES per year, i.e. 
over 50 million EUR (UNEP 2012). Moreover, these forests are described 
as reserves for biodiversity. For several years now, with the development 
of the policies for combatting global warming, they are also described as 
“carbon sinks” because they absorb and sequester CO2 (UNEP 2009).
Works led by UNEP then in association with other stakeholders such as 
the Kenya Forest Working Group (KFWG) have relied on the diachronic 
analysis of aerial or satellite images for analysing the evolution of the forest 
cover and measuring the type and scope of the human activities that have 
posed a threat since the end of the 1990s9 (UNEP 1999; UNEP KWS, Rhino 
Ark & KFWG 2003; KFWG 2004; 2006). Despite the (acknowledged) lack of 
precision of some of the data gathered, the authors of the most recent report 
concluded that the Mau forest Complex (considered to be the largest water 
tower in the country in terms of surface area and because of the number of 
rivers originating from it) was far from being the most endangered forested 
area nationwide; they consequently urge the authorities to take immediate 
action (KFWG 2006). In 2008, the office of the Acting Prime Minister 
(Raila Odinga) appointed a working group comprised of several national 
institutions (the KFS, the KWS, the Water Resource Management Authority 
and the relevant ministerial offices) to address the question. Their report, 
published the next year, reveals that 107,000 hectares were cleared in fifteen 
years, which represents 25% of the total surface area of the forest complex. 
The “rehabilitation” of the Mau Forest entailed the eviction of the people 
living in the forest blocks, a measure for which accusations were made 
that it primarily targeted groups already marginalised (in particular, the 
Ogiek people). The “Mau question” represents a fundamental step in the 
agenda setting of the protection of water towers—made a a national issue—
as well as of the protection of water towers. The decision of evicting forest 
residents seems to prefigure the modus operandi endorsed in other areas.
In April 2012, the creation of a new institution, the Kenya Water Towers 
Agency (KWTA), in order to supervise the conservation measures taken 
for preserving these areas reflects the importance attached to the issue 
of “rehabilitating” Kenyan water towers. One of its official objectives is 
for Kenya to no longer be considered as a country suffering from water 
stress, despite its strong demographic growth.10 Following the failure of the 
9. Such as coal production, marijuana growing, and exploitation of timber.
10. By counting on the increase of the forest cover over the water towers and its 
beneficial effects on the rainfall and water flow regulation. See Bernard Calas’ 
chapter in this book for more information on demographic trends in Kenya.
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project to merge different parastatal agencies responsible for environmental 
management in Kenya (presented in image 1),11 the delimitation of KWTA’s 
areas of jurisdiction and prerogatives may compete with the mandates of 
the Kenya Forest Service (KFS) and the Kenya Wildlife Service (KWS). In 
fact, these two agencies are among the oldest and the most powerful in the 
country and may not be so keen on sharing the management of the areas 
for which they have traditionally been in charge.
 
Image 1. Parastatal agencies involved in environmental management  
and their respective responsible ministries in Kenya
Source: Websites of Kenyan ministries and parastatal agencies.  
Author: Gaële Rouillé-Kielo.
The measures supported by the public authorities for the protection of 
water towers in Kenya have led to greater restrictions on the use of these 
areas. In this sense, two main types of actions have been carried out. The 
first, highly controversial, has been based on operations to evict populations 
living in certain forest reserves. These operations have mainly taken place 
in the Mau forest complex and in the Cherangani Hills over the past few 
years12 and until very recently, and have involved several tens of thousands 
11. The Kenya Forestry and Wildlife Service is supposed to bring together 
the KWS, KFS, KWTA and the Nyayo Tea Zone. Donors, in particular those 
supporting the KWS, were strongly opposed to the reform, the goal of which was 
to create budgetary savings. See in particular Ndii, David. 2015. “Why Uhuru’s 
Parastatal Reform Was Doomed to Fail.” Daily Nation, 8 May. https://nation.
africa/kenya/blogs-opinion/opinion/why-uhuru-s-parastatal-reform-was-
doomed-to-fail-1092180 [archive]; Kemei, Kipchumba. 2014. “KWS-KFS Merger 
Opposed, Says CS.” The Standard, 5 April. https://www.standardmedia.co.ke/
kenya/article/2000108630/kws-kfs-merger-opposed-says-cs [archive]).
12. Vidal, John. 2014. “Kenyan Families Flee Embobut Forest to Avoid Forced 
Evictions by Police.” The Guardian, 7  January. https://www.theguardian.com/
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of people.13 On several occasions, international human rights NGOs 
denounced the operations carried out in the Mau and the Embobut forest 
in the Cherangani Hills (Amnesty International 2018). After the death of a 
high-profile Sengwer leader14 the European Union, which had endowed the 
Cherangani Hills rehabilitation programme with 31 million EUR, decided 
to suspend its aid in April 2018.15
The erection of electric fences around forest reserves is another type of 
measure developed in recent years for the protection of water towers. After 
the construction of a 400-kilometre fence around the Aberdare Mountains, 
which took place from the late 1980s to 2009, the Rhino Ark organisation 
was entrusted with the construction of the fence around the Eburru Forest, 
which is part of the Mau Forest Complex (2012-2014), and the Mount Kenya 
Forest Reserves (since 2012). This non-governmental organisation, which 
for a long time focused on the protection of black rhinos and on a single 
global-development/2014/jan/07/kenya-embobut-forest-forced-evictions-police 
[archive]; Kitelo, Peter. 2016. “Does Burning Homes Save the Water Towers? 
Quite the Opposite.” The Star, 12  July. Published in Katiba Institute: http://
katibainstitute.org/does-burning-homes-save-the-water-towers-quite-the-
opposite/ [archive].
13. In autumn 2019, the authorities announced plans to evict around 60,000 
people from land within the forest reserve north of Narok (Sayagie, George. 
2019. “60,000 Families Targeted in Second Mau Forest Eviction.” Daily Nation, 
2  September. https://nation.africa/kenya/counties/narok/60-000-families-
targeted-in-second-mau-forest-eviction-199852 [archive]). According to Human 
Rights Watch, 50,000 people have been driven out of the Mau Forest since 2018, 
and nine people have been killed during the operations (“Kenya: Mau Forest 
Evictees’ Plight Intensifies.” 2020. Human Rights Watch, 23 July. https://www.hrw.
org/news/2020/07/23/kenya-mau-forest-evictees-plight-intensifies [archive]). See 
also the following press articles: Mwale, Anne. 2019. “Looming Mau Phase Two 
Evictions Elicit Mixed Reactions.” Kenya News Agency, 6 September. https://www.
kenyanews.go.ke/looming-mau-phase-two-evictions-elicit-mixed-reactions/ 
[archive]; “Mau Evictions Should Be Done Humanely.” 2019. The Standard, 
7  October. https://www.standardmedia.co.ke/editorial/article/2001344617/mau-
evictions-should-be-done-humanely [archive].
14. Robert Kirotich, considered to be one of the last representatives of a hunter-
gatherer community, the Sengwer, was reportedly killed during an eviction 
order by agents of the Kenya Forest Service (Watts, Jonathan. 2018. “Kenya 
Forest Death: Activities Blame EU for Ignoring Human Rights Warnings.” The 
Guardian, 19  January. https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2018/jan/19/
kenya-forest-death-activists-blame-eu-for-ignoring-human-rights-warnings 
[archive]).
15. See on the European Parliament’s website the text referring to the question 
E-000557/2018 dated 19 April 2018 (https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/
document/E-8-2018-000557_EN.html [archive]).
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geographical area—the Aberdares16—has gradually integrated other issues 
such as the protection of water towers as part of the expansion of its area 
of action.17 While the activities of this organisation were for a long time 
financed exclusively through fundraising by individuals and companies 
within the framework of the Rhino Charge,18 it has been receiving public 
funds since 2012 within the framework of the implementation of a 
public-private partnership.19 This has doubled the organisation’s budget, 
which exceeded 2  million  USD in 2012 when the construction of fences 
was launched around Mount Eburru (43 kilometres), one of the blocks 
of the Mau forest complex, and Mount Kenya (450 kilometres of fences, 
still in progress). The electric fences are either in contact with the KFS 
forest plantation areas or directly with the cultivation and housing areas. 
Although they can still be crossed by local residents, who are allowed to 
collect firewood or graze their livestock, they are only accessible through 
gates 3 to 4 kilometres apart, which is a constraint for the population.
An Ambitious National Objective: Reaching over 10% Tree Cover
The protection of Kenyan water towers is part of a new national effort to 
increase the country’s tree cover. The Vision 2030 national development 
plan and the Constitution of 2010 set as an objective to attain and maintain 
a minimum of 10% tree cover on the national territory, thus following the 
international recommendation of the United Nations on the horizon of 
2030. However, official Kenyan texts do not specify what is understood by 
the expression “tree cover.”20 Recently, a 2022 deadline was mentioned in 
a governmental document providing details about the national strategy to 
fulfil this objective (RoK 2019).
16. In their typology of environmental organisations active in sub-Saharan 
Africa, Brockington and Scholfield (2010) classified this organisation as falling 
into two common categories: “Charismatic animal-orientated NGOs” and “Single 
protected area NGOs.”
17. This is reflected in the activity reports of the Rhino Ark ("Arkives") published 
every two years, which can be consulted on the organisation’s website 
(http://rhinoark.org/). 
18. It is a competition between 4 x 4 vehicles in steep areas. It brings in about 
100 million KES per year (about 1 million USD).
19. Interview, 2 December 2016, Rhino Ark Manager, Nyeri.
20. Most of the reports and articles refer to the forest cover surface area, even 
if its definition differs from one organisation to another. According to the FAO, 
whose data we use, a “forest” is a “land spanning more than 0,5 hectares with 




The afforestation measures (i.e. the planting of trees on non-forested 
areas) in the country can build on a dense and old network of tree 
nurseries, managed by individuals, community groups and associations. 
This willingness to increase the tree cover in Kenya has been encouraged 
for several decades now, especially by the Green Belt Movement, created 
in 1977. The tree planting measure was presented by Wangari Maathai’s 
association as a means of combatting the supposed desertification of the 
country—which was a great political concern in the 1970s—and to improve 
the living conditions of rural populations (and especially of women) who 
could find the resources necessary for their domestic conditions directly 
on their land before, without having to go to the forest (Maathai 2005). 
 
Photo 1. The electric enclosure located east from Mount Kipiriri
This section was completed in 2009, finalising the encirclement project 
of the Aberdare Range. The fences stretch along the forest reserves 
and allow the migration of the elephants between Mount Kipiriri and 
the Aberdare Range along a 4  km corridor. The fence delimits the 
forest from the agricultural area, in this case the settlement scheme 
of Mikaro created on former forest reserves in 1969.
Photo credits: Gaële Rouillé-Kielo, 23 January 2016.
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Today, measures favouring the increase of the country’s tree cover are also 
justified by the issues related to water supply on a national level and the 
fight against global warming on an international level.
Since the areas classified as “forest reserves” account for only 3.5% of 
the total surface area of the country and are mostly forested, the ordinary, 
non-classified areas, and the private property areas are also important for 
the goal of increasing tree cover. Farmers are therefore encouraged by 
the authorities to dedicate 10% of their land to tree planting. It is notably 
in this aim that agroforestry is promoted.21 In fact, as noted in the region 
of Naivasha, the national authorities and environmental organisations 
present in Kenya insist on giving priority to indigenous trees instead of 
the more exotic fast-growing trees, such as the cypress and especially the 
eucalyptus, that are nevertheless favoured by many farmers. The reasons 
behind this are ecological (increasing the local biodiversity), hydrological 
(local tree species consume less water) and agronomical (enriching the 
soil) in nature.
In order to encourage the increase of tree cover, including in the 
productive areas, and prevent its destruction in other areas, for several 
years now projects of “payment for environmental services” (PES) are 
being developed in Kenya—a compensation mechanism consisting of 
monetary or in-kind incentives for the purposes of encouraging the 
adoption of environmentally-friendly practices. Kenya is one of the first 
East African countries to have initiated “payments for watershed services” 
programmes22 (Bennett & Caroll 2014) in the region of Naivasha. This is 
the only programme of its kind in Kenya that has gone beyond the study 
phase and in which financial transactions, albeit modest, have taken place 
so far between the actors involved upstream and downstream (Rouillé et al. 
2015; Rouillé-Kielo 2019a).23 Several REDD+ projects (Reduced Emissions 
from Deforestation and Forest Degradation) have also been implemented 
in the country (Kariuki et al. 2018).
21. Especially by the World Agroforestry Centre (ICRAF), which also has a 
regional office in Nairobi.
22. Several “payments for watershed services” projects were studied and/or 
piloted in Kenya over the last fifteen years (around the Sasumua dam, in the 
Upper-Tana, and in the Upper-Mara).
23. It is worth noting that several “payments for watershed services” projects 
have been developed in Kenya, mainly in the highlands, to improve water 
supply to large cities or key sectors of the economy. However, the lack of 
“buyers” for these watershed services has prevented the achievement of these 
projects. The Nairobi Water Funds project currently being developed by The 
Nature Conservancy, if it comes to fruition, could be the first African “Water 
fund” (there are several in Latin America). 
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According to a report published by the FAO in 2015, measures to increase 
tree cover has already produced positive effects. The surface of the territory 
covered in forests is constantly increasing: from 3.5  million hectares in 
2000, it reached over 4 million in 2005, and up to 4.2 million in 2010, to 
finally reach 4.4 million hectares in 2015.24 However, this monitoring of the 
tree cover percentage encountered significant difficulties in its evaluation. 
At the moment, the forest cover of the country is officially around 7% (KFS 
2015). This rapid increase since the year 2000 (25% in fifteen years) cannot 
be solely attributed to the reforestation and afforestation efforts of the 
country, but also to the usage of more efficient remote sensing software or 
to the use of tdifferent definition criteria of a “forest.” It should also be noted 
that there are strong regional disparities, with 15 counties having a lower 
cover than the national average, especially in the area around Lake Victoria 
(0.44% in Kisumu county) and in the North of the country, but there are also 
17 counties that have already surpassed the threshold of 10%, especially in 
the old central province (38.03% in Nyeri county) (KWTA 2015, 31).
2. Despite the Reforms,  
Users’ Involvement Is still Limited
Following the lively critiques directed to the extremely centralised 
character of natural resources management in Kenya, and the injunctions 
expressed on an international level for a transition towards a more 
participative and decentralised management of these resources, the 
sectorial laws promulgated at the beginning of the 2000s (Water Act 2002; 
Forest Act 2005), under president Mwai Kibaki’s mandate (2002–2013), have 
seemed to represent a historic turning point regarding governance. The 
creation of users’ associations could be seen as a demonstration of the 
willingness of the central government to delegate part of its prerogatives 
to the local level. However, according to recent studies on this subject, the 
global trend is towards the strong inertia of previous functioning modes, 
with the decision-making power still remaining largely in the hands of the 
state and the parastatal agencies maintaining the state’s control locally.
Water and Forest Reforms in Kenya
The content of the Water Act adopted in 2002 embraces the main principles 
of the Integrated Water Resource Management (IWRM) (monetisation of 
usage, river basin management approach and users’ participation), which 
were initially stated during the Conference on Water and the Environment in 
24. These figures relate only to forests such as they were previously defined in 
note 16 and not to smaller and less dense vegetation patches.
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Dublin in 1992 (Rouillé-Kielo 2019b). One of the major changes25 introduced 
by the Water Act consists of delegating part of the central government’s 
powers to lower levels (Mumma 2007). New management areas were also 
created to correspond to those of the drainage areas of the country’s major 
rivers.26 On a regional level, six catchment areas27 were defined. Each one 
is managed from a regional office of the parastatal institution created for 
the reform, the Water Resource Management Authority (WRMA). Basin 
committees for each of these have also been established. Finally, the 
territory was also subdivided in sub-catchments (in 2016 their number stood 
at 1,23728). Each of these sub-catchments is supposed to be represented by 
one Water Resource Users Association (WRUA). In June  2014, only 30% 
of the country’s potential WRUAs were established, with considerable 
inequalities among regions. In 2016, established WRUAs would have 
reached 50% (Rouillé-Kielo 2019b).
Another reform in the forest sector was undertaken with the adoption 
of the 2005 Forest Act, which came into force in 2007. It was inspired by the 
principles of Participatory Forest Management, a management model that 
calls upon central powers to delegate the management of forest resources 
to local institutions. The forest sector reform thus introduced two major 
changes. The first was the creation of the parastatal agency Kenya Forest 
Service (KFS) as a replacement to the Forest Department, whose actions 
were highly criticised in the past. The KFS was to take over the management 
of all state forests. The second was the establishment of community-based 
organisations, called Community Forest Associations (CFAs), as well as the 
possibility for the existing associations to have their rights for participating 
in public forest management activities recognised before the KFS. Given 
that there can be only one CFA per forest block, their possible total number 
in the entire country reaches over 400. A vast majority of them had been 
created already by the late 2000s (Hübertz 2009). As is the case of water 
users associations, the definition of the potential members of a CFA is both 
25. The others consist of a separation, which is now clear, between the 
institutions responsible for water management and the water supply services, a 
separation of the policy design with daily administration and daily regulations; 
the involvement of non-government entities in both the water resource 
management and the water supply services (Mumma 2007: 160).
26. The division was made with respect to a critical size (in terms of surface 
area—150 to 200 km² per WRUA (Richards & Syallow 2018) and representation of 
population), with the limits of the catchment areas not being necessarily taken 
into account. 
27. Lake Victoria North, Lake Victoria South, Rift Valley, Ewaso Ng’iro North, 
Tana, Athi.




vague and potentially very large, since it does not stipulate the maximum 
distance from the forest where the potential members of these associations 
are to be living and the decision on that matter is ultimately left to the 
discretion of each association.
Persistent Centralism
Despite the declared willingness to put a stop to the concentration of 
power in the hands of the central government, the newly created parastatal 
agencies, KFS and WRMA, responsible for representing the state locally, 
have preponderant power.
In the forest sector, the creation of a CFA must be approved by the 
KFS after examination of the association’s statute and management plan. 
The KFS also has control over the resources and the rules related to their 
usage. Ultimately, the CFA members are responsible only for ensuring the 
monitoring of the state of the resources and the control over the rights of use. 
It is therefore more of a so-called “Join Forest Management” model between 
the authorities and the users than a real participatory management placing 
the users at the heart of the decision-making process and regarding them 
not only as simple users, but also as owners of the resources (Witcomb & 
Dorward 2009; Mogoi et al. 2012). More specifically, the main advantage 
gained from being a member of a CFA is the ability to access the possibility 
of cultivating the plantations managed by the KFS.29 Regarding this last 
point, the establishment of the Plantation Establishment and Livelihood 
Improvement Schemes (PELIS) can be regarded as a return to the shamba 
system. Introduced by the British in 1910, this system consisted of jointly 
planting tree seedlings and food crops in the plantation areas managed 
by the Forest Department. The farmers involved were responsible for 
making sure that both the tree seedlings and their food crops would grow 
well. After about three years, when the tree seedlings were creating too 
much shadow over the food crops, a new section of the forest inside the 
plantations was cleared. Prohibited in 1988 before being re-established in 
1994 (under a non-residential form), the system was again halted in 2003 
before it was reintroduced in 2007, this time under the acronym “PELIS” 
(Witcomb & Dorward 2009). This change was however only a facade since 
the functioning globally remained the same. The Kenya Forestry Research 
Institute (KEFRI) evaluated the surface of the plantation managed by the 
PELIS system at 10,000 hectares30 in 2013 (KEFRI 2014).
29. The users rights attached to public forests (such as the right to collect dead 
wood, honey or medicinal herbs and graze livestock) do not depend on the CFA 
membership.
30. As a first step, only 24 plantations in the country are affected.
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In the case of water reform, the decision-making power also remains 
very centralised (Mumma 2007). Regionally, it is the government authorities 
that prepare the management plans (the catchment areas management 
strategy plans). As observed in the Naivasha region, the management and 
water resource protection rules, which are supposedly formulated by the 
WRUAs, are not very adjusted to the local contexts and coincide very much 
with the rules established by law and WRMA recommendations or from 
other organisations that work with the WRMA locally. It is noteworthy 
that these associations have no sanctioning power and must settle for 
reporting any irregularities observed to the WRMA, with the WRMA not 
necessarily following up on the requests made to it, due to a lack of time 
and resources. Their creation was encouraged by meetings organised by 
WRMA in collaboration with representatives of local authorities, or by 
NGOs or cooperation agencies with a local base. The members of these 
associations are mainly mobilised for activities related to protection of 
catchment areas, and especially for maintaining and restoring riparian 
woodlands (or riverside forests) by planting local tree species cast as 
water-friendly trees. In rural areas, they are also called upon to approach 
riparian land owners (many of which are farmers) in order to raise their 
“awareness” of issues related to the protection of water resources.
The scarcity of resources available to the users is described in the 
literature as a major obstacle to economic development. The KFS retains 
control over revenues from the exploitation of forest resources while WRMA 
controls the royalties on water consumption. The annual contributions of 
their members are the only fixed revenue base the associations can count 
on. When these are provided by individuals, they are usually of little value 
(about a few euros). The associations can however apply for one-off grants as 
community groups with the Community Development Trust Fund (CDTF). 
In the water sector, the WSTF (the Water Service Trust Fund), which is 
supposed to finance the activities of WRUAs’ subcatchment management 
plans, now applies a logic by county for the distribution of funds to the 
WRUAs.31 In order to resolve this rather precarious financial situation, 
the WRUAs and CFAs located in non-selected counties are encouraged to 
develop strategies for differentiating their sources of revenue, especially 
by responding to grants offered by environmental organisations.
31. Within the framework of the ASAL program (arid and semi-arid land), led 
by the Danish cooperation agency Danida and the European Union, only six 
counties were selected. Today, with many new projects emerging, around 17 
counties and a little under 100 WRUAs should be able to receive support by the 




Image 2. Institutional organisation of the water sector  
after the adoption of the Water Act of 2002
Source: Kenyan Ministry of Water. Author: Gaële Rouillé-Kielo.
 
Image 3. Institutional organisation of the forest sector  
after the adoption of the 2005 Forest Act
Source: Kenyan Ministry of Environment and Natural Resources.  
Author: Gaële Rouillé-Kielo.
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Who Is “Involved”?
Participation in users’ associations is voluntary by nature and subjected 
to a payment of a membership fee, usually paid annually. Most of the 
users’ associations have a corporate membership system and represent 
different groups of stakeholders (tree nursery growers, beekeepers, etc.). 
In the regions with such associations, it is in fact common that these are 
both members of the local CFA and WRUA. While the composition of the 
associations, and especially of their office, is supposed to be (as encouraged 
by the authorities) representative of the different elements of the local 
“community” in question (gender parity criterion, representation of young 
people and different cultural groups, representation of the different areas 
from upstream to downstream of the sub-catchments for the WRUAs), 
studies addressing the issue have reported a more contrasted reality. Works 
dedicated to CFAs underline the marginalisation of the poorest population, 
which can be attributed to the membership fee system, seen as an economic 
barrier to participation (Hübertz 2009). In fact, the prominent positions of 
the association’s offices (president and secretary) are largely occupied by 
men, while women are relegated to more time-consuming and less gratifying 
tasks (Mogoi et al 2012). Furthermore, in the CFA of the forest Ngare Ndare 
near Mount Kenya, Chomba et al. (2015) report monopolisation of the 
power by several members in an area marked by strong socio-economic and 
land-ownership discrepancies.32 However, this situation is not necessarily 
reported elsewhere. For instance, in the eastern part of the Mau forest 
complex (i.e. in the Sururu and Eburu forests) the corporate membership 
system is presented as a safeguard against confiscation of power by the 
wealthiest users (Mutune, Wahome & Mungai 2015). Most of these remarks 
also apply to the WRUAs. For example, the twelve associations in Lake 
Naivasha water basin were all managed by men in 2016. The requirement 
to fluently know how to read and write in Swahili and in English in order 
to be considered for the position of secretary or president of an association 
can prevent less educated people from accessing these positions.
32. The major landowners, who are for the most part of European origin and 
own ranches or conservancies which can be of over 10,000 hectares, managed to 
influence the budgetary orientations of the CFA in their favour, and did so at the 
expense of the small landowners who are Kikuyu, Maasai and Meru and 91% of 
which own less than 2 hectares of land (Chomba et al. 2015).
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3. New Challenges Related to Natural Resources 
Management within the Framework  
of the Devolution
In 2010, Kenya adopted a new constitution introducing a major change 
with the creation of 47 counties, each having its own government. 
The harmonisation of the content of the water and forest acts with the 
constitutional provisions entailed the delegation of some of the central 
government’s prerogatives to the counties. However, the issue of the 
devolution of natural resources management created tensions.
Constitutional Provisions  
concerning Natural Resources Management
Section  69 of the Constitution of 2010 specifies the obligation of the 
state regarding natural resources and environmental management. The 
state is committed to ensuring the exploitation, usage, management, and 
sustainable protection of the environment and its natural resources, as 
well as a fair distribution of the revenues that may be generated from the 
same (KLR 2010, 69, 1, a). The state shall also encourage involvement in the 
management and protection of the environment (KLR 2010, 69, 1, d).
Schedule 4 of the constitution lays out the respective functions of the 
central government and the counties within the framework of the devolution 
process but does not allow however to clearly identify who will be in charge 
of natural resources management. This ambiguity gave way to multiple 
interpretations and discussions during the examination of the water and 
forest laws. The text (Schedule 4, 22) states that the national government is 
responsible for ensuring the protection of the environment and its natural 
resources for the purpose of establishing a sustainable development process. 
However, according to this same text (Schedule 4, 10), the counties’ mission 
in terms of natural resources management is also very broad: counties are 
responsible for implementing the government policies for protection of the 
natural resources and the environment, which also includes, as is specified 
in the text, the protection of the soil and the water resources, as well as the 
management of the forests. They are responsible for the forests previously 
managed by the local authorities, while the public forests (which are much 
larger) remain under the management of the Kenya Forest Service.
Natural Resources Management, a Coveted Financial Issue
Since the creation of the counties, and in the period during which 
legislation frameworks were being revised and adapted to the constitutional 
provisions, intense discussions were ongoing. Disputes between counties 
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were echoed in the press several times,33 following the expressed intention 
by the governors of counties such as Nyandarua and Murang’a, where 
the waterway sources supplying notably Nairobi are located, to request 
financial compensation from the counties situated downstream. During 
the revision period of the framework law on forests, the issue of sharing 
revenues was highly debated. With the provisions of the new law, KFS 
retains discretionary power over the issuing of licenses for exploitation 
of public plantation forests, and with it, control over the related revenues 
(evaluated at 1 billion KES per year, which is equivalent to 8.6 million EUR). 
Furthermore, the exploitation of mature trees from the forests with 
local species or the selling of carbon credits as part of the possible 
implementation of the REDD+ programs could provide important revenues 
rising great interest among counties’ governors. During the discussions 
preceding the adoption of the law, the National Alliance of Community 
Forest Associations (NACOFA), responsible for representing the CFAs on 
a national level, also started negotiations with the central government for 
allowing users associations to benefit from a part of the revenues generated 
by the exploitation of the public forests they co-managed. A priori, these 
claims were to remain unsatisfied.
The Water Act (RoK 2016) and the Forest conservation and management 
Act (RoK 2016) were finally adopted in September 2016, i.e. respectively 
two years and one year following their drafting. These laws partially 
clarify the conditions for participation of counties in natural resources 
management issues. As for water resources, the counties’ representatives 
shall be appointed in the new basin committees, the Basin Water Resources 
Committees (BWRC), which have an expanded mandate and are created 
as a replacement to the old CAACs, which had only a very limited and 
exclusively advisory role. The assertion of decision-making power at the 
national level marked in the Water Act 2016 was challenged by county 
representatives as soon as the text was adopted, claiming that it was 
unconstitutional.34 Since then, there have been press reports of county 
governors’ continued willingness to take possession of water from dams 
33. See in particular, Munyeki, James. 2013. “Central Nakuru, Nairobi Counties 
Have Vowed not to Pay for Water.” The Standard, 9 August. https://www.
standardmedia.co.ke/central/article/2000090485/uproar-over-countys-plan-to-
charge-for-water [archive].
34. Several press articles were published in the months following the adoption of 
the text, in particular to report an appeal to the Court of Justice by the Council of 
Governors, representing the county governors (Kadida, Jillo. 2016. “Counties in 
Court to Block Enforcement of Water Act, Say it Takes away their Roles.” The Star, 
15 December; Kadida, Jillo. 2017. “Citizen Sues to Stop Implementation of New 
Water Act.” The Star, 6 February [archive]; Kakah, Maureen. 2016. “Governors 
Challenge Implementation of Water Act in Kenya.” Daily Nation, 14 December. 
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for riverine communities35 or to impose taxes on water supplies to other 
counties.36 In 2019, Nairobi County committed itself to compensating the 
counties where rivers that contribute to the city’s water supply are located 
by adopting the Water and Sanitation Services Policy.37
Apart from these new acts of parliament, that followed the adoption of the 
constitution in 2010, several initiatives for developing discussion between 
the different key stakeholders for natural resources protection on the 
county level emerged. The county natural resources forums were intended 
to be set up to unite all representatives of the local government, the county, 
the private sector, the civil society and the “indigenous communities.” By 
2016 only six forums would have been created.38 In the case of water towers, 
many of which stretch over several counties (the one in Mount Kenya, 
for example, is shared between five counties), KWTA has encouraged the 
development of inter-county management plans by adopting a landscape 
approach so as to allow natural resources management to be organised in 
line with the ecosystem limits rather than the administrative boundaries 
(KWTA 2015, 32).
Conclusion
The changes initiated with the adoption of the Water and Forest Acts 
adopted in the early 2000s, which have been revised recently, reflect the 
“integration” paradigm in natural resources management, with a greater 
involvement of the local levels in “governance.” However, after several 
years of implementation and in spite of the small revisions recently made as 
part of the devolution, participation primarily concerns the management of 
natural resources that can be described as “productive” (for example, KFS’s 
plantations with the “PELIS” system, or riparian agricultural holdings), 
and do not pertain to areas under stricter protection. In the “productive” 
areas, the central government retains control over the rules for the use of 
https://nation.africa/kenya/news/governors-challenge-implementation-of-
water-act-337874 [archive]).
35. Gachane, Ndungu. 2019. “Wa Iria Threatens Lawsuit for Murang’a to Get 
Ndakaini Water.” Daily Nation, 8 September. https://nation.africa/kenya/
counties/muranga/wa-iria-threatens-lawsuit-for-murang-a-to-get-ndakaini-
water-201678 [archive].
36. Maina, Waikwa. 2018. “Nyandarua Leaders Want 14 Counties to Pay for 
Water Supply.” Business Daily.
37. The county of Nairobi is the first in the country to have adopted a law in this 
area. The amount of funds earmarked for compensation to other counties was 
not reported in the sources consulted.
38. Interview from 25 September 2016, Kenya Working Forest Group (KFWG), 
national coordinator.
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resources, as well as over the revenues generated by this use. It seems that 
the water and forest users’ associations “participate” in the management 
activities primarily as auxiliaries to the central government, in order to 
help achieve the objectives set on a national level, in particular that of a 
10% tree cover up to 2022.
Recently, the challenge of protecting water towers allowed for the 
justification of a stricter protection of the forest reserves. The valorisation 
of the forests described as “indigenous” is part of the process of making 
the Kenyan water towers sanctuaries of the national “natural” heritage and 
presenting them as guarantors to the emerging economic prosperity of the 
country. Protection of these forests is implemented through materialisation 
(with electric fences) of their borders and through regular eviction of the 
groups of people residing there. The selective nature of the movement 
for recalling the former forest reserves raises the question of the way the 
authorities decide whose presence in these areas is legitimate or not. The 
modalities of protecting these forests, particularly the evictions measures, 
raise human rights concerns. The ongoing preparation of a Bill regarding 
the management of water towers (whose first draft was released in 2019) 
will potentially clarify the strategy of the national authorities on how to 
restore these areas.
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Challenges and Tactics of Private Security 
Guards in the Fragmented City
Jean-Baptiste Lanne
Translated by Sadie J. Mobley
In 2016, private security services made up the largest sector of Kenya’s 
salaried labor force. In 2015–2016, this fast-growing market generated an 
average of 265 million EUR in annual turnover and employed 300,000 to 
350,000 workers in 2018.1 Roughly 70% of these workers are concentrated 
in Nairobi. Beyond statistics, the importance of the private security market 
in Kenya’s capital city stands out immediately in the urban landscape. 
For locals, seeing an askari—originally meaning “soldier” in Swahili—
opening doors and checking visitors at the gates of private compounds 
or shopping malls is an everyday experience. For an outside observer, the 
direct experience of military urbanism (high walls, barbed wire, electronic 
locks, and cameras) gives the impression of encountering an “anxious city” 
(Bernard & Segaud 2011).
Yet, the scope of urban threats remains difficult to grasp. Police reports 
are the only documents available to map out a statistical portrait of crime 
in Nairobi, though they are highly unreliable. On the one hand, many 
residents choose not to report crimes because of widespread mistrust of 
the police. On the other, statistics are limited to “cases” filtered by the 
administration and exclude minor offenses and situations involving police 
misconduct (Ruteere, Mutahi, Mitchell et al. 2013). Empirical evidence 
identifies four main types of fear emanating from different social groups: 
fear of “the poor,” generally associated with juvenile delinquency; mass 
political violence, such as riots, lynching and murders; police violence; 
and terrorism, pervasive for over twenty years and which the attacks of 
Westgate (2013) and Garissa (2015) revived.2
1. Source: Kenya Security Industry Association (2018). The lack of market 
regulation explains the inaccuracy of statistics. 
2. Kenya was hit by a series of attacks claimed by the al-Shabaab Islamist group 
in response to Kenya’s military action in southern Somalia. Two large-scale 
attacks were especially traumatic: the attack on the upscale shopping centre 
“Westgate” in Nairobi on 24 September 2013, and another at the University 
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Faced with these difficulties, it seems necessary to move beyond questions 
about effectiveness of security systems. Relying on a recent epistemological 
renewal,3 this chapter proposes to diverge from Frédéric Gros’ objectivist 
definition of security as “an objective situation characterised by the absence 
of danger” (Gros 2012, 74), and rather open onto a more performative 
approach. Security, then, refers to a performance whose main objective is 
to stimulate, guide and manage the peace of mind of given population. This 
approach consequently draws the focus to actors who literally embody 
security on the ground: guards posted at the gates of private residences or 
large public facilities. It allows to identify two main axes of research. The 
first one is about examining the strict disciplinary constraints weighing on 
the guards: physical education, inculcation of corporate codes, mandatory 
wearing of the uniform, and GPS tracking of any movement. Over time, 
the guards nevertheless develop tactical routines to evade the constant 
supervision and recreate spaces of freedom. The security performance is 
secondly to be studied as a powerful mechanism of social distinction—
creating a sense of belonging at the heart of residential neighbourhoods, 
that is, a sense of home and community. This last matter has repercussions 
on the ambiguous role held by guards—while they come to protect an 
“inside” (the safe place, the microcosm), they are often, in fact, physically 
and symbolically relegated outside the social space they consecrate.
1. Creating the Immobile Human4
For formal neighbourhoods in Nairobi, there are three prominent types of 
security service supply. The first brings together some thirty national-scale 
(BM Security, Securex, Lavington, Security) or international security firms 
(KK Security, G4S). These are structured by a strong chain of command: 
managers, team officers, supervisors, and senior security guards. These 
companies are in charge of the most critical infrastructures (airports, 
embassies, public buildings, shopping centres) as well as of residences 
in the wealthiest parts of the city. The second type includes around 1900 
“small” companies (50 to 500 employees) allotted to lower infrastructures: 
supermarkets, shops, and service stations, as well as middle class residences. 
These companies are characterised by working methods borrowing 
both from the official register (uniforms, vehicles, acronyms, corporate 
of Garissa in the eastern part of the country on 2 April 2015, carried out in a 
similar manner (terrorist commando storming the building and slaughtering a 
large number of hostages).
3. See especially Schneier (1999), Pain & Smith (2008), and Barnett (2015).
4. “One of our goals is to create immobile human beings… As long as they 
don’t move, nothing can happen. They have to report anything they witness.” 
(Director of operations at Lavington Security Ltd, interview, 9 February 2016).
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headquarters, and registration with the Capital Markets Authority) and 
the informal sector (bribes, absence of employment contracts and social 
contributions). Finally, the third type of supply, by far the largest in terms 
of clients, is made up entirely of individually contracted untrained guards, 
directly hired by owners or owners’ associations. It is the one contracted by 
the vast majority of the middle-class in Nairobi.
When hired, guards are divided into three segments based on two 
criteria: the level of education and physical skills. Men or women who 
can substantiate an “O-level” (12 years of schooling) and meet certain 
size and strength requirements, seek employment with formal or semi-
formal enterprises. Those ones provide them significantly higher salaries 
(~12,000 KES per month, expenses deducted5) and possibly a contribution 
to the national social security fund (NSSF) or health insurance programs 
(NHIF). Workers who do not meet these criteria find a job in the informal 
sector, earning from 6,000 to 8,000  KES per month. Beyond these main 
distinctions, guard profiles are relatively homogeneous. Among the sixty 
guards surveyed, most are newcomers to Nairobi with less than five years 
in the city. Most of them are young, and just starting their family life. The 
lack of economic opportunities in the countryside, combined with rising 
financial needs (dependent children, tuition fees), pushes them to leave 
their home towns to try their luck in Nairobi, often on the advice of a 
relative. When they left, none of them ever imagined becoming an askari. 
Mr Safala,6 a marketing manager for Securex Ltd, is conscious of the low 
motivation of his employees: “You don’t grow up wishing to become a 
security guard. In Kenya, mothers tell to their children: if you don’t work 
hard enough, you will finish like those askaris!” (interview 6. April 2016).
In the formal sector, training askaris is an attempt to compensate for 
the lack of prestige in the profession. The issue is twofold: avoiding early 
demotivation, while instilling guards with enough morale to faithfully 
showcase corporate values. This strategy is characteristic of an “emotional 
labour”7 where emotions expressed by workers, especially through their 
body language, are an integral part of the professional performance. 
Every day at his post, the security guard must visibly express values of 
seriousness, commitment, courtesy, prestige and professionalism. By doing 
so, he contributes in augmenting the standing of the place. In practice, 
5.  The figures given are averages, because of the great variability of wages, 
especially in the informal sector. Government recommendations as of June 26, 
2015 are respectively 10,954 KES per month and 12,221 KES per month for day 
and night guards Source: Kenya Gazette Supplement no. 91: 587. 
6. Names have been changed to protect anonymity.
7. On the notion of “emotional labour,” see Leidner (1999), Mac Dowell (2009), 
and Wharton (2009). 
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training remains short: they last from a week to a month depending on 
the company. It basically consists of two main components: physical 
training and an introduction to public relations. The physical component 
closely resembles paramilitary training; new recruits learn how to march 
in formation and perform a proper salute (arm along the body, joined 
ankles, military salute). The development of physical discipline is a core 
exercise, even more than the teaching of basic defense techniques. Purely 
protective performance is relegated to the background. As Nandini Gooptu 
(2013) points out in her study of urban sentinels in India, “public relation” 
training allows one to learn the full lexicon of subordination. In class, new 
recruits are taught how to use expressions such as “Good morning, sir/
madam, how can I help you? What can I do for you today?,” “Yes, sir,” and 
“Yes, madam.” They must ask clients how they wish to be addressed in 
order to satisfy their needs. Although rarely put into practice, the military 
salute is theoretically required. Finally, communication techniques are 
taught in order to mitigate and resolve conflicts. Faced with a belligerent 
or aggressive client, the guard must remain firm yet calm. Guards must 
not challenge clients, but should rather intensify expressions of politeness: 
“Sir, I understand your point, but…,” “This is not in my power to allow you 
to…” As the tone rises, guards are advised not to take initiative, and to leave 
management of the incident to the proper chain of command.
According to a manager, the main purpose of training is to create 
“immobile human beings.” This control over bodies and attitudes requires 
a two-fold immobility from the askari: a physical one, first—being able to 
stand for hours at the gate of compounds; a social one, then—i.e. agreeing 
to stay at his/her place, a social notch below the residents.
2. What Security for Those who Secure?
Holding a Job Somewhere…
After training, security guards are assigned to a position. Those from 
the informal sector usually work in their employer’s home. In the two 
survey districts, Kileleshwa (Nairobi West) and Buruburu (Nairobi East), 
guards express recurrent concerns Workdays are long (12-hour shifts 
starting or ending from 6 A.M. to 6 P.M.) and often described as boring 
due to the monotonous nature of the work: opening and closing the door 
for incoming or outgoing vehicles. Hunger is also frequently mentioned. 
Most of the guards have tea in the morning, eating only once a day for 
dinner. Eating during a shift is indeed difficult, as cooking at the workplace 
is mostly prohibited (“it makes the place dirty,” a tenant of Kileleshwa says). 
Respondents also evoke physical suffering: standing fatigue, headache-
inducing heat, sickness brought on by the rain and cold, or mosquito bites 
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in the evening or early morning. More specific to night watchmen, feelings 
of loneliness and fear characterise the watching experience. More, the 
interactions with customers seem to be at the heart of the work’s difficulty. 
For residents or customers, guards may even appear as daily obstacles. 
Customers have an array of names at their disposal, depending on whether 
they want to be polite or rude. "Soldier!” and “Askari!” are relatively 
benevolent terms, while “Watchman”! (referring to the passive function of 
one who only watches), or “Maasai!” (locally and professionally perceived 
as “primitive” in popular representations) are intentionally humiliating. 
If an incident upsets a passer-by, he or she can play on the register of 
social distinction, putting the guardian back in his (lower) place: “You are 
useless!,” “Open the gate, stupid!,” or “You are so primitive!” Such verbal 
abuse contributes to weaken the guards’ psychological condition, as most 
of them felt reached in their dignity. Nelson A., 31, working in a residence 
in Kileleshwa, describes this interiorised condition: “I open your gate, I wait 
at your gate… I’m waiting for you like your dog…!” (Interview 11 February 
2016). Alfred G., 46, guard in a Kileleshwa compound, explicitly recognises 
the process of alienation that he is undergoing:
[>Interviewer]: And are you ready if someone attacks you?
[>Alfred]: Yeah. I’m ready because we still have the material. We are just 
trained to use the material…
[>Int.]: What kind of material are you talking about?
[>Alfred]: Material… I have this one [he shows me his baton], and then myself.
[>Int.]: And then yourself?
[>Alfred]: Mmhhh. I just leave myself to you.
(Interview 3 February 2016.)
Alfred’s words seem to rehearse the rhetoric assimilated during training. 
The technical term “material” he uses to refer to his own body is quite 
significant in that sense. Likewise, the expressed value of total commitment 
to the customers (“I just leave myself to you”), mirroring the idea of sacrifice 
in the army, is typical of ideological conditioning. Thus, fear, loneliness, 
poor self-esteem and a feeling of alienation all by turns create a sense of 
identity and psychological insecurity among the guards.
… and Being Absent Elsewhere
Guards assignments to a fixed position for a dozen hours a day directly 
explain their weak integration in their neighbourhoods. In a vast majority, 
they live in informal settlements in Nairobi—the only urban areas where 
rents are available—but work in better-off neighbourhoods. For example, 
guards working in Kileleshwa usually live in Kawangware, Kibera, or 
Kangemi, all slums in the western part of the city. Guards in Buruburu 
reside in the slums east of the city, like Mathare, Kiambui, Korogocho, or 
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Dandora. In these neighbourhoods, self-preservation is rooted in profound 
and sustained social interactions.8 Safety is built daily through nods and 
greetings in passing, offering a cigarette, advancing a small sum of money, in 
short, maintaining good neighbourhood relations. These relationships may 
be useful in case of harm (theft, assault, landlord litigation, etc.), especially 
in urban areas where police intervention is often perceived as ineffective. 
As newcomers to the city, guards do not benefit from this social capital and 
struggle to build it. Leaving at 5 A.M. and returning at nearly 7 P.M., they 
live as strangers in their own places of residence. During interviews, many 
mention that they do not trust their neighbours. Some fear that because of 
their daily absences, their landlords will rent their place to other tenants. 
Others describe the lack of material investment in their place for fear of 
being stolen during the day. The inside is then reduced to bare necessity 
(no TV or even radio). Josphat M., 25, a guard in Kileleshwa and resident 
of Kawangware, talks about his daily absence that makes him a potential 
target for neighbourhood youth: “When you are not around… obviously 
they know that you have gone searching for money. So, when you come 
back… they look at you in a certain way… they think that you are making 
a lot. When you are not around, and they know you are going for work… 
they know you are making [money]… the more you are lost, the more you 
are making [money]… So, you have to look for your security very well” 
(Interview, 15 February 2016).
The perceived dangers are not limited to the neighbourhood. From a 
sample of 57 guards surveyed, 32 admit being victims of assault on their 
way to work, most often for racketeering purposes. Certain factors increase 
the odds. The first concerns the times of the trips: around 5  A.M. and 
around 7 P.M. for day guards. These times are higher risk because of the 
darkness (the night guards are a little favoured because they start at 5 P.M. 
and return at 7  A.M.). Another factor is the route used for commuting: 
at least part of the trip is made through the slums on unlit roads. Guards 
newly-arrived in the city have little knowledge of the hotspots for danger 
and sometimes unknowingly take routes known for frequent muggings 
(e.g. Jamhuri estate when leaving Kibera, or Dandora Bridge, on the path to 
Dandora). Finally, the regularity of the commute constitutes an additional 
risk factor. Adding to the racket, the potentiality of police aggression is real 
(brutal interrogation, threats, arrest). A lone man,9 walking from or to a 
slum at an early or late hour, is automatically suspect. The guards, among 
others, are the first victims of the criminalisation of the poor in Nairobi. 
One might ask why the guardians do not simply wear their uniforms in 
8. These findings come from a multi-month ethnographic work in Kibera, a 
large slum in Nairobi West, conducted between February 2015 and April 2017.
9. The guards surveyed did not report any such police aggression.
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transit. Yet the same attire that might protect them from police violence, 
makes them a walking target to youth gangs in the slum.
Could these workers, subjected daily to uncertain and harmful conditions, 
then be described as an “urban precariat” (Standing 2011)? Guy Standing’s 
theoretical effort to define a new category of workers—neo-victims of the 
neoliberal city—seems partly relevant, provided that the term “precariat” 
is not necessarily to be understood in terms of “class.” Standing defines 
precariat as a social group characterised by its vulnerability to multiple 
uncertainties: job-insecurity due to the interchangeable nature of the 
worker (without bringing valued skills to the table); social insecurity in 
the absence of trade unions and social protection systems; uncertainty of 
times and places of work in the name of flexible economic activity; and 
finally representational insecurity, as dispersed workers have no place for a 
collective voice to emerge. In the cities of the Global North, representations 
of the precariat are increasingly embodied by deliverymen, janitors, 
maintenance workers, and dry cleaners. It is important to remember that 
such a precariat also exists in Global South cities, operating through the 
same mechanisms of subjection. In Nairobi, the guards also undergo a form 
of poly-insecurity, visible at several levels: physical, psychological, social, 
relational and political.
3. Living in the Place of the Other:  
What Tactics for which Lifestyle?
Askaris carry many burdens every day. Those are mostly due to the fact that 
guards actually live in the place of the other. This last expression describes 
a generally enclosed place where a person or a group of persons (a tenant, 
a group of tenants, or a chain of command) have the power to impose their 
own life rules. As a result, guards are daily subjected to a series of small 
injunctions specific to their workplace (and life): being told how to stand, 
what one has the right to do or not do, with whom one has the right to interact, 
how objects should be arranged, and for what uses, etc. This emblematic 
type of place finds local variations in Nairobi: the “compound” (enclosed 
luxury buildings divided in apartments) in wealthy areas like Kileleshwa, 
Kilimani or Lavington; the “court” (small single houses distributed around a 
privatised street) in the middle-class neighbourhoods of Buruburu, Ngumo, 
or South C. These places are by definition familial, leading to a blurring of 
family and professional relationships, as Staci Strobl illustrated through 
the example of housemaids in Bahrain (Strobl 2009). Domestic workers are 
kept in an indistinct status oscillating between temporary family-members 
(they are given presents for Christmas for example, or second-hand clothes 
for their kids) and fundamentally undesirable figures (outsiders coming 
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to disturb the family’s privacy). Their work is desired, and yet, they must 
know how to become invisible when the situation requires it. Faced with 
this ambiguity, the guards develop “tactical” behaviours (Certeau 1991, 
46) consisting of trickery, playing with conventions, diverting the uses of 
micro-places and objects to pursue their own interests. In this very specific 
case, a comparison between Kileleshwa’s compounds and Buruburu’s 
courts makes it possible to grasp the importance of spatial configuration in 
the development of individualised tactics.
In Kileleshwa, Number as Resource
In Kileleshwa, a wealthy neighbourhood west of Nairobi, residential 
buildings are mostly composed by private compounds. The specific type 
of housing consists of several buildings divided into apartments, usually 
organised around a car park and often equipped with shared facilities 
(gardens, games for children, gym, swimming pool) depending on the 
standing. It is usually surrounded by a wall, most often equipped with an 
electric fence. Several characteristics emerge here. Firstly, the compound 
is inhabited by wealthy populations, who typically employ domestic 
staff. Secondly, the habitat density—due to the apartment complex style—
explains the daily proximity of employees. Guards, caretakers, gardeners, 
garbage collectors and domestic helpers all work together in a relatively 
small space. Finally, residents most often rely on private security firms 
from the formal sector. Such firms exercise strict control over the guards—
particularly regarding safety protocols—via supervisors or team officers 
on motorcycles. For the most secure compounds, high technology further 
reinforces this control (real-time geolocation of guards, push buttons to 
operate at regular intervals, etc.).
In this context, can guards find some spaces of freedom? The number of 
people working in the compound, combined with the limited space, creates 
the conditions for a community of mutual aid. It is common, for example, 
for domestic helpers to bring leftovers from the family dinner to the askaris 
quarters. Gardeners share the fruits they have harvested in the gardens. 
In hotels, launderers run laundry for everyone. As for the guards, they are 
deliberately less careful about the entry and exit of domestic helpers during 
the day. This community of workers does not end, however, with a series 
of good deed exchanges. It branches out to provide psychological support 
as well—especially when facing domestic violence—but also through 
the simple pleasure of social gathering. The spatial configuration of the 
compound makes it all possible. With a number of hidden spaces, workers 
can find respite from tenants’ constant surveillance. Staircases, flat roofs 
where laundry is suspended, car parks, swimming-pool areas: all these 
spaces, relatively quiet at certain times of the day, become interstitial life 
Securing Everyday Nairobi
257
places where people converse, exchange tips, eat together, or braid hair. Day 
by day, the development of such sociability can be directly understood in 
regards to the workers’ difficulties in producing social cohesion in their 
places of residence. Kept away from their neighbourhoods during the day, 
they recreate neighbourly relationships (mutual favours, daily conversations, 
invitation to their respective “corners”10) in adapting to the monitoring 
and local constraints. Finally, contracting with a formal security company 
seemingly produces, a certain disempowerment of tenants vis-à-vis the 
security protocol. As the company’s supervisors take care of discipline, it is 
not up to tenants to worry about the behaviour of any particular askari. As 
a result, some tenants are more lenient with the small economic businesses 
of the guards: newspaper sales, car washes, small commissions at the 
neighbouring store, etc. As they benefit these extra services for themselves, 
they even defend, if necessary, their employees against the managers.
In Buruburu, Fluidity of Spaces… and Social Positions
In Buruburu, a middle-class residential neighbourhood east of Nairobi, the 
socio-spatial structure of the environment offers varied possibilities. The 
general neighbourhood consists of five estates built successively from the 
1960s (Phase I to Phase V), with each subdivided into “courts.” A court is 
a group of small houses distributed around a cul-de-sac street, enclosed 
by a gate. The airy setting, detached houses with gardens, semi-private 
streets and the location a retreat from the hustle and bustle of the city 
centre make it an ideal place for family life. The population is mainly 
composed of civil servants, business workers, and employees—forming a 
much wealthier fringe than that of the surrounding neighbourhoods like in 
Umoja, Kariobangi, Kayole, or Jericho.
Buruburu’s singular space can be understood as a “continuum of 
publicity” (Staeheli & Mitchell 2008). In other words, there is a gradient 
of publicity from the domestic space to the main street, understood as the 
centre of public life (commercial activities, bars, lively animation, traffic). 
Between these two poles fit at least two spaces representing varying 
degrees of enclosure. The common areas of the court, enclosed by a gate, 
come just after the domestic space: they constitute a relatively private 
space shared between neighbours, where children are free to play. Beyond 
this space, intermediate streets connecting several courts to the main street 
10. While doing my observations, I noticed that domestic workers tend to create 
a place of their own within the compound: a partially limited or withdrawn 
place, equipped with a few personal belongings, generally corresponding with 
their different workstations (sentry box, garden, swimming pool facilities, 
stairwells, rooftop terraces for the cleaning staff). This is how they are able to 
receive visitors and develop a neighbourhood social life.
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are vitalised by some shops. If these streets are not closed in the literal 
sense of the term, they remain a semi-exclusive space, insofar as they only 
give access to private spaces. This continuum of spaces allows a more fluid 
mobility for the guards. It is not uncommon for instance to see a Buruburu 
askari leaving his court to talk with a colleague across the way, or to buy a 
soda at the small grocery on the street. The either public or private character 
of the streets is ambiguous enough to offer the guards a certain flexibility 
in their movements. Following the same logic, the gate of the court does 
not need to be systematically closed, which allows the askari to be absent 
for a short period of time.
Buruburu guards mostly come from the informal sector. They are 
individually recruited by the association of residents managing the court. 
As a result, the compliance with the security protocol is far much looser. 
Guards have no training, little to no equipment, few wear uniforms, and 
they do not fall under the supervision of a team officer. To some extent, 
this increases their flexibility. An observation in the neighbourhood 
confirms it. At Buruburu Phase II, two courts face each other: Fatia Court 
and Lomilio Court. In March 2016, while finishing an interview with Paul 
S., a Fatia Court guard, one of the guards from Lomilio, Jackson, came to 
interrupt our conversation. Jackson was employed by a formal company, 
247 Security Ltd, unlike Paul. Two years before indeed, the inhabitants of 
Lomilio Court preferred to use the services of a formal security company 
following cases of vandalism within the court. Jackson came to Paul to 
propose him an agreement: if the latter agreed to come to Lomilio Court 
to wash resident cars, they would share the profits. Jackson could not do it 
himself, because his uniform forbid him. The inhabitants of Lomilio Court, 
in opting for a formal company, put a subsequent end to the guard’s poly-
activity. At Lomilio Court, they had to focus exclusively on surveillance. 
But the relative mobility of Jackson allowed him to outsource his extra 
work to Paul—a guard without uniform and foreign to the court, who 
would discretely do the job. This example is representative of the different 
tactics at work in Buruburu. Guards can play on their visibilities (uniforms 
or absence of uniforms), on their worker status (informal guards or formal 
guards controlled by team officers), as well as on their differentiated 
mobility, linked to the relative fluidity between different closed spaces.
Conclusion
In Nairobi, the security performance is not to be only understood as a response 
to identified threats. It is also, and perhaps even above all, a powerful force for 
social distinction. Contracting with a security company is a sign of standing, 
both for real estate developers and residents. Socioeconomic hierarchies 
are explicitly displayed through the type of security services contracted: 
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international companies using high technologies for the wealthiest; local, 
sometimes semi-formal enterprises for the upper and middle classes; askari 
recruited informally for the small middle class; and protection by youth 
groups for the poorest populations.11 This literally distinctive value, in 
Bourdieu’s sense of the term “distinction,” does not only apply to spaces 
and social groups that employ security services. It logically leads to the 
subjection of security workers themselves, and in particular the guards. The 
security performance can be read as a system of representations in which 
the guard is, in a way, reduced to the role of a stooge. For the tenant, he—like 
all domestic staff—is presented as the subordinate, the inferior, the one who 
lacks education and whose ways (of speaking, standing, working) call back 
to a certain “primitiveness” (this term often comes up in interviews). For the 
visitor, for the customer of the mall, he must rather be a living marker of 
the prestige of the place. The cleanliness of the uniform, the politeness, the 
qualities of communication, as well as a quasi-mechanical compliancy in the 
exercise of the protocol are determinants in the construction of a standing. 
Therein lies an observable paradox of the everyday security performance: 
the material and symbolic construction of a peer group leads to the creation 
of a “zone of indistinctness” (Agamben 1997, 46) at its margins—a space that 
lets neither inside nor outside those who, by their own bodies, contribute to 
secure the community.
Finally, guards are assigned to places—gates, parking lots, entrances 
areas of shopping malls—that they do not choose, and from which they 
can be removed at any time. These places are generally located far from 
their place of residence, out of their fields of action, and inserted into social 
configurations offering them few opportunities to develop a professional 
sociability. As a result, some form of social immobility is added to spatial 
immobility. A current representation of social achievement in urban areas is 
based on the mobility of the individual: to be able to move, to go to work by 
car, to access various leisure areas, to leave for the weekend on holidays, etc. 
In Nairobi, in order for a small – and certainly growing – number to safely 
access such mobility, a large number finds itself consequently immobilised, 
assigned to a place or moved arbitrarily. This last remark makes it possible, in 
essence, to turn away from an objectivist conception of security. Observing 
the daily challenges and tactics of guards in Nairobi shows that the goal of 
security—if there is one—is never so much oriented towards a person or 
a property, but rather towards a “social arrangement”(Dalby 1997, 9): the 
collective acceptance of a given situation to the detriment of another.
11. Security mechanisms in Nairobi’s slums are not covered in this chapter, 
which focuses exclusively on the figure of the askari posted at the entrance of 
privatised spaces. Security in slum is nevertheless very subtly organised. For an 
overview, see Rodriguez-Torres (2014).
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What Education for All in Kenya?
The School of Inequalities
Hélène Charton
Translated by Clare Rainey & Hannah Stauch
Education occupies a central position in Kenya’s social and political 
landscape, as evident in the number of schools and academic institutions 
throughout the territory. Key measures have been implemented over the 
last 10 years to democratise education by making schools accessible to 
everyone, particularly the poorest in society. These measures included the 
introduction of free primary education in 2003, followed by the abolition of 
secondary education fees five years later. These decisions have strengthened 
public debate on education issues and have featured prominently in 
newspaper columns.
In 2012, with official net enrolment rates of 81.8% in primary and 50% 
in secondary education, as well as 11 years of school life expectancy and a 
survival rate in primary education of 90.7%, Kenya was at the forefront of 
the educational rankings in sub-Saharan Africa, according to data compiled 
by the Unesco1 Institute for Statistics. The country was then spending 
approximately 30% of its budget and 6.7% of its GDP on education. However 
acceptable this may seem, these figures, produced and compiled by the 
institute, were notable in what they did not reveal in terms of regional, 
socio-economic and gender inequalities and as such this must be borne in 
mind. In 2009, Kenya had more than one million children out of school. 
This phenomenon had been on the rise after a sharp decline in 2007 and, 
as in many other African countries, it has affected the poorest and most 
marginalised populations. In 2008, 55% of girls from the poorest households 
in the North-Eastern region had not attended school. The quality of 
education provided in schools also raises many questions. According to 
the annual Unesco Education for All monitoring report, 6% of young men 
between the ages of 15 and 29 who had left after 6 years of schooling were 
considered illiterate and 26% semi-literate. These figures were even more 
alarming for young women, with 9% considered illiterate and 30% semi-
literate (Unesco 2012). With only 4% of students enrolled in universities, 
1. Unesco Institute for Statistics. http://www.uis.unesco.org/DataCentre/Pages/




access to higher education remained problematic in Kenya: only 30% of 
qualified baccalaureate graduates were then admitted at university.
This outcome must be viewed in the context of the global standards for 
educational reforms implemented worldwide since 2000 in the framework 
of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), a result of the approach 
to education undertaken in Kenya since its independence in 1963. Some 
elements of this approach date as far back as the colonial period. With 
only 4% of its resources coming from international aid, education in Kenya 
is essentially a national affair, as is highlighted by the close ties between 
educational reform and the country’s political and electoral agenda.
This chapter aims to highlight the historical dynamics that have helped 
shape education in present-day Kenya. First, we will address the nature and 
expression of the social demand for education. Then, we will examine the 
way in which education has been extensively invested in by the successive 
political regimes. This dual dynamic has been a key element in driving 
forward education, yet it has also been at the root of the deep geographical 
and economic inequalities that characterise Kenya’s educational system.
1. The Desire to Go to School
At the beginning of the January 2003 academic year, over one million new 
pupils attended Kenya’s government primary schools, declared as being 
“free of charge.” The confusion generated by the implementation of the 
election promise made by the then new President of the Republic, Mwai 
Kibaki, was widely covered in the press. Coverage focused on the chaos in 
schools and described long queues in front of the most popular schools.2 
By the end of that month, 500,000 new entrants joined schools that were 
often already full.3 For the sake of clarity, these figures must be put into 
perspective. Almost 5% of these new entrants dropped out of school in 
their first year (Unesco 2005). A number of them had actually been enrolled 
in schools that were not recognised by the government and found in the 
poorest neighbourhoods, to which a few pupils returned after a while.
This phenomenon was brought to light in the poorly integrated Kibera 
district of Nairobi during a study carried out by the John Templeton 
Foundation between April  2003 and December  2005 on the existence of 
private educational provision for the poorest populations in Africa and 
Asia. It helped emphasise the importance of social demand for education 
in the most disadvantaged areas. Seventy-six formal private schools 
(not registered by the government) were identified in Kibera, which had 
a population of about 600,000 at that time (Tooley, Dixon & Stanfield 
2. “Admission Chaos Hits Schools.” 2003. Daily Nation, 8 January.
3. “Free Education: Kenya’s School Overwhelmed.” 2003. Daily Nation, 20 January.
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2008, 451). This finding was made in October  2003, 10 months after the 
introduction of the Free Primary Education program (FPE) and included 
the 57% enrolment increase in the five public schools in the neighbourhood 
(compared to the 43% increase in Nairobi), partly at the expense of private 
schools. The scale of enrolment in these private primary schools, which 
in November 2003 had 12,132 pupils compared to 9,126 in public schools, 
revealed the constant demand for fee-paying education among the poorest 
populations. Interviews held with parents and the administrators of these 
schools confirmed this demand. They gave two main reasons: the cost and 
the quality of education. All these schools, with the exception of two run by 
religious congregations, received tuition fees ranging from 50 to 500 KES 
per month. These fees were tailored to individual situations, ranging from 
discounts to exemptions for large families or orphans. However, these fees 
are lower than the hidden fees in public schools that are non-negotiable 
and involve compulsory purchases, such as acquiring two sets of uniforms 
(compared to one in the private sector) or various other contributions 
(activity or construction fees). The total amount can be prohibitive for the 
poorest households. Teaching conditions and conditions in general are 
also perceived as more favourable in the private sector. Private schools 
are generally smaller than public schools, which accommodate up to 2,000 
pupils. They also benefit from a higher teacher-pupil ratio, on average 21 
pupils for every one teacher compared 60 or even 67 pupils to one teacher in 
public schools. These facts are crucial to the perception of what constitutes 
a quality education, one which even the poorest are willing to pay for. 
As one parent put it, “If you go to the market and are given free fruit and 
vegetables, they are probably rotten. If you want fresh fruit and vegetables, 
you have to pay for them” (Tooley, Dixon & Stanfield 2008, 462).
As this study shows, the way in which the poor relate to education 
(although the inhabitants of Kibera are not all poor to the same extent) 
demonstrates the importance of school investment for the people of Kenya 
whose long-standing history is inseparable from the shortcomings of the 
educational provisions implemented by its successive governments.
In a colonial context marked by severe racial segregation, the educational 
system for the Africans, entrusted mainly to missionaries, was aimed 
primarily at providing for the colony’s labour needs. It was in response to 
this narrow perspective of education that the first African initiatives for 
education were launched.
From their creation in 1924, the Local Native Councils, established by 
the colonial power to provide an avenue of legal expression for African 
communities, made educational development one of their priorities 
through the creation of mission-free schools. Mission schools were accused 
of foregoing their pedagogic duties in favour of evangelising. In 1926, LNCs 
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spent an average of 20% of their budget on education (Mutua 1975, 152-153). 
The Western and Central provinces which were both the most populated 
and most exposed to European colonisation were at the top of this list 
(Charton 1997). The colonial government, anxious to avoid disrupting the 
fragile treaty established with the missions, never authorised the LNCs to 
open their own schools, as they had requested. It simply channelled the 
funds raised from local communities in the form of taxes to finance its own 
institutions (Government African schools) outside the sphere of missionary 
influence. In Kenya’s Central Province, however, LNCs found another 
outlet for their education-centred mobilisation by funding independent 
Kikuyu schools, created following the circumcision crisis and the shutdown 
of many schools whose teachers had been dismissed.4 In 1935, there were 
34 independent schools with 2,500 students. Ten years later, these schools, 
which were constantly threatened with closure by the colonial authorities, 
had 13,500 students enrolled. At that time, 12.5% of the African population 
had access to education but at primary level it was 97%. The colony then 
had only one secondary school, Alliance High School in Kikuyu, built in 
1926. The only post-secondary option was Makerere College in Uganda, 
which trained African administrative assistants in education, agriculture, 
veterinary sciences and medicine for the whole of East Africa.
The creation of the African Teachers College in Githunguri in 1939 to 
train teachers for independent schools and to address gaps in secondary 
and post-secondary education had strengthened this network, partly thanks 
to the investment of Chief Koinange wa Mbiyu and his eldest son, Peter 
Mbiyu. On his return from the United States in 1938, where he had gone 
to study in 1927 with the support of the Phelps-Stokes Foundation, Peter 
Koinange was the most educated African in the colony. Declining all job 
offers in the administration, he then took over the leadership of Githunguri 
College, which he named Teachers College, in reference to Columbia where 
he had obtained his master’s degree. On the eve of its closure, following 
the declaration of a state of emergency in November 1952, nearly 30% of 
students in Kiambu and Fort Hall districts attended the college.
The education level of the African people tripled over the course of 
the decade following the Second World War, as a result of the policies 
of “colonial modernisation” initiated by metropolitan authorities that 
4. Kikuyu independent churches were born in 1929 with the refusal of a number 
of worshippers to comply with the injunctions of Reverend Arthur (Church 
of Scotland Mission of Kiambu, Central Province) asking them to renounce 
traditional practices such as clitoridectomy. The dissident Christians, many of 
whom were teachers or catechists, founded their own network of churches and 
schools.
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stimulated people’s investment in their children’s education, as shown in 
the following graph:
Figure 1. Education funding between 1957 and 1962
Sources: Colony and Protectorate,  
Education Department Triennial Surveys 1958–1960 and 1961–1963.
It was precisely these dynamics that led to an explosion in the number of 
schools that marked the country’s transition to independence in 1963. At the 
beginning of the 1964 school year, primary schools welcomed over a million 
students, twice the number welcomed in 1957 and four times more than in 
1948 (Bogonko 1992, 112). Expectations of school were then commensurate 
with the frustrations of the colonial era. During independence, education 
was officially identified as a lever for the country’s economic and social 
development, in which all populations were invited to participate within 
the framework of the Harambee state philosophy.
In ten years, the number of primary schools doubled and the number of 
secondary schools increased tenfold. This was due to the combined efforts 
of the government, whose budget share for education increased from 11.9% 
to 24.7% between 1963 and 1973 (Bogonko 1992, 112). The population 
directly contributed as part of Harambee fundraising campaigns for school 
construction and teacher recruitment. Harambee schools, which in 1973 
accounted for 60% of secondary schools built since independence, charged 
high tuition fees for poor quality education compared to national and 
regional schools, which had limited capacity (Amutabi 2003, 130).
These institutions were created by communities to overcome the 
shortage of secondary education provided by the government, thus placing 
its educational responsibilities on local communities (as in the case of LNCs 
during the colonial era). Several politicians, such as Tom Mboya, spoke out 
against a system that reinforced social and regional inequalities as regards 
access to education, but without any real success apart from increased 
inspections and some additional resources. However, most Harambee 
schools were integrated into the national system in 1974, but in an unequal 
manner, since it was the central province that benefited most from these 
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takeovers, strengthening an already dense network of schools in the region 
(Hornsby 2013, 138-140).
These different stages in the long history of education in Kenya highlight 
the scale of the demand for schools and the extent of people’s commitment 
to education (Charton 2011, 219-237). The way in which this desire for 
education has been used politically is a second characteristic feature of the 
history of education in Kenya. While it can also be traced back to colonial 
times, it actually took effect in 1973 when free primary education was first 
introduced. The 2003 presidential decree included nothing new. It simply 
reiterated, in a very different political, economic and international context, 
one of the key measures by the Father of the Nation, Jomo Kenyatta. This 
was implemented on the country’s tenth year of independence and was 
approved by his successor, Daniel arap Moi, upon his arrival to power in 
1978. The history of education is closely linked to the country’s political 
history. It can also be claimed that education has been a major instrument 
of political legitimisation for the various governments that have succeeded 
each other since independence.
2. School as an Instrument of Political Legitimacy
In 2003, as well as in 2008, the withdrawal of school fees from primary 
and, later, secondary schools, was in line with the election promises 
made by then candidate Kibaki. These latter measures benefitted from an 
international climate favourable to their implementation within the context 
of the MDGs and Education for All programmes supported by international 
benefactors. However, like the two previous experiences of free primary 
education, they occurred at significant moments in Kenya’s political life. A 
major political legacy driven by strong social demand, universal education 
was brandished by each of Kenya’s three presidents during periods of 
transition and political fragility in order to restore the social bond between 
society and its government.
Initially driven by African nationalist movements in the 1940s, universal 
education has always been at the centre of Kenya’s political agenda. 
Present in the memorandum sent by the representatives of the Kenya 
African Union (the first national political association) to the Colonial 
Office in 1945, universal education remained a social ideal enshrined in 
the 1960 KANU (Kenya African National Union) manifesto, which was the 
heir to nationalist struggles. When Kenyatta became Prime Minister on 
1 June 1963, he identified education as a national priority on which all the 
efforts of the Kenyan people should be focused (Kenyatta 1965). On the 
tenth year of independence, the 1973 Presidential Decree which established 
free primary education for the first four stages and capped enrolment 
fees at 60 KES (8.5 USD) for the other three stages was in line with this 
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tradition. The President’s “gift” to the Nation was a concrete reaffirmation 
of KANU’s commitment to universal education while rewarding the efforts 
and sacrifices made by the population for educational development. The 
effects of this measure were immediate and saw the arrival of 1.8 million 
additional students and a 152% increase in first-year enrolment. Despite 
large drop-outs in the first few years (54.7% of students who entered the 
system in 1973 had left the system four years later) first-year enrolment 
stabilised at a high level (600,000 new students) and drop-out rates were 
“normalised” (20% of drop-outs after three years in the 1976 study: Somerset 
2007, 10-11). To cope with this influx of students, the government undertook 
a massive recruitment drive for unqualified teachers. Their numbers rose 
from 22% to 37% between 1973 and 1976, thus maintaining the teacher-pupil 
ratio at a relatively low level (one teacher per 32 pupils: ibid., 14-15). But 
welcoming new entrants required additional classrooms to be built at the 
expense of schools and, therefore, families. Numerous rises in compulsory 
contributions for buildings, activities and even security (Abreu 1982) began 
to arise. As these schools were not governed by any legislation, there were 
significant disparities between schools, some charging fees ten times more 
than the tuition fees that existed prior to 1974 (Somerset 2007, 11). By 1978, 
primary education everywhere had become more expensive than it had 
been in 1973 (Charton 2005).
It is within this context that Daniel arap Moi, who succeeded Kenyatta in 
1978, kicked off his presidency by abolishing all contributions at all primary 
stages. The 1978 decree provided the new president, from a minority 
ethnic group, with an opportunity to assert his political legitimacy by 
following in the footsteps and actions of his predecessor, while endorsing 
KANU’s legacy. As in 1973, the implementation of the presidential decree 
 
Figure 2. Primary and secondary school enrolment 1961–2012
Source: Ministry of Planning and National Development. Statistical Abstract (1960 to 
2012). Nairobi: Government Printer.
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in January 1979 led to a new influx of pupils into primary schools with 
970,000 new enrolments in the first year. Enrolment rates remained high 
in the years following the adoption of the measure (900,000 pupils) but 
equally drop-out rates remained very high with 45.5% of pupils who 
entered school in 1979 still in school five years later and only 32.2% at 
the end of the seven-year primary cycle. Due to a lack of recruitment, the 
teacher-pupil ratio had increased significantly to 1:39 (Somerset 2007, 14-
15). As in 1973, covert school fees soon reappeared, making free schooling 
obsolete. The comprehensive “8–4–4”5 reform of the education system, 
which came into effect in 1985, placed a heavy burden on households. The 
extension of the primary cycle by one year, from 7 to 8 years, required 
the construction of new classes (13,370) and additional equipment for 
technical and agricultural disciplines (laboratories, workshops, etc.). 
These costs were largely borne by parents through the reappearance of 
additional fees and the proliferation of Harambee for the construction of 
new buildings. Since 1983, school supplies had no longer been provided by 
schools and parents were officially responsible for equipping classrooms. 
The emphasis on basic education (with a specific ministry from 1979) at 
the expense of other educational stages has corresponded to the liberal 
shift taken by international organisations and the emergence of the first 
structural adjustment plans (applied in Kenya in the 1990s) to try to recover 
economies in crisis. While population growth continued at a sustained 
pace, weighing heavily on the education system, Kenya’s economic growth 
slowed with a decline in GDP from 6.5% to 3.7% between 1964 and 1984 
(Ogot & Ochieng’ 1995, 151-153). School adjustment policies were defined 
in a 1988 World Bank report entitled Education in Sub-Saharan Africa: 
Policies for Adjustment, Revitalization and Expansion. In a context where 
resources are scarce, priority should be given to sectors where the social 
return on public investment is most significant. According to calculations 
by World Bank economists, this was the primary stage (Heyneman 2005).
At secondary and higher levels, where education was considered a 
personal investment due to its direct employment benefits, cost-sharing 
with beneficiaries was advocated. These recommendations were endorsed 
in Sessional Paper No. 6 of 1988, which introduced the principle of “Cost 
sharing with beneficiaries.” This was applied in Kenya from 1991, with the 
cost of boarding school fees for public secondary schools transferred to 
parents and the introduction, for the first time, of higher education fees 
initially set at 6,000 KES (100 USD) before being increased to 50,000 KES 
(833  USD) in 1998. Despite the existence of scholarships and, more 
especially, loans granted by the Higher Education Loans Board (HELB) to the 
5. Schooling is now divided into a 8-year primary cycle, followed by a secondary 
cycle and a higher cycle of 4 years each. 
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majority of students, these measures contributed to preventing the poorest 
populations from accessing university (Klopp & Orina 2002, 60). As in most 
African countries, students, who were almost guaranteed employment 
in public services and parastatal companies, hitherto enjoyed privileged 
conditions (free education and pensions and an allowance known as the 
“boom”: Eshiwani 1993, 46 & 51). This policy proved to be disastrous at all 
levels. In a context of increasing extreme poverty, school had never been 
more expensive. Between 1994 and 1997, the average annual burden for 
the families of a primary school pupil increased from 843 KES to 1,200 KES 
(12  USD to 22  USD), covering contributions for classroom construction, 
examination fees, the purchase of books, equipment, uniforms, cutlery and 
mattresses in boarding schools, etc. This excluded the most economically 
vulnerable populations (Koech 2000, 75). For those who managed to 
complete primary education, opportunities to pursue secondary education 
continued to decline with transition rates falling from 49% to 40% between 
1992 and 1999 (ibid., 94). The crisis in the education system that began in 
the 1990s resulted in an unprecedented erosion of gross enrolment rates to 
89% in 1998, from 105% in 1989.
For the first time in Kenya’s history, some populations were shying 
away from school, hence disrupting the school dynamics established since 
independence. The government attempted to address the school crisis, 
which showed similarities with the social and political crisis the country 
was experiencing at the time. They appointed an inquiry commission on the 
eve of the 1997 general elections, in a climate of extreme political tension 
and violence, which was to carry out a thorough reform of the education 
system. The announced school reforms were supposed to ease the political 
and social climate but President Moi quickly buried these promises as soon 
as he was re-elected. The Koech Commission report was published three 
years later, in 2000, and despite strong protests and strikes by 50 schools 
(including the prestigious Alliance Girls High School) the government 
limited itself to flashy measures, such as shortening the curriculum, instead 
of remodeling the system as a whole by moving from the 8–4–4 structure to 
a 12-year basic cycle, as recommended in the report (Charton 2003).
It is in this climate of crisis and breakdown of dialogue between state and 
society that the theme of universal education resurfaced at the heart of the 
electoral platform of the opposition coalition led by Mwai Kibaki (NARC 
2002). As a key measure of the National Rainbow Coalition’s (NarRC) 
programme, free primary education was not only the President’s “gift” to 
his people, as in 1973, but the pledge of a new social agreement that the new 
democratically elected government intended to establish. The guarantee of 
equal access to education for all citizens refers to the principles of justice 
and equity. This forms the basis of the Nation’s rebuilding to which the 
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new President and his team have committed themselves.6 After ten years of 
major crisis, this measure had a very strong symbolic significance in that it 
marked a break with the practices and excesses of the previous regime while 
continuing the legacy of Kenyatta. The context in which free education was 
restored in primary schools in January 2003 was, however, very different 
from that of 1973. At an international conference held in Jomtien, Thailand 
in 1990, and more so at another international conference held in Dakar 
in 2000, the international community and donors committed themselves 
to universal primary education by 2015. This is the second “Millennium 
Development Goal.” Free education programmes, introduced in Malawi in 
1994 and Uganda in 1997, subsequently became more widespread, thanks to 
the support of international donors. As in the 1973 and 1978 experiments, 
the abolition of school fees generated a significant influx of new pupils, 
whose numbers remained high. Kenya’s primary schools recorded a 32% 
increase in enrolment in the first year at the beginning of the 2003 school 
year (Oketch & Somerset 2010). The state was able to meet the direct cost 
of the Free Primary Education program, estimated at 62  million  USD, 
thanks to the release of 69.5 million USD7 (a one-quarter increase in the 
education budget) to pay schools the allocations calculated in proportion to 
the number of enrolled students. However, the success and sustainability of 
the reform depended on the new team’s ability to attract external funding 
by restoring donor-confidence, shaken over the last ten years of the Moi 
era. The ERS (Economic Recovery Strategy for wealth and employment 
creation), endorsed by international donors in 2004 and backed by the 
education sector strategy, had established priorities for action in terms 
of economic and financial governance. The national consultation, which 
brought together 800 participants in November 2003, made it possible to 
define the orientations of the sectoral education strategy, adopted on 25 July 
2005 under the title, Kenya Education Sector Support Programme 2005–
2010—Delivering quality education and training to all Kenyans (KESSP). 
KESSP, which was 89% government-funded, received support from donors 
through the Education Donor Coordination Group (EDCG), including 
80 million USD from the World Bank in 2006 and 121 million USD from the 
Fast Track Initiative.
Building on these successes, Mwai Kibaki promised to withdraw school 
fees in secondary public day schools if he were re-elected in December 2007. 
However, this policy, implemented in January 2008 during a climate of high 
tension following the violence that followed the disputed election results, 
did not keep all its promises. However, the extension of free education 
6. Inaugural speech of the 3rd President of Kenya, Mwai Kibaki, on 30 December 
2002, Nairobi.
7. Daily Nation, 30 April 2003.
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to secondary schools made it possible, as the FPE did, to bring back to 
secondary schools the children of those economically weakened by the 
crisis, without affecting the poorest.
Yet the main effect of the high volume of pupils accessing primary 
education, and to a lesser extent secondary education, was the reinforcement 
of the hierarchies and differentiation strategies of schools and families, hence 
an increase in the already glaring social and geographical inequalities. In 
Kenya, the poor had never been to school in such numbers, yet the schools 
they were attending were schools for the poor.
3. What Type of Universal Education in Kenya?
Historically, with nearly ten million children enrolled in primary school 
compared to one million at the time of independence and a net enrolment 
rate of 82% in primary schools and 50% in secondary schools in 2012, 
according to Unesco statistics,8 the measures taken over the past 40 years 
to promote universal education seemed to have yielded some results. 
However, despite these proactive measures promoting access to education, 
poor and marginalised populations continued to be excluded from school.
Social and geographical inequalities in access to education have been, 
in fact, another characteristic feature of Kenya’s education system, the 
origins of which are old and have worsened rather than been rectified over 
time. Policies to increase access to education have automatically led to an 
increase in supply which has diversified in response to the remodeling of 
high social demand. The privatisation of education at all levels (from pre-
school to university) has portrayed, until today, both the persistent desire 
for education that is still strong yet not satisfied by the public authorities 
and the role that schools play in the process of differentiation and social 
stratification.
Since the colonial period, education provision has been developed locally, 
depending on the mobilising capacity of communities (LNC, Harambee) 
and the degree of investment by local political leaders, who have sometimes 
endowed their districts with institutions bearing their names as in the 
“Kenyatta High” or “Moi Girls” model (Amutabi 2003, 131). Initiatives by 
political elites to promote access to school capital for their citizens have 
further enhanced these inequalities, projecting the ethnic difficulties that 
structure contemporary Kenyan politics into the school setting. Thus, in 
1984, President Daniel arap Moi decided to increase the quota of places 
reserved for primary school pupils in the region’s prestigious high schools 
8. Unesco Institute for Statistics. http://www.uis.unesco.org/DataCentre/Pages/




from 60% to 85%. This policy, in addition to strengthening the “ethnicisation” 
of society, enabled the Rift Valley (President Moi’s region of origin) to catch 
up with the level of secondary education in the central province. When 
Mwai Kibaki came to power in 2003, he was quick to restore the quotas to 
their original proportions (Hornsbt 2013, 649).
Such features produced strong regional disparities. In 1969, the central 
province had gross primary school enrolment rates of 102%, while only 
56% and 43% of children in Nyanza and Rift Valley provinces were enrolled 
(ibid., 267). Some districts, such as Nyeri, had almost achieved universal 
education by 2003, when the net primary school enrolment rate was 
only 40% in the North East region in 2010 (Oketch & Somerset 2010, 10). 
Regions with high school capitals were those that best resisted the 1990 
crisis, further increasing geographical inequalities not yet tackled by free 
education programmes (apart from specific actions in arid and semi-arid 
areas), nor have they made it possible to solve the social inequality problem 
reproduced by schools.
Admittedly, free education has increased access to schools for the poor 
but perhaps not for the poorest because school has never been completely 
free. In a broad context, the hidden costs of education have made it possible 
to maintain distinct hierarchies between schools by practising convoluted 
forms of selectivity. A survey conducted between 2007 and 2008 among 17 
schools (14 public and three private) in four districts (Nairobi, Nyeri, Kajiado 
and Kisii) revealed the differential effects of the EPF on access to education. 
Some public schools continued to select their students by charging twice 
as much as anywhere else. In Kisasa (Nairobi), for example, the total 
amount of contributions that replaced traditional school fees reached an 
annual total of 143 USD, one year after the introduction of the EPF. In Kazi 
(Nyeri), where additional contributions were abolished, first-year places 
were reserved for students in the private kindergarten section (16 USD per 
month). These schools have thus bypassed the EPF by screening their pupil 
recruitment, in order maintain the reputation and level of their schools. In 
2006, Kazi was ranked sixth in Nyeri District for its results on the Kenya 
Certificate of Primary Education (KCPE) exam which determines access to 
secondary education (Oketch & Somerset 2010, 10).
Despite the scholarships introduced by the government in 1994, the 
poorest populations remained less likely to continue on to secondary 
education. The distribution of students according to family income level 
shows that, in 2012, 10% of the lower echelon had access to this level of 
education compared to 55% of boys and 42% of girls in the higher echelon 
(Muriithi Muhindi 2012, 34). Despite the abolition of school fees in 2008, it 
was not possible to address these inequalities. A study conducted in the Nyeri 
region in 2009 with 33 secondary schools, showed that the government’s 
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allocation to secondary schools of 10,625 KES per enrolled student was not 
sufficient to cover their actual needs, estimated at 24,590 KES by the school 
principals who were interviewed. Above all, however, the total cost of 
mandatory purchases was estimated at 9,230 KES (uniforms, dictionaries, 
atlases, etc.) to which was added 3,200 KES for the purchase of additional 
equipment required by most schools (school bags, sports equipment, 
school T-shirts, etc.). These additional costs remain an exclusion factor for 
certain population groups (ibid., 51). As with scholarships, the reduction in 
secondary school tuition fees has mostly affected children who are already 
in school.
 
Figure 3. Number of private and public primary schools from 2003 to 2013
Sources: Government of Kenya. 2004. Economic Survey. Nairobi: Government Printer.
 
Figure 4. Number of private and public secondary schools from 2003 to 2013
Sources: Government of Kenya. 2004. Economic Survey. Nairobi: Government Printer.
Hélène Charton
274
All in all, the abolition of (partial) school fees in primary and secondary 
education has improved access to education for a greater number of 
children without changing the hierarchies and selection methods still 
occurring in some schools. Expanding this basis has automatically led to 
increased selectivity towards higher education, one of the consequences 
of which has been the development of private education and new forms of 
“privatisation” of public education.
Private primary education developed during the crisis in the 1990s to 
fill the gaps left by public education provision. At that time, Kenya had 
290 private primary schools, mainly located in urban areas, but ten years 
later, 1,236 schools, and 7% of the school population, were registered. Free 
programmes have led to an increase in this trend, as shown in the following 
graphs. The proportion of pupils enrolled in private schools increased from 
10% to 15% between 2004 and 2011.
From the 1990s, most private schools began to position themselves in the 
high-performance education niche, as shown by the results obtained in the 
national end-of-primary (KCPE) and secondary (KCSE—Kenya Certificate 
of Secondary Education) examinations. With only 1% of candidates in 1996, 
private schools had won the top ten positions at KCPE. Five years later, 
in 2001, 27 of the top 30 scoring schools were private schools. In Nairobi 
and Nyeri district, private schools occupied the top 57 and 45 places in the 
KCPE ranking in 2007 (Oketch & Somerset 2010, 24).
The results obtained in this examination are crucial because they 
determine the orientation of students towards the different types of 
secondary schools that do not offer the same conditions of study and 
opportunities for university access. The 18 national institutions, which 
are schools dating back to the colonial period, recruit the best primary 
school students (1%) and obtain the best results in the KCSE, whose 
grades determine access to university. Next come provincial schools 
(20%), which developed in the 1960s under a system of regional quotas. 
The vast majority are oriented towards district schools, most of which are 
former Harambee schools, “free” since 2008 (they are day schools, unlike 
the other two categories: Oketch & Somerset 2010, 24). This prioritisation 
of educational provision determines the school strategies of families who 
strive, when they have the means, to choose the most efficient primary (or 
even nursery) schools and employ private tutoring so that their children 
succeed in entering a national or provincial secondary school where 
students are most likely to go to university. Such a system helps promote 
social inequalities in access to education. These actions were denounced 
by the 1998 Koech report, whose recommendations proposed the abolition 
of the KCPE and the classification of primary schools (Koech 2000). The 
report found that the deterioration in pupil reception conditions in public 
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schools since the introduction of free education programmes had further 
increased the divisions between schools and widened the inequality gap in 
access to education, also found at higher education levels.
The total number of students enrolled in university increased fivefold, 
from 44,000 to 240,000 between 1996 and 2012. Public and private provisions 
increased considerably during this period, after the creation of five new 
higher education institutions from 1984, bringing the total number of public 
universities to seven.9 After the opening of the Baraton University of East 
Africa in 1991, the Commission for University Education (CUE) increased 
the number of accredited private universities from 18 to 30 between 2005 and 
2012 (and enrolment from 8,800 to 37,600 during the same period: Mwiria 
2007, 21). To meet the ever-increasing demand for higher education, public 
universities started to offer private courses from 2006. Known as “parallel 
courses,” their annual cost varied between 120,000 KES for an Arts student 
9. Sources: Commission for University Education, http://www.cue.or.ke 
[archive], list updated in 2014. After the creation of Moi University in Eldoret 
in 1984 (President Moi’s home region), three higher education institutions were 
granted university status (Kenyatta University, Egerton University, and Jomo 
Kenyatta University of Agriculture and Technology) and two new universities 
were created, Maseno University in 2001 and Masinde Muliro University of 
Sciences and Technology, in Kakamega (Western Province) in 2006. 
Figure 5. University enrolment from 2001 to 2012




and 450,000 KES for a medical student (excluding boarding fees), while the 
average enrolment fee for regular courses was 28,500 KES in 2008.10
Like private universities, these courses welcome baccalaureate graduates 
who qualified to enter university but whose KCSE grades were not enough 
to enter regular training. In 2006, 10,600 of the 47,000 qualified high school 
students had obtained a place in public education11 and by 2012 it was still 
less than one third of the initial amount. The teaching conditions on parallel 
courses, whose numbers exceed those of regular courses, also attract students 
who can prepare the same diplomas without facing the threat of strikes and 
administrative bottle-necks that lengthen the duration of studies (Charton 
2012). Frequently denounced as a hindrance to the quality of education and 
a source of inequality, the merging of these courses with regular training, 
recommended by a report by the Public University Inspection Board, has 
been constantly postponed, as the public university finds itself unable to 
welcome all the graduates.12 In the meantime, the Higher Education Loans 
Board is offering loans to students on parallel courses and endorsing the 
privatisation process.
Conclusion
The educational landscape of present-day Kenya is the end result of a 
long process of structuring, whose roots date back to colonial times. The 
importance of the school experience, which has been reflected in the 
different forms and degrees of investment by the population throughout the 
country’s history, has made it a major political subject and a central point 
for agreement on the bond between state and society. Since independence, 
successive governments, aware of the challenges related to education have 
systematically used educational issues to assert their legitimacy in times 
of political tension or fragility. This dual dynamic of a social and political 
nature has enabled education to reach unprecedented heights over the past 
half-century without, however, questioning the elitist and selective nature 
of the education system inherited from the colonial period and reflected 
in strong social and regional inequalities. The latest measures taken to 
promote universal education in the context of educational liberalisation 
is a far cry from addressing these trends. Instead, it has heightened them 
10. “Move to Abolish Parallel Programmes in Kenyan Universities.” 2009. The 
Standard, 30 March. http://africanewsonline.blogspot.com/2009/03/move-to-
abolish-parallel-degree.html [archive].
11. The Standard, 26 June 2006.
12. Ngare, Peter, and Benjamin Muindi. 2008. “Parallel Degree Programmes 
Blamed for Declining Quality of Education.” Daily Nation, 24 August. https://
nation.africa/kenya/news/parallel-degree-programme-blamed-for-declining-
quality-of-education--555980 [archive]. 
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by confirming the existence of second-class schooling for the poorest. In 
this we can conclude that the education system reflects and crystallises the 
social, regional economic and political divisions of present-day Kenya.
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The Regionalisation  
of University Systems: An Empty Shell?
Olivier Provini
Translated by I.J. Walker
In 2006, the Inter-university Council of East Africa (IUCEA) and the 
German Academic Exchange Service (DAAD) established a partnership to 
promote quality assurance programs within public and private universities 
in East Africa. Between 2006 and 2012 the DAAD invested 1.4 million EUR 
for this large scale project for the sector. This cooperation programme has, 
among other things, enabled staff from various universities to undertake 
management training in Germany and to draft framework documents that 
set benchmarks and regional standards for public and private institutions’ 
quality assurance procedures. This collaboration between the IUCEA and 
DAAD is part of a policy of harmonisation of certain activities in higher 
education institutions within the framework of the East African Community 
(EAC) and based on the European integration model (the European Union 
and the Bologna Process).
This inter-university council is an organisational structure of the EAC, 
the inception of which dates back to 1970, following the dismantling of the 
University of East Africa. Indeed, the formation of the IUCEA has been 
supported by the legacies of the universities of Nairobi (Kenya), Makerere 
(Uganda), and Dar es Salaam (Tanzania), all of which share a singular 
history and common anglophone academic practices as they formed, 
between 1963 and 1970, the University of East Africa, an independent 
college of the University of London. Because of this, the IUCEA’s official 
mission has been to coordinate and pilot regional university policies with 
higher education national commissions from each member country, the 
sector being thought of as a driving force for regional integration. IUCEA’s 
principal objectives are therefore to facilitate contact between leaders of 
East African universities, to provide an arena for discussion for higher 
education stakeholders, and to establish comparable academic standards. 
The IUCEA is therefore a space that encourages a priori the sharing of 
technical expertise, while disseminating a specific vision of what it is, 
what it must be and what it means to be a university. Since the end of 
the 1990s and the beginning of the 2000s, IUCEA’s successive executive 
secretaries, notably Tanzania’s Mayunga H.H. Nkunya and Rwanda’s 
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Alexandre Lyanmabje, have indicated their willingness to strengthen the 
standardisation of the regional space, in particular on the basis of this 
quality assurance policy.
One of the central changes adopted by higher education institutions in 
the region, that is however overlooked in the scientific literature, resides in 
very transformations of the governance of public and private universities 
by the advent of this regional quality assurance policy. The apparent 
necessity of establishing these new procedures has been legitimised by the 
IUCEA regarding the challenge encountered by since the end of the 1990s: 
the massification of higher education. With the flourishing of public and 
private universities, one has witnessed the advent of a substantial regional 
higher education market. For example, Kenya currently has 25 public 
universities and 68 private ones; Uganda has 11 public and 33 private; 
Tanzania has 11 and 29. The decaying state of public institutions has freed 
up space in the higher education market due to the rise in demand. The 
private university has therefore positioned itself as a credible alternative 
to public higher education. This massification of higher education commits 
political leaders and universities to respond to the increase in the number 
of students. Kenya, for example, went from having 62,677 students enrolled 
in higher education in 2002 to 194,528 in 2013, an increase of around 210% 
in just over ten years. Yet, the increase in staff numbers brings into question 
the quality of outputs in private institutions as well as public. The IUCEA, 
within the framework of the EAC’s framework, has therefore positioned 
itself as an institution that hopes to improve and harmonise the functioning 
of universities in the region.
By taking a position on sensitive policy subjects such as regional 
harmonisation of university tuition fees, the IUCEA shows that it has 
significant ambitions to oversee further reforms, whether these are in 
national policies or more local strategies. However, the IUCEA and the 
EAC do not yet possess the restrictive legislative framework to directly 
manage university policies in the region and to establish a harmonisation of 
university structures. Notably, the IUCEA does not yet own the budgetary 
or human resources for its ambitions and so must form numerous 
partnerships with foreign founders to lead these regional programmes. At 
first sight the IUCEA appears to be an empty shell, where historic public 
universities such as those of Nairobi, Makerere and Dar es Salaam are 
poorly represented. The IUCEA is instead co-opted by new universities, 
both private and public, that find visibility for themselves there. The semi-
regular conferences that the IUCEA organises are not decisive spaces for 
public higher education policy where future transformations of institutions 
are discussed and played out—these meetings and seminars are, rather, 
The Regionalisation of University Systems: An Empty Shell?
spaces for socialisation that allow political and administrative actors to 
meet each other, to exchange views, and to establish new partnerships.
The activities of the IUCEA, within the framework of the EAC, thus 
question the regionalisation of public higher education policies in East Africa. 
Regional integration promotes the dissemination of dominant theories on 
the reforms to be undertaken, a dynamic that is facilitated by the IUCEA’s 
activities and by the movement of academics. However, harmonisation and 
regularisation of university systems in East Africa is still difficult to achieve. 
The case of quality assurance programmes that proliferate in the region is 
the exception. The most discussed example that illustrates the difficulty 
of implementing regional policy in the sector is, without any doubt, that 
of institutional economic models. Kenya, Uganda and Rwanda have public 
and private universities that have been marketised, where the majority 
of students pay tuition fees, whereas Tanzania and Burundi already have 
university systems largely subsidised by their governments. These set-ups 
are the results of policies and reforms inherited from different governments 
since these countries gained their independence. East African universities, 
under the guise of convergence—for example in new modes of governance—
have nevertheless their own singularities, histories, and memories. There 
exists significant differences between public and private universities, to the 
extent that one can question the formation of a homogeneous East African 
university space, in particular on the very politicised issue of tuition fees. 
However, the regional space of the East African Community seems to be 
a coherent structure that is able to respond to the challenges of higher 
education. It is particularly the case that universities have become strategic 
institutions in the economic development of the region. This is evidenced 
by national programmes (Vision 2030 in Kenya and Vision 2045 in Uganda, 
for example) that allow universities to train qualified staff and to develop 
research capacities in strategic sectors (science, energy, management, etc.). 
This will involve a strengthening of the binding legal capacities of the 
IUCEA and the EAC and a budget consistent with their missions. These 
transformations can not be achieved without the common and shared 




Christian Forms of Religion in Kenya
Yvan Droz & Yonatan N. Gez
Translated by Ellen Kibble, Francesca I. Kleine & Claire Hefty
Introduction
Although Kenya is often considered a Christian country, a Kenyan journalist 
asserted in 2013 that, “if an opinion poll was conducted to establish how 
many citizens regularly go to places of worship, the results would frighten 
the clergy to death. If the researchers were to probe deeper, it might 
emerge that going to heaven is hardly the reason the few who visit places 
of worship (to ogle at gorgeous choir members) go there in the first place.” 
Despite these cynical remarks, several surveys underline the importance of 
religion for Kenyans. One study by Afrobarometer indicates that 88% of the 
country’s citizens (85% of men and 90% of women) consider religion to be 
very important in their lives (Afrobarometer 20111). Another survey shows 
that 80% claim to attend church at least once a week, while 64% participate 
in religious groups every week (Pew Research Center 2006). In both studies, 
Kenyans’ religiosity ranked highest among the ten countries surveyed.2
This chapter opens with a historical overview of Christianity in Kenya.3 
It then discusses recent transformations in the field of religion, before 
examining the political role of churches in Kenya. Finally, we describe 
certain religious practices and show that they are not confined to single 
religious institutions but instead involve  butinage  or “church hopping.” 
Such practices are present in various religious forms, and are as much part 
of Kenyans’ everyday life as they are of their lifelong religious trajectories.
1. The question asked was, “How important is religion in your life?” (question 
98B), and possible options included: “Not at all important”; “Not very important”; 
“Somewhat important”; “Very important”; and “Refused to answer.”
2. The countries that participated in the second survey were the United States, 
Brazil, Chile, Guatemala, Kenya, Nigeria, South Africa, parts of India, the 
Philippines, and South Korea.
3. We have limited our scope to Christianity. According to the 2009 census, 
Christianity accounts for 82.6% of the population. Historian John Lonsdale 
claims, evoking “educated ‘guesstimates’,” that 80% of Kenyans were Christian, 
7.3% Muslim, and 11.55% “traditionalists” (Lonsdale 2009, 63). For consideration 
of Islam in Kenya, read Michel Adam’s chapter in this volume, as well as Adam 
(2010) and Herzig (2006).
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1. Christian Religions in Kenya
Three branches of Christianity have played an important role in the 
evangelisation of central Kenya: Catholicism, Protestantism, and 
Anglicanism.4 Though this division into three branches poses little problem 
for the Catholics and the Anglicans—the latter being united under the Church 
of the Province of Kenya (CPK)5—the considerable diversity encompassed 
under the label of “Protestant” makes things less straightforward for the 
third branch.
Likely the “most important institution” in the country, the Catholic 
Church remains a significant power in Kenya. The Church’s social 
engagement—such as parish activities, teaching, and especially healthcare—
has contributed greatly to the Church’s success in Kenya. This appeal 
continues to this day, even though Catholic schools were not considered to 
be among the best in the country during the colonial period. Additionally, 
the Church Fathers’ nationalities (French and Italian) allowed them to adopt 
a position relatively independent from the British colonial government 
while forcing them to take extreme political caution. This particular 
feature of Catholicism stood in stark contrast to the stance taken by 
Protestants and Anglicans, who were tempted by political compromise and 
were always suspected of supporting the colonisers. The almost marginal 
political position of Catholicism within a colony of Anglican obedience 
did not go unnoticed by future converts, who were often more eager to 
embrace the “religion of the ‘more powerful,’ of those who call the shots, 
who control the situation and thereby demonstrate their superior strength” 
(Neckebrouck 1978, 472-473). Today, Catholicism seems to resist the 
significant loss of followers suffered by other religious groups following 
the meteoric rise of Pentecostalism.6 The explanation for this stability lies 
not only in the prudent restraint and relative lack of scandals embroiling 
the Catholic hierarchy, but also in the involvement of Catholic missionaries 
on the ground,—as well as papal prestige. Protestant puritanism influenced 
by the East African Revival (which we shall discuss later), however, regards 
Catholicism as a superficial religion, and suspects it of compromising with 
traditional religious practices. Some even consider Catholicism to be a 
cover for “satanic” activities.
4. We were inspired here by Droz (2004), which we have thoroughly revised and 
updated. 
5. Since renamed the Anglican Church of Kenya (ACK).
6. According to the 2009 national census, the Kenyan Catholic Church has close 
to 10 million followers.
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A former church of the British state, the Church of the Province of Kenya 
(CPK7) was long seen as the church of the colonisers, and was suspected of 
complicity with the colonial administration. It is true that the role held by 
this branch of Christianity throughout the Mau Mau War (1952–1956) left 
painful scars. Indeed, the Anglican and the Evangelical Churches supported 
the British army in the “rehabilitation” of the Mau Mau prisoners.8 Today, 
the CPK remains associated with conservative currents, even though 
it adopts—together with the Presbyterian Church, PCEA—a very critical 
outlook on Kenyan politics.9
Other historic Protestant churches make up nearly a third of Christians 
in Kenya. The largest among them remains the Presbyterian Church of 
East Africa (PCEA). Unlike Anglicans and Catholics, and despite some 
exceptions, Presbyterians consider the consumption of tobacco and alcohol 
as sinful. This prohibition demonstrates the strictness of faith taught by 
the Presbyterian Church—and, as we will see, by the Pentecostalists as 
well—and explains why these denominations perceive Catholicism as a lax 
religion.
2. The Independent African Churches  
in the Wave of Pentecostalism
As in the rest of sub-Saharan Africa, missionary churches—particularly 
Anglican churches, and especially Protestant ones—were subject to schisms 
that led to the establishment of independent churches. In Kenya, this resulted 
from clashes concerning clitoridectomy and the quality of education (1928–
38),10 in which the Anglican and Catholic churches supported a moderate 
position. The diverse movement towards religious independence, equally 
7. According to some estimations, the Anglican Church represented almost 
10.6% of the population in 2007 (Kagema 2008). This is a significant increase, 
as statistics presented by David Barrett from the early 1980s indicate that 
only 7.2% of the population followed this denomination (Barrett 1982). In the 
latest censuses (2009, 2019), the Anglican Church was integrated into the larger 
category of “Protestants.”
8. The British put into place an anti-insurrectional strategy inspired by their 
then-recent experience in Malaysia in order to “bring back” and “rehabilitate” 
the Mau Mau prisoners. The prisoners passed through a series of camps where 
Protestant preachers would play an infamous role (Elkin 2005; Maloba 1993).
9. Benson (1995, 195); for a detailed account of Anglicanism in Kenya, see Bowen 
(2016).
10. The attempt to forbid clitoridectomy in Kikuyu territory was met with fierce 
resistance that inspired Kikuyus to found the independent schools movement as 
well as numerous independent Christian churches (Murray 1974; Sandgren 1989; 
Strayer 1978).
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motivated by colonial racism and political activism, coincided with the East 
African Revival (1936–38), which originated in Rwanda.11 Terence Ranger 
interprets the emergence of the East African Revival as a reaction from 
missionary churches which experienced a considerable loss of followers 
who left to join the independent churches (Ranger 1986, 35). This is true 
for central Kenya, where the East African Revival offered an alternative to 
the independent churches. Pentecostalism and independent churches were 
therefore two sides of the same coin, with both taking a new perspective on 
conversion and, more generally, on social mobility with a view to achieve 
personal fulfilment (Droz 1999).
Indeed, the commonalities between these two religious traditions are 
not confined to the motivations people have for converting to them, but 
can also be found in numerous doctrinal similarities, and in the emphasis 
placed on an expression of faith, both emotionally and institutionally 
(congregationalism). Even if certain “pagan” aspects seem to characterise 
independent churches, they often follow the same organisational framework, 
such as with regard to parish independence or the active participation of 
the congregation in religious services.12 Moreover, these factions were 
historically developed in unison until the country’s independence. In the 
1920s and 1930s, Pentecostalism was confined to restricted social circles, 
often composed of settlers. That Pentecostalism emerged from (first wave) 
“white” North American fundamentalist groups, and was distinguishable 
from (second wave) “black” American Pentecostalism (Hollenweger 1999). 
With the arrival of the East African Revival, the Pentecostal movement 
took off:
“placing an emphasis more on the experience of converting than on religious 
instruction, [the East African Revival] made itself more accessible to illiterate 
or poorly educated believers. In addition, its hymns […] gained great popularity 
and are often integrated into the ceremonies of other Churches. The third factor 
in its success is due to the fact that the East African Revival took a decisive 
stance on lay people (and notably on women), who are freely elected to lead 
the group. This denomination soon developed affinities with the Pentecostals 
[…]” (Maupeu 1998).
A second period in the development of Kenyan Pentecostalism can be 
distinguished, beginning in the 1960s, when the independent churches 
seemed to experience an equally significant growth following the end of 
the Mau Mau War. This phase was characterised by the arrival of foreign 
preachers, most of whom came from North and South America. As 
demonstrated by the flourishing of the Assemblies of God, these groups 
11. The East African Revival was a movement of Protestant revivalism that 
grew rapidly in neighbouring countries (Peterson 2012).
12. Personal correspondence by Hervé Maupeu, 24 December 1999.
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found Kenya to be a fertile ground. During this time, the number of 
Pentecostal churches in Kenya exploded, as did the number of Protestant 
missionaries, many of whom were Pentecostal or Evangelical. More 
recently, the wave of conversion to neo-Pentecostalism13 reached Kenya, 
along with the rest of Africa. The first conversions took place in the early 
1980s, and the numbers have been rising ever since. This third wave of 
Pentecostalism constitutes an important sociological phenomenon that 
is transforming religious affinities.14 It came at a time when Kenya faced 
major political and social upheavals—marked by the democratisation and 
the liberalisation of the political, economic, and religious markets. The 
process of registering a new denomination has been greatly simplified, 
thereby eliciting an explosion in the number of recognised churches.15
The new Pentecostal missionaries have profoundly transformed 
Christianity in Kenya.16 They offer a charismatic liturgy that underlines the 
importance of being “born again,”17 and they often emphasise the theology 
of prosperity. It is important to note that the Born-Again conversion process 
should not be understood as a phenomenon implicating the entirety of 
one’s beliefs, but rather as a social practice involved in the construction 
of multiple identities which prevail in Kenya (Droz 2002). Usually, the new 
converts would keep their previous religious affiliation after becoming born 
again, adding a new layer to their multifaceted identity (ethnic, religious, 
political, socio-economic, etc.) as they reposition themselves within new 
social networks. Conversions reinforce the social fabric of Pentecostalists, 
as “Jesus is the object of one’s commitment, but the commitment only 
13. For a description of neo-Pentecostalism, see Rey (2018) and Anderson (2004). 
(Neo-)Pentecostalism is an umbrella term for a number of movements that are so 
different that it is difficult to categorise them under any sort of common label 
(Anderson 2010).
14. At the end of the twentieth century, there were 126 million Pentecostalists 
in Africa, making up nearly 11% of the population of the continent. The majority 
converted after 1980 (Barrett 2001, 287).
15. In 2007, the Attorney General of Kenya, Amos Wako, asserted that there 
were 8,520 recognised churches in Kenya and 6,740 requests for recognition, 
with around 60 arriving each month (Ndegwa, Alex. 2007. “Over 6,000 Churches 
Awaiting Registration.” The Standard, 4 September).
16. As John Lonsdale has stressed: “in the 1990s Kenya had 1,300 of them 
[Evangelical missionaries], an astounding figure, twice as many as any other 
African country, and a second missionisation none would have foretold in 
1963” (Lonsdale 2002, 184). According to Paul Gifford, the number of foreign 
missionaries in Kenya was even higher (Gifford 1994, 519). In 1989, there were 
1,225 American protestant missionaries; in 1993, they were 1,337 (out of a total 
1,150 missionaries of all nationalities in 1978, 1,850 in 1986, and 2,321 in 1993).
17. Born again are Christians who have accepted a second baptism by immersion.
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becomes apparent in social relationships” (Englund 2007, 485). Nevertheless, 
a person’s conversion can also weaken their prior social relations, as some 
converts break former solidarities, or give up on participating in family 
ceremonies henceforth considered as “pagan.”
Today we are seeing a rapprochement between Pentecostalism and 
Evangelical Protestantism, a shift that has enabled a certain fluidity between 
independent and Pentecostal churches. Followers are able to alternate 
between events organised by different denominations with relative ease, 
as we will see below. At the same time, multiple denominations may 
come together to collaborate around public Christian “crusades.” Some 
international evangelists draw enormous crowds to their Pentecostal 
rallies at Nairobi’s Uhuru Park, and these performances that showcase 
masterful technical skills (Gifford 1987; 1992; Samita 2004). In addition, 
American televangelists such as Joel Osteen, Joyce Meyer, and T.D. Jakes 
attract numerous followers who watch their television programmes or read 
their books.18 Some of them are accused of “stealing” congregants from 
small independent churches or of subverting their structures in order to 
“prove” the value of their own evangelist work to their believers in Europe, 
South Africa, Nigeria, and especially North America. This frenzied quest 
for followers is further reinforcing the divisions inherent in Pentecostal 
and independent churches.19 Ever so often, minor leaders in one church 
allow themselves to be tempted by the seductive prospect of founding a 
new denomination, thereby seeing their name inscribed into the annals of 
Christianity.
These preachers proselytise in the markets, and announce the end of 
the world, or the imminence of the reign of God, or sometimes the Second 
Coming.20 They testify to the imminent power of God, promise healings or 
economic successes, and urge the audience to offer public confessions, so 
18. The commitment of these famous evangelists and their congregations in 
Kenya is not limited to the dissemination of sermons and the occasional crusade, 
and many Kenyans are regular beneficiaries of evangelistic and development 
programs funded and led by them. That said, their self-assessment of their work 
in Kenya is sometimes exaggerated, as we saw in 2013, when the North American 
evangelist T.D. Jakes was forced to apologise after overestimating the extent of 
the donations made by his church. He said, “the natives all over Kenya drink 
water because of this ministry. And the hospital in Nairobi survives because 
of this ministry.” Karanja, Antony. 2013. “US Pastor TD Jakes Apologises over 
Kenya Comments.” Daily Nation Online, 18 October. https://nation.africa/kenya/
news/us-pastor-td-jakes-apologises-over-kenya-comments-905700 [archive].
19. We recall that these fissures are not new, and that they have studded the 
history of Christianity in Kenya, and elsewhere (Neckebrouck 1983).
20. An era promised to the Righteous, after the second coming of Christ, 
according to the Apocalypse (20: 16).
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that they may be to be “saved” by receiving baptism by the Holy Spirit. Like 
pre-colonial African prophets, some predict future events or “explain”—
armed with biblical passages—extraordinary accidents or natural disasters.
Additionally, many of these Pentecostal preachers seek to carry out all 
of the signs indicated in the Bible to hasten the Second Coming of the 
Messiah (Droz 2001). This atmosphere of exalted expectation of the Second 
Coming is equally expressed in the numerous Pentecostal publications 
sold in the streets, outside the religious services of many provocatively 
named Pentecostal churches: Maximum Miracle Centre, Universal Church 
of the Kingdom of God, Jesus Is Alive Ministries, Glory of Christ Ministry, 
Power of Jesus Around the World, and so on. These publications announce 
upcoming “crusades” and peddle signs for the end of times: The Antichrist 
lives among us and tempts the faithful by the means of false prophets; the 
“Y2K bug” proved that the power of God remains superior to the miraculous 
technologies of Man; the Mark of the Beast is concealed in barcodes, revealed 
to those who inspect closely and, through numerological calculations, 
identify the infamous 666; dead children are revived after the laying on 
of hands by valiant preachers; the 1998 attack on the American embassy 
in Nairobi was an attempt by Satan’s supporters to weaken the soldiers 
of Christ; the inauguration of a Hindu temple in Nairobi is a worrying 
sign of the power of idolaters (Séraphin 2003). In short, there are many 
Kenyans who live in a world re-enchanted by the apocalyptic teachings of 
Pentecostal movements.
The certainty of bearing witness to the millennium quickly leads 
to performative social practices, as they can be akin to self-fulfilling 
prophecies. The millennium thus takes a prosaic form, with the faithful 
hoping to see non-believers punished so that they themselves might enjoy 
the very concrete fruits promised to the faithful disciples of this exacting 
faith. In other words, such Pentecostals live in a (re-)enchanted world 
where the hand of God (as well as that of Satan) is omnipresent and where 
miracles and sinful temptations co-exist in daily life. They believe that the 
times they are living correspond to the early days described in the Bible, 
those following the birth of Christ, and when the effusion of the Holy Spirit 
embraced the apostles.
In recent years, we have seen these spiritual ideas give way to ambitious 
plans to transform Kenyan society. Many Pentecostal movements have 
abandoned their reticence of “worldliness,” and openly engage in politics 
to promote a programme that some have qualified as “politics of the spirit” 
(Marshall 2009; Steigenga 2001; Villafañe 1996; Yong 2010). They maintain 
that their religious ideals could surpass earthly woes and promote a 
moralisation of political life, such as through the rejection of corruption, 
adherence to Christian values, etc. This new political involvement, which 
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is informed by a clear division between good and evil, could be considered 
as a form of pentecostalisation of the public sphere, which would clean up 
Kenyan politics and to bring morals back to political life (Parsitau 2008).
Despite such ambitions for society in general, a large part of Pentecostal 
entrepreneurship manifests itself in the opening of small denominations 
(often micro-denominations) that start off with grandiose ambitions, but 
ultimately remain active only locally. As Paul Gifford notes, Pentecostalism 
has seen the emergence of a “new class of religious professionals, that is to 
say the founders/owners/religious leaders” (Gifford 2009, 154; Gez & Droz 
2021). Unlike the priests of historic churches, these entrepreneurs do not 
enjoy the support of a recognised church platform, nor do they possess 
formal theological training. As Ruth Marshall points out with regards 
to Nigerian Pentecostalism, “While various forms of institutionalised 
accreditation exist, pastoral authority is represented as inhering in a 
personal call from God; anybody with a vision can start a church, a 
fellowship, or a mission, and they do” (Marshall 2009, 12; see also Corten & 
Marshall-Fratani 2001, 5). In Kenya, Pentecostal churches are so numerous 
that the national office cannot keep up with the rate of applications, even as 
the majority of churches probably do not seek official registration.
The arrival on the religious scene of these new entrepreneurs with no 
theological training has thrown into question the separation between social, 
political, economic and religious aspects of life; so much so that it is often 
said that “religion has become just like a business.” Founding a religious 
movement is therefore often considered to be a means of building up a 
political clientele and satisfying preachers’ thirst for power.21 In the eyes of 
many, Kenyan Pentecostals have lost their moral credentials in recent years 
due to repeated financial and sexual scandals (Gez & Droz 2015). Some 
people feel that the political projects of the Pentecostal movement do not 
represent a viable alternative to the current political system, but are simply 
a means for leaders to insert themselves into it. Consequently, Pentecostals 
are considered to be “among the most enterprising entrepreneurs of the 
21. The case of the Pentecostal bishop Margaret Wanjiru of the Jesus is Alive 
Ministries (JIAM) is edifying. She was elected to Parliament in 2007 for 
the ODM in the Starehe Constituency, but then lost her seat in 2013. Despite 
largely mobilising her followers through her sermons, the scandals which 
had enveloped her proved to be fatal. Though her claims that almost 20,000 
voters in Starehe were from her flock are no doubt exaggerated, they underline 
her church followers’ role in her 2007 success (Kareithi, Amos. 2006. “Bishop 
Wanjiru Hopes to Be President.” The Standard, 5 November. http://allafrica.com/
stories/200611060988.html). In January 2013, shortly before the election, she said 
from the pulpit that, “if you do not know who to vote for, call the numbers on the 
screen and we will tell you who to vote for” (JIAM morning service, 13 January 
2013). See Gez & Alvis (2015).
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religious world” (Anderson 2004, 280), and the absence of any centralised 
institutional structure further heightens the appeal of individual initiatives. 
Today, it is common to hear the inhabitants of Nairobi make remarks such 
as, “to become a pastor nowadays, all you need is a Bible and a suit.” Under 
such conditions, it is not surprising that Pentecostalism’s social and political 
long-term impact remains uncertain.
3. Churches and the Pluralist Elections
Since the return of a multi-party political system in 1991, each of the 
six general elections that have been held have revealed a different state 
of Kenyan civil society (Droz & Maupeu 2013; Maupeu 1998). In the late 
1980s, a number of civil society actors criticised the repression of Moi’s 
dictatorial regime and its totalitarian inclinations: tight control of the 
corps intermédiaires (political parties, trade unions, employers, etc.), rising 
numbers of political prisoners, political persecution, and surveillance. In 
the elections of 1988, a new voting process that required voters to line up 
behind their candidate, and the marginalisation of certain ethnic groups, 
shocked many high-profile civil society leaders. Some ministers stood up 
against these trends and criticised the voting system. In close collaboration 
with human rights lawyers, they backed the politicians persecuted for 
demanding free, multi-party elections. Following intense international 
pressure, President Moi—who threatened that ethnic unrest would befall the 
country following the abandonment of the single-party system—authorised 
new political parties, which were created under the patronage of the main 
Churches. During this period, the opposition party utilised religious 
establishments and disseminated its messages through Christian networks. 
But the political class quickly sought to free itself of this religious tutelage, 
and during the electoral campaign of 1992, the clergy was ostensibly left 
aside. Despite its divisions, the opposition was confident about winning 
the elections. However, the re-election of President Moi and the decisive 
victory of his party forced the opposition politicians to reconsider their 
strategy, and their means for expanding their electoral base.
In 1992 and 1993, the main churches worked to accommodate almost 
one hundred thousand refugees fleeing massacres in the Rift Valley. These 
ethnic cleansings were denied by the authorities, who were complicit in 
(if not the actual authors of) the killings (Maupeu 1997). The state and 
the ruling elite ignored the dramatic situation in the Rift Valley, while 
the administration hindered the relief efforts of Christian organisations. 
During this humanitarian crisis, the opposition unconvincingly denounced 
the massacres, creating a rupture between the political class, religious 
forces, and human rights NGOs. Five years later, human rights associations 
dictated the agenda and the themes of the electoral campaign of 1997. 
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As early as 1996, some activists mobilised a diverse public to propose a 
reform of the Constitution. Many Protestant and Catholic opinion leaders 
supported the constitutional reform from the ground up. Nevertheless, 
these attempts were unsuccessful and only superficial modifications were 
introduced to the Constitution, tailor-made to favour President Moi’s re-
election in 1997.
The same year, the opposition organised huge demonstrations in order to 
demand a change to the Constitution before the elections. Convinced by the 
success of these mobilisations, an ailing opposition attempted to recapture 
some of the momentum that had been generated. Once again, politicians 
joined the opposition party, working with the Catholic and Protestant 
Churches. However, six months before the vote, the demonstrations 
escalated due to increased police persecution, and demonstrators were 
beaten inside the Anglican Cathedral in Nairobi. Faced with the number of 
casualties and the risk of anarchy, the clergy and several opposition leaders 
negotiated with the authorities, further marginalising the leaders of the 
social movement. As a result, Christian organisations have long alienated 
human rights NGOs and many lawyers (Maupeu 2001).
In 2002, the Churches hardly appeared in the national electoral campaign. 
Most of them supported the opposition, but their commitment was mostly 
felt at the local level, where they organised the primary round of voting 
for certain parties and endorsed their candidates at religious ceremonies. 
Thus, with the exception of the AIC22 and some Pentecostal movements, the 
Christians strongly supported Mr Kibaki and his party, whose victory was 
also theirs. The new regime cleverly appointed several high-ranking clergy 
members to committees which were essentially well-paid sinecures. Hence, 
these leaders did not look for a reason to criticise the new governmental 
team (Maupeu, Musambayi & Mitullah 2005).
In the 2005 constitutional referendum, the churches uncritically defended 
the modification of the country’s constitution, which were swept away by 
the voters. In the 2007 elections, the Catholic elite ostensibly supported 
the re-election of Mwai Kibaki. The National Council of Churches of 
Kenya (NCCK), which acts as the umbrella organisation for the country’s 
Protestant Churches, seemed to lose its neutrality when its leader ran in the 
legislative elections under the banner of the President’s party. Furthermore, 
many religious leaders, particularly among the Pentecostals, decided to 
enter the race for a seat in Parliament, encouraged by the rejection of the 
2005 draft of the Constitution (Cheeseman 2008; Kavulla 2008; Gez & Alvis 
2015; Gifford 2009; Droz & Maupeu 2013). Thus, the 2007—as well as the 
2013—elections saw a tidal wave of Pentecostal candidates, many of whom 
22. The African Inland Church broke away from an evangelical mission 
originated in the East Coast of the United States.
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came from neo-Pentecostal currents, which preach involvement in world 
affairs and advocate entrepreneurship through their theology of prosperity. 
In 2010, a new version of the Constitution was submitted for referendum 
and was eventually accepted. However, heated debates on the religious 
issues addressed in the Constitution draft—like the legalisation of abortion 
and the autonomous status of the Khadi Courts for the Muslims of Kenya—
underlined the influence of the Christian lobby (Osur 2011).
The elections of 2013 raised fears of a recurrence of the 2008 post-
electoral violence that had inflamed the whole country and left more 
than 1,500 dead. Back then, some religious leaders had played incendiary 
roles by violently supporting their own candidate and fuelling tensions 
between different communities, showing that the churches had grievously 
failed to play their role as peacemaker. Having largely learned from these 
tragic events, they developed programmes to promote national unity and 
to successfully prevent future violence. For example, many ecumenical 
prayer meetings were organised and widely reported in the media. In an 
interfaith meeting broadcast on television, Bishop David Oginde of the 
Nairobi Pentecostal Church (NPC) pointed out that the use of churches as 
electoral stepping-stones by politicians had been sharply curtailed: “If you 
compare this year with the 2007 [elections] for example, you hardly notice 
any church group or any church leader that are praying for, endorsing 
any particular candidates. […] We had a meeting and we agreed [that] we 
pray generally for the elections to be peaceful, we pray for our members 
who are campaigning that God may go before them, but that is [a] general 
prayer” (Citizen TV, 16 February 2013). Nevertheless, the effectiveness of 
these measures is still open to question, given that the forum of Muslim 
chiefs supported the candidacy of Raila Odinga, while Uhuru Kenyatta was 
backed by the association of Muslim organisations.23
The latest elections in 2017, which saw Uhuru Kenyatta’s victory in the 
first round of voting, did not give rise to much public intervention from the 
churches, contrary to what we have seen in previous elections.24
4. Religious Butinage in Kenya
We met Charles in August 2014, near Kisumu on the shores of Lake Victoria 
in Western Kenya. At thirty years old, he was living with his wife, and their 
three children. His parents, both members of Legio Maria (Kustenbauder 
23. Alongside the commitment of the historic churches in electoral politics, 
other religious forces played an influential role, such as neo-traditionalist 
religious movements.
24. Perhaps we can see here the results of the ecumenism created by religious 
butinage. See Droz & Gez (2019).
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2009)—his mother, a born catholic, had to convert in order to marry her 
husband—brought him to Kisumu at a young age. His birth was difficult 
and considered as a miracle brought about by the prayers of the members 
of Legio Maria. His mother was admonished that Charles “at all times 
should be in Legio, should not walk out of Legio.” He remained in this 
denomination for many years, becoming a devout “mass child.” However, as 
the demands of his church his church precluded him from studying, he left 
it in secondary school. But his life was not easy—he passed from odd job to 
odd job, and his house was burgled. For his family, all these troubles were 
the result of him leaving Legio Maria, in contravention of the prophecy 
of his birth. They attempted in vain to convince Charles to return to their 
church. But his woes did not end there. Charles suffered several accidents 
before meeting a young Luo man in a park in Mombasa, who invited him to 
join his small Pentecostal church. Although he really enjoyed this church 
for a while, Charles became exasperated by the political turn the sermons 
took before the 2007 elections. He left this church and returned to Kisumu.
He then approached another church, Deliverance Church, but soon left it 
following institutional quarrels (the central leadership accused its Kisumu 
branch of siphoning off money from the tithe) in order to join another 
Pentecostal denomination led by a white reverend. However, the reverend 
asked him to testify on his behalf before the police, which irritated Charles: 
“I’m sorry for this, [but] one of my objectives of coming to church was to 
pray, not to do [court] cases. I’m sorry, I’m not coming to that.” After some 
time, the institutional quarrel was resolved, and Charles’ wife, as well as his 
children, returned to Deliverance Church where they remain today.
Thinking of the succession of misfortunes that had befallen him, Charles 
admits that he sometimes believed that he was cursed by members of his 
family. In fact, Charles dreaded returning to his home village for fear of 
witchcraft. He explained that he would never go to consult a witchdoctor 
for help, but he admitted to having asked a preacher to pray for him, in 
order to protect him from spells, with little success. He complained of false 
preachers, of the many preachers who divert money from the Church or 
who take advantage of their congregation. Nevertheless, he insisted that 
“back in the day,” the members of Legio Maria were truly animated by the 
Holy Spirit: “We the people, we’ve walked away from God. People [today] 
want to do their things, there is despair, desperate, we want money, and the 
people who know God’s matter, people who are eloquent, who understand 
God’s word, they also seem to take advantage of the same, just to extort 
money from the people.” Charles feels demoralised by the attitudes of 
today’s pastors and admits to not having attended church in more than a 
year. Before that, he visited several denominations, including the Jehovah’s 
Witnesses, without remaining at any for long. He now says he is drawn to 
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Catholicism, having enjoyed the Catholic services he attended in Mombasa 
with his maternal uncle. However, he has clashed with his wife over this, 
as she remains deeply committed to Deliverance Church. Having recently 
bought a television set, he spends his Sunday mornings “church zapping”—
that is, channel-hopping from one religious station to another.
How can we understand a story like Charles’, so varied and yet not 
unfamiliar to the people of Kenya? Statistics tell us a part of the story. 
According to the most recent census data from 2019, Kenya’s population 
of 47.6 million consists of 85.5% Christian (33.5% Protestant, 20.6% Catholic 
and 20.4% Evangelical) and 11% Muslims. The census respondents had to 
choose a single response out of the eight provided, though we observe 
that it is common for many people to participate in the services of 
several denominations. Of course, the census did not consider the degree 
of involvement in religious services either: is it a formal and recognised 
affiliation, a constant participation in a religious service without formal 
affiliation, an episodic participation, or an occasional visit? Finally, knowing 
that in Kenya it is frowned upon not to declare a religious affiliation, it is 
highly possible that respondents claimed an affiliation even if it is barely, 
if at all, practised. In this respect, it is noteworthy that almost a million 
Kenyans still affirm an absence of religion affiliation.
Nevertheless, though religious identity is strongly influenced by 
religious institutions, it is not limited to them. Religious identities in 
Kenya are polymorphous and highly variable. Social science researchers 
have demonstrated—by evoking the concept of “lived religion” (Hall 1997; 
McGuire 2008; Roof 2001)—that religious practices transcend institutional 
boundaries. For their part, Kenyans often declare that “God is one” and 
that religious practices depend on personal preferences or pragmatic and 
contextual considerations, insofar as they keep to the realm of Christianity. 
In her master’s thesis, Elisabeth Wafula (2003, 106-107), a Kenyan, states:
Previously, people attended a Church because of their loyalty to the 
congregation. Even if the Church was not ministering to their needs, they 
remained because of their sense of duty. Nowadays, people hop from Church 
to Church depending on their particular needs and available programs within 
the Church which minister to their needs. Their identity within the Church 
is nolonger [sic] based upon the past, but upon the contributions the Church 
makes on their lives and families. This has indeed brought pressure upon most 
Churches to develop multiple ministries resulting into inter-denomination 
[sic] mobility.25
25. Wafula’s thesis relies on the results of the study done by the Nairobi Urban 
Integration Research Project. The data were collected in the early 2000s from 
1,535 people in Nairobi. 457 among them (30%) claimed to have changed religious 
denomination at least once since birth.
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A more refined approach to religious identities in Kenya, such as Charles’, 
therefore requires acknowledging a relative fluidity of participation in 
religious services, as well as a significant mobility of affiliations, both at 
present, as Wafula indicates, and likely also in the past (Neckebrouck 1978; 
1983; Peterson 1996; 2000; Chanson, Droz, Gez & Soares 2014). Kenyans can 
adopt a denomination that they consider to be the core of their affiliation, 
while maintaining more “peripheral” links to other religious forms, and 
can equally participate in circular religious mobility, or go back and forth 
between churches.
It is therefore possible in Kenya to distinguish between “visits” to 
religious services and affiliation to a church. This distinction highlights 
the possibility of combining simultaneous engagement in different forms 
of participation in religious services with the existence of a hierarchical 
difference between them. The affiliation remains at the heart of belonging to 
a faith, both declared and experienced, while visits represent a “secondary,” 
often exploratory, form of participation. They are generally institutionalised 
and often follow an established protocol (Gez & Droz 2017). Nevertheless, 
such mobility can turn into “church hopping,” a notion describing a person’s 
lack of stable affiliation as a solid primary affiliation is not maintained. An 
individual may be suspected of changing affiliation to create dissension 
or to seek financial or sexual interests. Some, like Charles, prudently limit 
their participation in religious services and stay at home to watch the 
ceremonies of various Christian television programmes, or to follow the 
virtual “crusades” of the televangelists, and consequently are less involved 
in “church hopping” than they are in “church zapping.” For example, a 
Kenyan journalist presents the story of a lady called Christine Ndegwa, 
“a Christian who prefers watching sermons on television to attending 
church.” Ndegwa explains her preferences by alluding to discontent with 
contemporary pastors, who she sees as living a lavish, immoral lifestyle, 
while their congregations languish in poverty. During our research in 
Nairobi, we heard several people give similar examples. In Kenya, there are 
many religious television channels such as Family TV, and international 
religious stations are equally available. Some religious programmes also 
broadcast on private channels. While “church zapping” could come from 
disillusionment with today’s preachers, it could also be a means of coping 
with the demands of wage employment, as waiters or receptionists who 
work on Sundays can also “participate” in religious services, just like taxis 
drivers who listen to these radio programmes while on the road.26
26. Okeyo, Verah. 2013. “Preaching to the Converted: The Rise of Atheism in 
Modern Kenya.” Daily Nation—DN2, 3 July: 2-3. https://nation.africa/kenya/life-
and-style/dn2/the-rise-of-atheism-in-modern-kenya-872868 [archive].
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Such observations emphasise that taking religious practices into account 
requires us to go beyond the “theological” notion of a singular religious 
affiliation, which suggests a strict adherence to explicit institutional 
prescriptions. Rather, the concept of “religious butinage” (named after the 
French term for the foraging movement of bees while gathering pollen) 
makes it possible for us to account for these fluid and varied religious 
practices. To discuss religious butinage is also to examine the social practices 
and the “manières de faire” (“ways of doing,” de Certeau 1980) within the 
religious field, and to thus document religious practices that too often go 
unnoticed: switching from one denomination to another, participating in 
several churches at once without formally adhering to any one, partaking 
in prayer circles that bring together practitioners of various denominations, 
channel-hopping between televised sermons, etc. The Abrahamic religions 
offer a representation of the religious and of religious practices that favours 
the dichotomy between believers and unbelievers. Any view to the contrary 
is perceived as a deviation from orthodoxy. However, religious butinage’s 
manière de faire acknowledges the everyday mobility of the practitioner as 
irreducible to institutional prescriptions.
The practice of religious butinage takes religion into account as a 
practice of (re)production of social relations (neighbourhood, friendships, 
etc.) but also of meaning. The practice of butinage may thus be interpreted 
as allowing Kenyans to accumulate religious resources that offer them 
certain securities in the face of the ever-changing field of religion—in 
which schisms, collapses, and fusions of religious movements are frequent, 
as are suspicions of abuse of power by religious dignitaries (Droz 1997; 
Gez & Droz 2015). Religious butinage, or multiple practices, allows for 
diverse ways of worship to be preserved in case one’s primary, or initial, 
denomination descends into political or financial scandal, or an individual’s 
religious identity transforms in light of lived experience such as geographic 
mobility. Religious identity is in a constant process of renegotiation.
Speaking of religious butinage also takes into account the entanglement 
of the religious world with the secular one (Soares 2009; Soares, Droz & 
Gez 2012; Droz, Soares & Oro 2014; Droz, Soares, Gez & Rey 2016; Droz 
& Gez 2019). Consequently, in order to avoid seeing their followers stray 
into the sins of popular entertainment (alcohol, sex, disco, cinema, etc.), 
the Christian churches offer religious services that are sometimes akin to a 
“show” with musical and theatrical production values on par with those of 
professional performers.
Emphasising the blending of the secular and the religious allows us to 
show that the latter is not only a place of spiritual engagement, but also a 
place of socialisation, recreation, and pleasure (Bayart 2014). Many of our 
interlocutors remarked that the Sunday religious services are very engaging 
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and that they take pleasure in going because the church is “where things 
happen.” Additionally, for the many inhabitants of Nairobi with limited 
financial resources, the leisure activities offered by the capital remain 
inaccessible, meaning that religious services are also seen as an affordable 
entertainment and a way to “pass the time.”
Conclusion
Since colonisation, Christian churches in Kenya have helped to make 
sense of a world in constant upheaval by offering opportunities for 
social advancement, through education or politics, and by achieving (at 
least partially) some of their promises of development (Droz 2016). This 
chapter has highlighted the range of perspectives taken by established 
religious denominations, first in the face of British powers and later under 
independent rule. The country’s religious leadership played sometimes-
contradictory roles confronting the ruling power, before engaging in the 
game of representative democracy during the 2007 and 2013 elections at the 
risk of losing their independence.
This commitment to secular politics was further reinforced by the 
establishment of numerous Pentecostal churches. New religious movements 
(whether they represent independent African churches emerging out 
of missionary churches or Pentecostal movements) have profoundly 
transformed the religious landscape of Kenya. In recent years, the wave of 
neo-Pentecostalism and missionary work (mostly by American preachers) 
has further intensified this process. So much so that, according to a Kenyan 
journalist, “From the 1970s to date, what was and what is are now worlds 
apart.”27 These changes can be seen in the “Pentecostalisation” of Kenyan 
Christianity, to the extent that Pentecostal teachings are today shared by 
many established churches.
But outside the institutional confines of Kenyan religious forms, 
it appears that the “faithful” are much more than that: their religious 
commitments, whether visiting other churches or their primary religious 
affiliation, transcend institutionalised identities and practices. Kenyans like 
Charles move freely within the religious landscape to build their often-
polymorphic and composite religious identities. The study of religious 
denominations should therefore not be limited to institutional dynamics 
such as the political actions of the church and their official discourses. 
Research should equally take into account the social norms and actual 
practices of the congregants, who oscillate between their primary religious 
27. Oduor, Peter. 2013. “The Kenyan Church and the Gospel of Prosperity.” Daily 
Nation—DN2, 13  February: 2-3. https://nation.africa/kenya/life-and-style/dn2/
the-kenyan-church-and-the-gospel-of-prosperity--847652 [archive]. 
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affiliation and multiple visits, not to mention the practice of “religious 
butinage” or “church zapping” on television. The dynamics of these practices 
go beyond the institutional prescriptions and offer a new research horizon 
for analysing religious practices in Kenya and elsewhere.
If we attempt to predict the future of these institutional, personal, 
and political religious dynamics, one might evoke the relatively recent 
emergence of questions about the possibility of no longer affiliating with 
any single church, or recognise the absence of commitment to a religion. 
Even if statistics are not very reliable, Kenyans have a sense that “the 
number of families who have no affiliation with any religion is growing.”28 
Some have argued that this tendency could be explained by the appearance 
of a middle class, whose higher rates of education promotes a “scientific” 
representation of the world and a critical spirit, reinforced by access to new 
means of electronic communication.29 Moreover, this trend might equally 
be associated with the numerous scandals that affected multiple religious 
leaders and their churches. This caused a certain disillusionment affecting 
church leaders and self-proclaimed prophets, who are overly preoccupied 
by very secular things: money, sex and power. Whatever this trend means 
and wherever its supposed causes may lie, it underlines the intense 
mobility—of religion, politics, or identity—within the religious landscape of 
Kenya, and its members.
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The Church  
as a Provider of Material Support:  
An Inner/Outer Circles Perspective
Yonatan N. Gez
In this brief text,1 I discuss independent Pentecostal churches in Kenya as 
facilitators of material support for their members, and illustrate some of 
the dilemmas that these churches face concerning the allocation of limited 
resources in assisting members in need. I argue that, in order to understand 
such practices, we must take into account congregations’ internal diversity, 
including socio-economic disparity and varying degrees of commitment. 
While such divisions might be expected in large congregations, I evoke 
the example of The Sanctuary Mission (pseudonym), an independent 
Pentecostal church of about 40–50 members located in Kisumu, to show 
how even small and quite tightly knit congregations contain such internal 
diversity. Using the distinction between inner- and outer circle members, I 
suggest that churches’ behaviour in response to members’ material needs is 
largely influenced by the tension between repelling and drawing in lesser-
committed members.
Scholars often emphasise the role of religion in maintaining spiritual, 
social, and material benefits as a key for understanding its particular appeal 
in the Global South. For instance, Pippa Norris and Ronald Inglehart hold the 
view whereby societies’ drift away from religion, especially in the Global 
North, can be tied to “existential security—that is, the feeling that survival 
is secure enough that it can be taken for granted” (Norris & Inglehart 
2004, 4). This is clearly not the case with fast-urbanising Kenya, where 
the relevance of religion appears to coincide with volatility and precarious 
living circumstances, above all for the low and floating classes. Already 
as far back as 1977, Andrew Hake suggested that migration to Nairobi 
can generate a thirst for religion, which in turn offers a sense of security 
“particularly when traditional beliefs and groupings are threatened with 
1. This text was written within the context of the project “Structures 
anthropologiques du religieux: butinage et voisinage,” financed by the Swiss 
National Science Foundation (2010-2013; prolonged for 2013-2014). Fieldwork at 
The Sanctuary Mission was carried out between May and July 2014. Some of the 




break-up” (Hake 1977, 234). More recently, with regard to Kenya’s thriving 
Pentecostal movement, Damaris S. Parsitau, and Philomena N. Mwaura 
(2010, 16) argued along similar lines that “Pentecostalism provides a place 
of spiritual security and personal community to people who find Kenya’s 
rapid social change to be both unsettling and frightening.”
One of the ways through which religious communities can serve as a 
haven of stability is by providing material support to its members in their 
hour of need. Informed by a sense of camaraderie and Christian values, 
as well as by a missionary zeal, churches tend to acknowledge a certain 
obligation towards the wellbeing of their members. As examples throughout 
the history of Christianity show, this sense of material obligation tends to 
be intertwined with an ultimate preoccupation with spiritual salvation.2 
Wherever their motivation for assistance may lie, Kenyan churches 
are often perceived as islands of solidarity within a general climate of 
institutional mistrust.3 But while mainline churches may afford to finance 
special ministries dedicated to assisting members in need, independent 
Pentecostal churches have less room for manoeuvre. These churches, which 
have emerged since the 1980s-1990s, struggle with intense competition. 
With their small and mainly lower classes congregations, and little to no 
overseas partnership and financial backing, many of them barely manage 
to keep themselves afloat.
While these new churches might not have a designated department 
or fund for assisting members in need, they may offer congregational 
assistance on an ad hoc basis, for example by using the church platform 
to hold fundraising called harambee.4 Yet such interventions tend to be 
quite rare, and are limited to what one Sanctuary Mission member termed 
“overwhelming problems,” such as death in the family and outstanding 
hospital bills. Intervening in cases of everyday challenges, such as school 
fees arrears or need for travel fare, risks attracting disgruntlement and 
bitterness from other members, who feel that they too are struggling, and 
can lead to accusations of nepotism. As one lay leader at The Sanctuary 
Mission explained, “you cannot say in front of the church [that you need 
school fees]. You know, sometimes, if we say [that] we have a fundraising 
2. One leader at The Sanctuary Mission evoked the image of the New Testament 
story of the wedding at Cana, whereby Jesus’ miraculous provision of wine 
made the wedding participants attentive to his words. As my interviewee 
concluded, “some people, if we go the extra mile to show we care for them, for 
their needs, they will be motivated to sit down more and listen to what we are 
teaching them.”
3. This being said, there appears to be indications that religious trust in Kenya 
is eroding (Gez & Droz 2015).
4. Such collections may take place on Sunday after the main service.
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for someone, there is somebody on the other side who will be in need for 
school fees too.”
More can be said once we draw a distinction between The Sanctuary 
Mission’s inner- and outer membership circles. The church’s inner circle, 
which amounts to about 15 individuals, consists of the church committee, 
which includes the clergy and lay members engaged in various institutional 
departments. This inner-circle congregational commitment appears to have 
significant correspondence to the congregation’s income and educational 
elite. Overall, members of the inner group hold more prestigious, middle 
class jobs (e.g. accountant, teacher, businessman) compared to less 
committed congregants. Thus, for instance, the five partners in The 
Sanctuary Mission’s lucrative car hire business, which requires substantial 
initial capital through the ownership of at least one vehicle, are all members 
of the church committee. The wider Sunday assembly, by contrast, includes 
a majority of lesser-committed, low-income individuals, many of whom are 
youth.
This association between socio-economic advantage and assuming 
church roles is probably not coincidental. In my research, I often noticed 
that better-educated and better-paid individuals tend to gravitate towards 
church leadership. While this might be because such individuals see 
themselves, and are perceived by others, as natural leaders, they may also 
be coaxed into such positions in attempt to ensure access to their talents 
and means, and to ensure their long-standing institutional commitment in 
an environment of high institutional turnover (Gez and Droz 2017). Indeed, 
placing a member in a position of institutional responsibility involves a tacit 
expectation of him or her to be committed to the success of that particular 
ministry—among other things, through pledging economic contributions. 
By contrast, it appears that, by and large, lesser educated and lesser paid 
Kenyans are more prone to religious mobility. This tendency might be 
linked to precarious living and pragmatic outlook, as well as to greater 
reliance on religion as a provider of such services as healing (Gez 2018; 
Gifford 2009, 125–33).
In a highly competitive religious market, the church is particularly 
preoccupied with drawing members of the outer circles towards greater 
commitment, for instance by inviting them to join one of countless church 
departments.5 When it comes to members’ material needs, while being 
5. Thus, for instance, despite its small size, The Sanctuary Mission has a 
complex institutional structure, which can be understood as one way of binding 
members towards greater institutional commitment. The church’s ministries 
appear to include the following: women, men, and youth ministries; Sunday 
school; church development; instruments; praise and worship; intercession; 
ushering; and discipleship. 
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assisted by the church may help to bind a non-committed outer circle 
member, it may simultaneously repel other members, who already feel 
burdened by Pentecostal churches’ reputation as emphasising economic 
contributions. As one church leader explained, “when we say, “next week 
we have fundraising, we need money to assist somebody’s school fees, we 
hope to do like this”—we realised that when they reach that day, other 
members are not coming—[namely,] the non-committed ones.”
Understanding this distinction between inner and outer circles and the 
risk of disaffiliation on the part of outer circle members offers insights 
into the considerations surrounding members’ assistance at The Sanctuary 
Mission. All formal requests for assistance must pass through the church 
committee, which then deliberates and decides whether to pass the request 
on to the congregation and to organise a formal fundraiser. While the 
committee may reject requests or approve them, cases that are less than 
“overwhelming” are most likely to be resolved within the committee itself. 
One of my interviewees explained this procedure using the following, 
hypothetical example: “[if a member needs money for] transport to go and 
see someone who is sick in Nairobi […] and we announce that in church—
we cannot [do that]. They need transport, so we come and sit [in the church 
committee], […] the pastor gives 500, I give 500, so-and-so gives 500, that 
money is enough.” While resolving members’ needs within the committee 
level might be economically strenuous for those inner circle members, 
such a course of action may offer an effective response to a number of 
challenges. As the committee is predominantly comprised of the church’s 
socio-economic elite, providing solutions within the committee may obey 
a redistributive logic, whereby those who are in need—who are most likely 
to be from among the fragile outer circle—are assisted directly by the 
higher earners from among the inner circle. Moreover, resolving individual 
challenges on that level can mitigate the discomfort of excessive demands 
from the church’s lower-class lay members through the Sunday assembly, 
thus reducing the risk that appealing for assistance might drive outer-circle 
members out of the church. Indeed, the better-resourced members of the 
inner circle might hope that, by assuming the costs of assisting outer-circle 
members in their hour of need, they would be able to draw them towards 
greater commitment.
One more advantage to such strategy of action is discreteness. From 
the assistance seeker’s perspective, resolving challenges within the church 
committee replaces the need to face the entire congregation and announce 
one’s economic fragility and dependence publicly. This discreetness might 
also be preferred by the institution, for the inconspicuousness of such 
appeals saves the church from the risk of incurring an influx of additional 
requests. The Sanctuary Mission already had such a negative experience 
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when, some years back, it experimented with issuing membership cards, 
yet soon had to abandon the idea, after it has seemingly given members a 
sense of entitlement to material assistance. As the church’s pastor explained 
to me, the issuance of cards attracted a stream of requests, including from 
uncommitted—and even former—members, who re-emerged, waving their 
membership card as proof of the church’s obligation towards them. Indeed, 
in a setting where basic material lack is high, the church must consider 
how its moves might open the floodgate to unrealizable demands and 
overwhelm the rest of the congregation.
It remains to be seen to what extent what was observed in the case 
of The Sanctuary Mission—and especially, the rough association between 
degrees of membership commitment and social class—can be generalised 
as a common trend in Kenya, or even beyond. Patterns may vary between 
small, medium and large congregations, as well as across socio-economic 
levels and degree of congregational disparity, and between urban and rural 
churches.
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Minorities of Indo-Pakistani Origin
Michel Adam
Translated by Shruti Singhal
At the beginning of the twenty-first century, the population of Kenya 
includes minorities of Indian or Pakistani origin whose number 
(approximately 100,000 people, or 0.3% of the total population) is unrelated 
to their economic, social and cultural importance (Nowik 2010, 132–33).
At the crossroads of several cultural and linguistic areas (Bantu, 
Nilotic, Cushitic, Arab-Swahili), Kenya is an ethnically composite country, 
populated by successive waves of migration over the past centuries. If most 
of the country’s ethnic groups are of African descent, other groups—despite 
the fact that they may have established in Kenya long ago in history—
were coming from more distant territories, in any case outside of the 
African continent. This is the situation of the Arab and Persian minorities, 
established on the coast of the Indian Ocean since the beginning of the 
Middle Ages, or of the populations from the Indian subcontinent discussed 
in this chapter.1
Compared to its western coast, which is facing the desolate expanses of 
the Atlantic Ocean, the eastern coast of the African continent opens onto 
an inland sea dotted with islands. From Yemen to the south of India, it is 
bordered by lands which were once populous and prosperous, and by means 
of a regular regime of trade winds, lend themselves to important human 
and commercial exchanges. Navigating at high speeds, big dhows coming 
from the coast of India could—and can still today—reach unhindered the 
coasts of Africa and Madagascar from the beginning of the winter monsoon 
(October to March) and return during the summer monsoon to their home 
ports in favour of the inversion of the trade winds. Closely associated 
with the African settlements of the Arabs and Persians since the sixteenth 
century, various Indian traders from the regions of Gujarat and Sindh did 
not fail, as the Portuguese navigators testified, to arm ships coming from 
India and the Persian Gulf, occasionally financing cargo caravans within 
1. The curious reader will find much more complete information on the subject 
in the book that the author published in French (Adam 2010), and its English 
translation (Adam 2016). Other sources of information include Adam (2004; 2006). 
The English translation of the 2006 text, published in 2010, is seriously flawed 
(“A Microcosmic Minority: The Indo-Kenyans of Nairobi,” in Nairobi Today: The 
Paradox of a Fragmented City, see: http://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctvk3gmfc.11).
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the African continent and engaging in local trade activities in Zanzibar, 
Pemba, Mombasa and as far as in the northern parts of Kenya’s coast.
If the presence of Indians on the Kenyan coast is ancient, their settlement 
in the interior of the country is comparatively recent: it dates from the 
late nineteenth  century and corresponds to the establishment of British 
colonies in Eastern Africa.
From the beginnings of British colonisation, the British East Africa 
Protectorate, a sparsely populated territory and climatically welcoming to 
European immigration, became, in the eyes of the colonial authorities, a 
sort of extension of the Indian empire geographically quite close and easy 
for marine access. While the use of the Indian rupee as an instrument of 
exchange became dominant in the country, the small staff of the African 
colony (clerics, domestic, policemen and soldiers) were recruited on a 
voluntary basis in the northern and western provinces of the sub-continent 
(Baluchistan, Punjab, Gujarat, Kerala). In order to ensure the rapid 
construction of a railway linking Mombasa to the protectorate of Buganda 
and because they were anxious to distinguish the professional qualities of 
an already trained workforce, the British called on 35,000 skilled Indian 
workers (masons, blacksmiths, carpenters, surveyors, drivers, mechanics, 
etc.) to work in Kenya. After most of these contract workers were returned 
to their country at the completion of the railway, several waves of voluntary 
immigrants succeeded in the first quarter of the twentieth century. 
Almost all of these migrants were from intermediate castes (craftsmen 
and technicians, skilled workers, traders, employees) who came to make a 
fortune in the country. By settling in the cities but also in the intermediate 
villages and in the proximity of the peasant populations, these newcomers 
understood very quickly that the African population, which the British 
incited to enroll in a monetary economy, represented a very vast market 
(Gregory 1993, 11).
Like in South Africa, Indian immigration to Kenya—and to East Africa 
in general—was encouraged by the colonial authorities. Following the 
expansionist and imperialist aims of Cecil Rhodes, the British had in 
mind that a vast Indo-African confederation could be ruled from India. 
In this imperial context characterised by large demographic disparities 
and significant inequalities in technical development, the purpose of 
population movements was to ensure a better distribution of the human 
resources, necessary for the development of each province. In Kenya, 
a territory of a great future already promised to an important European 
settlement but devoid of resources of intermediate level manpower (e.g. 
technicians, tradesmen, administrative staff), the colonial power strove to 
gather the human means susceptible to work on what was called at the time 
“development” (mise en valeur), even sketching the idea (yet abandoned 
Minorities of Indo-Pakistani Origin
315
before the 1920s) of a massive installation of Hindu Patel small farmers2 in 
the distant hinterland of the port of Mombasa and around Kisumu. In the 
period between the two wars, Indians quickly exceeded Europeans. From 
44,000 individuals in 1931, the number of Indians reached 177,000 in 1962, 
or 2% of the total population, and almost 20% of the urban population.
Like in other imperial spaces where the logic of colonial confinement 
ruled, the socio-economic and socio-cultural model of the ethnic division 
of labor was applied even without being establishing institutionally. This 
system of territorial exploitation followed two regulatory principles:
• First principle. The colonial society was made up of three specialised and 
hierarchical community groups: 
 —the Europeans, about 30,000 people at the end of the colonial 
period, who, after seizing the best lands, reserved for themselves the 
very remunerative functions of agro-export exploitation (tea, coffee, 
cotton, etc.), general administration and command; 
 —Africans, confined to reserves, were dedicated to food production; 
under the control of the British administration, some of them were 
mobilised for subordinate services (domesticity, forced labor) and to 
serve as auxiliaries to large export agriculture; 
 —Indians were assigned to economically and socially intermediate 
tasks, which were themselves divided according to the community 
specialisations related to the caste system. They were appointed 
with trusted administrative responsibilities (state employees, health 
personnel, police officers, postal and railway staff), or were whole-
sale and retail traders, qualified technicians, service providers, small 
industrial contractors. Overtime, they encroached, as far as possible, 
on the privileges of Europeans, gradually controlling a growing 
share of industry, banking and insurance, gaining access to many 
liberal profession positions thank to their first-class university de-
grees, thus becoming lawyers, architects, doctors, pharmacists, etc.
• Second principle. The three production and community entities were 
deemed complementary, not in competition. Enclosed in specific and 
largely exclusive activities, these communities exchanged goods and 
services but were not (or only marginally) competing economically. 
Thus, Indians were (legally) excluded from agricultural activities while 
Africans were banned from export farming and removed (de facto) from 
trade and industry.
These three communities remained physically and socially separated 
in accordance with the principles of colonial apartheid, which was not 
a legal but a de facto partition in force until the threshold of the 1960s, 
and materialised through the system of African “reserves,” residential 
2. Patel: caste of peasants and traders from north-western India.
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segregation in the city, segregation at school, in hospital and in society, 
strict endogamy, etc. Without endorsing the apartheid principles of which 
they were also the victims, the Indians made do with—and in some respects 
profited from—the tripartite division of labour and communal separation 
which reflected the division of castes still in force in India.
As secondary actors in the anti-colonial struggle, and being unpopular 
among the African population, East African Indians suffered from 
xenophobic reactions in the aftermath of African independence with 
partial expulsion and massacres in Zanzibar, mass expulsion in Uganda 
(Prunier 1990), and discriminatory measures in Kenya. At the end of a 
period of uncertainty corresponding to a strong demographic regression, 
they nevertheless preserved over the years their social and cultural 
characteristics while consolidating their economic power over the country.
1. Main Characteristics  
of the Indian Diaspora in Kenya
Also present in the other countries of Eastern and Southern Africa (Tanzania, 
Uganda, Malawi, Zimbabwe, Botswana, South Africa), minorities of Indian 
origin in Kenya mainly live in major cities (Nairobi, Mombasa, Kisumu, etc.) 
Some of them also reside in secondary urban centres, including the most 
remote rural villages. Since the first years of independence, the significant 
reduction in their demographic importance has been accentuated by the 
considerable increase in African population, and even more in the urban 
population. From 2% of the total population in 1962, their numbers fell to 
0.7% in 2010 and to 1.5% of the urban population instead of 20%.
The diaspora of Indian origin has, for two or three decades, been 
partially renewed by the more or less clandestine influx of migrants from 
India. The latter are often eager, at the end of a first professional experience 
in Africa, for a migratory rebound towards a Western country. Typically 
recruited from the Internet and from the middle class, this recent wave is 
mostly made up of young single graduates, facing unemployment in their 
home country, as a result of positive discrimination measures in favour 
of “low castes” and “disadvantaged classes,” also called “scheduled casts” 
or “backward classes” respectively (Jaffrelot 2002). These new expatriates 
are attested in several branches of industry, banking, import export and 
international hotels. Equipped with a high level of qualification (especially 
in IT, commerce and management), low wage requirements and poorly 
welcomed by most Africans, these new expatriates are nicknamed rockets 
(“rockets”). Evaluating their numbers is all the more difficult as many of 
these young workers are undocumented and have obtained residency status 
through bribery (Adam 2010, 29–30; see also Prunier 1998).
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On its side, the Indo-Kenyan population of older stock maintains over 
generations the geographic dispersion of some of its members, both in East 
Africa and in a limited number of English-speaking countries, from the 
United Kingdom to North America to Australia. In their eyes, this propensity 
for mobility shows the capacity for reconversion associated with the family 
geographical break-up, but without calling into question—as will be seen 
below—the claim for the status of autochthones which people of Indian 
origin living in Africa frequently make.
Originally, in the great majority of the north-west of the subcontinent 
(Gujarat, Punjab, Maharawra, secondarily Kerala, and Pakistani Sindh), the 
Indian diaspora in Kenya has no less form a sort of cultural concentrate 
of India or apart from the political dimension, like “India in reduction.” 
Almost all the social and religious communities in India are represented, 
but in different proportions than in the former metropolis: more Muslims 
(35 to 40% instead of 14%), and among these, a significant proportion of 
Shiites (40% instead of 13%, including a large proportion of Ismailis); more 
“classes” or “castes” averages, and very few low or very low castes, among 
which the untouchables are absent. Finally, among Hindus, representatives 
of schismatic organisations form very large minorities (15% of Jains instead 
of 0.3% in India, 8% of Sikhs instead of 1.8%). Other minorities which are 
tiny in India, such as Christians or Pârsis, are also over-represented in 
Kenya (10% Christians instead of 3%, 0.05% Pârsis instead of 0.01%). This 
prevalence of religious minorities maintains highly tolerant behaviour 
among all communities (Adam 2010, 32–33).
The Indians are grouped into 100 community associations formed by 
reference of the following three criteria of belonging: denominational 
membership, caste (or, for Muslims and Sikhs, the professional corporation 
that stand for it), and the region of origin. Community associations are 
instances of sociability and cultural and ceremonial animation, mutual aid 
and cooperation, and legal protection. They own their religious buildings, 
their recreation centres, their clubs, and wherever possible, their schools, 
hospitals, credit societies, radio-TV stations, and so on. In the case of 
certain communities (Ismailis and, to a lesser extent, Bohra), the association 
leaders possess as delegates supranational religious authorities and have 
quasi-sovereign powers: they raise taxes, control the allocation of credit, 
register acts of civil status, manage health and social services, administer 
sanctions, etc.
Although divided religiously and statutorily, the Indo-Kenyans are 
nonetheless united by the feeling of a common belonging as well as, for 
the most part, by the same geographical origin and by the existence of 
a widely shared cultural heritage: language (Gujarati or Hindi), etiquette, 
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social, dress and culinary usages, secular rituals (almost all of Hindu origin, 
but commonly observed by Muslims and Christians).
The feeling of unity, which is reactivated in situations of xenophobic 
pressure, is further reinforced by the fact that in the diaspora situation, Indo-
Kenyans are generally perceived by Africans (who are often ill-informed 
of the complex differences that separate the different communities) as 
belonging to a single socio-cultural entity. Sometimes neglected—or even 
decried—in inter-community relations, the community of belonging feeds 
on the external gaze or even more on threats made by others.
2. The Place of the Indians  
in Multi-Ethnic Kenyan Society
In the aftermath of independence, when called to choose between 
departure and integration into a new socio-political group, the Kenyan 
Indians chose a middle way: they preferred to establish in the country but 
refused full integration as they were invited to do by the new authorities. 
Successive Kenyan governments accepted this compromise—concerned, 
for their part, not to jeopardise sectors of activity considered vital for the 
prosperity of the country—and respected a kind of self-segregation among 
Indian communities contrary to the principles of diversity advocated by 
the paladins of independence. The new situation that had thus just been 
created was in several times detrimental to the immigrant communities, 
yet it was to continue until today. Its characteristics can be described as 
follows:
1. Partial survival of the community and statutory division of labour;
2. Displayed willingness to preserve the culture of the origins;
3. Low social and political integration.
1) Despite the denial by the independent Kenyan state of the formalised 
framework of the old ethnic division of labour (statutory barriers, 
corporatist protections, social segregation, etc.) and the competition of 
Indians with Africans concerned about promotion economic and social, 
the Indians have maintained and greatly expanded their hold on trade and 
industry activities in many ways. Having acceded to the British ownership 
of the main means of production, they now control about 80% of industrial 
branches (agri-food, textile, metallurgy, pharmacy, plastics, paper and 
packaging, chemistry, etc.), a growing share of agribusiness (fruit and 
vegetables), tourism and hospitality, 50% of banks and insurance, the bulk 
of retail, wholesale and retail of the press and advertising agencies which 
is a very important fraction of real estate activities and liberal professions 
(Adam 2010: 45–52). In Indian-controlled enterprises, recruitment takes 
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place on family and community bases, with African staff being, with some 
exceptions, maintained in low professional positions.
The professional compartmentalisation associated with the caste 
has lost its binding character nowadays, yet the division of professions 
specific to each community still corresponds, to a certain extent, to ancient 
corporatist traditions: leatherworking, goldsmithing, laundry, metallurgy, 
textiles, bank, etc. Due in large part to the inertia of acquired situations 
(transmission of knowledge and capital), these technico-professional 
continuums—which are frequently modernised and brought up to date—do 
contribute to an Indian stranglehold on certain branches of activity.
In the current distribution of professions, we observe interesting 
symbolic transpositions that are quite similar to those encountered in 
Europe in the history of the old corporations. This is how Soni (jewelers) 
are today jewelers and watchmakers, but also sellers of curios; Dhobi 
(whiteners) have the monopoly of Dry Cleanings while Mochi (shoemakers) 
are industrial and shoe merchants; Wanza Darji (tailors) are industrial and 
clothing traders; the Nayee (barbers) are frequently doctors and surgeons; 
the Sutar (carpenters) are building contractors, etc.
2) Socially, Indians remain very weakly integrated into African society. 
The old segregation imposed by the colonial tutelage has been replaced 
by an informal self-regulation that leaves little room for a social and 
cultural mix: separate residential neighbourhoods, denominational schools, 
community hospitals, social and sports clubs, etc.
One of the first reasons for this social isolation, stemming from very 
ancient prescriptions of the Hindu culture, resides, according to the Indians 
themselves, in the repulsion with regard to natural and organic matters—
earth, blood, bodily substances—commonly manipulated by Africans and 
generally placed by their counterparts in the symbolic register of the 
impure. Attached to the chtonian rites, consumers of alcohol, beef and 
animal blood, operators of the human body (on the occasion of the initiation 
ceremonies), the Africans are opposed in all, by their religious and daily 
practices, to these canonical preventions, as they are in any case displayed 
by orthodoxy. One of the consequences of this opposition is the almost 
total absence of commensality between Indians and Africans as expressed 
in the register of food and inter-corporal contact.
Secondly, community endogamy, which was inherited from religious 
and statutory prescriptions, resists the temptations of mixed marriage, even 
within the diaspora itself. While religious endogamy (still very strict) itself 
contributes to limiting inter-marriages between Indians and Africans to a 
small minority of Sunni Muslims (Shiism having practically no followers in 
East Africa), ethnic endogamy, in the broad sense, represents, in the eyes of 
the Indians, only an enlarged form of caste endogamy. At the same time, it 
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seems to be self-evident as caste endogamy, for most of the part, has retained 
its dissuasive force. Thus, there are very few Indo-African marriages, but low 
percentages are nonetheless on the growth, especially among young people 
with higher education from a foreign country. Moreover, these marriages, 
when they exist, are always limited to the union of a man of Indian origin 
and of an African woman, a formula which inevitably leads—because of the 
patrilineal rule—to the absorption of wife and children by the husband’s 
family. It thus excludes the opposite hypothesis of the insertion of a woman 
of Indian descent and her descent into African culture.
The logic of community confinement has two complementary effects: it 
limits the impregnation of African cultures among representatives of the 
diaspora—except for the use of the Swahili language generally adopted by all 
Indians; and it contributes greatly to the preservation of the Indian culture 
of origin (religion, language, clothing, food, social code, aesthetics, etc.), a 
culture that remains foreign and frequently indecipherable to Africans.
3) The weak involvement of the Indian diaspora in the political life of 
their host countries is another aspect of community juxtaposition with East 
Africa. Indians form informal pressure groups, sometimes very intricate 
in circles of power. Yet, with some exceptions, they do not participate in 
public political debates, show little partisan commitment and despite the 
political alliance attempts initiated after independence, they delegate very 
few representatives in the local or national deliberative instances.
3. Identity Issues and the Future of Indians in Kenya
In many respects, however, the situation of the Indians does not correspond 
to the caricature of xenophobic slogans which make them foreigners in 
Kenya and emissaries of rival interests. Kenyan Indians, like all East 
African Indians, have largely broken their ties with the homeland of their 
ancestors. Although India remains a place of occasional pilgrimage and an 
unsurpassed reference to revitalise the culture of origins (music, dance, 
literature, cinema, etc.), it has become a foreign land, socially, economically 
and politically speaking as well as in terms of family connections, and is in 
no case represents a possible reverse migratory appeal. For most of them, 
the Indians of Kenya have been settled in Africa for several generations 
and a majority hold Kenyan citizenship, so much so that they can as just 
be considered as Africans of Indian origin, being Indo-Africans or Asian-
Africans as they name themselves.
In ways similar to the South African Indians but distinct from the West 
Indians and the Indonesians, the identity situation of the Kenyan Indians 
is original and, in some respect, hitherto unseen. Interlocked identities, in 
the first place, are remarkable. Born in Kenya, an Indian from the diaspora 
engages, successively or simultaneously, half a dozen identity references: 
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his family, the geographical and social environment of his childhood, his 
vernacular language, his religious community, his caste (or what stands 
for it), his two vehicular languages (Swahili and English) and the cultural 
environment of its insertion his modern life (school, profession, social 
environment, etc.), and his citizenship (Kenyan). Moreover, and in a 
complementary way, as certain religious denominations are minorities—a 
dominant pattern in East Africa, with the Ismailis, the Bohra, the Jain, 
the Pârsis, etc.—, transnational community attachment has become the 
privileged protective reference, beyond the nation-states. As mentioned 
earlier, this is how the Ismailis, for example, find in the Aga Khan institutions 
quasi-state services (e.g. bank, judiciary, hospital, education, etc.). Such 
transnational ties facilitate the establishment of industrial, commercial and 
financial networks. The frequent dispersion of the families—a phenomenon 
that is independent from economic expansion—continuously maintains the 
link with other regions of the world and cosmopolitan references. Already 
influenced by several cultures (Indian, Anglo-American, African) and 
multiple identities (Indo-community, national-African), many families of 
the diaspora are disseminated across the globe due to the contingencies 
of academic curricula (children enrolled in Anglo-Saxon universities) or 
to secondary emigration (other African countries, North America, Europe, 
Australia, etc.). National identity, which Africans reproach Indians for not 
being attached to—though they are themselves not always attached to it 
more than to another regional or clan identity—is not, however, negligible 
value for the Indians. But it connects to other identity referents that 
compose complex individual trajectories, and in some ways always unique. 
The problem of the Indians is then no longer to choose between several 
trajectories situated both within and outside their person; it is rather 
to discover the way to make these multiple components coexist whilst 
respecting their duties as citizens and the laws of their host country.
The array of cultural characteristics specific to Indo-Africans in general 
evokes the description by Arjun Appadurai (2001) of the “postmodern 
diasporas” as well as the notion of the “end of the territories” used by 
Bertrand Badie (1995). In many ways, these scattered minorities are the 
illustrations of globalisation on the move across the globe. Without exclusive 
territorial ties, they deploy their activities on a transcontinental scale and 
communicate easily with their distant correspondents in a world without 
borders. However, they have not given up their identity ties. The reference 
to largely reconstructed or imagined cultural resources—for example, in 
the territorial references of ancient castes in the distant and abstract past—
revives Benedict Anderson’s “imagined communities” and the mobilisation 
of their respective “ethnoscapes” (Anderson 1996).
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Are they citizens of their countries and citizens of the world? It is almost 
in these terms that in East Africa a minority of political activists pleading for 
integration present themselves against the conception of the “isomorphism 
of the extremes” between territory, origin and religion. Without partisan 
belonging and political ties, they plead the cause of citizen integration 
(national preference in economic matters, fiscal citizenship, opening of 
companies to African leaders, etc.), without denying the diversity of their 
cultural references or their cosmopolitan attachments. Represented by 
lawyers, teachers, doctors, and tradesmen, these activists display that their 
links with Africans and sometimes give the example of social mix through 
marriage. Despite the support of the liberal press (Nairobi’s Daily Nation, 
for example), their commitments, however, are currently largely unheard 
of by the public.
Conclusion
As a conclusion, let us to return to a debate that has stirred the African and 
Indo-African intellectual circles for a number of years and briefly above 
mentioned.
As Kenyan citizens, the question arises—once again—whether Kenya’s 
Indians can be considered “Africans,” that is, indigenous or autochthones 
in this country, or not? In other words, at what point does one stop being 
a foreigner or allochthone, knowing of course that in all countries of 
the world, most but if not all autochthones are former allochthones. To 
define autochthony is apparently, therefore, about assessing how long ago 
establishment in a particular place happened. It goes without saying that an 
answer in terms of temporal depth calls other questions of a socio-cultural 
nature. Indeed time is not a condition in itself here, but a simple factor 
of one of the way more fundamental attributes of the identity of “native,” 
namely, not so much the erasure as such of the previous origins but the 
irreversibility of immigration defined as the impossibility of a return to that 
origin.
Considering this important clarification, we can call “autochthone,” in 
the general sense of the term, any person who can not avail themselves of 
other family ties as well as social and socio-cultural ties than in the country 
of their birth. To put it differently, it defines a person who cannot envisage, 
even as a possibility, a return to the country of their forebears, even in the 
hypothesis that such a country could be identified.
Just like the Maasai—who arrived in the country just 250 years ago—, the 
Indo-Kenyans are at home in Kenya. The curious walker can discover on 
the shores of the Indian Ocean, a few kilometres north of Mombasa but at 
some distance from any human settlement, a Hindu temple set in a marine 
cave, partially covered by the waves at high tide. This temple is still very 
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popular with the faithful of the neighbourhood and can be dated more than 
200 years, and it is not impossible that it is much older. No African has ever 
thought of questioning the legitimacy of Indians to hold this temple on the 
African soil of their ancestors.
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Kenya’s Coast: Religion, Race, 
Ethnicity and the Elusive Nature of 
Political Community
Justin Willis & Hassan Mwakimako
In January 2019, Kenya’s already crowded political landscape was joined 
by another new party. The Umoja Summit Political Party was, avowedly, a 
party for the coast “formed on the basis of bringing back the elusive unity 
of the region,” as its founder declared.1 Observers might have been forgiven 
for regarding this initiative with scepticism. Following the general elections 
of 2013 there had been a series of meetings amongst a slightly shifting cast 
of politicians from the six counties which had—until the implementation of 
the 2010 constitution—made up Kenya’s Coast Province. Those meetings 
too had announced the formation of a new party to embody coastal unity.2 
Even then, the idea was one with a long and inglorious history. There had 
been several avowedly “coast” parties in the brief initial phase of party 
politics in the late 1950s and early 1960s—the Coast People’s Party, the 
Coast African People’s Union, the Kenya Protectorate National Party 
(Salim 1973). The idea that the coast should have its own party had been 
revived in the 1990s, with a succession of parties laying claim to this role: 
Shirikisho and the Kenya African Democratic Union–Asili are the most 
obvious examples (Gona 2008). Again and again, it has been argued that a 
distinct political constituency of wapwani (“coast people”) or (as some put 
it) “coastarians” requires united political representation.3
The idea of such a party reflects Kenya’s wider politics which, while 
they have been described as ethnic or “ethno-nationalist,” may more 
usefully be called “ethno-regional”—since the grievances that lie behind 
ethnic mobilisation are a long-term product of regional inequalities (Muigai 
2004; Branch & Cheeseman 2009, 3). Regional big men seek to mobilise 
1. Baya, Samuel. 2019. “New Coast Party Out to Woo Hassan Joho, Amason 
Kingi.” Daily Nation, 27 January. https://www.nation.co.ke/news/politics/USPP-
the-new-party-in-the-Coast/1064-4953386-8hvi3kz/index.html [archive].
2. “Coast Region to Form One Political Party.” 2014. The Star, 6 January. 
3. “Coast MPs to Quit ODM for New Party.” 2014. The Star, 1 April; “Coast Leaders 
to Discuss Political Future.” 2014, The Star, 13 November; “MPs Form Group for 
Unity, Economic Clout.” 2015. The Star, 17 November.
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and maintain political constituencies which are defined both by ethnicity 
and locality, amid a popular sense that government is unpredictable and 
responsive only to claims made through the affective ties of kinship, 
ethnicity and locality. The core term of this politics is marginalisation. It is 
a term that expresses a salient historical truth—that the centralised nature 
of the post-independence constitution allowed incumbent presidents to 
channel the spoils of power to their own home regions. It is also a term 
that has become something of a cliché; now every act of political claims-
making tends to be prefaced by the assertion that a particular community 
and region has been marginalised. Yet those who claim to speak for the 
coast will readily agree that the region has been especially subject to 
marginalisation under British rule and subsequently; grievances over land, 
education and employment are keenly felt.
Despite their unanimity on that core issue, however, those who claim 
to represent the coast have never actually created a distinctive coast party 
with general support, nor is there likely to be one in the near future. Though 
a succession of politicians from the coast have risen to brief prominence, 
all have struggled to mobilise widespread support at the coast itself. The 
idea of a coast party has been encouraged by the sense that since 2007 there 
has been a strong vote at the coast for Raila Odinga’s Orange Democratic 
Movement. But as this chapter will suggest, the coast has not been, and still 
is not, a single political community. There are multiple divisions among the 
people who live in the six counties of the former Coast Province; like other 
ethno-regional identities, the coast is in practice deeply contested. Raila 
Odinga’s apparent popularity in a succession of elections and referenda 
rested on a shared sense that the coast has been disadvantaged by central 
government—but was possible partly because he is not from the coast, and 
so cannot be readily identified with any particular one of the groups who vie 
to embody the coast. While “the coast” can be imagined as a singularity—
the antithesis of “up-country” Kenya—there are in truth are many coasts, 
and they exist in tension with one another.
1. Where is the Coast?
A campaign for secession flourished briefly on the coast just before Kenya’s 
independence in the early 1960s, and has been revived in the early twenty-
first century in the context of debates over Kenya’s constitution (Willis 
& Gona 2013). The campaign has always been driven by fears of political 
and economic domination by people from other parts of Kenya, but it was 
partly predicated on a historical distinction. The initial establishment of 
British authority at the coast, in the 1880s, had rested on the legal basis 
of the 1886 Anglo-German treaty, which had declared a ten-mile strip, 
running south along the coast from the mouth of the Tana River, to be the 
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territory of the Sultan of Zanzibar. The Sultan leased this to the British 
East Africa Company in 1887. In 1895 the British government took direct 
control of the strip as part of the larger British East Africa Protectorate. 
When, in 1920, the rest of that Protectorate became Kenya Colony, the strip 
remained, formally, the territory of the Sultan—hence the title “Colony 
and Protectorate of Kenya.” So it was that as independence neared in the 
early 1960s, some argued that “Mwambao,” as they called it, should either 
be returned to Zanzibari rule or become independent by itself (Brennan 
2008; Prestholdt 2014). Those arguments were echoed some fifty years later 
by the supporters of the nebulous Mombasa Republican Council (MRC), 
which again called for independence for the coast. The MRC insisted—
quite without evidence—that the 1963 agreement by which the Sultan had 
renounced all claims to sovereignty in the coast was subject to a time limit, 
and expired in 2013. Those campaigners for secession, in the early 1960s 
and in the early twenty-first century, were deliberately vague in their use of 
the term “coast.” Sometimes this focussed on the shoreline, but sometimes it 
effectively embraced the whole of Coast Province, which stretched far inland 
to the Taita hills, and included a long finger of land along the Tana River, 
roughly following the area inhabited by Pokomo people. The claim that 
this larger coast could—or should—form a political community was driven 
by the idea that the “original” inhabitants of the province were threatened 
by an “up-country” monopoly on wealth and power; here, as elsewhere in 
Kenya, the claims of autochthony have been strengthened since the 1990s 
by the international efflorescence of a language of indigeneity (Hughes 
2005; Geschiere 2009; Lynch 2011). This “coast” was very much larger—
and more clearly defined on the map—than the “ten-mile strip,” which had 
never been marked out by administrative boundaries (Willis & Gona 2013).
Both “ten-mile strip” and “Coast Province” were, of course, in some 
measure arbitrary: the first a useful legal device in the partition of Africa; 
the second a colonial and post-colonial administrative convenience. Yet 
the difference between these two definitions of the coast expresses two 
quite different imaginaries of the coast as a physical territory, as well as 
a human society—on the one hand, as a thin fringe of shoreline, looking 
out to the Indian Ocean for its commerce and cultural inspiration; on the 
other hand, as a wider landscape, across which people move and trade 
continually, combining shoreline with a hinterland which embraces both 
the relatively well-watered agricultural land of the coastal ridge and the 
Taita hills, and a swathe of semi-arid land long used by pastoralists. These 
contending imaginaries are both shaped by—and shape—everyday life in 
the very varied territory embraced by what are now the six “coast” counties; 
and these differing territorial visions are overlaid on religious, ethnic and 
racial divides, sometimes cross-cutting and sometimes coinciding. All of 
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these categories are, of course, social constructs: yet they are powerful 
forces in shaping people’s experience and their ideas of personal and 
collective interests.
2. The Muslim Coast?
For many Kenyans—including many at the coast—the coast and Islam 
are somehow synonymous. Islam has a long history at the coast; both 
archaeological remains and the current architecture and public culture of 
most shoreline towns reveal the powerful presence of Islam as a daily part 
of many people’s lives over more than a thousand years. But in terms of 
population, the six counties of the coast are by no means overwhelmingly 
Muslim. According to the 2019 census, there are significantly more 
Christians (2.4 million) than Muslims (1.6 million) in the six counties of 
the coast. Muslims are in a majority only in Kwale, Lamu and Tana River 
(Kenya National Bureau of Statistics 2019, 422). While the population of 
the towns and smaller settlements of the shoreline have historically been 
Muslim, the people of the hinterland have not. South of Mombasa, and 
along the Tana River, there was a relatively swift process of Islamisation in 
the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries; but in the quite densely settled 
hinterland immediately north of Mombasa, Islam spread more slowly 
(Holway 1970). While Christianity too was slow to win converts at the coast 
in the colonial period, it spread more swiftly from the 1960s (Deacon et al. 
2017). Even more significant, however, has been the movement to the coast 
of people from elsewhere in Kenya—“up-country” people, or wabara, as 
coast people call them—a large proportion of whom are Christians (Sperling 
2000). This migration to the coast was already apparent in colonial Kenya, 
as Mombasa in particular drew in workers from many miles away. Since 
independence, this in-migration has continued, and over time it has come 
to affect many areas of the coast. It has been particularly apparent in the 
main towns and centres of the tourist industry along the shoreline, but is 
also a feature of some settlement schemes (Kanyinga 2000).
Relations between Christians and Muslims have often been tense. As 
David Sperling (2000) has argued, there has been a history of religious 
plurality at the coast. Both in the rural hinterland and in some urban 
settlements, a family may have members who are Christian, Muslim, or 
who follow neither faith, living close together and routinely involved 
in each other’s daily lives; everywhere, Muslims and Christians live as 
neighbours, and there is no religious “zoning,” though some areas may 
have particular concentrations of one faith or another. But this plurality 
has come under strain (Mwakimako 2007). Over the last three decades, a 
narrative of collective Muslim marginalisation has become increasingly 
powerful. This identifies individuals’ quotidian experiences of inequality 
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and discrimination as aspects of a global marginalisation of Muslims as 
a community. While this narrative of marginalisation is by no means the 
only way in which Muslims at the coast talk about their political interests 
or identity, it is nevertheless powerful, and it has inspired a whole range of 
political involvements, from a peaceful activism focussing on constitutional 
change and human rights, to a violent radicalism which entirely rejects the 
state (Chome 2019; Thordsen 2009). At the same time, the identification of 
Christianity with political and economic power in Kenya has become ever 
more apparent (Wandera 2008–9). This is, moreover, a Christianity which 
is increasingly Pentecostal and often overtly hostile to Islam (Gifford 1994). 
The sense that Christianity and Islam are in conflict is readily aroused 
(Chome 2019, 17–18). Suspicion that Christians receive favoured treatment 
from the state merges with resentment against people who have moved to 
the coast from other parts of Kenya, many of whom are Christian.
This sense of exclusion in Kenya has become entwined with debates 
on the position of Muslims internationally, which have become ever more 
intense in recent years, enabled by new technologies and driven by events 
in Palestine and elsewhere in the Middle East, and by the complex conflict 
in Somalia. One consequence of this has been the emergence of a violent 
radicalism in Kenya, particularly amongst Muslim youth (Shinn 2007). 
The terrorist bombings of US embassies in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam in 
1998 were largely externally planned, but between 2001 and 2014 there 
was a steady increase in the frequency of attacks, and considerable local 
recruitment of men who committed themselves to a violent jihad, largely 
at the coast, but also elsewhere in Kenya. Such recruitment built on the 
argument that local experiences—of poverty, poor education, landlessness, 
and misgovernment—are simply manifestations of a wider pattern of 
discrimination against Muslims globally, and that the only effective way 
to counter them is the violent overthrow of the state, and of the wider 
international system. The Kenya military intervention in Somalia in 2011 
lent strength to this argument, and led to increased violence. Alongside 
occasional major terrorist attacks—one of which, at Mkepetoni, targeted 
a major centre of up-country settlement at the coast in a clear attempt to 
appeal to Muslim grievances—there was from 2012 to 2015 a bitter little war 
of assassination and counter-assassination, mostly in and around Mombasa, 
between the security forces, suspected radicals and suspected informers 
(Mwakimako and Willis, 2014). The often-brutal and extra-legal campaign 
of “counter-terrorism” at the coast increased tensions (Prestholdt 2011; 
Open Society Justice Initiative/MUHURI 2013). In 2012 and 2013, when 
radical preachers died in targeted assassinations which were widely blamed 
on the security forces, there were riots in Mombasa in which churches 
became the target of angry Muslim protesters; Christian pastors were also 
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attacked in several incidents. The ambiguous position of Christianity at 
the coast was evident in the debates around the nature of the MRC. Those 
who claimed to be the leaders of the MRC were Muslims; and MRC slogans 
appeared spray-painted on urban walls alongside the slogans of radical 
Islam, apparently by the same hands. Yet some MRC supporters insisted 
that this was a movement for all “coast” people, not just for Muslims (Willis 
& Gona 2013; Deacon et al. 2017).
A similar uncertainty characterises the debate over a “Coast party”; 
must the coast be represented by a Muslim leader? The most prominent 
politicians from the coast in the 1960s were Christians: Ronald Ngala was 
a Christian; so too was well-known politician of the early 2000s, Karisa 
Maitha (despite his earlier association with the United Muslims of Africa, 
an organisation founded with government backing in the 1990s to confront 
anti-government Muslim activists on the streets of Mombasa). But Maitha, 
who died in 2005, was not ostentatious about his Christianity; nor was 
Ngala. In the current national political climate, in which church services 
and fund-raisings are routinely used as political platforms, and political 
events blur uncertainly into prayer meetings, it would be difficult for a 
Christian national politician to avoid very public displays of faith; which, 
in turn, would make problematic any claims to leadership of “the coast.” 
In recent years, those who sought national status as leaders of the coast—
Najib Balala, Chirau Mwakwere, and most recently Hassan Joho—have 
been Muslims; though, as will be explained below, ideas of ethnicity and 
race have undermined their ambitions.
If the divide between Muslims and Christians on the coast has become 
more evident in recent years, so too have divisions among Muslims. The 
perceived contest between “African Islam” and “Islam in Africa” has 
become a near-dominant analytical paradigm for understanding tensions 
amongst Muslims in Africa (Cruise O’Brien 1981; Rosander 1997). The 
neatness of that paradigm may misrepresent a reality in which individuals 
live across the two categories (Otayek and Soares 2007); but clearly Islam 
on Kenya’s coast has long been shaped by debates over what it means to 
live properly as a Muslim (Chome 2019). Generations of Muslim reformers 
have sought to change established local practices and beliefs. Though the 
process is often dated to the 1970s, in Kenya it was first apparent in the 
1930s, in the work of Shaykh Al-Amin Mazrui, and gained energy from 
the 1960s, notably through the work of scholars on the northern island of 
Faza, who were inspired by Egyptian teachers (Pouwels 1981; Swaleh 2012). 
External finance, and the intellectual influence of Islamic institutions of 
higher education outside Kenya, have played a part in these debates. From 
the 1960s, a growing range of governments and international bodies offered 
scholarships for religious studies, and provided funds for the building of 
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mosques and madrassa, and for the salaries of imams. Young men from the 
coast went to study in Saudi Arabia, Yemen or Sudan, and latterly also in 
Uganda; they returned with belief both that Islam should be spread to non-
believers, and that “innovations”—the Arabic word bid’a is routinely used 
in Swahili to describe these—which had crept into orthodox Islam should 
be removed, as part of a process of religious and social reform and renewal 
(the Arabic words, islah and tajdid, are routinely used in Swahili and English 
text and speech for “reform” and “renewal”). South Asian movements such 
as the Tabligh Jamaat also became active participants in a rural campaign of 
proselytisation. Empowered by their education—which gave them the all-
important ability to pursue theological debates in Arabic—and by the funds 
which supported them and allowed them to run minor local education and 
welfare projects, these men steadily shifted the terms of debate, and the 
bounds of permissible practice (Kresse 2007). The result has been tension 
over the propriety of some long-established practices: some funeral prayers; 
the offering of prayers at the tombs of renowned holy men; the playing of 
music in mosques as part of the celebration of the Prophet’s birthday (the 
mawlid). Physical confrontations over these issues, became less common by 
around 2010, but debates remained lively, and occasionally divisive. After 
2010, some practices—such as the celebration of mawlid—which had vanished 
for a time under the influence of the reformers have begun to reappear.
The debate over “innovation,” on the Kenya coast as elsewhere in Africa, 
is often cast as a contest between a moderate form of established practice—
usually described as Sufi—socially tolerant, and politically uninvolved as 
well as syncretic in ritual, and an intrusive reformism which is strict in its 
view of religious practice, intolerant of diversity and is inherently political. 
The reformist work of Salafists—as most now prefer to be called, shunning 
the Wahhabist label which some still apply to them—has come to be seen 
as linked with radical projects of political Islam and with violence and acts 
of terrorism (Haynes 2005; Rosenau 2005; Loimeier 2011). The narrative of 
Salafists using Saudi money or training to displace a tolerant local Islam 
is not wholly misleading (Ndzovu 2018). Yet it requires some nuancing. 
“Sufism” takes a particular form at the Kenya coast: practices associated 
with Sufism have been common in Islam at the coast. But, while mosques 
in which these practices are common may consider themselves as “tariqa 
mosques,” Sufi brotherhoods (tariqa) actually have little significance. 
The widespread networks of spiritual patronage—and therefore of social 
power—which characterise Sufism in, for example, Senegal, are much less 
significant on the Kenyan coast. More importantly, the simple association 
of Salafism with “Islamism”—that is, with the quest for a political system 
run along Islamic principles—may underestimate the growing political 
engagement of all Muslims, which is both a wider Kenyan and international 
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phenomenon (Thordsen 2009). In Kenya, and on the coast in particular, 
the politics of multi-partyism and the constitutional debates which have 
dominated public life for the last two decades have involved Muslims from 
the outset (Bakari 1995; Haynes 2006). In the early 1990s the Islamic Party 
of Kenya (IPK) was for a time one of the most prominent organisations 
calling for political change (Cruise O’Brien 2003; Oded 1996). While it came 
to be dominated by a radical preacher who had studied in the Middle East, 
IPK’s agenda was to challenge despotism, and mainly focussed on opening 
up political space for Muslim youth through multi-partyism and electoral 
participation. Since then, multiple Muslim organisations have been closely 
involved in constitutional debates, both because of the perceived threat 
to the position of “Kadhi courts” (which provided justice to Muslims in 
matters of personal law) and because constitutional reform was seen as a 
way to overcome the political and economic marginalisation of Muslims. 
In both 2005 and 2010, Muslim organisations took very clear stands in 
constitutional referenda, and Muslims everywhere in Kenya—whatever 
their views on bid’a—were encouraged to think of themselves as Muslims, 
with a shared political interest.
Radical preachers who combined Salafist views on religious practice 
with an explicit support for violent jihad have undoubtedly encouraged 
recruitment to al-Shabaab on the Kenya coast. But not all those attracted 
to the idea of violent jihad—who are almost all young men—have any 
particular interest in debates over practice. The young men who flocked 
to an advertised “jihad training” event at Masjid Musa—a mosque in the 
Majengo area of Mombasa—in early 2014 were not all Salafists, or regular 
worshippers at mosques where Salafists preach. The sense that Muslims 
are marginalised, and that this is an international condition, is not 
restricted to those who call themselves Salafists; it is an idea articulated, 
in different ways, by many preachers in many mosques, as well as on the 
internet (Chome 2019; Mwakimako & Willis 2014). It is by no means always 
advanced as a justification for violence—there are many prominent Muslims 
at the coast whose views on religious practice might be viewed as Salafist, 
but who nonetheless encourage peaceful political engagement through 
the constitution and through elections. That encouragement tends to be 
conditional—based not on the belief that liberal democracy is a good thing, 
but rather on the argument that it is the best way to pursue the interests 
of the Muslim community in current circumstances (Mwakimako & Willis 
2016). It is, however, the corollary of a substantial engagement in electoral 
politics; while a small number of Muslim youths at the coast have become 
involved in radical violence and denounce the very idea of democracy, it 
seems clear that large number of Muslims registered and voted in both 2013 
and 2017 elections.
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There was not, however, any “Muslim vote” in either of those sets of 
elections. In 2013 this was despite—or perhaps because of—attempts by 
various Muslim organisations to orchestrate a community consensus; in 
2017, little effort was made to mobilise Muslims collectively. The rivalrous 
multiplication of leadership bodies has been a feature of Islam in Kenya 
since the 1990s, and there have been repeated disputes over which, 
if any, organisation has the right to endorse particular candidates or 
policies (Constantin 1993; Ndzovu 2012). The rivalry sometimes sets coast 
Muslims against Somali or “up-country” Muslims, but there are rivalries 
for leadership amongst Muslims on the coast (Kresse 2009). Debates over 
practice can drive such rivalries. So, for example, the Kenya Assembly of 
Ulama and Imams (KAULI)—which despite its name, was really focussed on 
the coast—was created specifically to represent imams of “tariqa mosques,” 
who felt that they were inadequately represented by other bodies, notably 
the Council of Imams and Preachers of Kenya (CIPK), which was also very 
largely a coast organisation. Both have become rather inactive since 2013. 
The proliferation of Muslim representative organisations was been fuelled 
by personal rivalries, and perhaps by the availability of “anti-radicalisation” 
funds from the US and its allies, some of which have been channelled 
through such bodies. But doctrinal differences and external funding aside, 
there are other dividing lines among Muslims at the coast, which were 
perhaps most clearly evident in the distinction between CIPK and another 
organisation, the Kenya Muslim National Advisory Council (KEMNAC). 
Like CIPK, KEMNAC has been based at the coast, despite its name—and is, 
in fact, very largely restricted to Mombasa. The difference between these 
two organisations was not doctrinal, and has nothing to do with the debate 
over bid’a. It was, quite simply, based on ideas of racial category. CIPK 
was led by men who—whatever they may call themselves—would be called 
Swahili or Arabs by many coast people who view themselves as Africans. 
KEMNAC, on the other hand, has been led by a man who has assertively 
argued the claims of—as he puts it—Africans (Ndzovu 2012, 34).
3. Who Are the Wapwani?
This sense of racial difference is a powerful force on the coast. Its influence 
is felt well beyond the rivalries of Muslim leadership organisations. It is 
also, of course, deeply problematic. Many of those who claim some distant 
Yemeni or Omani ancestry would nonetheless insist that they are Africans, 
as well as Arabs; and one of the many ways in which the ethnonym Swahili 
has been used is to capture a sense of an identity which is both African and 
coastal, looking out to the Indian Ocean but also rooted in the continent 
(Constantin 1989; Topan 2004). Arab and African, some would say, are 
entirely compatible kinds of identity. Yet there are many others who simply 
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do not accept this, and who resent what they see as a long-standing social 
and economic dominance of coast society by people who they categorise 
as Arabs. Undoubtedly, this sense of racial difference is partly the result 
of British colonial policy, which linked these categories to distinct sets of 
rights, privileges and obligations—so that, for example, Arabs could own 
land, and vote, and Africans could not. Arabs were citizens and Africans 
were natives (Salim 1973, 183–246; Willis 1993). But as Glassman (2011) has 
argued of Zanzibar, racial thinking is not simply a colonial imposition; it 
draws on local understandings of identity in which a sense of indigeneity 
is a powerful force.
Whatever its origins, this idea of “race” continues to divide Muslims at the 
coast, and the population of the coast more generally, as Janet McIntosh’s 
work (2009; also Ndzovu 2012) has shown. African Muslims believe that they 
are subject to discrimination and exclusion by their Arab co-religionists, and 
readily locate this contemporary condition to a history of slavery which is 
seen (not entirely accurately) as a history of Arab oppression of Africans. 
Landlessness is a constant source of friction at the coast, especially along 
the coast and its near hinterland north of Mombasa, where the legacy of 
nineteenth-century slavery and Omani rule, of British colonial policy, and 
of post-colonial rule is that tens of thousands of people live as squatters on 
the land of large landowners (Kanyinga 1998). For decades, this friction has 
been understood, and expressed, in racial terms, as conflict between Arabs 
and Africans—although that, again, is a considerable simplification. While 
some accuse “up-country” people—and especially, Kikuyu—of grabbing 
land at the coast, there are many squatters who prefer to blame “the 
Arabs” for their plight. In talking of land, in particular, people play with an 
uncertain categorical distinction between what might be called “race” and 
“ethnicity,” which turns on an idea of autochthony. Up-country Kenyans 
are Africans—a term explicitly used—though they belong to other tribes; 
but “Arabs” are allegedly not. Public statements on racial difference have 
become less common in the face of threatened prosecutions by the National 
Cohesion and Integration Commission—but private language still routinely 
evokes race, in way that allows an allusive public style in which categories 
of racial difference are not mentioned, yet are ubiquitous.
The depth of this divide made itself apparent in the secessionist agitation 
associated with the MRC. The supporters of the MRC described themselves 
as wapwani. Yet there were uncertainties over who these wapwani were. The 
Facebook page of the MRC evoked a vision of the coast whose epitome was 
Mombasa’s Old Town: Arab or Swahili in culture. The chosen symbols of 
the movement, which echoed the (largely Arab and Swahili) Coast People’s 
Party of the 1960s, emphasised this link; in contrast, one self-defined 
African politician who was publicly critical of the MRC (though evidently 
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mindful of its potential to mobilise coast grievances), Chirau Mwakwere, 
suggested that the very name “Mombasa Republican Council” revealed how 
unrepresentative the movement was—a characteristically elliptical way 
of raising the issue of racial difference. Meanwhile, some of the written 
material circulating under the name of the MRC offered an inclusive, 
cosmopolitan vision of the coast; while other “MRC” literature pointedly 
excluded Arabs from membership of the community of wapwani (Willis & 
Gona 2013). These contradictions may to some degree reflect unresolved 
tensions in people’s own sense of their identity; but they evidently also 
reflect the way in which the “MRC” as a brand could be appropriated by 
different groups, who had very different ideas of what “the coast” was.
Neither are the “Africans” of the coast united. Since the 1940s, the term 
Mijikenda has come into use to express an idea of political community 
amongst “nine tribes” on the southern coast: the nine being usually 
listed as Digo, Duruma, Giryama, Rabai, Ribe, Kambe, Jibana, Chonyi and 
Kauma. There are considerable cultural and linguistic continuities among 
the people of these groups (though also some differences); their slightly 
halting emergence as a “super-tribe” was roughly contemporaneous with 
a similar process among the groups who became the Kalenjin. A product 
of the late-colonial period, and particularly of the frenzied politics around 
independence, Mijikenda identity reflected the power of the idea of a 
collective voice which was both African and distinctively of the coast 
(Willis & Gona 2013). Uncertain attempts to fold other ethnic groups—
notably the Taita and the Pokomo—into this wider identity have had little 
success, both because cultural and historical differences mean that there is 
little emotional power to this, and because members of those groups have 
seen little advantage in adopting this identity. If categorised as a single 
group, the Mijikenda form a clear majority of the population in the six 
counties of the coast: 1.9 million of a total coast population of 3.3 million, 
according to the 2009 census. Yet their sense of shared identity is fragile. 
Most Digo are Muslim, unlike other Mijikenda; not all Mijikenda languages 
are readily inter-comprehensible; and while multiple ties of migration 
and marriage bind Mijikenda, there are also bitter local disputes over land 
which can be expressed in terms of rivalries between Chonyi and Kauma, 
or Jibana and Giryama. At the same time, to be Mijikenda is not always 
so incompatible with being Swahili: ties of marriage and descent blur a 
boundary that appears very clear in rhetoric (Parkin 1989; Peake 1989). 
It is not, of course, unusual for identities to be multiple, and for larger 
groups to be internally fragmented. Yet it is striking that the mobilising 
and disciplining force of the idea of “being Mijikenda” seems so limited—
perhaps because these divisions have been exacerbated by an engagement 
with national politics which sees aspiring Mijikenda leaders evoking these 
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differences in attempts to undermine one another’s claims to leadership, 
and allows national politicians to playing on such divisions to keep the 
upper hand over their Mijikenda “point men.”
Repeated attempts by individuals to establish a national position as 
“coast” leaders have been confounded by ethnic and racial division. Ronald 
Ngala was engaged in a constant struggle—waged often along racial lines—
to assert his status (Stren 1974). Sharif Nassir became a powerful politician 
in Mombasa, but could never establish himself as a wider coast leader, 
because he was seen as a Yemeni Arab. Karisa Maitha, sometime protégé of 
Shariff Nassir (who used him to try and reach a Mijikenda constituency), 
became vocal in his denunciations of Arabs and achieved a degree of 
prominence, but at the cost of alienating his former patron. Rivalry for 
position in Kenya’s politics of ethno-regionalism is not unusual, but the 
coast has seen a particularly high turnover of politicians, particularly since 
the return of multi-partyism (Gona 2008). Najib Balala, who more than 
one national politician has hopefully sponsored as a potential coast leader, 
has never been able to reach a wider constituency because he is seen as 
an Arab—his “Republican Congress” party was a spectacular failure in 
the 2013 elections. Chirau Mwakwere, who aspired to be the coast “point 
man” for national politicians, was unable to build any sort of reputation 
outside his own Digo community, even among other Mijikenda. In 2013, 
the competition for the position of governor of Mombasa revealed very 
clearly the nature of racial and ethnic politics: the two leading candidates, 
widely seen as Arab or Arab/Swahili, each took care to ensure that they 
had a Mijikenda running mate. Between them, these partnerships took 88% 
of the vote. The successful candidate in that election, Ali Hassan Joho, has 
become the most influential individual in coast politics, and has achieved 
a national prominence.
Between 2014 and 2017, Joho apparently courted confrontation with 
Uhuru Kenyatta, presenting himself as the champion of coastal interests 
against central government. The gambit paid off; despite criticism of his 
performance as Mombasa’s governor, Joho won that position again in 2017 
with a substantial majority. But neither this prominence nor his unconcealed 
ambition to run for the presidency have made him the unquestioned leader 
of the coast; there have been repeated attempts by Mijikenda politicians 
to form groups or parties that specifically exclude him.4 In the run-up to 
the 2017 election one Mijikenda politician forecast that Joho would lose as 
4. Oketch, Willis. 2016. “Governor Hassan Joho Says He Will Be First 
President from the Coast Come 2022.” Standard Digital, 21 March. http://www.
standardmedia.co.ke/article/2000195586/governor-hassan-joho-says-he-will-
be-first-president-from-coast-come-2022. For one example of plans for coastal 
unity which exclude Joho, and are Mijikenda focussed, see Gari, Alphonce. 2016. 
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he lacked the support of the “indigenous communities”—which turned out 
be quite wrong, but was a reminder of the persistence of that racialised 
language.5 The aftermath of the 2017 elections was revealing. Joho, together 
with the governor of Kilifi County Amason Kingi (a Mijikenda) made bold 
statements threatening coast secession as a response to the debacle of the 
presidential poll.6 Both men then stepped back from that confrontational 
line, and were quick to welcome the “handshake” that reconciled Kenyatta 
and Odinga in March 2018. Since then, Kingi has apparently become more 
distant from Joho; one of his reported public statements simultaneously 
asserted and denounced divisions: “The importance of the Mijikenda must 
be recognised, as well as the unity of the coast people.”7
Joho’s presidential ambitions rest on the idea that he might become the 
regional big man for the coast. That hope is inspired by what looks like 
a pattern of voting, yet it may be misplaced. In the elections of 1992 and 
1997, Coast Province—with the exception of Mombasa—was considered 
something of a “KANU zone,” and Moi received 63% of the presidential 
votes at the coast in 1992 and 67% in 1997. At that time, however, the ruling 
party’s dominance relied on a patchwork of local leaders playing to local 
constituencies, not on a single key “coast” intermediary. The coast vote 
looked more like a real phenomenon in the series of polls since 2005 that 
gave a consistent majority for Raila Odinga, or for causes supported by 
him, with an overall rise in participation levels.
“Movement to Unite Counties for 2017 Poll.” The Star, 29 April. http://www.the-
star.co.ke/news/2016/04/29/movement-to-unite-counties-for-2017-poll_c1341235. 
5. Mwaboza, Anania. 2017. “Why Joho Will Lose on August 8th.” The Star, 27 
June.
6. Ahmed, Mohamed. 2017. “Hassan Joho, Amason Kingi Call for Breakaway of 
Coast.” Daily Nation, 3 November. https://www.nation.co.ke/news/Hassan-Joho-
Amason-Kingi-call-for-breakaway-of-Coast-from-Kenya/1056-4172150-2rxmh2z/
index.html. 
7. Reported in Lwanga, Charles. 2018. “New Bid for Mijikenda Unity Announced 
at Cultural Festival.” Daily Nation, 12 September. https://www.nation.
co.ke/counties/kilifi/New-bid-for-Mijikenda-unity-announced-at-cultural-
festival/1183282-4752918-fq0qlxz/index.html. 
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Table 1. Voting figures on the coast from 2005 to 2017,  
with participation rates and percentages of votes for Raila Odinga
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Sources: figures released by ECK and IEBC.
This does suggest that voters at the coast see themselves as very much a 
part of Kenyan politics, whatever the talk of secessionism. It also suggests 
that the determined efforts by Uhuru Kenyatta and William Ruto to shift 
public opinion at the coast in advance of the 2017 elections—notably 
through some limited but high profile interventions over the chronic 
problem of land—were not very successful.8 But to interpret this pattern 
as evidence that the coast as a whole supports Raila, or is an “ODM” zone, 
or that Joho could count on this vote in his own presidential bid, would 
not be safe. In the August  2017 poll, as previously, the vote for Odinga 
was concentrated very much in the southern half of the coast (where the 
bulk of the population is); Lamu and Tana River counties saw considerable 
support for Kenyatta. Despite Joho’s national prominence, the turnout—
and the vote for Odinga—in his Mombasa County was weaker than any 
other southern part of the coast (a 59% turnout, and a 70% vote for Odinga; 
by contrast, Kilifi saw a 65% turnout and an 84% poll for Odinga). It would 
seem safer to say that voting patterns have indicated a broad preference for 
devolution, and a suspicion of central government, in the southern counties 
of what was once Coast Province; since Odinga has been an advocate 
8. Tsuma Nyassi, Daniel, Kalume Kazungu, and PSCU. 2016. “Uhuru to Visit Lamu 
and Issue Title Deeds to Waitiki Land Owners.” Daily Nation, 6 January. http://
www.nation.co.ke/news/politics/Uhuru-to-visit-Lamu-and-give-title-deeds-to-
Waitiki-land-owners/1064-3022564-xwncc6/index.html [archive]. “Uhuru, Ruto, 
Start Coast Tour Full of Goodies.” 2016. Daily Nation, 3 September. https://nation.
africa/news/politics/Uhuru-Ruto--start-Coast-tour-full-of-goodies/3126390-
3367774-15csglwz/index.html [archive].
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for devolution, and the avowed enemy of centralised government, this 
favoured him. Were Joho to stand for the presidency, that support would 
not necessarily transfer to him.
Conclusion
The multiple divisions of the “coast” mean that no politician has ever been 
fully able to claim to represent this contested entity. Odinga’s popularity 
was itself anomalous in a context where the most prominent “national” 
politician in any region is usually a person from that area—it seemed to 
contradict the logic of ethno-regionalism. His role as coast champion was 
the consequence of his status as an outsider, but also an outsider who is not 
connected with the coast’s history of marginalisation: neither his family, 
nor his ethnic group are seen as land-grabbers at the coast. Coast politicians 
are irretrievably marked by their religious identity, by their ethnicity and—
most of all—by the imagined but immensely powerful categories of race 
which shape and divide the coast. Odinga benefitted for a time by standing 
apart from those divisions and at the same time supporting devolution, 
which commanded widespread support.
Yet while “devolution” may be popular in principle, there are significant 
differences in how people understand the term, which expose the multiple 
divisions among the imagined “wapwani”: will it offer Muslims relief from 
the apparently arbitrary violence of the security forces? Will it give land 
title to squatters? Will it allow Digo to monopolise employment in Kwale, 
or Giryama to do so in Kilifi? These divisions have been amplified, not 
resolved, by the debate over the Building Bridges Initiative. Rival politicians 
from the coast continue to seek support for their own ambitions—and 
rewards for their particular religious, ethnic or racial community—by 
offering themselves as intermediaries to national politicians. Despite the 
constant rhetoric of coast unity, the coast remains profoundly divided: 
what devolution should mean, and which “coast” people should benefit 
from it, remain very much open to debate.
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History, Memory, and the Heritage  
of Slavery on the Kenyan Coast
The Witu and Shimoni Cases
Patrick O. Abungu & Clélia Coret
Translated by Stephanie Horsford
Despite their different trajectories, the Witu and Shimoni cases are 
interesting to compare as they provide a contrasting perspective on the 
history of slavery and trafficking on the Swahili coast, as well as on the way 
this past has been variously understood by the contemporary coastal society 
and by the Kenyan state and its institutions. Today’s Witu and Shimoni are 
two villages: one is situated to the north of the coast, on the mainland 
facing the Lamu archipelago, and the other is seventy-five kilometres to 
the south of Mombasa. The history of these two places is linked to slave 
trafficking at its height in East Africa in the nineteenth century.
Many runaway slaves (watoro in kiswahili) settled in the Witu region 
in the middle of the nineteenth century, after having, for many of them, 
escaped from plantations in Lamu. Their settlement around Witu can be 
explained, in part, by the formation of alliances with the Aweer hunter-
gatherer populations. It can also be explained by the presence (from 
1862) of a Nabahani rebel chief—sultan Ahmed Simba1—whose influence 
enabled him to oppose masters seeking to recover their slaves. These 
watoro are estimated to be around several thousand in the second half of 
the nineteenth century. Some lived in the villages surrounding Witu and 
negotiated patron-client relationships with the sultan, but others, further 
from the town and more autonomous, recreated their kinship and alliance 
networks with non-Swahili populations.
The Shimoni site has a different history: it was a major step in the slave 
trade. The freshly captured slaves were held there before being put on the 
Zanzibar market. In kiswahili, the term shimoni means “a place in the hole” 
or “inside the hole,” which accurately conveys the use that was made of the 
caves in that area. Naturally created by the tides, these caves extended over 
1. The dynastic Nabahani clan was in power in Pate from around the end of the 
seventeenth century until the beginning of the nineteenth century. At that time, 
they suffered political pressure from the Omani imam (who became the sultan 
of Zanzibar in the 1840s) and from his allies in Lamu. Part of the Nabahani 
family fled to the mainland and re-established a city-state in Witu.
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almost five kilometres and were divided into multiple tunnels. Oral sources 
indicate that they were used to hide the slaves when British ships, looking 
to break up the trafficking networks, attempted to intercept boats in the 
Indian Ocean that were transporting human cargoes.
By crossing the available written documentation (especially the 
German and British archives) and the oral sources, it is possible to sketch 
an approximative map of the watoro villages around Witu. Many villages 
no longer exist and their population was displaced following violence 
in the region, particularly during the Somalian shifta raids in the 1970s. 
Furthermore, the ethnonyms used at the end of the nineteenth century to 
define these watoro groups (such as Wadoe, Wazigua and Watu wa Witu) 
are no longer in use today. It seems that, amongst the descendants of the 
escaped slaves, there is no pride in having ancestors who rebelled against 
their masters by fleeing and founding new villages. Thus, it is extremely 
difficult to study the memory of the former slaves’ arrival, especially since 
research is still to be done to determine where the history of marronage 
and slavery situates in local memories—unlike the Shimoni case where 
oral investigations could be carried out thanks to the heritage making of 
the site.
In Shimoni, archaeological excavations contributed to demonstrating 
that the caves were used as warehouses to keep the slaves. Interviews have 
revealed differences in memory interpretation about the historic usage of the 
caves. While certain testimonies refer to a warehouse for slaves departing 
to Zanzibar, others speak of a place used to secretly hide the local slaves in 
order for them to serve on the coastal plantations after the closure of the 
Zanzibar market (in 1873). Moreover, those whose ancestors were involved 
in slave trade deny the existence of any slavery practices, whereas the 
families of the victims of slavery confirm its historical existence, although 
it is still rare to admit to a servile ancestry. Thus, unlike other regions 
affected by trafficking and slavery, these themes are discussed in Shimoni, 
in different versions, which gives a particularly illuminating example of 
the way in which these societies “tinker” with memory to construct their 
heritage and their identity.
Yet, Kenyan institutions have not initiated much heritage initiatives 
about the history of slavery and marronage on the coast. In the case of 
Witu and of Lamu region, the heritage-making of the Swahili “civilisation” 
and its history largely ignores slavery. The history of slavery does not 
yet have its place in heritage development, which is linked to the tourism 
industry that generates the highest income for the archipelago. The history 
and culture of the coast are at the heart of the heritage initiatives, to the 
extent that the Lamu archipelago is generally considered to be one of the 
birthplaces of the Swahili “civilisation.” The Swahili House Museum as 
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well as the exhibitions at the fort and at the Lamu museum unambiguously 
reflect the prominence given to certain aspects the coastal history—its trade 
culture, dhows, Islam, city-states, etc.—while they neglect the long-term 
contacts that the coastal cities maintained with the non-Swahili mainland 
populations through trade, patron-client relations, migrations between the 
coast and the mainland, etc. The same partial perception of history is found 
in the way heritage is showcased in the rest of the archipelago (e.g. the 
ruins of the ancient city-state in Pate) and at the mouth of the Tana river 
(in Ungwana for example), where archaeological excavations have been 
carried out since the 1960s.
However, in Shimoni, actions towards a better visibility of the history 
of slavery have been taken for many years. Protected under the Museums 
and Heritage Act of Parliament of 2006, the gazetted Shimoni heritage 
landscape covers over fourteen hectares of land, and the slave cave was 
opened for tourism in 2001 as a place of memories of slave trade and 
slavery. The caves were used earlier by the local inhabitants to hide from 
raids by hostile communities, then as a warehouse for holding slaves by 
the traffickers, and later a local shrine by the local community. In general, 
Shimoni heritage landscape is place of multiple memories, and apart from 
the slave caves, also hosts some colonial buildings and a cemetery where a 
British soldier, Captain Frederick Lawrence, was buried after he was killed 
while leading an antislavery expedition around Gazi, near Shimoni. In 
2014, a museum entirely dedicated to the issue of slavery was inaugurated 
in one of the colonial buildings, making the Shimoni Slavery Museum one 
of a kind in Kenya. This place of memory for trafficking and slavery has 
made it possible to generate income which is used locally for social ends.
Despite differences in the history of slavery in Witu and Shimoni, these 
two regions have both been marked by major constraints on mobility 
which still have an impact on the coastal societies of contemporary 
Kenya. Moreover, the heritage development of these sites is unequal: while 
Shimoni, through the 2000s, has become a place of memory for slavery, the 
regions of the Lamu archipelago and Witu have not, for the time being, 
prompted any such initiatives from the state. Yet, the involvement of state 
institutions in these sensitive historical and memory questions cannot be 
achieved without a profound reflection on the impact of their actions on 
the populations concerned by the heritage of slavery.
Patrick O. Abungu & Clélia Coret
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Chapter 13
Beyond its Whitewashed Past, the 
Unique Peoples of Precolonial Kenya
Anne-Marie Peatrik
Translated by Jane Womack & Sara Doel
Twenty years have elapsed since the first edition of Kenya contemporain 
(Grignon & Prunier 1998), even more if we refer to the point at which the 
authors wrote their respective contributions. The last chapter of the edited 
volume (Grignon 1998) on the “democratic invention,” for instance, was an 
attempt at determining what the effects of the fall of the Berlin Wall and the 
new multi-party system were on political life. Obviously, since then, Kenya, 
like the rest of the world, has changed in this area, as in many others.
Taking stock of change is not as simple with regard to the topic to which 
we are paying particular attention here, namely the peoples and cultures or 
civilisations before the conquest of what was to become Kenya, as well as 
the advances in knowledge pertaining to them during those two decades. 
In this regard, the chapter on “Les sociétés anciennes et leur héritage” 
(“Ancient Societies and their Heritage”) drafted by myself (Peatrik 1998) 
stands up reasonably well but the idea of “heritage” which underpinned 
a number of developments needs revisiting. “Heritage,” defined as the 
implicit or deliberate transmission and reception of ways of acting and 
thinking which leave their mark on contemporary practices, is no longer 
understood in the same way in Kenya: the quite different notion of 
“heritagisation” (or “heritage-making”) of culture has taken its place. This 
reappraisal of the status of the peoples and of their “customs,” and the new 
anthropological theory on which it is based, is arguably the real intellectual 
innovation which came from those decades. Before getting to the heart of 
our topic, it is important to highlight these shifts as they shape the way 
in which knowledge of the populations under discussion is presented and 
disseminated, and more immediately, the content of this article.
1. How Current Events Affect Knowledge
The move towards freedom of speech and the freedom to broach a wide 
range of topics within everyday conversation and across various media, 
magnified by the availability of digital technologies, has undoubtedly led to 
introduce questions about “culture” within the public debate which would 
have been previously impossible or unthinkable to address in Kenya.
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One must remember the reticence and self-censorship that existed in 
the shadow of a culture of informing, which restricted exchanges and 
conversations under Daniel arap Moi’s presidency (1978–2002) until the 
early 1990s. Customs, music and “traditional” clothing, which are in many 
ways harmless practices, were no exception: it was impossible to refer to 
them, let alone reclaim them at the risk of being labelled anti-modern, 
backward and even unpatriotic. The author of this text, who carried out 
research among the Meru from 1986 to 1993 on their ancient (and highly 
original) traditional political system, well remembers the initial disapproval, 
refusal to speak or even disbelief of the people she spoke to. Kenyans were 
educated, modern, properly dressed, they said, adding that all these customs 
of yesteryear were long gone and only pastoralists from the semi-desert 
regions and their herds would cling on to these retrograde practices. The 
popularity of the Maasai was then at its height among tourists (foreigners, 
needless to say) and many incredulous Kenyans questioned what image these 
warriors with their braided hair, bodies covered in ochre and armed with 
spears were conveying about their country. The only belated concession to 
the tradition and to the Africanness it represented was made by Moi, who, 
ready to make concessions in order to counter claims of multi-partyism, 
began extolling the virtues of committees of elders, whether revived, or 
self-appointed without foundation, since they had been brushed aside for 
so long. The “reinvented tradition” (Ranger 1983) was thus reimagined for 
the purposes of political control: few were fooled by the U-turn performed 
by the skilful tyrant, but the move delighted certain local baronets for 
whom it was too good an opportunity to miss.1
A quarter of a century later, the shift is evident. There is no city, no 
village anywhere in Kenya where you cannot find at least one “cultural 
dance” group, approved, if possible, by the County committee2; no market 
where you cannot find signs promoting local plants and medicines or a little 
1. At the very beginning of the 1990s, the Njuri Ncheke, at that time in 
decline, re-emerged among the Meru (Peatrik 1999: 455-470, 2020 [2019]: 372-
384): President Moi saw them as a model council of elders and encouraged 
that such councils be (re)instated elsewhere in Kenya. Within the framework 
of the Organisation of African Unity, until 2011 these councils were financed 
by Muammar Gaddafi, the “King of Kings,” who considered them to be better 
suited to managing populations than Western-inspired structures. This period 
in which traditional councils were manipulated to thwart multi-partyism, and 
which resumed the practices of the colonial administration under a different 
guise, is still in need of specialist research. Some elements can be found in 
Nyamweru & Chidongo (2018).
2. Since the reform of 2010, the county has replaced the district (an administrative 
division equivalent to the French department) and is governed locally by a 
county assembly which is elected by universal suffrage.
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private museum that an elderly person will be delighted to show you around. 
During public meetings, the governing elites break into isukuti steps—a 
very popular dance originating from the West of Kenya (Kiiru 2014)—to 
break up the meeting, casually don shirts with “African” designs on, and 
their wives no longer think twice about draping themselves in billowing 
brown dresses decorated with braids, reminiscent of the clothes of their 
ancestors, made from tanned and softened hides, adorned with pearls and 
cowry shells. Could it be the fallout from the years of policies encouraging 
cultural diversity to stave off fratricidal ethnic rivalries, particularly the 
post-election violence of 2007–2008?
Or could it be the intensive heritagisation programmes funded by 
Unesco and relayed through local campaigns and NGOs who see it as a 
resource for tourism and potential development? And what about the 
YouTube videos and countless websites promoting one “ethnic group” or 
another, and the use of local languages? Never before has cultural diversity 
and the ethnic brand associated with it been as promoted or lauded as it 
is in Kenya today. To the extent that the ethnographer must now contend 
with interviewees who are too keen to allow their culture to be studied and 
mirrored back to them.
How are we to understand it when Kenyans now speak of “culture,” 
that is, as an understatement or euphemism for what they used to call 
customs or traditions? Are they praising the idea of returning to a frugal, 
ecological way of life which nonetheless incorporates cars, mobile phones, 
electricity and running water? Are they championing the values of respect 
and solidarity even though they are now being divorced from the practices 
which instilled them, such as gruelling initiations, public male and female 
circumcision, or even restrictive rules like the “bride price3” that was paid 
to secure marriages and determine the parents of children yet to be born? 
Do they want a return to the funerals of the past, during which, so as to 
not pollute the soils, the remains of the deceased were left in the bush for 
the hyenas and vultures, and grief was relieved through ritual coitus, for 
fear that the stain of death would otherwise endure? What should we say 
about “pagan” ceremonies (to use the missionaries’ term), which are a far 
cry from various festivities that exist today where just a few animals are 
sacrificed? And about cultural dances whose choreography draws freely 
3. “Bride price” or “bride wealth” was paid in kind and/or in cash by the future 
husband (usually with help from his family) to guarantee the status of any 
future children by the woman, his future wife, who would leave her family 
of origin to set up home with their husband and start their own family. This 
transaction and social contract are often confused in both French and English 
with the “dowry” which refers to the material goods that a woman brings with 
her to her new family. The two transactions can co-exist but do not in any way 
follow the same logic. 
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from those rituals, with the sequences which seem inappropriate or out 
of place removed? As for witchcraft, that paragon of past customs, what 
should we make of the fact that the way in which it spreads and feeds 
rumours turns out to be closely linked with modernity (Middleton 1963; 
Luongo 2011)?
It appears that in Kenya, culture, customs and traditions cover a broad 
spectrum of meanings, ranging from the quest for identity in a post-colonial 
context to membership of clientelist networks or self-defence groups; from 
an imaginative space from which creative inspiration can be drawn, to 
stereotypes which can promote folklore-influenced brands or breed ethnic 
violence; or even knowledge and straightforward skills passed down by a 
parent to implicit ways of categorising which are conveyed through use of 
the mother tongue. We must not overlook geographical patterns, ways of 
roaming the land, the fact of staying in certain sites more than others, ways 
of perceiving the landscape, and associated land and property claims.4
To illustrate this abundance of meanings, conducive as it is to syncretism 
and a mish-mash of ideology, let us consider the astonishing movement 
called, “The Multitude” or Mûngiki (from the verb kwonga, meaning to 
multiply). This is the name of a generation of reinvented traditionalists, 
among them a small number of young Kikuyu who joined in the 1980s 
at the time of the first ethnic conflict and formed self-defence groups. 
Aimed at young men faced with unemployment and low achievement, 
these Mûngiki activists, who also called themselves heirs of the Mau 
Mau uprising (which, we must remember, led to independence in 1963), 
advocated a return to family “traditions” and to the ancient practice of 
passing official powers down through traditional generations.5 This young 
Multitude, in search of neo-patriarchal models and practices (Maupeu 
2003; Lafargue 2010), even if they failed to rally anyone beyond their 
accomplices, still managed to frighten the middle classes, both Kikuyu and 
Kenyan, and those within powerful circles.
Yet all of this is a very long way from what the ante-colonial populations 
referred to using the ethnonym kikuyu, or by any other ethnonym. More 
than a century has passed since the military conquest, longer than that if we 
4. In short, a civilisational process which anthropological scholars have 
incorporated into the notions of ethos or habitus, and have set about 
deconstructing across many analytical fields such as kinship, powers, modes of 
production, rites and religion, beliefs and knowledge… The collection recently 
published under the direction of Hughes & Lamont (2018) which addresses the 
way in which 2010 constitution promoted culture to the status of “cultural 
rights” puts forward interesting avenues. 
5. The subject of traditional generational classes is explained in the section 4, 
p. 363.
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refer to the arrival of missionaries in the middle of the nineteenth century. 
This has been a century and a half of major transformation across Africa and 
the world, over the course of which traditional institutions and ancestral 
practices, themselves shaped by a unique history, have been continuously 
put to the test.
Whilst in recent years, knowledge of the history of contemporary Africa 
has grown considerably, supported by an increasing number of written 
sources which are at last available—consider for example the reappraisal of 
the Mau Mau uprising (Ogot 2005; Charton 2011) or research into writing in 
African languages in Kenya (Peterson 2004; MacArthur 2016)—, knowledge 
of the societies and cultures that really existed prior to the conquests has 
progressed very little, with a few exceptions. The crisis affecting Kenyan 
national museums is proof of this. The prestigious site is now a sad thing 
to behold, after the reform of 2006 which resulted in the ethnographic 
galleries at the Nairobi National Museum being closed6—they were judged 
to be “colonialist” but were a mine of information about ancient societies 
and customs—and in devolved responsibilities to counties who were 
supposed to revive the national museums locally. Apart from a few well-
equipped rooms, one wanders past mostly empty, dusty display cabinets, 
with a few photos and several plaques which make up the temporary 
exhibitions that are always there. And the groups of schoolchildren who go 
for extracurricular visits hardly make up for the sluggish visitor numbers. 
A new national museum of ethnography and history of peoples and past 
civilisations is still looking for its creators in Kenya, as is also the case in 
other African countries.
Unravelling Africa’s distant past presents a number of methodological 
difficulties (Spear 1981; Sutton 1990). Written sources remain limited 
and oral traditions have a specific relevance but their analysis requires 
precaution. Regarding the history of languages, it is difficult to come up 
with reference points that are easy to use. Ethnographical data is poorly 
mobilised and historiography lacks reflexivity. As for archaeological digs, 
they are insufficient: they are costly and seen as less prestigious than research 
into hominisation and early man by the academic world and by financers, 
thus attracting fewer researchers even though there are many sites listed. 
In Kenya, according to the accounts of researchers at the national museum, 
6. The superb Kikuyu hut which demonstrated the skill of traditional builders 
and was located outside was also destroyed, on the pretext that it perpetuated the 
confusion between national identity and Kikuyu identity… At the same time, the 
open-air Bomas of Kenya museum on the edge of the Nairobi National Park, where 
the national dance company is based and habitats (“bomas”) which represent 
national diversity have been built, has not undergone any specific renovation 
even though its more national character would make this highly worthwhile.
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working on 1,000,000 year old history potentially offers more prestige 
and credibility than that which dates back 10,000, 5,000 or 1,000 years BP. 
And yet it is during these last millennia that key elements of the historical 
framework of today’s East Africans have fallen into place (Lane 2016). Very 
recently, a few studies have been carried out on the history of ecosystems 
linked to the climate crisis and the question of preserving natural heritage. 
Similarly, progress has been made in settlement history thanks to the rise of 
population genetics but the major socio-human frameworks are still rarely 
questioned. Highland societies are still considered to be limited in their 
historical richness. This is of course contrary to the cities of the Swahili 
Corridor which left behind “traces” and accounts that are more in keeping 
with the conventional tools of historical and archaeological research.
In the absence of debate around these areas, while the cultural heritage 
craze is in full swing, the gap between the knowledge of contemporary 
East Africa and the East Africa of the past is widening. One must, 
supported by specific knowledge, be increasingly imaginative in avoiding 
anachronisms and capturing the unique spaces and peoples of East Africa. 
How long will it take for intellectuals and the educated elite to realise 
that the institutions and practices which underpin “customs” are born of 
a history that is social, political, religious, aesthetic, demographic, which 
pertains to heterogeneous timescales (emic and etic) and which should 
be investigated? This is the way things happen in science and knowledge 
production. As soon as there is evidence of a social and political expectation 
regarding these questions, coming from the new generation, the academic 
momentum and stewardship will follow.
The overview presented below is based on field research and monographs 
carried out in the twentieth  century, at a time when witnesses and 
participants from before the conquest were still able to provide first-hand 
information. Ethnographic in its content, this broad portrait aims to draw 
out the original characters from unique worlds, which have undergone 
profound change but whose influence can be found in a number of ways in 
the present-day reality.7
2. A Unique Geography and Economy
Who and which peoples from the time before colonial borders were created 
are we talking about? In what became Kenya, the smallest populations and 
groupings, wherever they were located, were often identified by proper 
names which are rarely used and are not well known today. According 
7. It is impossible to detail the countless references which support this overview. 
At the end of the article, the selected biography suggests further reading and 
provides links to further references.
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to whether these peoples named themselves or other people named them, 
they had changing ethnonyms. And many contemporary names, which 
seem to carry the hallmark of antiquity, are as much the product of tenuous 
transcriptions and opposing representations as they are of the improvised 
way the colonial administration was implemented.
The Meru ethnonym was coined in 1908 by the conqueror and first 
administrator of the area, derived from a Maasai name, which also appears 
to echo a toponym of the place where the first administrative and military 
post was established. In reality, at least five groups came under the label 
“Meru”: the Igembe, Mwiko jwa Ngaa (still called Tigania), Imenti, Chuka, 
Tharaka. The “Kikuyu” ethnonym was reappropriated in the 1930s to 
embrace all the people living between the northeast and southwest, and 
west of Mount Kenya—Meru, Embu, Mbeere, Gichugu, Ndia, Gaki, Metume, 
Karura—all of whom came under the single “Kikuyu Land Unit” by the 
colonial administration.
The Samburu, herders from North Kenya, known by this name of Bantu 
and/or Maasai origin, call themselves Lokop, an ethnonym that only they 
use. Further west towards Mount Elgon and Nyanza, the name (Aba-)Luyia 
incorporates, in simple terms, the Vugusu, Hayo, Marach, Wanga, Nyala, 
Tsotso, Marama, Holo, Isuxa, Idaxo, Kisa, Nyole, Logoli, Tiriki. Returning 
to the hinterland of the coast of the Indian Ocean, we find the Mijikenda 
(literally “the nine settlements”), an ethnonym that was coined in the 
1930s to distinguish it from the Swahili (also an exogenous ethnonym) and 
to replace their unflattering naming as “bushmen” (wanyika), bringing 
together nine different groups: Giriama, Jibana, Chonyi, Ribe, Kambe, 
Kauma, Rabai, Digo, Duruma.
The list is long. An interactive, multi-scalar map would best 
accommodate these ancient and contemporary onomastics. This would be 
a very solid introduction to the relativity and historicity of designations, 
which would look good in the entrance hall of a renovated and reinvented 
Kenyan national museum of ethnography and history, something which 
it is pleasing to imagine in this text. However, this does not mean these 
labile or arbitrary designations should be seen to reflect vague, ill-defined 
and unstructured communities, in line with another idea conceived in the 
minds of the first conquerors and administrators of these groups. Behind 
these names, or within them, there lie memberships and affiliations, 
rights and bans, solidarity and conflict, and also several limits—in sum, 
institutions, all without the use of writing or state bureaucracy, which it 
fell to anthropology and ethnography to decipher. Briefly, and without 
going into too much detail, the notion of “people” used here refers to the 
effectiveness of marking out political units which have been formed within 
or by the generational system (or traditional generations) and initiations—
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we will explain these two institutions later in the text. Otherwise, we are 
referring to more modest human groupings, which are expected over 
time either to expand or to merge or join together with more powerful 
neighbouring groups, or even disappear.
The highlands and lowlands of Kenya, like those of the border regions of 
neighbouring countries, are part of a unique environment made up of long, 
mostly gentle slopes, which are exposed to seasonal winds mainly coming 
from the Indian Ocean, bringing maritime influences and with them, rain. 
With the slopes acting as a shield against the humid winds, clouds form 
and rainfall increases in intensity in line with altitude as the temperature 
cools. And because these air masses come and go twice in the year, they 
trigger two rainy seasons (bimodal rainfall pattern) which allows for the 
possibility of two harvests, continuous lactation of herds and the regular 
production of beehives. The layering of ecosystems is another characteristic 
and additional benefit. Thermal gradient and humidity combine to produce 
environments that are versatile, according to altitude: lower down it is drier 
and suited to cereals and peas; at altitude it is cooler and more humid and 
suitable for roots, tubers, sugar cane, beans and bananas. Land at around 
1700 metres has (or had) many advantages conducive to human settlements: 
in an intermediate position and at a reasonable distance from those 
mentioned above, land at this altitude which is comparatively cool without 
being too cold, was unaffected by the anopheles (carriers of malaria) or by 
diseases that spread in hot and humid environments (lower morbidity).
However, this natural potential is limited by irregular rainfall. Such 
irregularity owes to the contrast between the well-watered slopes and 
the dryer leeward slopes, but also to the irregular rains from year to year, 
whether these are short rains in autumn or long rains in spring which can 
be insufficient, excessive, late or early. Current changes in the climate are, 
for the moment, only exacerbating this irregularity. There are a number 
of responses that people, over centuries and millennia, have learned to 
identify, to protect themselves and make the best use of this potential. 
The most sustainable of these was to have sufficiently large and varied 
land available and to practice a range of economic activities. Taking the 
opportunity to open gardens, graze a herd, hunt and forage for food in 
places where the rain is more abundant and moving to another slope or 
altitude without having to negotiate the move or the land’s ownership is the 
most appropriate response. The political drivers behind such a territorial 
arrangement are examined below.
Carrying out multiple economic activities in these spaces does not fit 
well with the portrayed image of the Maasai herdsmen, whose pastoral 
specialisation would have been a quintessential aspect of the traditional 
East African economy. Again, we must correct the stereotype that the 
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Maasai themselves often employ. This problematic and exceptional 
specialisation was probably a late decision in the history of these peoples, 
and the Maasai, although highly visible, are not very representative. The 
other peoples combined, to varying degrees and made up in many different 
ways, foraging and hunting, breeding (large and small ruminants, bees), 
agriculture (cereals, legumes, tubers, bananas, sugar cane), handmade items 
and bartering.
A wide range of items were made by hand, from the construction of various 
buildings (varying in size, life span and purpose) to the tanning of skins 
for clothing and bedding, as well as jewellery, ropemaking and containers: 
decorated gourds, wooden buckets sewn with leather, earthenware pots 
made by women during the cool and dry season, a period of plenty, 
conducive to feasts and rituals. Only the manufacturing of iron tools was 
carried out by specialists. Blacksmiths, who used pits for ore reduction, 
were craftsmen who were both feared and despised. These people and their 
activities were avoided and were subject to prohibitions. For example, they 
were not allowed to marry non-blacksmiths and a blacksmith’s wife could 
not practice farming, with the exception of small gardens within the family 
homestead. Blacksmith’s wives traded iron tools for agricultural goods, 
sometimes by means of force. Blacksmiths often owned large herds which 
had been amassed in exchange for their products, in particular essential 
weapons with which to equip the warrior classes.
The idea of “caste,” however, is inappropriate since these societies were 
non-hierarchical, egalitarian and by no means imbued with the ideology 
of purity. For both pragmatic and symbolic reasons, blacksmiths were 
considered to be abusive and ill-mannered. Since people could not do 
without them, it was best to protect oneself from them. But their Oolitic 
iron deposits were kept secret and guarded by warriors, as were some clay 
pits which were reserved for female potters, and salt deposits which were 
essential for health of herds and people. Medical knowledge was widely 
shared to such an extent that the same pharmacopoeia was used to treat 
herds of animals and human beings. The diviner-healer was a little unusual: 
a healer who was visited by the sick or victims of repeated misfortune, he 
was also the diviner that warriors would consult before embarking on a 
raid. These skills did not overly set him apart; as he was obviously paid for 
his consultations the traditional diviner-healer tended simply to be richer 
than average.
Tasks were distributed according to limits of age, generation and gender 
which in turn helped to maintain those limits. Again, one should not view 
this division as inflexible and its limits as insurmountable: within the 
sphere of economic activity, practical reason and the demands of everyday 
life took precedence. Beekeeping (and mead) and hunting were reserved 
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for men, while pottery and making beer were reserved for women. The 
domestic economy relied largely on the contributions of children and young 
people. And when they grew older, leaving the family homestead to become 
warriors and join the warrior class, or to marry into another homestead, 
was delayed for as long as possible. Adults worked in the gardens and 
with the herd for as long as they had the strength. The most common mix 
of activities was agriculture and animal husbandry, to varying degrees 
depending on time and space. Some non-farmers combined blacksmithing, 
breeding and foraging. Everyone, including those who had a small number 
of herds or no longer had any, loved and idealised cattle, which were seen 
as the very best way to conduct contractual relations between humans, 
as well as offerings and sacrifices to the deity: called by different names 
according to the language, this principle, around which the world would 
come to be based, was universally recognised by these peoples.
One final aspect relating to exchange and movement deserves further 
explanation. The idea that these peoples were isolated and inward-looking, 
that they were self-sufficient, in line with the stereotype that has been 
so prevalent in relation to these “primitive” precolonial people, is not 
appropriate. People moved around East African areas quite freely with 
almost no insurmountable obstacles, with only a need to know routes and 
take precautions. Over the centuries, networks were created, undone and 
rebuilt. Bartering was in operation across short or long distances: it was 
practised within domestic markets by people living short distances away, 
between producers of goods grown on higher and lower ground (cereals in 
exchange for bananas, roots and beans, and agricultural products for small 
cattle or iron objects). It was also practised between neighbouring people: 
women would go on trading expeditions under the protection of warriors, 
carrying bags of various goods—grains and cereals—on their backs, which 
they would trade for skins which were abundant among pastoralists. 
Conversely, pastoralists went up to markets at high altitudes in search of 
agricultural products, iron objects etc, which they traded for cattle.
There was no money, in the strict sense of the term, hence the concept 
of barter, but exchange values existed, which were determined from place 
to place and according to the seasons. A plausible value attributed to cattle 
was used as a focal point which varied according to the quality of the 
animals. A certain number of bags of grain were traded for iron tools; herds 
of small cattle for bananas or even large cattle, cows, heifers, calves, bulls, 
oxen, both fat and scrawny; and salt cakes for bags of yams. Blue or cowry 
shell pearls were given in exchange for cereals or herds of cattle… These 
transactions took place alongside other forms of trade and debt such as 
cattle contracts, marriage contracts and child fostering. These oral contracts, 
sealed in various ways (animal sacrifices and blood pacts together with the 
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threat of curses and retaliation in cases of non-compliance) were based 
on interpersonal relationships and mutually recognised contacts. Thus, the 
names of categories relating to generation and age, by means of comparing 
lists specific to each group of people, very often made it possible for people 
to locate any given person they had met in passing. Here, as elsewhere, 
people could break their word, or break a contract but these interactions 
would involve nearby or distant communities. Trading networks of widely 
varied kinds interconnected these peoples and communities. Distances 
beyond the reach of a trumpet call were given a value according to the 
number of days of walking, for the warriors in particular, one of whose 
main functions was to survey the country—theirs and others’—sometimes 
with hostile intentions. It was usually women who would carry things 
over shorter distances. Processions of men would cross each other while 
travelling longer distances. The tsetse fly limited the use of donkeys almost 
everywhere; and dromedaries roamed the more arid Northern regions.
These areas had relatively gentle terrain and were outward-looking. 
Various products were introduced: cowry shells, coloured pearls, blue 
Persian pearls in particular, new species and varieties to farm, which 
were adopted and adapted according to soil cultivation, transforming 
and improving them: American or South Asian species (beans, bananas, 
taro, sugar cane…) that arrived via the Nile basin and the coasts, which 
facilitated the development of more elevated land and allowed for new 
economic combinations and an increase in population. Products were 
transported to the coast of the Indian Ocean where coastal societies had 
been formed, long before the so-called Swahili cities appeared, this time 
in collaboration with well-established Arab-Muslim traders. For a long 
time products from highland blacksmiths were exported. Cattle were 
also brought to the coast. Valuable goods such as rhinoceros horns and 
elephant tusks arrived through the Kamba and other people too, who had 
established themselves as essential intermediaries. Lastly, contrary to what 
happened in the hinterland of what was to become Tanzania, Swahili and 
Arab merchants’ caravans did not penetrate, or not to a large degree, the 
continent in the hinterland of today’s Kenya. The people who lived there 
had a reputation for being “savage” and barbaric and for being protected by 
cruel warriors, a reputation that the Kamba were careful not to dispute, all 
the more so since the fate that met Swahili or Somali caravans that never 
returned confirmed this.
In this ancient economy, being rich and accumulating wealth were by 
no means held in contempt. The rich man, one who was successful in 
his various occupations, was an important person who was constantly 
called upon: he was “the one who makes people happy,” according to the 
literal meaning of one of the local names for these “big men.” He became 
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someone who provided benefits and was a resource for his citizens. He 
could not avoid the demands that were made of him as they went along 
with his reputation and position, which were determined by the number 
of “dependants” and by his ability to widen his networks. After a while, 
however, the accumulation and transfer of wealth were doomed to fail. 
Despite people’s proven expertise in conservation, any potential surplus 
from harvests could not easily be stored for long periods. Herds, despite 
being spread out across different areas, just as people lived in scattered 
settlements, remained exposed to epidemics or raids.
In short, the primitive accumulation of capital, so dear to economists, was 
not possible. It was the accumulation of people that mattered. The ability to 
overcome food or political crises, or increased mortality, was what set apart 
groups or individuals: this is one of the merits of having a range of activities, 
along with the possibility of having a sufficiently large and versatile area 
of land. Raids also made it possible to quickly recover what was needed 
to survive and start again: raids were carried out to seize cattle, or take 
captive—women and children who were taken and integrated to replenish 
the workforce. But it was important not to set off a cycle of retaliatory 
attacks. The use of raids had to be contained, otherwise widespread war 
would set in, something which had obviously happened in the past,8 but 
not to the point of causing lasting depopulation. We must adopt another 
point of view in order to understand that these peoples and their modes of 
organisation created the possibility of another form of accumulation, one 
which resulted in increased population density.
3. Peoples and Speakers
These versatile highlands were conducive to human settlements, provided 
the settlers were equipped to benefit from them and enjoyed a lower 
prevalence of disease. The varied economic activity mentioned above is the 
result of a complex process spanning centuries and millennia. Unlike many 
underpopulated or depopulated areas of pre-colonial Africa, these regions 
appeared to the conquerors to be “bastions of population” (or densely 
populated highlands) according to the classical expression used by French 
geographers: high undulating plateaus of the lacustrine kingdoms to the 
west, highlands and peaks towards the Indian Ocean, Mount Elgon, Mount 
Kenya; in Tanzania, Mount Meru and Kilimanjaro and other regions with 
8. The least well-known example is that of the internal Maasai wars which 
devastated these peoples at the end of the nineteenth century after their 
herds were destroyed by rinderpest (not to mention the drought and small pox 
epidemic which affected all populations in these regions), which again puts into 
question the risk they would have taken and the choice they would have made 
to undertake only one kind of activity.
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bimodal rainfall; to the north, beyond the semi-arid Turkana Basin, uplands 
which spring up again in Ethiopia.
Various peoples slowly moved into these areas, in search of hunting 
ground and places to fish, seeking new pastures to keep pace with new crops 
and slow but definite demographic growth. The existence of three major 
linguistic families—Cushitic, Bantu and Nilotic—in the present day attests 
to this, even if it is difficult to piece together the history of how they spread 
and mixed together.9 Whilst some can be seen to predominate, the mixing 
of populations is nonetheless active and dates back a long time. A number 
of terms pertaining to ancient political institutions are commonly used, 
demonstrating the melting-pot effect that some of them had and points to 
them having been actively used in the past. Some Bantu speakers gradually 
mixed with proto-Nilotic speakers and/or proto-Cushitic speakers, which, 
little by little, were “Bantu-ised,” a mixture which is probably at the root of 
so-called oriental Bantu languages (around Kenya’s Central Province) and 
differs from other branches of Bantu speakers. In the same way, Nilotic 
speakers—aside from the very staggered arrivals from South Sudan—can be 
separated into southern Nilotic speakers who arrived long ago and whose 
language borrows considerably from Cushitic languages (Nandi, Kipsisgis, 
Tugen, Pokot, Okiek…), eastern Nilotic speakers who arrived more recently 
(Samburu, Maasai, Turkana) and most recently, western Nilotic speakers 
(Luo). All groups, however, mixed with other pre-existing groups.
Beyond the differences in languages or their division into different 
dialects, the modes of existence of the various families of speakers remained 
very similar. Human settlements became permanent, and attracted and 
integrated other migrants. The warmer, lower areas which were suitable 
for grazing and cereal but exposed to recurrent droughts could be easily 
abandoned simply by moving to higher ground and settling on higher and 
better resourced slopes. Over the centuries, many territorial communities 
organised themselves according to slopes by combining diverse soils and 
grasslands on higher and lower ground. If groups differed from each other, 
due to distances that were too far to travel, close ties were forged between 
highland and lowland societies, which were sanctioned by various rituals. 
In the west of Kenya, we can refer to the famous case of the Luo, Nilotic 
speakers and agropastoralist fisherman who came from South Sudan as 
their herds were displaced and they mixed with pre-existing populations; 
by settling on the eastern shores of Lake Nyanza-Victoria, an area rich in 
resources, they forged strong links with the Gusii, communities of farmers 
and breeders who were established on the hills to the east. The Gusii, Bantu 
9. All the more so since the current speakers are the last recorded; their 
presence in no way rules out other families of speakers having existed and then 
disappeared without leaving easily detectable traces (Philippson 2009).
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speakers who had lived on these highlands for many years, were themselves 
a product of mixing with proto-Nilotic speakers who long preceded them.
This settlement process was made all the more likely to happen when a 
significant resource made the area at the bottom of the slopes an initial focal 
point, which led to a pioneer front heading upstream: salt deposits, surface 
iron, quality clay and wells that were easy to dig. Long-term settlement at 
the water’s edge was avoided due to exposure to the tsetse fly. Ithanga, a 
clay deposit at the southern foot of Mount Kenya, was probably the basis 
for a settlement of people that became long after the Kikuyu. Blacksmiths 
in what became Mbeere set up permanent populations, then expanded to 
higher ground, eventually becoming the Embu. To the northeast of the 
Nyambene Hills, Ngombe—a crater lake rich in salt and minerals and a 
source of vitality for humans and herds—agglomerated, in association with 
sites controlled by blacksmiths, one of the centres of populations that much 
later became the Igembe and Tigania (Meru). In southwest Kenya, beneath 
the Loita Hills, farmers and breeders settled around foothill springs, and 
became known as the Loita Maasai; these people married within groups 
of farmers, the most well-known example being the Kikuyu, among whom 
mothers and fathers are of Maasai descent and two traditions of initiation 
co-existed (the Maasai tradition and Kikuyu tradition).
More widely, any eminence that provided two rainy seasons and a 
defensive ridge was able to attract permanent populations: the Taita 
settled on the mountains of the same name, behind the Swahili coast; to 
the northwest, if it benefitted them to roam the dry lowlands, the Kamba 
would often settle on any of the hills that were dotted around towards 
Mount Kenya and make them their territory. As a counterexample, the 
people who eventually became the Turkana worthy of note. They had 
very good reasons for leaving the highlands of the Karimojong peoples 
from the sixteenth century onwards and scattering across the semi-desert 
foothills. In short, the exception that proves the rule is that settling on 
higher ground while taking control of lower slopes and foothills is the 
winning combination. And tracing the movements of ancient populations 
and human settlements requires detailed knowledge of the geographical 
frameworks and ecological potential of the areas concerned, which are 
themselves unstable.
One final subject deserves clarification: the scattered settlements that 
characterise these regions and go far beyond Kenya. This is something 
which is difficult to explain. The “villagisation” imposed on the Kikuyu 
and on some of the Embu and Meru during the 1950s under the state of 
emergency and anti-Mau Mau repression conversely reveals how prevalent 
this custom was. It is reminiscent of the contrast between bocage (a French 
word designating a landscape of hedges and settlements scattered across 
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hamlets) and open field (settlements grouped together in villages) which have 
long been observed in the West, along with the stream of analysis it elicited; 
or closer to the world of Africa, in Cameroon, the enduring controversy 
around the Bamileke bocage and its scattered settlements. The scattering 
of settlements as a way of meeting the need to develop diverse ecosystems, 
within secure areas, is the simplest explanation that can be provided within 
the scope of this article. Especially since as family settlements appeared 
along the slopes and on the preferred land situated at 1,700 metres (roughly), 
there was a custom of congregating for various purposes: the promotion of 
warriors who were placed in kind of warriors barracks in strategic places; 
processions of novices and newly initiated members travelled across the 
land reasserting its boundaries; occasional meetings in public grounds, 
barter markets, assemblies for Fathers of the Country and at a different 
location, assemblies of women. When the time came, these localities, often 
used day to day as communal pastureland, were transformed into dedicated 
or sacred areas by means of sacrifices and suitable invocations, which brings 
us straight on to political and religious structures.
4. East African Government and Politics of the Past
The highlands of today’s Kenya, like those of the border regions of 
neighbouring states, were known for an original form of social and 
political organisation, a kind of polity based on class systems relating to 
generation and age.10 Within the polities in question, each put in place by 
its own traditional generational class system and identifiable through a 
specific list of names, the population, primarily the males, were included in 
generational classes of people who exercised power in turn. If a man was in 
class “A,” his sons would be in class “B,” his grandsons in class “C,” etc. When 
there was a transfer of power from an aging generation to the successive 
younger generation, the other classes would also change position. In this 
often antagonistic phase of reordering positions (particularly in connection 
to the variable number of individuals who were born too early or too 
late relative to the time when their class came into power), names which 
were provisional then permanent were collectively chosen for the newly 
promoted classes. Another characteristic was that the manner in which 
power was transferred varied considerably from one polity to another: 
partial transfers occurred every eight years (Borana), every 15 to 20 years 
(Meru, Samburu, Maasai, Nandi, Kipsigis, Pokot, Gabbra, Dassanatch…), or 
10. “Polity” in the sense of a political entity characterised by individual socio-
political institutions: here there are generational systems, elsewhere there could 
be chiefdoms, kingdoms, empires, city-states, the latter of which can be found 
on the so-called Swahili coast, and there are as many different kinds of polity. 
However, some of their characteristics can be combined to a certain extent. 
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the transfer took place every 30 to 40 years (Kikuyu, Karimojong peoples, 
Giriama…).11
These variations reflect tensions relating to reproduction within 
traditional generations and to the specific methods by which classes were 
recruited, such as by organising rituals, by controlling, mostly successfully, 
the time at which people married or through the practice of polygamy; 
but the methods and ethos through which power was exercised were very 
similar. The ruling class of men, or Fathers of the Country, had authority 
through assemblies which would meet in public grounds: the fathers 
debated public affairs, judged the cases put before them, modified traditions 
if necessary, such as altering the “bride price” (see note 3) when it tended 
towards increasing too much. It was their particular responsibility to keep 
control of the class of young men from which their own sons were often 
recruited, and who made up the official warrior class. When the warriors 
came of age and expressed the desire to establish themselves as fathers of 
families, then a new group of warriors had to be promoted, even if it meant 
putting pressure on Fathers of the Country who were ageing but reluctant 
to accept being replaced by new fathers of the Country.
Life was often broken up into clearly defined stages, i.e. age grades or age 
status, in which rights and responsibilities were set out, and which had to be 
reached either on a personal basis or, more often, together with one’s own 
age and/or generation class. The initiation process to become a warrior was 
a crucial step for men. Warriors—the Maasai morans provide an example 
made popular by tourism—carried out offensive or defensive raids, bringing 
back herds taken from enemies; we have also mentioned that women and 
children were taken captive and integrated through initiations to boost 
the numbers among populations which were deemed insufficient; there 
was no slave trading or slave status. However, the Fathers of the Country 
took care to reign in the warriors’ aggressive zeal. They feared retaliation 
from neighbouring polities, who could very often put together armies of 
warriors who were capable of similar attacks. This allows us to understand 
the importance of the link between warriors, territory and Fathers of the 
Country which was the foundation of each polity: it is not inappropriate 
to talk in terms of “territorial sovereignty” and, in the case of the fathers, 
11. On this huge topic of social and political anthropology, see, among others: 
Baxter & Almagor 1978; Bernardi 1985; Legesse 2006; Marmone 2017; Muriuki 
1974; Peatrik 1995, 1999, 2003, 2004, 2019; Tornay 1995, 2001; Spencer 1973; 
Stewart 1977. These political organisations have presented particular challenges 
in terms of description and analysis. The overview being offered is a (condensed) 
response to the key question the purpose of these forms of society which have 
become prevalent in these regions of East Africa, and the twofold question of 
their historicity or historical depth, and their historical bearing on East Africa. 
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of “collective sovereign.” Even when travelling, or indeed migrating, each 
person belonging to an age or generation class remained a member of that 
class and a citizen of that polity, even if they did not live there. That is 
unless people left, in cases of a crisis or a disagreement with their fathers 
and along with fellow dissenters. They would leave to try to create their 
own polity under the pretext of seeking new pastures, often taking groups 
of girls with them as accomplices.
Over the centuries, some polities disappeared and others were formed, 
bringing together the populations of defunct polities. This simple and 
effective form of government which was self-referential or even self-
established but not free of intrinsic tensions and reproductive crises, was 
based around it being possible to quickly get institutions moving again 
after the inevitable disasters which leave their mark on human societies: 
human and animal epidemics, environmental problems, small-scale wars 
that descend into full-scale conflict, for example, as previously mentioned 
in note 8, the conflicts and disasters that struck East Africa at the end of 
the nineteenth century and helped pave the way for the colonial conquest 
by justifying it. By putting a group of self-appointed Fathers of the Country 
on one side and their sons who were in charge of defence on the other, a 
territory was established and social life could get back to being less chaotic; 
later, initiation sessions and ritual processions would strengthen the 
collectives and reinforce ties to the newly established territory. There was 
no chief here, no dynasty descending from a founding hero. Rather there 
were groups of men who shared the same traditional ethos, remarkable 
individuals who were also able to influence others, who were determined 
to work together to set up their own society.
These political systems, with their collective authority and shared 
power, were egalitarian. These societies were not very hierarchical and 
fostered an individualism which was unconnected to modernity and drew 
upon a farming ethos and pastoralist practices. There was little hierarchy 
because all young people, who at one time were subordinate, were called 
upon to become Fathers of the Country. The order of birth was almost 
unimportant in these matters, and the idea of differential roles and status 
depending on who is first born, second born… or last born, as is typically 
seen in the lineage societies well-known within African Studies, have no 
real relevance. We are looking at a different African paradigm. Everyone, 
provided they lived long enough, would cross the age thresholds along 
with their class and take on various roles relating to family, politics and 
ritual. With everyone potentially in the same boat, this system valued the 
achievements of each person, creating and also legitimising the idea that 
some people (men and woman) were more successful than others.
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These democracies of yesteryear were also capable of amalgamating 
relatively large populations through generation and age classes: it can be 
estimated that the numbers ranged from 20,000 to 90,000 inhabitants. Under 
20,000, it was no longer possible to line up sufficient numbers of warriors 
and a polity whose existence was under threat risked having to merge 
with its neighbours. Above 90,000, the distances needing to be crossed 
became too long but sometimes neighbouring polities would join together 
on the basis of jointly organised initiations. These grand rituals were a 
focus for the populations and enemies were sometimes tempted to attack 
groups while they were busy recruiting a new class of warriors. Historical-
mythical accounts explain this clearly and help us understand how, step by 
step, territorial sections grouped together in larger areas which were made 
peaceful through co-initiation. We discover the capacity of collective rites 
of passage to integrate, as well as their importance in governance, forming 
assemblies and controlling peace and war in any given territory. In this way, 
these polities were able to control sufficiently large territories within which 
anyone considered a member of the polity, or even as its ally, could move 
around. The adaptive advantage these territories displayed has already 
been mentioned. These polities were not defined by borders in the Western 
sense of the term, but by boundary areas which were identified by different 
notable ground features, very often considered “consecrated” sites where 
sacrifices were made during initiation processions which crossed the length 
of the territory. Lastly, the citizens of each of the polities could be identified 
through a common list of class names (relating to generation and age). This 
identification was a preliminary part of meetings and meant that everyone 
could find their bearings and move around far from their respective bases.
Without going into too much detail, it should be noted that women 
were included in the system through classes of wives who were named and 
associated with their husbands’ generation classes; they usually had their 
own councils and deliberated matters that concerned them, and remarkable 
women emerged from this. Rules of kinship, in terms of children and 
marriage, as well as how quickly people married and prohibitions within 
marriage, were often regulated by the system of generational and age 
classes. A man could not have sexual relations with a woman who was 
the daughter of a man of the same generation as him, or even marry that 
woman. That would amount to him marrying his own daughter, and for 
a girl to accept the advances of a man considered as her father was taboo 
and a form of incest, in this case generational, in addition to the more well 
know taboo of family incest.
In these polities there was therefore no chiefdom or dynasty; the principle 
of hereditary succession in a lineage within a predominant clan could even 
be said to contradict the principle of replacing a class of aging fathers with 
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the consecutive class of sons. The colonial administration, in the beginning, 
evidently concluded that these populations devoid of centralised power had 
no government—“anarchic” was the word used to describe these “archaic” 
indigenous people—until the most astute among them, including district 
commissioner Harold E. Lambert, realised the complexity of the traditional 
systems, their capacity for integration and the principles of devolving 
authority. These principles—elicited by Jomo Kenyatta (1938) in his 
pioneering monograph on the Kikuyu—were at the root of the resistance 
fought by Africans, who then became colonial subjects, even after their 
generation class system had been disrupted by the conquest.
It is telling that in terms of regional distribution, these political regimes 
disappear in places where, for reasons relating to geography and historical 
heritage, other regimes asserted themselves. If you head west towards 
the Great Lakes region, you find kingdoms that deeply fascinated the 
British such as the Baganda and their kabaka which was not dissimilar 
to their own monarch. This affirmation of dynasty goes hand in hand 
with the increasing importance of lineage based on proven filiation and 
the ancestralisation of some of the deceased. To the south, towards what 
is today Tanzania, chiefdoms were formed when chiefs managed, to the 
detriment of the Fathers of the Country, to sustainably manage the process 
of initiating and training the warrior class which they would use to their 
own advantage (Chagga, Rwa). To the north, towards Ethiopia, peoples 
with a generational class system like the famous Oromo gadaa system, 
after having conquered the southern half of the Ethiopian plateaus, became 
principalities before later being absorbed into Menelik II’s empire at the 
end of the nineteenth  century. Towards the coast of the Indian Ocean, 
there is good reason to think that the Swahili cities are the result of the 
transformation of local societies probably organised in the remote past 
according to classes of generation and age, similar to the system which 
remains in the Comoros archipelago. Generation and age systems of East 
African origin, as evidenced by a common vocabulary and principles 
continued to exist there while they were transformed by the influence of 
traders, then by Arab-Muslim principalities. This situation is indicative 
of ancient links between the continent and the archipelago which have 
recently been picked up by historians.
5. The Religion of Initiation
East African peoples, with their generation and age-based systems, had little 
interest in stories about the origins of the world, cosmogony or the genesis 
of the beings who came to populate it. A different conceptual and symbolic 
framework prevailed and other themes informed the stories and legends 
that they liked to tell. The world was considered to be originated from an 
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abstract power seen as working continuously for its self-maintenance. This 
abstract, energising power was regarded as a kind of deity called Ngaï, 
Murungu, Akuj, Waaka… depending on the language. It could be felt in the 
air people and animals breathed, in the wind that makes the leaves rustle 
and the water ripple; and also in reproductive substances, in the seminal 
reproductive forces of men and bulls, forces of germination seen in harvests 
and the fertilising forces of saliva mixed with mead. The world’s ills and 
misfortunes were a result of human misconduct which disturbed exchange 
and balance; and rituals, prayers and sacrifices to the deity or higher power 
aimed to redress this balance and restore proper flow and exchanges.
Ritual activities were of great importance in the life of these populations. 
The household economy, besides everyday food provision, was a way for 
the head of the family and his wives to fulfil their ritual obligations in 
a dignified manner by providing what was needed in order for them to 
take place, and by feeding the largest possible number of spectators. Paul 
Baxter, ethnographer of the Boran, even maintained that these populations 
lived in a sea of rituals and blessings, also implying that it was difficult to 
separate activities that could be classed as rituals from those that were part 
of everyday life.
In order to really characterise the religion of these East African worlds, 
we have to talk of a religion of initiation, and relate it to the link between the 
initiator and the initiated, as with the worship of ancestors, which relates to 
lineage—and has long been identified by religious studies—or, more recently, 
outside of Africa, the principle of the shaman and the shamanic journey to 
the spirit world. Nowhere else, in fact, have initiation and rites of passage, 
biographical and political, taken on such importance: rites of passage that 
mark a person’s life from birth until death, and the collective rite of passage 
when a new class of fathers comes to power, causing all the other classes 
to change position. The organisation of rituals legitimised the political; and 
generally speaking the effect of a rite was not only symbolic or magical, it 
had a practical effect that changed people in concrete ways, reconfiguring 
social ties and social precedence. Some rites were modest procedures, 
almost surreptitious but no less significant, such as the first shaving of a 
child’s hair which was carried out long after they were born, within the 
family homestead, at a time when it was sure that they would survive. The 
child would then receive a name, the first of several during his existence, 
which would be that of a grandparent of the same sex. This grand-parent, 
through the gift of his or her name and the principle of the identity of the 
alternating generations, was thus granted a kind of longevity. Other rituals 
such as the initiation to promote someone to warrior status—some involved 
circumcision but many other initiatory ritual procedures existed—could 
take place over the course of a year. Various groups of the population would 
Beyond its Whitewashed Past, the Unique Peoples of Precolonial Kenya
369
perform as part of a true spectacle with the initiation process starting only 
when the granaries were full, the herds were well fed and there had been 
peace for a sufficiently long time; these ritual gatherings or co-initiations 
helped to incorporate groups into larger collectives, as mentioned above.
In accordance with the egalitarianism of the political and social system, 
no religious leader was responsible for conducting the rituals but some 
dignitaries sometimes worked in conjunction with the Fathers and the 
“Accomplished.” A person’s intangible and spiritual capacity to influence 
the course of life depended firstly on having the power to bless, and also to 
curse. Every person potentially had this gift but the effectiveness of their 
power depended on the person’s age status and reputation as an individual. 
The blessings of those who had reached the last age grade were particularly 
effective and sought after: having succeeded in overcoming all the crises 
of existence, these “Accomplished” men and women were considered to be 
closest to the Deity, if not as part of it. In some polities, certain figures were 
known for having a particular aptitude for giving blessings, such as the 
mûgwe among the Meru, whose blessings using the left hand were beneficial 
and sought after. Outside the setting of rituals, nothing really distinguished 
them from their fellow citizens. These specific dignitaries simply honed 
their particular skills which it was useful to draw upon during times of 
excessive or insufficient rain, among other examples, in an eclipse or even 
when an epidemic indicated a disturbance in the cycles of rain and sun 
(Bernardi 1959; Legesse 1979; Waller 1995; Wood 1999).
The requests for protection that these figures or the Accomplished 
persons would address to the Deity, their benevolent words interspersed 
with jets of saliva mixed with mead, the rubbing of clay or fat on to certain 
parts of the body—all their actions were very effective and the presence 
of the Accomplished men and women was essential during the many 
rituals that marked age-grading and the progress of generation classes. The 
opposite and complementary practice of cursing, in which menacing words 
were publicly declared interspersed with saliva projected from the top 
teeth, was available to everyone; but again, its effectiveness corresponded 
to the age of the speaker, and cursing was a powerful instrument of social 
control not be used lightly. Among certain peoples, a curse was irreversible 
(the Maasai for example) while for others, it was possible for it to be lifted 
after a certain length of time, when the speaker of the curse had come to 
accept the request put forward by the person being cursed. Reconciliation 
took place through a ritual based around the sacrifice of a particular animal 
followed by the sharing of the carcass which was eaten immediately. 
Blessings and curses forged links between the living and, in some cases, 
the recently deceased whose word had not been respected and who people 
tried to appease through sharing a sacrificed animal (Peatrik 1991).
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Since they were publicly announced, blessings and curses were known 
to everyone, and were everyone’s responsibility, unlike attacks through 
witchcraft which were thought to be secret acts by certain wicked people 
who spoke evil words to themselves, buried certain objects that were 
considered dangerous in specific places and slipped poison into the food 
of those they wanted to harm. A source of fear and anxiety, rumours of 
witchcraft constituted a serious disruption to public order. The individuals 
accused were judged by councils of fathers and subjected to ordeals, 
and the guilty were condemned to death and executed, only after being 
subjected to torture and enduring “exemplary” suffering. The work of the 
assembly of fathers was broader as they decided on the ritual procedures to 
be performed when misfortune and hardship repeatedly struck the polity: 
excess water or drought, epidemic and increased mortality… there was a 
complete sacrificial process which included the dignitaries mentioned 
above and aimed to restore balance to the cycles of rain and sun. Sometimes 
even disturbances in the atmosphere indicated that the time had come to 
renew the social and political body, to urge the older generation to depart 
and bring in a new class of Fathers of the Country. Ideally, aging and 
rejuvenation would be a part of the way in which institutions kept going: 
individuals would come and go but the polity, distinguished by its list of 
names of generations, would remain.
It fell to the diviner-healer to deal with individual and family troubles 
and find the causes (Fratkin 2011). He would examine the entrails of 
a goat which was sacrificed for this purpose or the diagrams drawn by 
the tiny objects projecting from his divination gourd. There was a wide 
range of causes of unhappiness which could involve family or community 
networks. Misfortune or illness could result from accidentally or 
deliberately committing a forbidden act considered particularly improper, 
from insufficient blessings or intentional curses, or from witchcraft. Again, 
making amends meant sacrificing an animal from the herd, with the 
procedures varying according to the type of animal: its age, sex, the colour 
of its coat, the method of killing and the way the carcass was used, whether 
it was shared or completely destroyed. Other methods of treating diseases 
existed such as herbal medicine and initiation into therapeutic associations, 
but the use and the sacrifice of animals from the herd, even if it was only a 
few goats’ heads, remained the quintessential way of carrying out acts of 
reparation.
Funeral rituals were strictly a family matter, involving no public display, 
and differed according to the age of the deceased. This was in accordance 
with an indifference to the idea of individual post-mortem existence 
besides grandchildren, but not to a collective existence after death since 
bringing back the names of old generational classes made sure of this. 
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Everything was thought to take place during a person’s lifetime which 
accounts for the high value placed on initiations and the final stage of 
accomplishment. Protocols were similar from group to group, with some 
variations. Therefore, the deaths of people who died before this stage 
had been completed were considered tragic and their remains were left 
in the bush for predators; in contrast, the remains of the Accomplished 
which sometimes dried out quickly due to fires that were kept going day 
and night, were buried and considered beneficial to the ground in the pit 
where the herd’s droppings were collected. And as is logical, if one looks 
outside the area where systems relating to age and generation predominate, 
one comes across ways of worshipping ancestors, well-formed lineages, 
rules of inheritance for widows, recognisable funeral rites—in short, all 
the workings of other ritual-social societies, for example of the Luo or the 
Luyia. However, social hierarchies, despite having different features, were 
not expressed and were characterised by the same high value placed on the 
herd and the same central importance of cows.
In light of this picture of East African and Kenyan worlds before they 
were transformed by the colonial conquest, then by decolonisation, there is 
clearly food for thought and a case for imagining a new national museum 
of Kenyan ethnography and history, which could make use of multimedia 
collections and resources in ways not seen before. The emphasis could 
be on processes and dynamics—technological, organisational, ritual—, on 
variations of scale which highlight specific geographical and historical 
features, on biographies, not of kings but of figures who have left a wealth 
of material in collections of oral sources, which could make up a highly 
original gallery of portraits. The historical depth of these phenomena—
even if we only partially know about it—, could be enhanced and conveyed 
through synoptic tables displaying the different methods—those used by 
archaeologists differing from those of linguists for example—and separating 
likely or plausible dates from proven dates, with this being modified as and 
when there are advances in knowledge. The display would also need to 
show the mixture of both what is permanent and the profound changes that 
makes up the real Kenya: a variety of languages but a homogeneity in terms 
of economic conditions; environmental contrasts and conflict relating to 
land use but also ancient trading systems and the active circulation of 
goods; societies with collective power, forms of territorial sovereignty, 
forms of individualism, not without their parallels with contemporary 
political processes. Age-grading and learning through initiations echo the 
schooling which Kenyans have championed, as well as the readiness for 
hard work and the value placed on individual achievement which, in the 
early days, fuelled for example the energy of Kenyan runners… Beyond 
the undeniable rupture that the colonial conquest represented, now that 
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a sufficient number of years have passed since decolonisation, we have a 
better sense of the way in which Kenya is a product of these legacies. In a 
nation that sometimes doubts itself, we can allow ourselves to think that 
perhaps becoming (re)acquainted with a shared past, with all its rough edges 
and differences and not just made “heritage,” would allow for a clearer look 
ahead to a shared future; perhaps the use of critical and reflexive knowledge 
of the past and identities is not incompatible with nation building, in fact 
quite the opposite.
Conclusion
Broadly speaking, the subject of Kenya as presented in this article is an 
invitation to further research which will be set out by way of a conclusion. 
When considered alongside other situations in Africa and elsewhere, 
it could provide the basis for a comparison incorporating two starting 
points: the status of customs and nation-building. Thus, in analysing the 
“folklorisation” process that popular customs underwent following the 
French Revolution, which accompanied the advent of the industrial world 
and modern nation-states, it is revealed that customs were subject to a double 
transformation at the very moment that they were destined to disappear. 
They were regionalised and folkorised, even inspiring regionalist literature 
and became knowledge objects for the first methodical ethnographic 
surveys which were designed to rescue them before they died out (Fabre 
1996; Thiesse 1999).
African states, beyond some common dysfunction analysed by political 
scientists, display great diversity. Concerning East Africa only, how can we 
keep thinking of the institutions of Kenya, Ethiopia, Uganda and Tanzania 
as fitting into the same mould, as if the distinctive features of their ante-
colonial circumstances have had no effect on their modes of existence? 
Kenya, with its unique configuration, appears to be permanently influenced 
by the generational polities which once prevailed across a large part of 
its territory. However, these old political systems—still partly in existence 
in the northern counties of Kenya—as well as inviting us to look beyond 
the idea that a state-based society and a stateless society are opposed to 
one another,12 have to do with the practical values and methods that have 
permeated the various emancipation movements and remained within 
contemporary practices. Thus, there exists a continuity, one which is 
often underestimated and misunderstood, between territorial sovereignty 
(Mbembe 2005) and the ethos of these ancient democracies, on the one 
12. This opposition seen in the first major study of African political systems 
(Fortes and Evans-Pritchard 1940) should not be jettisoned but rather qualified, 
amended or built upon, drawing upon the great number of monographs which 
have been produced in different regions of Africa since this pioneering work.
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hand, and modern democracies, on the other. The current situation of 
cultures in Kenya is best clarified in a different way. The “heritagisation” in 
progress could be less indicative of a whitewashed past, instead displaying 
an awareness of a past which is in the process of becoming the past, and of 
customs disappearing. In a kind of dialectic movement being passed down 
through successive generations, the folklorisation called for in most Kenyan 
counties could serve as a prelude to distancing from the societies and 
cultures of yesteryear, and to the sustainable13 development of systematic 
knowledge, this being the task that lies ahead for the future of history in 
tomorrow’s Kenya.
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The Aravai Peoples,  
the Site of Rabai and its Sacred Forests 
on the Kenyan Coast
Marie Pierre Ballarin
Translated by Keenya Hofmaier
Social science research on the Kenyan coast has largely emphasised Swahili 
culture—for which there exists a vast amount of academic literature—but has 
paid little attention to the Mijikenda. The Mijikenda, linguistically related 
to the Bantu populations, include the following subgroups: Agiriama, 
Akambe, Aribe, Aravai, Achhonyi, Adigo, Aduruma, Adzihana and 
Akauma. According to oral tradition, they came from a mythical territory 
called Singwaya (in the southern part of present-day Somalia) and settled 
in hilltop villages that were “fortified” by very dense vegetation, known as 
the kayas (Kiriama 2013).1 The Mijikenda formed a group of intermediaries 
between the coast and the hinterland, and they were very early on included 
in the economic and political exchange systems conducted by the Swahili 
(Thomas 1978; Brantley 1981). According to the historian Justin Willis 
(1993), the name “Mijikenda” does not identify a unified ethnic group 
but rather was created under British colonisation to designate the two 
demographically dominant coastal groups under the guise of a land access 
policy based on ethno-racial differences. From an anthropological viewpoint, 
research carried out in the 1970s by David Parkin on the Giriama, as well as 
more recent research by Linda Giles and Monica Udvardy (Udvardy 1992; 
Udvardy, Giles & Mitsanze 2004), made it possible to show the complexity 
of the Giriama’s social and ritual organisation in the broader context of 
Mijikenda culture (Giles & Gearhart 2014).2 Since the 1990s and 2000s, a 
team from the National Museums of Kenya undertook archaeological and 
historical research on some of the primary sites formerly occupied by the 
1. Archaeological research recently conducted by the National Museums 
of Kenya showed that occupation of the kayas dates back even further to the 
beginning of the second millennium. See notably Kiriama (2013).
2. The recent introduction of Cynthia Brantley in the collective work edited 
by Linda Giles and Rebecca Gearhart, Contesting Identities (2014), appropriately 
places the Mijikenda studies in their historical and academic context since the 
1970s. This book is a recent synthesis about the Mijikenda and relies on fieldwork 
conducted mainly with the Giriama people.
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Mijikenda people. This research was part of a governmental policy aimed 
at the valorisation and protection of sacred forests. The scope of much of 
the research focused on the Aravai, the site of Rabai and its sacred forests; 
all of which will be presented in this paper.
Origin myths begin with the establishment of the Aravai in the kayas 
and, as Thomas Spear described, the creation of the nine ethnic groups 
that formed the Mijikenda identity. It is also widely accepted that in the 
nineteenth  century, following the territory’s pacification and due to 
demographic pressure, the Mijikenda began to settle outside their forest 
lands. The original settlements were maintained as sacred places and burial 
grounds, reinforcing the territorialisation of the group. The elders from 
these lineages formed a council with the intention of preserving these 
places. At the same time, strict rules were put in place to guarantee the 
sanctity of the forests: the cutting of wood and vegetation was prohibited, 
a particular dress code was required, various taboos were to be respected, 
access was reserved for elders—especially in places of high magical value 
where the community’s protective talismans (fingos) are buried—and 
finally, specific paths of circulation were created within the kaya enclosure. 
The boundary between land for human use and sacred land was therefore 
reinforced. Today, the kayas are still central to ceremonies such as social 
harmony rituals and rain rituals held under the elders’ authority. These 
elders play a dominate role regarding social regulations and control and 
organise weekly meetings designed to resolve community problems. In this 
regard, these forests are “by the ritual acts that occur there, a place within 
the village where the social and territorial ties from various social groups 
of diverse origins are created” (Liberski-Bagnoud, Fournier & Nignan 2010).
In Rabai, resorting to a longue durée approach makes it possible to 
understand the evolution of Mijikenda groups and their guardianship over 
the kayas until today. Rabai is an extremely rich site of varying facets, and 
its study is part of a broader reflection on the role of history and memory 
in the process of valorisation of heritage resources. It raises questions 
about the preservation and sustainable management of heritage sites by 
the communities concerned, all while the sacred forests of Rabai are being 
threatened by reckless deforestation.
The 5 kayas of Rabai are: Mudzimuvya, Bomu, Fimboni, Mudzi Mwiru 
and Mzizima. They form a block of forest composed of small wooded hills 
that constitute a prominent feature of the landscape bordering large coconut 
plantations. Rabai has one of the highest concentrations of coconuts on the 
coast and their exploitation plays a significant role in the local economy 
(notably through the production of palm wine). These plantations are 
under the responsibility of the elders who are divided into two main clans: 
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the Amwezi and the Achiza. The plantations can be accessed by following 
a path leading to two to three entrances.
Just before the first entrance, depending on the kaya, one can see 
the tombs (makaburini) of individuals who died outside the site. These 
individuals were buried on both sides of the path in accordance with their 
cause of death and/or their clan membership. Not far away is the cherani, 
or area where the body is exposed before a decision is made about its final 
burial place. The elders and the most renowned prophets are buried inside 
the kaya. For example, the kaya elder named Jindwa is buried in Mudzi 
Muvya. In the mid-nineteenth century, Jindwa welcomed Johannes Krapf, 
the Anglican missionary who founded the Rabai mission, thus making it 
the starting point for the expansion of Christianity in Kenya.
The last entrance leads to the historically occupied site. The elders bury 
their wooden sticks (ndata) in the ground before entering the kaya and 
retrieve them once they have finished their activities. These sticks symbolise 
their authority as well as hierarchy within the group. In a secret location 
of high sacred value, one finds the buried fingo, a talisman brought from 
Singwaya which is associated with the myth of their arrival. The parliament 
(moro), originally located in the middle of the kaya, is now located in the 
village. There, the elders manage everyday life within the community 
and decide on ritual activities. Sessions are organised to deliberate on the 
various problems faced by the village’s inhabitants (family issues, land 
conflict, societal offences, etc.).
The ceremonies and cultual locations are diverse, and each kaya has a 
specific role. In Rabai, there is an annual ritual cycle related to community 
preservation and kaya maintenance. It is marked by various rituals 
and organised according to the circumstance, such as the reparation of 
an offence, the initiation of an elder to a higher rank, or other specific 
requests. For example, in 2008, a ritual honouring a Mijikenda prophetess 
was modified with the addition of a special prayer to obtain the ancestors’ 
consent to open the Mudzi Muvya kaya to ecotourism. This ritual also 
sought authorisation to undertake archaeological research in Mudzi 
Mwiru, the oldest kaya in terms of occupancy, and the most important in 
terms of rituals.
The current affirmation of Mijikenda identity through a cultural revival 
marked by festivals, the creation of ecomuseums and ritual effervescence 
is part of a larger search for legitimisation and social recognition. This 
affirmation aims to cope with external pressures: solicitation by political 
movements, pression on land access and resources, and other requests 
related to tourism development. The 2009 public opening of the Mudzi 
Muvya kaya, funded by the French Embassy in Kenya, is indicative of the 
diversity of interests and issues involved, whether local (the Rabai group 
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of elders, villagers, elders of the surrounding kayas, local authorities, etc.), 
national (governmental authorities, National Museums of Kenya, political 
parties, etc.) or international (Unesco, NGOs and research institutions). In 
2013, this project was self-directed with real investment from the groups 
involved. But the tensions between its members are constant, both within 
the elders’ councils and between the elders and the women’s groups who 
challenge the power of the latter—who are always men—and demand a 
more equitable share of the benefits. On the other hand, the site does not 
receive enough visitors, and to overcome this problem, some members of 
the association approach Mombasa hotels with a significant international 
clientele. Thus, on July 13, 2013, a delegation of tourism professionals visited 
Rabai where a new portion of forest was being prepared as a tourist village 
to promote the site. Dances and songs from different villages were abound, 
and ceremonial practices and daily activities were presented. Yet, one of 
the new members of the association had invited some political leaders from 
the opposition party, and the day ended up becoming a political meeting… 
In fact, questions arise concerning the different levels of power and the 
scale game at play which the situation of heritage-making in Rabai reveals. 
Today’s Mijikenda society is caught up in these contradictions and the 
elders of the Aravai and Giriama kayas are at the heart of the socio-political 
issues encompassing the whole of contemporary Kenyan society.
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Presentation and Representation  
in the Nairobi Art Market
Danielle de Lame
Translation revised by the author
Introduction
The history of the development of visual art—and other art forms—in 
Nairobi reflects and condenses the history of networks between the 
city and the world through personal interactions. In general, art objects 
give us a specific material representation of the insertion of goods in the 
international chain of commodities. In Nairobi, the creation of graphic art—
which is the subject of this article—is rooted in the local social dynamics 
operating in synergy with various markets and in connection with the 
knowledge of international artistic trends, past and present. It could be 
argued that in Nairobi as elsewhere the quest for sponsors and access to 
markets exerts a multiform influence on artistic content and form. If the 
insertion of artists in these circuits is a necessary pathway to secure their 
access to market, the modalities of their insertion result from a synergy 
between the transnational and the local perspectives. In Kenya, the social 
ethos of mutual support has for a long time been, and to a certain extent 
continues to be, the source of a creative blossoming from which great 
individuals emerge. The transformation of the capital city over time and 
the mobility of its areas of insecurity and of transit zones have shifted its 
traditional points of contact. The emergence of online trading in art has 
disrupted the more conventional gallery and studio networks. Some of these 
networks continue to operate from shantytowns that remain attractive 
to a certain public. However, most galleries today attract an audience of 
“connoisseurs”—and collectors—even though consecration by the pundits 
of “African Art” remains largely dependent on chance encounters. A recent 
trend tends to circumvent traditional channels and give more value to peer 
recognition at the international level.
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1. The Flower-Power Years
I will recount the journey of some artists and their works as the capital 
city of Nairobi, now a great metropolis, got increasingly inserted into the 
world-system. I do not intend to theorise, but simply to provide some ideas 
that could encourage an accurate collect of facts, which further studies 
could push forward, hopefully free of exoticism. The blooming of visual 
arts during the “golden sixties” in Kenya, and more specifically in Nairobi, 
is partially anchored in local cultures and in the colonial training belatedly 
initiated by the Kenya Art Association. The extraordinary coifs and jewels 
worn by different groups, the Kisii soapstone sculptures, the engraving 
of calabashes, etc., all demonstrate, if needed, the deep-seated aesthetic 
sensibility and cleverness in the use of materials. An informal1 trade for 
tourists existed, especially for sculptures. In addition, beyond a rudimentary 
school training (Robarts 1981), the splendid “ethnic” representations by the 
Austrian Joy Adamson materialise a form of contact—characteristic of that 
era—between worlds that claimed to be so different: the world of the those 
who represent and that of the represented. For some Kenyan observers, 
these pictures may have constituted an incentive to a documentary self-
representation, which is found in the early times of the local pictorial 
production in bars, for instance, where oral traditions can be have been put 
in painting, as I have observed in Ngecha.2 The use of commercial signs,3 
which were a source of income that made it possible for artists to develop 
a more elaborate art, may have allowed for the emergence of creativity 
which the educational system did not favour (Robarts 1981). Finally, as 
elsewhere in Africa, a new trend emerged that was tied both to, on the one 
hand, the local effects of the independences and the pride and enthusiasm 
they generated, and, on the other, the American Pan-Africanist, Black 
Power and “Flower Power” movements, themselves growing within the 
more general movements of liberation from social constraints and anti-
Vietnam war protests.
1. Equating the entire informal Kenyan art market with the informal sector, 
locally called jua kali, as done by Margaretta Swigert (2011), does not seem to 
capture the reality. Her work provides interesting information— sometime 
in need of cross-checking—about this first period of artistic development in 
Nairobi. Margaretta Swigert, under the name Margaretta WaGacheru, publishes 
an art column in two Kenyan newspapers belonging to the same group, The 
Daily Nation and The Business Daily. Her often-partisan articles contain a lot of 
interesting information, though.
2. Kiambu County, 30 minutes from Nairobi. See below.
3. See the magnificent book by Steve Bloom (2009). Today’s signs differ from 
those created earlier, which belonged to the art of graffiti that can be seen on 
the well-known matatu vans.
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Art education opened to Africans, as shown by the case of Francis Kahuri, 
a Kenyan artist trained by Dora Betts at the KAS4 (Swigert 2011, 65), who 
joined other East African artists, notably Kenyans, trained at Makerere 
University (Uganda) by Margaret Trowell (ibid., 66). At the beginning of 
the seventies, a dynamic scene emerged where several artists crossed paths, 
such as Elimo Njau, a Tanzanian artist who had arrived in Kenya in 1958 and 
was commissioned by the Anglican Church to design murals at Fort Hall,5 
as well as avant-garde poets and writers, such as Ngugiwa Thiong’o. Elimo 
Njau, who had a solo exhibition in London in 1961 (ibid., 69) and travelled to 
Europe, founded the first African art centre in Nairobi in 1966, PaayaPaa; it 
was an art gallery as well as an international art centre,6 a refuge for artists 
from African countries experiencing social and political unrest, especially 
those from the African East Coast. Kenya also attracted American artists; 
among them, one finds the three founders of Watatu Galery7 in 1969, Yoni 
Waite, Robin Anderson, and David Hart. These three prestigious artists 
created, according to Swigert, what was perceived to be an artistic universe 
for expatriates (ibid., 72). Other initiatives left their marks on today’s 
Nairobi artistic scene, such as the establishment of jewelry workshops in 
the slums. Two Americans, including Alan Donovan,8 who had a significant 
role in the Nairobi arts market, were behind these activities (ibid., 75).
This is the period (1977) when the Alliance Française, locally known as 
the “French Cultural Centre” set up a first important exhibition, displaying 
Ancent Soi (Michael Soi’s father), the Ugandan artist Jak Katarikawe and 
other artists during the “Wildlife Awareness Week” (ibid., 74), which 
presented mainly pieces exalting nature.
4. The Kenya Art Society was linked to the East African Women’s League, 
which still exists; it holds weekly meetings and intends to be “multiracial.”
5. Fort Hall was the name of the city of Murang’a during colonial times. The 
paintings are known as “the Murang’a murals” and their creation was linked 
to a commemoration of the victims of the Mau Mau anti-colonialist attacks 
reprimanded by expeditions launched from Fort Hall. It seems ironic that a 
personality like Elimo Njau, the first artists to have promoted the arts in Kenya, 
could be linked to this controversial work. See also Miller, 2014.
6. PaayaPaa and its activities remain in the memory of those who were 
present in Nairobi at the time (John Lonsdale, personal communication, Paris, 
February 2015.)
7. For a detailed history of the Watatu Gallery, critically read Margaretta 
WaGacheru: WaGacheru, Margaretta. 2013. “Nairobi’s Upmarket Red Hill Opens 
a New Gallery.” Business Daily, 16  September. http://www.businessdailyafrica.
com/Nairobi-upmarket-Red-Hill-opens-a-new-gallery/-/1248928/1498086/-
/6k5jqc/-/index.html [archive].
8. Alan Donovan promoted not only painting and jewelry making; he organised 
“afro” fashion shows and still exhibits an interesting collection of paintings in 
his “Heritage House” not far from Nairobi National Park.
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During the 1980s, the Watatu Gallery, which welcomed all types of 
artists, changed hands as the three founding artists prioritised their artistic 
activities rather than the management of the gallery.9 After a brief period 
of management under Rhodia Mann and Sherri Saittoti, the American Ruth 
Schaffner10 became the owner of the gallery and orientated it towards the 
promotion of African artists. It is hard nowadays to form an opinion on 
Ruth Schaffner’s personality as she was both vilified and glorified. She had 
created a familial atmosphere around the Watatu Gallery, took charges 
on school fees and made loans to artists in exchange for absolute loyalty, 
exclusivity, and… a 50% commission as from the 1990s (Littlefield Kasfir 
1999, 79)—an unusually high rate in Africa and never required again in 
Kenya. As the owner of two galleries in Los Angeles, she had a significant 
influence on the artistic development in and around Nairobi. With her, 
anyway, the field of painting grew along with the opportunities she 
was offering by establishing contacts between artists during workshops 
and encouraging certain shapes (even certain hues) which connected 
artists from the village to the American market, expatriates and tourists. 
The existing galleries—Watatu, PaayaPaa, the Stanley Hotel gallery, and 
later the Donovan “African Heritage” Gallery—were located in the heart 
of Nairobi, a place insuring a cosmopolitan clientele at a time when the 
downtown, alive with activity, was safe, where the cafes were welcoming 
passers-by. This city centre is hard to imagine today, described by the cliché 
phrase of the time: “the green city under the sun,” with a postcard optimism 
that dropped the mask during the 1982 riots, the beginning of the spread 
of crime from the slums to the city centre (Grignon 1997; de Lame 2006).
Just like the jewelry artisans from the Mathare Valley slums who worked 
for Donovan, the up-and-coming painters had experience making small 
earnings in the art of advertisement and in the often-mediocre works sold 
in small curio shops. While Donovan created many jobs in the “hybrid” 
(Swigert 2011, 75) jewelry field, but also, later, in the textile and fashion 
industries, thanks to Ruth Schaffner, the painters who tried to earn a 
living in a field where they developed their talents, real or imagined, were 
able to emerge, create their style, and adapt to a market they, themselves, 
influenced. Wanyu Brush, who is settled on the green hills of Kiambu 
County in Ngecha, and who was taught painting at the YMCA Art Center, 
took with him Sane Wadu, Chain Muhandi, Sebastian Kiarie, Alan Githuka, 
and many others. The Ngecha Artist Association was born. It provided many 
9. Y. Waite, personal communication.
10. “the formidable German-born Californian who’d long given up her social 
life in America for Africa’s savanna and a sixth husband twenty years her 
junior” “Wanyu Brush.” S.d. Art Nanadede [archive]. For more biographical data, 
see Littlefield Kasfir (1999, 78-84).
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young artists—a number of them still active—with training—and attracted 
other artists like Shine Tani.11 Ruth Schaffner supported this movement: 
in addition to advice, she provided the necessary supplies, organised 
monthly workshops and bought the works of artists to resell them to 
the Watatu Gallery or to galleries in the United States.12 She emphasised 
on the autodidact nature of these artists (according to Yoni Waite, there 
were not many others), in tune with a naïve form of “African Art” as she 
wanted to sell it.13 WaGacheru insists on the pioneering aspect of Schaffner 
at the commercial level: she has supposedly been the first to perceive 
the value of Kenyan art on the international market.14 Painting became a 
feature of local culture in the village of Ngecha, as the organisation of an 
annual festival demonstrates. As early as 1993, the Banana Hill Art Studio, 
founded by Shine Tani, ten kilometres away from Nairobi, welcomed and 
exhibited local artists’ works,15 including those from Ngecha. As nowadays, 
it offered training to the youth, a typical and persistent feature of the life 
of many Nairobi painters. The Banana Hill Art Studio and the One Off 
Gallery, founded in the same year by Carol Lees,16 started two different yet 
interconnected orientations of the market, at a time when Ruth Schaffner 
11. Shine abandoned his bread and butter as an acrobat downtown after he 
discovered painting in a hotel and touched base with R. Schaffner (personal 
communication).
12. On the topic of prices, see WaGacheru, Margaretta. 2013. “Good Old 
Gallery Watatu in Limbo.” Daily Nation, 5 August. https://nation.africa/kenya/
life-and-style/dn2/good-old-gallery-watatu-in-limbo-880584 [archive]; details 
also received from Shine Tani (one of WaGacheru’s informants), personal 
communication.
13. Lucki Mutebi interviewed by Margaretta WaGacheru: “Tani didn’t like the 
way she bought Kenyan art for very little then sold it at much higher prices. He felt 
she was not benefiting the artists.” WaGacheru, Margaretta. 2012. “Artist of Two 
Worlds Finally Traces His Way back to Kenya.” Business Daily, 22 March. https://
www.businessdailyafrica.com/lifestyle/society/Artist-of-two-worlds-finally-
traces-his-way-back-to-Kenya/3405664-1371484-q8467p/index.html [archive].
14. International ignorance of the art produced in Kenya lasted until a decade 
ago: see below.
15. Here is a list of the pioneer artists as it was communicated to me by James 
Mbuthia: Shine Tani, Kamuyu Martin, Kamondia, Livingstone Miringu, Jim 
Gay, Lucky Mutebi, late Alex Mbugua, late George Thairu, Joseph Cartoon, 
Anthony Muya, Daniel Kinyanjui, Jeff Wambugu, Peter Kibunja, John Silver, 
Jonathan Mbugua, Julius Kimenia, Sebastian Kiarie, Hosea Muchugu (Giko), 
Shade Kamau, Baba, Willie Wamuti, Mary Ngugi, Rachael Wangari, Rahab 
Shine, Mwura. Personal communication on March 14, 2014.
16. The gallery, located as it is today “off Limuru Road,” on Carol Lees’ property, 
is halfway between the CBD and Banana Hill and Ngecha. Carol Lees, just like 
Yoni Waite and Mary Collis, are Kenyans.
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was redesigning her action in order to strengthen artists’ training; she did it 
together with her assistant Rob Burnett, who gave it a decisive momentum 
and transformed the artistic scene in Nairobi.
Some sociological aspects of that time are worth noting, such as the habit 
of artists to work with one another, to train the youth, often for free, and to 
represent social and political events in diverse pictorial styles, going from 
the descriptive to the satirical or even typical daily life scenes. In this first 
phase, the influence of galleries was stronger than that of sponsors, who, 
other than providing exhibit space, were quasi absent. These exhibits and 
the work of some gallery managers transformed the Nairobi artistic scene, 
starting in 1996 when the Kuona Trust was founded. The artists connected 
to the Ngecha Artists Association and the Banana Hill Art Studio have 
pursued their work until today, in their own styles that they had developed 
from the early days. According to Sidney Littlefield Kasfir (1999), these 
artists embody Kenyan contemporary painting, adding Kivuthi Mbuno, 
an artist who was notably published in La Revue Noire.17Littlefield Kasfir’s 
choice, in the Schaffter and Watatu Gallery exoticising line, can explain why 
Okwui Enwezor, the Pope of modern African art,18 did not include Kenya 
in his piece on contemporary African painters (Enwezor & Okeke-Agulu 
2009). This world of critics, centered on the Atlantic coast from Nigeria to 
Congo to South Africa, and the festivals of francophone Western Africa, 
does not mix with an immerging artistic scene such as Kenya,19 For Kenyan 
artists to be connected to a wider world, which galleries had failed to do up 
to this point, required the interest of important sponsors, persuaded of the 
social benefits of training artists in the field, and willing to provide them 
with common workshops and with means allowing them to develop their 
creative freedom.
The galleries, located in Nairobi’s city centre when the owners could 
afford it, were connecting the works and the buyers, but not the artists. 
Restaurants and hotels also exhibited Kenyan and more generally East 
African painters. As much as they can afford it, galleries are located where 
the potential clients are, which varies depending on urban development. 
17. Revue Noire. 1994 (March-April-May): 13. Kivuthi is present in numerous 
collections including the Pigozzi collection. Its theme—the proximity, see the 
equal value of men to animals—is also present with other painters, notably 
Richard Kimathi. Kivuthi is very particular in his technique of pencil drawing.
18. See Azimi, Roxana. 2015. “L’homme de l’art.” M Le magazine du Monde, 
24 January: 29-35. Enwezor was commissioner of the Dokumenta 2011 in Kassel 
and at the Venice Biennale in 2015. 
19. In an article published in Le Monde on July 27, 2016, André Magnin gives 
a description of his work as collector at the service of Pigozzi, illustrating the 
interaction of coincidences, research, and exhibits in the creation of collections, 
but also of markets. 
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During this first period, the city centre was attractive.20 The less wealthy 
galleries were located in Ngecha and Banana Hill and exploited—and still 
exploit—the appeal of an authentic village-like Africa to attract potential 
buyers. With the same goal, others bet on the fascination for slums where 
artists set up their studios serving as galleries.21 The artists, at that time, 
had very little direct contact with the artistic world abroad.
2. The Era of Sponsors
The Ngecha Artist Association looked for sponsors22 through rather usual 
means while Shine Tani and his group benefitted from the help, among 
other sponsors, of a Mennonite couple, Bob and Betty Baumann. They 
organised the exhibition “New Art from Nairobi” in Philadelphia (USA) 
that gave Shine Tani the opportunity to participate in many workshops 
in Europe (Swigert 2011, 93). Yet, with the creation of the Kuona Trust 
situated next to the National Museum, the search for sponsors became 
more professional. This creation caused a chiasmus between the two types 
of activities of the Watatu Gallery: on the one hand, sale, and on the other, 
artists’ development. This schism coincided not only with the creation of 
the Kuona Trust in 1996,23 but also with the passing of Ruth Schaffner.
The systematic search for sponsors and the connecting of artists to 
international workshops, gave the painters the means to display their work 
internationally, which was a necessary step to the construction of a resume 
that was previously left to chance encounters. The Kuona Trust was two-
years-old when I met there numerous artists now in vogue. The location 
within the National Museum was ideal in a climate of growing insecurity 
that made the city centre unsafe (de Lame 2006). Lead by Rob Burnet, the 
20. The city centre has recently been the object of a new interest, as shown by 
the establishment of artists’ studios near the Railway Museum, the GoDown 
installation and its studios in the industrial area, as well as the “Naini who” 
initiatives aiming to make Nairobi known thanks to the organisation of events 
in different urban locations, or even the project of a modern art museum at the 
heart of old Nairobi, not far from the National Archives. 
21. Certain artists continue to aim for this goal, such as the Msaï Mbili 
group combining the line of exoticism of misery with the more recent form of 
“installations.” One should note that the “two Masaï,” Otieno Gomba and Otieno 
Kota are not Masaï but decided to label themselves as members of the ethnic 
group favoured by tourists (personal communication with Otieno Gomba). Their 
success—supported by the Goethe Institute—is linked to personal relations, 
today with the artist Sam Hopkins.
22. See the magazine Caravan, 2001, where the painter King Dodge expresses 
his desires to create an artistic centre in Ngecha and where this pacifist militant 
magazine launched a fundraising plan to fund the project. 
23. For details that I was not able to verify, see Swigert (2011, 94–104).
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centre was managed with dynamism by Judy Ogana24 and included a music 
workshop and storytellers, in addition to a space shared by a dozen of 
preselected painters. Among those painters were, as I recall, Michael Soi, 
Patrick Mukabi, Peterson Kamwathi,25 Peter Elungat, Richard Kimathi, 
Simon Muriithi, Jimnah Kimani, Justus Kyalo, and Beatrice (Wanjiku) 
Njoroge. Many of them had benefitted from artistic training before their 
arrival to the Kuona Trust,26 for example at the Creative Arts Center, such as 
Patrick Mukabi who obtained his certificate in 1988. Since the selection was 
based on the promising character of the candidates, a previous training was 
an advantage. This training could come from a family environment, as it was 
the case for Michael Soi or John Kamicha,27 or from more formal centres. 
The Buruburu Institute of Fine Arts (BIFA) was founded in 1993, next to the 
Creative Arts Center in Nairobi. Initially, it intended to give youths from the 
popular area of Buruburu, an artistic training that was aimed towards their 
entry into the profession. In addition to a three-year curriculum, courses 
lasting a month to a year focused on skills as varied as ceramics, technical 
drawing, floral arrangements, event management, and… graffiti. Even in 
this field, the emphasis is put on access to employment but creativity is 
successfully promoted. Beatrice (Wanjiku) Njoroge, an internationally 
renowned painter, completed her training there and, henceforth, the BIFA 
attracts youths from all over the country. These painters of the Kuona Trust 
were often labeled as the “second generation,”28 somewhat strangely, since, 
on the first hand, the first generation had not been clearly defined, and on 
the other hand, the tendencies of styles and themes of the early days are still 
seen in many painters, notably in Ngecha and Banana Hill.
24. See the interview of Judy Ogana by Zaidi in Msanii no. 10, 2004: “Art as a 
Statement of where People Are at.” The content of the interview completes in a 
structured (and contrasted) way the allegations communicated without critique 
by Swigert (2011, 108 and following).
25. The biography of Peterson Kamwathi by Olivier Marcel (2012) and the 
interview by Sam Hopkins (2011) complement each other. Otherwise, David 
Kaiza (Hopkins 2011) brings to light the social insertion of art in Nairobi through 
the life trajectory of Kamwathi—an artist whose “Series” convey a political 
message. See “Contact Zones NRB”: https://www.contemporaryand.com/fr/
publication/contact-zones-nrb-a-book-series-of-the-goethe-institut-kenya-and-
native-intelligence/ [archive].
26. This preliminary artistic training is shown in the biographical notes 
given by the artists themselves in the “Kenya Arts Diary” calendars published 
annually as from 2011.
27. John Kamicha is the son of Zachariah Mbutha, artist at Banana Hill.
28. The “young guns” launched this year by Circle Art Agency (see below) 
might form a new generation and we will have to see how it distinguishes itself 
from the previous ones.
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Insecurity, the oppressive political climate to which an opposition, 
cautious in its verbal expression, responded,29 and the increase in both 
economic and retributive crimes influenced the themes adopted by artists, 
but also the themes that defined the search of sponsors. The artists felt 
they were the privileged interpreters of a silenced majority “since the 
police officers didn’t take painters seriously”30; painters, above all, made 
themselves the intermediates in the expression of grief and popular irony. 
Additionally, they responded to the buyer’s interests in the expression of 
social problems and the opposition to the dictatorship. Besides, all means 
were to be used to “cleanse” the city of its “street children.” The issue of 
urban poverty was a powerful engine to mobilise funds. While the slums, 
violence, and corruption became common themes for the Ngecha artists and 
others, the potential of art as a means of employment was—and is—used, as 
much to attract buyers in the slums as to encourage the generosity of donors 
and the youths searching for employment and training. The prospect of 
seeing the end of the Moi era sparked fervor for a Kenya that would have an 
optimistic and prosperous future and encouraged the generosity of donors.
Rob Burnet proved to be an extraordinarily efficient lobbyist. On the one 
hand, he was able to obtain funds from the Ford Foundation and numerous 
donors within the framework of development and cultural policies; on the 
other hand, by entering the Triangle Network,31 he put Kenya on the map of 
international artistic networks. When he was hired by the Ford Foundation 
in 2000, he subsidised many Kenyan organisations, among which were 
the Wasanii workshops, Kuona Trust, and RaMoMa. The move of Kuona 
Trust to the industrial zone of the city centre, in the heart of the much 
vaster GoDown complex, allowed to, not only shelter artists’ workshops, 
but also to host a performance hall. At the time when Kuona Trust was 
moving again, this time towards Hurlingham, the GoDown opened training 
workshops in fields as diverse as computer science, dance, classical music, 
graphic design, etc. while maintaining a few artists’ studios, notably 
those of Michael Soi, and, until recently, Patrick Mukabi.32 The creation, 
29. We remember, for example, in the weekly editorial signed by Wahome Jutahi 
“Whispers”; on Wahome Mutahi, see Maupeu & Mutahi (2005).
30. Personal Communication, Chain Muhandi, 2000.
31. Officially known as the Triangle Arts Trust, the organisation was launched, 
in 1982, by Robern Loder and Anthony Caro, with the goal of creating links 
between visual artists, organisations, and independent creative workshops held 
by artists; it is now present in 30 countries. See: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/
Triangle_Arts_Trust.
32. In 2015, Patrick Mukabi, who introduced numerous young students to 




and later management and multiple moves of Kuona Trust, resulted in a 
diversification of the location of artists. Numerous artists present during 
the early days of Kuona Trust left for areas where they found themselves 
close to one another, such as Kitengela, where is located the workshop of 
artistic glass creation of Nani Croze, an artist of German origin and an 
important player in the Nairobi art scene, and organiser of many training 
workshops in the art of glass. Next to the daily emulation created by the 
proximity, the more formal workshops,33 such as the Wasanii Workshops 
organised annually at Naivasha, Lamu, etc. gave artists connections beyond 
borders. From the beginning of Kuona Trust, the opportunity was given to 
artists, active on site, to visit workshops abroad and stay there in residence, 
in Africa as well as in Europe and the United States. The artists thus found 
themselves in contact with other cultures while also building a reputation 
and creating opportunities for exhibits abroad. The notion of an autodidact 
artist, dear to Ruth Schaffner, became a differentiating criterion—and also 
became partly obsolete—compared to a majority of artists who had been 
trained in one way or another34 and who advertised this training and their 
participation in workshops, artist residence, or exhibitions abroad.
Another sign of the times in the search for sponsors is the contrast 
between the engagement of private donors and the search for official or 
commercial sponsors. Thus, the PaayaPaa gallery, destroyed by a fire in 
1998, was reopened on a distant35 site thanks to the aid of an individual 
donor and through harambee fundraising, organised by leaders in the 
world of art. As for RaMoMa, founded by Mary Collis and Carol Lees, 
while the gallery benefitted from Ford Foundation grants, it gradually 
became sponsored by for-profit firms (Dormans, Safaricom…), and received 
donations from diplomatic offices, such as the High Commission of Canada 
to Kenya.36RaMoMa, located in the wealthy area of the Upper Hill,37 under 
Carol Lees’ leadership, immediately symbolised an evolution that continues 
33. For a list of the workshops over the course of the years, see also Gerschultz 
(2013). Informal workshops where artists train young students are added to the 
list. Yet, we are far from the “hundreds” of artists mentioned by Gerschultz. 
Another reservation: Gerschultz underestimates the role of two Kenyan women, 
Mary Collis and Carol Lees, signaling that “a few expats” appear on the scene. 
Both are Kenyan.
34. The University of Nairobi offers a “Masters in Fine Arts.”
35. PaayaPaa Arts Center, Ridgways Road, off Kiambu Road.
36. See, for example, the Msanii magazine, no. 14, March 2006, p. 2: “News.”
37. The location of administrative buildings and the Hotel Fairview, in the 
Rahimtullah Tower property of a Kenyan family (hence the name of the gallery 




today at the GoDown Arts Center and Kuona Trust. In harmony with the 
actors of the city’s art scene, RaMoMa was able to offer, in addition to 
workshops, beautiful exhibition and sale spaces; it attracted an educated 
public through the organisation of cultural activities involving foreign 
African artists from other horizons: concerts, modern dance, etc. Each 
exhibit premiere, along with other artistic Kenyan events, was recorded 
in a quarterly magazine from 2002, Msanii.38 This magazine, dedicated to 
the manifestation of visual arts in Nairobi, was a first in establishing a 
continuous contact between the public and the artists. The now well-known 
photographer, James Muriuki, designed the graphics of the magazine while 
the painter James Mbuthia39 participated in the organisation of workshops. 
The freedom left to the artists by Carol Lees facilitated the Ngecha and 
Banana Hill autodidact artist’s participation who were intimidated by the 
criteria required to be part of Kuona Trust.
At the Watatu Gallery (where the activities were now limited to sale), the 
Ngecha and Banana Hill studios had been added, as well various art centres 
such as RaMoMa and Kuona Trust. Art was also spreading through the city, 
whether in form of graffiti, notably by a team of the National Museum on 
the bridge that leads to its buildings or, in an omnipresent way, in hotels, 
restaurants—The Rustic, that no longer exists today, is a good example—and 
the Coffee Houses. Original paintings by Jimnah Kimani40 still decorate all 
the “Java House” cafes that have been designated as interior design models. 
The Sankara Hotel (Westlands) possesses one of the best collections in the 
country41: the works are exhibited in public areas, as well as in the rooms 
and a proper gallery attracts a posh clientele accordingly.
The cultural centres and embassies had offered exhibit spaces to Nairobi’s 
artists as well as all Kenyan artists, and, occasionally, to artists from all 
over East Africa—as early as 1977 when it comes to Alliance française. 
Harsita Waters’ constant presence, responsible for Cultural Affairs and 
Communication at the Alliance française for over twenty years, contributed 
to the institution’s solid cultural policy, founded on the knowledge of the 
38. The last edition holds no. 25, November 2008—January 2009, little before the 
closing of RaMoMa.
39. James Mbuthia, of Banana Hill, was supposed to launch workshops for 
sick children at the Nairobi hospital. This activity, which he is still pursuing, 
illustrates the frequent social engagement of artists. 
40. “With their signature Jimnah Kimani artwork, brick red and cream 
walls grounded wood and wrought iron…” Awori, Jordan. 2016. “Restaurant 
Inspiration: Java House Inspiration.” The Interior Decorator, 16  March. https://
www.jordanawori.com/?p=253 [archive].
41. Mark van Rampelberg, already present at the Watatu Gallery where he had 
designed the furniture, is the curator.
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Kenyan and East African art scenes,42 and, more generally, on the social 
issues that often gave their themes to the exhibitions. The situation is 
slightly different at the Goethe Institute, which for a long time had been 
a partner on the Nairobi art scene, but where the successive directors 
managed the cultural policies. The visitor can thus pass, with a few years’ 
interval, through an exhibit of expertly painted wooden birds (1999) or 
through an avant-garde exhibit whose authors, members of the Masaï Mbili 
group, were little experienced. Johannes Hossfeld, the director of the Goethe 
Institute from 2009 to 2013, clearly favoured fashionable artistic forms: 
installations, performances. He was at the source of the financing of “Half-
Life Nairobi,” a highly successful movie, remarkable for its social realism, 
and of the publications of artist monographs. His choices influenced the 
way Kenyan artists were represented abroad, as can be seen in the Afropolis 
volume where the Masaï Mbili group artists, based in the slums of Kibera, 
appear. In this volume, distributed internationally, the section dedicated 
to Nairobi focuses on the slums. The chosen groups rely on the personal 
networks of the Goethe Institute’s director at the time. Hossfeld had clear 
opinions when it came to which artists to promote: painting and sculpture 
that he considered “outdated” had to be replaced with installations (Sam 
Hopkins, Miriam Siowia Kambu), and performances (Ato Malinda), video 
clips, cinema (notably “Half-life Nairobi”43) and street art, specifically the 
famous matatu, yet relatively sober at the time of the Afropolis edition.44 
Paradoxically, while the Masaï Mbili group of the slums appears in 
Afropolis as a typical group, Hossfeld considered “good manners” to be a 
prerequisite for the international scene, next to high quality art. Embassies 
also organised exhibitions, following the individual artistic interests of 
their ambassador. This was the case, for example, during the two terms 
of Belgian Ambassador Bart Ouvry. Finally yet importantly, the National 
Museums of Kenya, that had for a long time a rather jumbled sales gallery, 
opened itself to contemporary art following its renovation.
42. The Alliance française in Nairobi possesses a collection of paintings, 
recently digitised, constructed over the course of exhibits. The artists only have 
one obligation when they are exhibited and that is to leave one work.
43. Personal communication.
44. From 2005 to 2015, the Kenyan Government prohibited paintings on the usual 
minibuses, VW type, the matatu. This is an aspect of the laws that affects them, 
and in addition limits the number of passengers and imposes various security 
norms. To respond to the limitation of the number of passengers, the owners 
focus on buying larger vehicles which escape the white and yellow striped colors 
that had become the mandatory and uniform design of the traditional vehicles. 
The current president has lifted the ban regarding the decoration of vehicles, 
reestablishing a dialogue between the styles of art visible to the public, the 
matatu being the most obvious example.
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3. The Buzz Years
On the extremely dynamic Nairobi art scene, every withdrawal has 
sparked momentum. The move of the Kuona Trust to the industrial area, 
still under the management of Judy Ogana, allowed for the opening of 
GoDown in 2003 and a diversification of the artistic activities offered. 
Kuona Trust separated itself after Judy Ogana’s short absence and 
settled in Hurlingham, under the management of Danda Jaroljmek, an 
artist member of the Triangle Network. The two institutions, now very 
different, experienced continuous expansion. Today, in the industrial area 
of the city, near a slum, the GoDown, managed by Judy Ogana and Joy 
Mboya, attracts a young crowd by various means: varied and popular 
training programs—break dancing, for example—but also now almost 
weekly “live” concerts, the organisation of annual exhibits with specific 
themes, “Manjano,” taking place in the chic and popular area of “Village 
Market,” and encourages young talents by connecting them to current 
social themes. The opening of GoDown was a major social event (given 
the “trendy” location) where were artists from all walks of life could meet 
and during which Thelatini, the first reference publication on Kenyan 
painters and sculptors, was launched. The selection of artists, probably 
more difficult during that time than today, was conducted with an 
emphasis on impartiality by a double committee of artists, gallery owners, 
and collectors (Kuona Trust 2003, 8). In 2017, Susan Wakhungu Githuku 
published a less selective and much more voluminous piece, which was, as 
a result, much more representative of the variety of pictorial production 
since the seventies (Waghungu Githuku 2018).
The ambitious move of RaMoMa to a safe and attractive location in 
Parklands radically transformed its activities by installing many galleries 
and exhibit spaces, workshops for children, a restaurant, a major monthly 
exhibition, the creation of a collection, etc. Carol Lees was its curator. The 
Msanii journal kept on publishing the artists and was even sold in kiosks. 
Swigert45 suggests a collusion, “a cartel” of subsidised centres producing 
for sale in the RaMoMa galleries. The reality is different: on the one hand, 
artists were free; on the other hand, in order to deny this allegation, it 
would be enough to consult the program of exhibitions and to recall the 
origin of each artist exhibited. The second version of RaMoMa offered a 
unique space for interaction where one could find, just like in the Kuona 
and GoDown workshops, artists from Ngecha and Banana Hill.46 These 
different locales, by the various people they attracted, allowed artists to 
45. Swigert (2011, 118) speaks of a “cartel.”
46. It was at this time that the Banana Hill Art Studio, after a crisis, stopped 
being a cooperative and became the property of Shine Tani.
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evolve out of the ghetto of naïf art, a movement that was accentuated by 
the progression of the Kuona artists as well as the increasing individualism 
of the artists. These years coincided with a certain dormancy of the 
Nairobi Museum, which was being renovated. Its reopening, in 2008, was 
a national event marked by the addition of a new exposition space, “the old 
PC’s office building,”47 where temporary exhibitions48 are being held in the 
heart of the city centre. The renovated museum also included the works of 
local artists, notably Miriam Syowia Kyambi,49 whose exhibit retraced the 
political Kenyan history.
The year of 2008 (who would not remember it?) was the beginning of 
a major economic crisis resulting in a drastic decrease of subsidies. For 
Kenya, it was also the beginning of a year marked by post electoral violence 
and the successive displacement of dozens of thousands people. These two 
events, one could argue, had important repercussions on the development 
of the Nairobi art scene as we know it today.
The decrease of donations from sponsors hindered the personal initiatives 
and created a need for more visibility. In particular, the government’s 
attention to the economic potential of artistic activities was drawn on 
multiple occasions, notably by the GoDown team.50 This team, with the 
support of the Ford Foundation, took control of the coverage of the post 
electoral violence conducted by nine talented photographers, to lead a 
campaign and spread awareness in various cities in the country. The photo 
collection “Kenya Burning” was even sold in supermarkets. Favouring 
raising awareness, the spread of these terrible images also allowed for the 
realisation of the power of images that would be demonstrated again in the 
years to come, notably through a pre-electoral graffiti campaign. The name 
of the photographer Boniface Mwangi is linked to the two events51: that of 
47. Located in the city centre, at the intersection of Kenyatta Avenue and Uhuru 
Highway. 
48. I was able to visit an exhibition of photographs taken by young artists from 
Eastleigh in the context of a competition organised by the National Museum: 
this testifies to the social engagement of art.
49. Laureate (second) in a UNESCO artistic competition in 2004, Miriam 
SyowiaKyambi graduated from the School of the Art Institute of Chicago. In 
2016, the artist chose to no longer use her European first name and now goes by 
Syowia Kyambi.
50. Personal communication of Judy Ogana: many meetings and a lot of research 
was organised.
51. See also Meyerfeld, Bruno. 2016. “L’hyperactiviste.” M Le Magazine du 
Monde, 23 January, 38-40: “Une ‘guérilla artistique’ menée sans illusions.” A few 
elements of the interview seem to have not been verified by the author. 
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the artistic centre Pawa254 (that he manages) is linked to the second.52 The 
events of 2007–2008 and the camps set up for the displaced people served 
as inspiration for many painters and became themes for workshops as a 
rather common representation of social and political facts.53
The years 2008 and 2009 were transitional years for the Nairobi arts 
scene. These years were the beginning of personal initiatives, as much 
from galleries as from artists: it became necessary to multiply events, 
make yourself visible, and create a “buzz.” Media and internet became 
omnipresent and essential means of communication for those interested 
in the field. Many events mark this period: the closing of RaMoMa (2009) 
and the reopening of its own gallery by Carol Lees (One Off)54 in 2010; 
Danda Jaroljmek’s arrival to the scene, first in 2009 as director of Kuona 
Trust, and later in 2012 as director of the Circle Art Agency (or Gallery); 
the unwavering dynamism of GoDown, which, in 2018 initiates a crowd 
funding for a renovation of its buildings55; the remarkable persistence of 
the Banana Hill studio under Shine Tani’s management; the opening of 
Red Hill Gallery, a new gallery concerned with the whole East Africa, by 
a German couple, coincide with the new dynamic of the Nairobi Museum 
where a contemporary art curator, Lydia Gatundu Galavu is working and 
progressively deploys temporary exhibitions, as she resorts to experienced 
curators in specific domains; the project “Amnesia,” which explored 
multiculturalism and post colonialism was led by Siman Njami56 and was 
52. Ni Chonghaile, Clar. 2012. “Kenyan Graffiti Artists Step up Battle against 
‘Vulture’ Politicians: Protesters Want Voters at Next Election to Kick out MPs 
Accused of Corruption.” The Guardian, 21  March. https://www.theguardian.
com/world/2012/mar/21/kenya-graffiti-artists-politicians-vultures [archive].
53. Well before these events, numerous painters had used the abuse of power, 
corruption, and police violence as themes… An exhibit on these themes was 
organised at Kuona Trust2 under the title “The Eyes have it,” which is also the 
title of a work by Kimathi. Among the painters who used these themes, we cite 
S. Kiarie—at their beginnings—P. Kamwathi, R. Kimathi, Bertiers, Michael Soi, 
J. Mbuthia, J. Kamisha, A. Githuka… See also Whalley, Frank. 2010. “Thin Line 
between Arts and Politics.” The East African, 26 July.
54. Located on her personal property, the gallery is an original architecture 
created by Dominic Martin and like to “create the buzz.” Group visits are 
frequent. 
55. On the GoDown Arts Centre site (http://www.godowntransforms.org 
[archive]), a reader interested in the history of GoDown will be able to hear from 
its director, Joy Mboya, outlining it and, above all, the philosophy.
56. The presence of Simon Njami in Nairobi promises a disembarkation of 
Kenyan artists. Co-founder of Revue Noire, artist and critic, Simon Njami can 
make artists known by an informed public. The project was also presented in 
Brussels by Africalia. Another sign of opening up is the intervention of artists 
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presented there in 2009. All the other places are engaged in the regular and 
frequent creation of events, widely publicised on the internet; some, in fact, 
exist only on the web. It is crucial, for artists, to be very present online and 
to distinguish themselves by style, quality, and the presentation itself.
In addition to the annual events, such as the Manjano competition 
organised by the GoDown and the exhibition organised by the art centre 
at the International School of Kenya, we find the monthly openings of the 
exhibitions at One Off, and the slightly less frequent ones at Red Hill Gallery 
and Banana Hill Arts Studio, as well as, recently, the initiative of Circle Art 
Agency. The artists regularly find themselves at the One Off exhibition 
openings, a place of conviviality and continuity with a history that they 
share with Carol Lees, a place where they converse with art amateurs or 
young talents who are seeking recognition. This proximity with the artists, 
in an informal way also present at Banana Hill, is typical of One Off where 
Carol Lees uses her knowledge and her networks to help the artists she 
represents and immediately pass on their success to those in her mailing 
list. Since 2012, one can also find these artists, and in a more sensational 
way, in the events created by Circle Art Agency.57 Led by Danda Jaroljmek, 
Circle Art Agency mostly functions around punctual events that, during 
several years, were organised through three-day sales in various places 
and, until today, by organising auctions. Recently (in 2017), the openings in 
this gallery and the launch of little-known58 young artists shook the Nairobi 
art scene once again. The first auction had taken place in November 2013, 
displaying mostly Kenyan painters put in perspective thanks to the works 
of other East African artists. It followed the most “buzzing” event of the 
year, the controversial auction sponsored by the Watatu Gallery when it 
permanently closed.59 Interestingly, the news of the Circle Art auction of 
201760 presented works of Kenyan artists from the seventies and eighties: 
linked to the group “White Cube” (see below) to put Nairobi on the international 
scene.
57. Contrary to what is written on its website, Circle Art is not, the reader 
realises, the first “independent agency” in Kenya. 
58. The “Young Guns” exposition was opened at the Circle Art Gallery on June 7, 
2017, presenting the works of 26 artists “especially young men, who have lots of 
energy and talent, and are becoming successful.” Some of their works are proof 
of the innovation of techniques, such as those of Mwini Mutuku, who works 
digitally and with lasers.
59. See WaGacheru, Margaretta. 2013. “Good Old Gallery Watatu in Limbo.” 
Daily Nation, 5 August. https://nation.africa/kenya/life-and-style/dn2/good-old-
gallery-watatu-in-limbo-880584 [archive].
60. On February 27, 2017, in a big hotel in the centre of Nairobi, this sale 
auctioned a few ancient works sold at very high prices in the typical emulation 
of the circumstance, at the pleasure of a few artists who were present. The 
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now individualised, these artists of the early days should take their own 
place in the market… and their collections become more valuable.61 Indeed, 
such collections do exist, as they have been patiently constituted by art 
connoisseurs for three decades or more, whether they were shown62 to the 
public or not. Any success abroad gives value to African artists… as do all 
artists that find themselves “in the right place.” For a long time, Carol Lees 
has used her contacts to make works travel, notably to London where she 
has gone annually since the first edition of the Contemporary African Art 
Fair where, in 2018, Circle Art and ArtLabAfrica were also represented. From 
her Karen house, ArtLabAfrica’s director LaviniaCalza plays a systematic 
role in the diffusion of Kenyan artists to places as prestigious as London 
and New York. Born in Nairobi, based in London, producing works clearly 
inspired by Kenya, the artist Michael Armitage, thanks to the “White Cube” 
network to which he belongs, put Kenya on the map by organising a three-
day seminar with the title “Art, Space and the City,” bringing together about 
fifty artists and personalities of the “cultural world,” coming from sixteen 
different countries. The last day, “The Gathering,” was open to a wide 
Nairobi public, with a bus allowing anyone to travel for free from Nairobi 
to Naivasha, where the seminar was taking place.63 The presentation of the 
artist Theaster Gates, based in Chicago, made it an unforgettable day and, 
without being closed, elitist, in a way that called on emotion as much as on 
analysis to promote the implantation of an urban art giving beauty to its 
environment, as poor as it may be.
The promotion of public urban art also appears as an efficient way to 
stimulate an artistic sensibility and familiarise the public with art and 
artists: this is the explicit goal of the installation of a monumental and 
tactile work by Peter Ngugi at the “Hub,” the commercial mall in Karen.
Classically, two journalists systematically report artistic events in the 
press. One, Margaretta (Swigert) waGacheru,64 has long been present through 
attraction for works produced in the seventies and eighties was obvious, despite 
the small number of works presented, while current artists proposed one or 
another of their works at the auction: sign of the slowing down of this type of 
sale requiring a search for works or artists’ attempts to raise their prices? They 
are not mutually exclusive.
61. As for big auction houses, only Bonham’s sold works by Kenyan artists.
62. Hotel Sankara, Alan Donovan’s African Heritage House, Red Hill Art 
Gallery…
63. More precisely, from February 17 to 19, 2017, at Great Rift Valley Lodge.
64. WaGacheru, Margaretta. 2012. “Nairobi’s Upmarket Red Hill Opens a New 





her columns in the Daily Nation and Business Daily. In 2008, a more informed 
critic, Frank Whalley “evaluates the quality of works offered in the public 
and private galleries by placing them in national and international context 
both in the present and past…”65 each week in The East African. His desire to 
educate his readers is clear.66 Finally, starting in 2010, at the request of the 
glass-artist of German origin, Nani Croze, the “Kenya Arts Diary” calendar, 
presenting mostly Kenyan artists, was published; its annual launching is an 
opportunity to honour an artist of which the most recently honoured was… 
Elimo Njau, the now octogenarian67 “father” of the artistic scene with his 
PaayaPaa gallery. Nani Croze attempts to individualise the artists and, by 
the sale of a luxurious and artistic diary, make them known abroad—thanks 
to the travels of expatriates—by showing their works, their biography, and 
their contact. Her contribution accompanies the desire of Kenyan artists 
to be, simply, artists, with a name, a style, a personality expressed in their 
works and universal themes: whether one buys a Sane Wadu (for example), 
and not a Kenyan or African painting. Whalley immediately echoes the 
successes of artists in his weekly art column, as he did, for example, for 
Paul Onditi68 or Beatrice Wanjiku, the latter declared, in 2016, best artist of 
the Contemporary African Arts Fair in New York.69
Conclusion: In the Big Leagues
The considerations of specialists of contemporary art apply to Kenyan 
art, matured since its beginnings, immune to the “empty period” of 
contemporary art deplored by Azimi and Bellet70: there is still enthusiasm 
65. Whalley, personal communication on July 13, 2016.
66. See, a.o. Whalley, Frank. 2014. “From Kenya to the US with Love.” The East 
African, 22  August [archive]. Paul Onditi, a Kenyan artist, lived ten years in 
Germany where he received a thorough artistic training. His works, created 
with materials resulting from personal research, testify to societal concerns that 
far exceed the context of Kenya. Following the election of Donald Trump, he 
created a series of paintings expressing the anxiety of many of us facing the 
drastic change of a world that he glimpses without optimism. 
67. “The Kenya Arts Diary Launch and Arts Exhibition 2015.” 2014. Heinrich 
Böll Stiftung Nairobi, 6 November. https://ke.boell.org/2014/11/06/kenya-arts-
diary-launch-and-arts-exhibition-2015 [archive].
68. Whalley, Frank. 2015. “Smokey Leads the Charge at International Arts Fair.” 
The East African, 9 October [archive].
69. Whalley, Frank, 2016. “Wanjiku Featured No 1 in New York’s African Art 
Fair.” The East African, 14 May [archive].
70. Azimi, Roxana, and Harry Bellet. 2015. “Désespérance de l’art contemporain.” 




in Kenya. More than ever, the Kenyan capital best embodies the description 
by these two authors: “Contemporary art is now part of the urban or media 
landscape (ibid.).” Nairobi is one of the greatest examples of omnipresent art, 
in the events that take place, as well as in everyday billboards, innumerable 
and magnificent graffiti, and the matatu that President Uhuru Kenyatta has 
returned to their colourful flow. This street art is taught and has become 
the subject of competition launched very recently by the Alliance française. 
The events that celebrated art—such as the Oscar awarded to the actress 
Lupita Nyong’o for her role in the film “Twelve Years a Slave,” result in 
as much national pride as the successes of athletes. In contrast, the lack 
of appreciation for arts by the authorities continues to be lamented, but 
everything is done to inform, put the Kenyan elites at ease, and create a 
market on the national scene.71 The intervention of the authorities in the 
context of financial support for the job market sometimes results in the 
sponsoring of groups, which at first glance, would not have access to the 
international market, which is still confusing.
Kenyan painters arrived on a scene already structured by festivals and 
by the—still rare—publications dedicated to modern works realised by 
Africans. Some have succeeded in circumventing these circuits and putting 
themselves on the forefront of more open stages. Often, the connection 
between works and stereotypes of naïve and primitive African art alleviates 
the ignorance of emerging networks, whether in Kenya or abroad. As shown 
recently by a public exhibit of a work by Peter Ngugi, the success of Paul 
Onditi, the consecration of Beatrice Wanjiku or that of Peterson Kamwathi, 
who has, among other successes, a work exhibited at the British Museum, 
the artist emerges alone if he escapes the clichés and if s/he embodies 
universal themes on the international art scene which s/he reaches through 
intermediaries.72 Freed from the clichés of exoticism, s/he no longer needs 
the faded laurels of a conventional biannual exhibit.73International art 
71. Thus, on July 22, 2017, the First Lady of Kenya, Margaret Kenyatta, was 
present at the launching of the Visual Voices book by S. Wakhungu Githuku.
72. The crucial role of intermediaries and collectors in the promotion of artists 
is not unique to Kenya or Africa. A striking example is the role that Peggy 
Guggenheim played in the emergence of Western abstract artists. Lavinia Calza, 
with ArtLabAfrica, presents African artists at the International Contemporary 
Art Fair in London (Somerset House, in the heart of London) and in New York.
73. The Kenyan Pavilion of the 2013 Biennal presented 11 artists of which 9 were 
Chinese, that of 2015, 8 Chinese artists and two Kenyans. This is self-explanatory 
and it is most fortunate that Kenyan artists and intellectuals reacted with force. 
See Serubiri, Moses. 2015. “The Double Life of Kenya at Venice. Serubiri Moses 





fairs, such as the Contemporary Arts Fair in New York and London, bring 
new Kenyan works to the attention of the public each year. Computing 
technology plays a remarkable role in the international diffusion of Kenyan 
art and the creation of events that make the city vibrate and attract its 
elite and middle class. The purchase of works by Kenyans has become 
increasingly common, particularly if they have a cosmopolitan background. 
The media certainly helps the diffusion and the education of artistic 
judgement. Numerous artists are standing out, as much through style—as 
they intend to define their own artistic criteria—as through their means of 
access to the market. When they can, they install home studios and create 
a website, some going to greater lengths and creating their own network of 
representation without using an intermediary.
The galleries mostly (but not only) present Kenyan artists; the diversity 
of the origins of the works creates a context for the Kenyan works.
Long linked to sponsors, to their own objectives and their perception of 
the sociopolitical situation and possible solutions, the Kenyan art scene has 
partially emerged in the wake of the success of great individualities. It is 
characterised now, in Nairobi, by the diversification of the production and 
of the markets, as much as by a diversification of the means of diffusion and 
the mobility of major artists. The art sometimes finds itself at the service of 
social issues, for example workshops dedicated to children in hospitals or 
AIDS patients, as done by the group Art2Be, or at the service of issues of 
national unity—the role of artists as social mediators was remarkable during 
the attack of the American embassy in Nairobi,74 by the Al-Shaabab group 
in 1998, or during the post-electoral violence when the government itself 
encouraged the artists to favour “the good governance,” a manipulation that 
testifies to aesthetic ignorance as well as economic benevolence. Recently, 
the lifting of the ban on decorating the matatu, the most democratic 
vehicles of graffiti art, was an opportunity to highlight the role of art 
on the local job market. For potential buyers, a demand remains for the 
remaining of pictorial, colourful, and naive works evoking the countryside, 
the slums, or everyday poverty, sometimes on a humorous model. But how 
can one talk about the extraversion of Kenyan art while this type of work, 
corresponding to clichés, is specifically awarded by international art fairs, 
notably in Dakar, while the best artists have followed different tracks? 
74. On August 7, 1998, Kenya suffered from its first terrorist attack in a still 
unfinished series: this one targeted the American Embassy. The Kenyan victims, 
including 300 deaths, were numerous. Several painters, notably Patrick Mukabi 
who reported this to me, laid out large canvases in the streets adjacent to the 
incident to paint the suggestions of passersby and help them express their 
emotions in this way. See also Azimi, Roxana. 2015. “L’homme de l’art.” M Le 
Magazine du Monde, 24 January: 29-35.
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These artists access the international market through the universality of 
their message and the quality of their works. The Kenyan Pavilion of the 
2017 Venice Biennale resets a quality standard absent in previous editions 
of the Biennale and presents five Kenyan artists under the leadership of 
Kiprop Lagat, a commissioner linked to the National Museums of Kenya.
The art scene in Nairobi, even if one limits it to graphic art as I do in 
this case, appears to be essentially multifaceted with its overlapping 
practices and subjects, conventions, and freedoms. It is also an exciting 
scene because, despite its international dimension, it remains a hotbed 
of clearly identifiable social networks and illuminates the more general 
development and operation of the art market. The (cyber) gallery operators 
and knowledgeable collectors could spark a surprise… unless that is already 
the case. The Kenyan art market is reflective of its imbrication in a city of 
tentacular growth engulfing galleries such as One Off, not so long ago on 
the outskirts, and—whilst now urban in its own right—is “popping up” in 
the new Riviera Mall, or even in Red Hill, to which the city is gradually 
getting closer.
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Post-scriptum
This contribution was revised several times and completed in November 2019. 
Since then, the Covid-19 pandemic has hit the art world hard, in Kenya and 
elsewhere. In Nairobi, the art market has declined considerably, despite the 
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tremendous efforts of a few galleries also affected by the situation. As soon 
as the confinement was lifted, which roughly coincided with the summer 
holidays (2020), the wealthy left the city, already largely abandoned by 
expatriates; as a consequence, a large proportion of the art buyers were 
absent. At the time of writing, at the end of September 2020, a slight upturn 
was starting off but, as elsewhere in the world, the fear for a downturn in 
the Nairobi art market is there, which raises questions about when and how 
the extraordinary dynamism of the Kenyan art scene will pick up again. 
But it will!
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Focus no. 6
Into a “Global Encounter”  
from the Art Scene in Nairobi
Olivier Marcel
Translated by Aoife Cunningham
 
A private house party in an apartment in Valley Arcade, March 2011
Image: Olivier Marcel.
This photograph shows a house party, that is, a selective and secure type of 
sociability typical of affluent residential neighbourhoods in Nairobi.1 Held 
in the shared house of a Kenyan performance artist just back from her time 
abroad, this party brought together many significant public figures from 
the contemporary art scene of the city. One can see, for example, an Italian 
filmmaker and cultural activist, an Ivorian photographer in residence, an 
Anglo-Kenyan visual artist, a German intern from the Goethe-Institut as 
well as many members of Maasai Mbili, a collective of Kenyan artists who 
are emblematic of the Kenyan slum of Kibera. There is a mutual gravitation 
1. This text is derived from my PhD research (Marcel 2014).
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to each other here despite their differing career paths. This scene portrays 
one type of performance that anthropologist Bob White (2011, 6) called a 
“global encounter”2 of which the composition reflects Nairobi’s position in 
the global contemporary art scene.
Despite the restrictive design of the places where such encounters 
happen—the green and electrified fences of the apartment complexes being 
the vivid expression and harsh metonymy of it—, the access to the switch of 
artist camaraderie does not result from the “crystallisation of a hypothetical 
urban identity.” It reflects rather the “fluidity of social, political, cultural 
and economic relations; the difficulty in clearly distinguishing between 
country and city dwellers, the elite and the common people, the formal and 
the informal” (Fourchard & Goerg 2009, 40, translated). This fluidity makes 
it a privileged ground for the merging of interests between the figures of 
the “cosmopolitan” and of the “local” (Hannerz 1990, 237–251). In a game 
where spatial hierarchies and tactics subtly play out, the “cosmopolitan” 
seeks to place their legitimacy on the “local”. These “locals,” who succeeded 
in overcoming the obstacles of a fragmented city, display their repertoire of 
auto-exoticism in order to obtain the resources needed for their mobility. 
Such encounters go along with the projects and careers of the artists and 
constitute for them a social resource. It is in these fringes of Nairobi’s 
cultural life that, among other things, collectives get formed. Through 
them, the ideological, aesthetic and curatorial lines of the projects that are 
emerging in the East African metropolis are stimulated and affirmed. The 
horizon of accomplishment of Kenyan artists is therefore partly played out 
in the connections they establish in Nairobi with a population in transit and 
mostly expatriates. Thus, at the end of the house party at Valley Arcade, 
new collaborations grew and led to a series of artistic events on memory, 
archives, “Afrofuturism” or the “ghetto culture,” which were notably hosted 
by the German cultural centre, acting both as a go-between and a director 
of this globalisation of art.
Nairobi maximises the opportunities for global encounters such as 
these because of its position as an East African hub for both tourism and 
humanitarian action, making the city an interface for North-South relations. 
Today however, cultural exchanges on one side only are no longer the rule 
because art centres and artistic communities from Africa’s large cities 
choose to network. Between 2011 and 2012, Kuona Trust, one of the region’s 
most active centres for visual arts, showcased the work of 256 artists. The 
national identity of these artists, as shown in the reports that the institution 
2. The notion of “global encounter” “refers to situations in which individuals 
from radically different traditions or worldviews come into contact and interact 
with one another based on limited information about one’s another values, 
resources, and intentions.”
Into a “Global Encounter” from the Art Scene in Nairobi
produced for its Western sponsors, showed that half of them came from 
international exchanges: 27% came from other African countries, 14% from 
Europe and North America, and 8% from the “South” (Marcel 2013). It is 
through these circulations that contemporary art practices in the “South” 
expand and, conversely, that Kenya’s participation in the globalised world 
of contemporary art needs to be considered.
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